

FM 100-2-1

**Headquarters
Department of the Army**



THE SOVIET ARMY

OPERATIONS AND TACTICS

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THE SOVIET ARMY:

Operations and Tactics

PREFACE

This field manual is part of FM series 100-2, The Soviet Army. The other volumes are FM 100-2-2, *The Soviet Army: Specialized Warfare and Rear Area Support*, and FM 100-2-3, *The Soviet Army: Troops, Organization and Equipment*. These manuals cannot stand alone but should be used interchangeably.

These field manuals serve as the definitive source of unclassified information on Soviet ground forces and their interaction with other services in combined arms warfare. These manuals represent the most current unclassified information and they will be updated periodically. More information would become available in the event of war or national emergency.

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The cover design is an adaptation of this patch which is worn by Soviet motorized rifle troops, whose organization is representative of the Soviet combined arms theme.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

SOVIET GROUND FORCES

This field manual describes the operations and tactics of Soviet general purpose ground forces. The **content** is based on information in Soviet writings and other open source literature. Most available information is focused on potential battle in Central Europe. This manual reflects that focus. Though Soviet military activity extends to other parts of the world, the Soviet forces opposite NATO represent a general model for Soviet forces elsewhere, as well as for forces of Soviet allies and surrogates.

The ground forces constitute the largest of the five Soviet military services. Soviet armies have always been massive. Today, they are also highly modernized, well equipped, and have great firepower and mobility. Manpower and materiel combined make the present Soviet ground forces a very formidable land army.

The main combat power of the ground forces is centered in tank and motorized rifle divisions that are deployed under combined arms commands (armies and **fronts**) and controlled through the Chief of the General Staff. The airborne troops are nominally an arm of the ground forces but are subordinate operationally to the General Staff.

In the years immediately following World War II, Stalin maintained massive ground forces to offset the threat of US nuclear power. As the Soviets developed their own strategic nuclear capability and forces, their emphasis shifted away from the ground forces. Under Khrushchev in the late 1950s and early 1960s, the size of the ground forces was reduced, while strategic rocket forces increased in size.

The Soviets are concerned about the growing threat from China and wars in the Middle East and Far East. They are increasingly aware that a war may be fought without the use of strategic nuclear weapons. For these reasons, the Brezhnev regime reemphasized the importance of the ground forces. Steady and systematic improvements continue. More than 30 divisions have been added since 1967. Many new weapons and equipment of all types have been introduced. Officer and conscript training has been improved. New tactics, operational art, and strategy also have been developed.

The Soviets believe that any future war could involve the use of nuclear weapons and that the initial stage of the war will be decisive. Tactical nuclear weapons have been assigned at all levels from division up. The **Soviets** have the largest and most effective array of chemical weapons and equipment in the world. They

are capable of employing chemical agents from battalion level upward.

The Soviets' basic principle of land warfare is violent, sustained, and deep offensive action. Mechanized and armored formations, supported by aviation and artillery, are to seize the initiative at the outset of hostilities, to penetrate the enemy's defenses, and to drive deeply and decisively into the enemy's rear area.

GROUPS OF FORCES

In peacetime, the major combined arms commands are located in the 16 military districts in the **USSR** and in the 4 groups of forces in Eastern Europe: Group of Soviet Forces, Germany, Northern Group of Forces in Poland, Central Group of Forces in Czechoslovakia, and Southern Group of Forces in Hungary. The Soviets also maintain sizable forces in Mongolia and Afghanistan. (See map on page 1-2.)

In wartime, forces in the groups of forces and military districts will be organized into theaters of military operations (Russian: **TVD**) and fronts (army groups) for combat operations. The military districts will continue to function as territorial commands, acting as mobilization and training bases and providing logistical and other support services.


The TVD

Besides being a level of command, a TVD is also a geographic entity. It consists of a particular territory, such as a continent or sea, where military forces of the **USSR** and/or its allies operate in wartime. The Soviets consider the major type of wartime operation to be the theater strategic operation. Within each **TVD** there are one or more strategic axes. A strategic axis consists of a wide strip of land or sea and the air space above it, leading the armed forces to the enemy's most important administrative-political and industrial-economic centers. The TVD's most important function will be to orchestrate and control coordinated theater-wide operations involving *fronts*, fleets, independent armies, or flotillas.

The Soviet Front

The *front* is the largest field formation in wartime. It is an operational and administrative unit, and its size and composition can vary widely depending on the

Soviet Military Districts and Groups of Forces

**MILITARY DISTRICTS:**

- | | |
|-----------------|--------------------|
| 1 - Leningrad | 5 - Carpathian |
| 2 - Baltic | 6 - Odessa |
| 3 - Belorussian | 7 - Kiev |
| 4 - Moscow | 8 - North Caucasus |

GROUPS OF FORCES IN EASTERN EUROPE:

- A - Group of Soviet Forces, Germany
 B - Northern Group, Poland

- | | |
|-------------------|-------------------|
| 9 - Transcaucasus | 13 - Central Asia |
| 10 - Volga | 14 - Siberian |
| 11 - Urais | 15 - Transbaykal |
| 12 - Turkestan | 16 - Far East |

- C - Central Group, Czechoslovakia
 D - Southern Group, Hungary

mission and situation. Roughly equivalent to a US/NATO army group, a *front* could be composed of three to five armies with organic artillery, missile, air defense, engineer, signal, intelligence, reconnaissance, and rear service units, plus aviation, air assault, and special purpose forces.

The Combined Arms Army. The combined arms army is an operational and administrative organization; it is the basic Soviet field army. A typical combined arms army includes two to four motorized rifle divisions and one or two tank divisions, plus artillery,

missile, air defense, engineer, chemical defense, signal, intelligence, reconnaissance, and rear support units. By altering the mix of motorized rifle and tank divisions and artillery and missile support, the army can operate in either offensive or defensive roles in different geographical areas and under various operational constraints.

The Tank Army. The tank army is an operational and administrative unit, and, like the combined arms army, is a basic component of a *front*. The size and composition of the army will depend on the mission, the situa-

tion, and the area of operations. A typical tank army includes two to four tank divisions and one or two motorized rifle divisions, plus artillery, missile, air defense, engineer, chemical defense, signal, intelligence, reconnaissance, and rear service units. A typical role of a tank army is to exploit penetrations deep into the enemy's rear areas.

There are three basic types of maneuver divisions in the Soviet ground forces: motorized rifle, tank, and airborne. (For more detailed information, refer to *FM 100-2-3, The Soviet Army: Troops, Organization and Equipment.*)

STRENGTH AND DEPLOYMENT OF FORCES

The Soviet ground forces have a total strength of about 1,825,000 men. There are currently 191 maneuver divisions. There are 134 motorized rifle divisions, 50 tank divisions, and 7 airborne divisions. Of these maneuver divisions, 30 are stationed in Eastern Europe (East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary), 80 are stationed in the European portion of the USSR, 29 in the Central Asian portion and Afghanistan, and 52 in Siberia, the Far East, and Mongolia.

There are four basic deployment groupings: against NATO, against China, against the Middle East, and a strategic reserve. The largest, best-equipped, and most combat-ready is the group deployed against NATO.

Many Soviet divisions are maintained at reduced strength in peacetime, but they can be brought up to operational strength quickly by calling up trained reservists.

For over a decade, the Soviets have been modernizing and upgrading their ground forces. This has involved large-scale improvements in mobility, fire power, shock action, command and control, obstacle-crossing capability, air defense, electronic warfare (EW), and logistic support. New and advanced equipment has been introduced.

The Soviets have been paying increased attention to the development of power projection forces that would enable them to assert their influence in areas distant from their borders. Naval and air transport resources can be employed to project regular ground force units as well as naval infantry and airborne units and independent air assault brigades.

Soviet power projection capabilities are impressive in the Persian Gulf region. The Soviets have a substantial number of divisions in varying states of readiness based in Afghanistan and in the Transcaucasus, North Caucasus, and Turkestan Military Districts. Soviet aircraft based in Afghanistan can reach most points in the Persian Gulf region and large portions of the Arabian Sea. Port facilities in the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen and Ethiopia greatly enhance the operating potential of the Soviet fleet in the Indian Ocean and Arabian Sea.

CHAPTER 2

SOVIET MILITARY DOCTRINE

THE SOVIET CONCEPT OF WAR

To the Soviets, war is a manifestation of the class struggle. It is an expression of the conflict between the "progressive forces of socialism" and the "reactionary forces of imperialistic capitalism," which they feel will be ultimately resolved in favor of socialism. The Soviet concept of war represents a continuation of politics. In Western perceptions, war occurs when politics fail to resolve conflicts nonviolently. The Soviets feel that war is the least desirable method by which the forces of history will move toward complete victory for socialism.

The Soviet political and military theorists compare the socialist and capitalist camps by a concept called the "correlation of forces." This concept compares the relative political, moral, economic, and military strengths of both sides. In the Soviet view, the correlation of forces has been shifting in favor of the socialist camp since the Soviet defeat of Nazi Germany in World War II. Soviet Marxist-Leninist ideology requires the correlation to shift continuously in favor of socialism. The correlation of forces may be advanced by both violent and nonviolent means. When it is advanced by violent means, the military component of the correlation is the dominant factor.

THE STRUCTURE OF SOVIET MILITARY THOUGHT

Soviet *military doctrine* is the officially accepted set of concepts that delineate the ways and means to achieve military objectives in the interest of politics. This doctrine also specifies the structure of the Soviet armed forces, allocates industrial resources and output, and orients research and development efforts to support armed forces. Military doctrine is the blueprint drawn up by the highest Soviet political leaders that describes in specific detail the shape of the armed forces and the way they are to be used.

The formulation of Soviet military doctrine is a continuous evolutionary process based on:

- Communist ideology.
- Soviet foreign policy.
- Economic and military strengths of adversaries.
- Soviet resources and geography.
- History.
- Science and technology.

Soviet military doctrine is based on an elaborate, integrated system of thought. The doctrinal concepts are precisely defined, and each has its place in a hierarchy of importance that corresponds to its mili-

tary decision-making level. The system deals with all military issues, ranging from national defense policy down to platoon tactics. Soviet military officers are quite familiar with the entire system of thought and routinely express themselves in these terms. They think and formulate decisions using these concepts.

Military science is the study and analysis of the diverse psychological and material phenomena relevant to armed combat for developing practical recommendations for the achievement of victory in war. Unlike doctrine, military science is characterized by controversy and debate. In military science, there may be several points of view, diverse "scientific" concepts, and original hypotheses that are not selected as doctrine and therefore are not accepted as official state views on military issues. Military science encompasses virtually all things military.

Military art is the most important and primary field within military science and is the basis for strategy, operational art, and tactics. It is the theory and practice of conducting armed conflict. The principles of military art are the basic ideas and the most important recommendations for the organization and conduct of battles, operations, and warfare.

The concept of military art and its role in military science are not just empty exercises in the Marxist-Leninist theory. Many Soviet military officers hold advanced degrees in military science and are serious and intense in their study. They are convinced of the superiority of this methodology for preparing the Soviet armed forces to achieve success in modern warfare. The structure of ideas, terminology, and concepts associated with this system of thought constitutes the very vocabulary through which Soviet officers express their perceptions of military problems and the measures they develop to resolve them.

Military art applies to three separate but interdependent levels of combat activity:

- Strategic - national and theater level.
- Operational - *fronts* and armies.
- Tactical - division and below.

Soviet perspectives on and prescriptions for armed conflict require that tactical success leads to operational success. Similarly, operational gains lead to strategic success.

It is often difficult to separate Soviet tactics from what the Soviets call "operational art" because the maneuver divisions that are the subject of tactics are the maneuver elements that achieve the "operational"

objectives of armies and *fronts*. Moreover, the two concepts are closely interrelated in Soviet military thinking and planning. A recurring theme in Soviet military writing is the need for the commander to keep the "operational" goal in mind. The overriding objective of the combined arms offensive is to rapidly turn tactical success into operational success by a well-orchestrated combination of massive fire, maneuver, and deep, violent strikes.

It is important to understand what the Soviets mean by "tactics" and "operations" as well as the various words and verbal formulas that they associate with each concept. To the Soviet officer, the word "operation" informs him that the activity in question involves at least an army or a *front* that was probably tailored for the mission. "Tactics" consist of combat actions at division level and lower. Divisions have a set organizational structure that, except for combat support reinforcements, does not vary from mission to mission.

Divisions fight battles, whereas armies conduct operations. First echelon divisions usually pursue tactical objectives in the enemy's tactical depth, whereas armies—normally using their second echelon divisions—must achieve operational objectives in the enemy's operational depth.

PRINCIPLES OF MILITARY ART

Soviet military theorists consider the following points to be the general principles of military art. They do not represent any special revelation of truth or radical departure from traditional military thought. However, by their emphasis on these particular points, Soviet military leaders reveal the character of their military thinking and predict the basic characteristics of future Soviet military operations.

According to the Soviets, their armed forces must:

- Be fully prepared to accomplish the mission regardless of the conditions under which war begins or must be conducted.
- Achieve surprise whenever possible. Military operations must be characterized by decisiveness and aggressiveness. Forces must strive continuously to seize and to hold the initiative.
- Make full use of all available military assets and capabilities to achieve victory.
- Insure that major formations and units of all services, branches, and arms effect thorough and continuous coordination.
- Select the principal enemy objective to be seized and the best routes for attacking it. Make a decisive concentration of combat power at the correct time.

- Maintain continuous and reliable command and control.
- Be determined and decisive in achieving the assigned mission.
- Maintain complete security of combat operations.
- Reconstitute reserves and restore combat effectiveness as quickly as possible.

These are general principles that apply to all three levels of military art: strategy, operations, and tactics. At each of these levels, there are more specific, detailed principles.

Soviet military thought subscribes to certain "laws of war" at the strategic level, and "principles of operational art and tactics" which apply to the actual conduct of combat.

The Laws of War

First Law: The course and outcome of war waged with unlimited employment of all means of conflict depends primarily on the correlation of available, strictly military combatants at the beginning of war . . .

Second Law: The course and outcome of war depend on the correlation of the military potentials of the combatants.

Third Law: (The) course and outcome (of war) depend on its political content.

Fourth Law: The course and outcome of war depend on the correlation of moral-political and psychological capabilities of the peoples and armies of the combatants.

Marshal Sokolovsky
Military Strategy

In simpler terms, these laws mean the following:

- **First Law:** Be prepared. Prepare in peacetime for the next war. Forces-in-being are the decisive factors. The side with the most and best troops and equipment at the start of war will win the war.
- **Second Law:** The side which can best sustain a protracted war will win the war.
- **Third Law:** The higher the political stakes of a war, the longer and more violent it will be.
- **Fourth Law:** War aims must be seen as just. Modern war cannot be waged without public support.

Soviet planning and preparation for war reflect a dominant feeling that war is inevitable. This is not to say that the USSR wants war, but that it is preparing for it continuously.

The Soviet state is autocratic, militarized, and centralized. Its political and economic systems give priority to military requirements. The state allocates

resources and directs production for preparation and maintenance of a war footing.

The preparation of a nation for war is accomplished along three main lines:

- the preparation of the armed forces,
- the preparation of the national economy,
- and the preparation of the population.

Marshal Sokolovsky
Military Strategy

The Soviet Union is prepared to exert itself at great expense to achieve its goals. It is a nation which through civil war, collectivization, attendant famine, and purges inflicted more than 20 million deaths on its own citizens from the Russian Revolution to the start of World War II. It is a nation that endured the loss of 20 million people during World War II. Its tolerance for sacrifice is high.

As the "laws of war" dominate strategic planning for war, so do "principles of operational art and tactics" govern the conduct of warfare within a given theater of operations. The popular Western version of these Soviet operational and tactical principles is very brief: objective, offensive, surprise, maneuver, and mass. This list does not fairly characterize the basis on which Soviet military leaders plan and conduct operations and tactics.

Just as they add new equipment to their forces without abandoning older equipment, the Soviets have modernized operational and tactical principles without fully abandoning earlier ones. A good place to begin is with those classical principles that were taught by the tsarist general staff.

Classic Russian Military Principles —————

- Extreme exertion of force at the very beginning of a war.
- Simultaneity of actions.
- Economy of forces.
- Concentration.
- Chief objective - the enemy's army.
- Surprise.
- Unity of action.
- Preparation.
- Energetic pursuit.
- Security.
- Initiative and dominance over the enemy's will.
- Strength where the enemy is weak.

The most significant points of this list are:

- He who gets to the initial battle with the "most" wins.
- The enemy must be confronted with more than one situation to deal with.
- One should not be diverted by geographical objectives, but should concentrate on the destruction of the enemy's military forces.
- Detailed, exacting preparation must precede an attack.
- Design actions to preempt the opponent and keep him reacting to situations that you control.
- Concentrate on the enemy's weak points rather than his strengths.

Contemporary Soviet military theorists hold that nuclear weaponry and other means of modern warfare have modified the basic principles. By the early 1970's, the following principles dominated Soviet operational art and tactics:

Russian Military Principles of the 1970s —————

- Mobility and high rates of combat operations.
- Concentration of main efforts and creation of superiority in forces and means over the enemy at the decisive place and at the decisive time.
- Surprise and security.
- Combat activeness.
- Preservation of the combat effectiveness of friendly forces.
- Conformity of the goal to the actual situation.
- Coordination.

Commenting on the above listing, Colonel V. Ye. Savkin wrote the following:

The enumerated principles have become the most important although of course, they cannot encompass the entire diversity of combat activity. Even now, as there is further development of means of warfare and military art, other principles can be formulated. For example, the principle of simultaneous action upon the enemy to the entire depth of his deployment and upon objectives of the deep rear has acquired an increasingly realistic basis with the adoption of nuclear weapons.

Colonel V. Ye. Savkin
*The Basic Principles of
Operational Art and Tactics
(Moscow, 1972)*

A melding of contemporary writings and those of the recent past, plus the influence of significant classical

Russian principles, results in the following specific Soviet principles of operational art and tactics:

Modern Operational and Tactical Principles

- The offensive is the basic form of combat action. Only by a resolute offense conducted at a high tempo and to great depth is total destruction of the enemy achieved.
- Combat maneuver units must be mobile and capable of rapid movement.
- Fire support, command and control, and logistics must be as mobile as maneuver units.
- Conduct thorough and continuous reconnaissance. Find the enemy's weak points.
- Perform a thorough estimate of the situation and make timely, analytical decisions. Be realistic. Consider the mission, enemy, your own combat power, terrain, weather and light conditions, and time.
- Prepare and plan extensively and in detail.
- The planning and conduct of an operation must involve the full coordination and cooperation of all commanders involved.
- There must be unity of command, a single commander for any operation.
- Fully orchestrate all available combat means in a coordinated, cooperative, combined arms effort.
- Deceive the enemy. Attack from an unexpected direction at an unexpected time. Use terrain and weather to your advantage.
- Strike early with great force. Constantly strive to preempt and dominate the enemy.
- Attack the enemy violently and simultaneously throughout his depth. Carry the battle to the enemy rear with swift penetrations by maneuver units, fires, aviation, airborne and heliborne assaults, and by unconventional warfare means.
- Be bold and decisive. Seize and hold the initiative.
- Prosecute an operation relentlessly, without pause, under all conditions of visibility or NBC contamination.
- Keep the enemy under constant pressure and off balance. Do not allow him to react effectively.
- Fully exploit the effects of nuclear or chemical strikes with deep attacks by all available forces.
- Whenever possible achieve mass by concentrated, massed nuclear or nonnuclear fires

rather than by massing maneuver forces.

- If maneuver forces must be massed, do so rapidly. Disperse them as soon as possible after the task has been achieved.
- Maneuver first with firepower. Firepower is maneuver.
- Maneuver forces should attack the weakest points in enemy defenses. If necessary, create weak points or holes with nuclear or nonnuclear fires. Bypass enemy strongpoints to strike deeply into his rear.
- Avoid frontal attacks. Whenever possible strike the enemy in the flanks or rear.
- Maintain security of your own flanks and rear.
- Maintain sufficient follow-on force to assure achievement of the mission and to deal with contingencies.
- Maintain uninterrupted combat support.
- Maintain effective, continuous command, control, and communications. Loss of communications leads to loss of control and defeat. Maintain redundant communications at higher levels. Rely on audio and visual signals and well-rehearsed battle drills at lower levels.
- Staffs at every level must have the equipment and skills necessary to collect and analyze information quickly and to develop and disseminate orders rapidly based on the commander's decision.
- Employ radioelectronic combat to deprive the enemy of effective command and control of his combat forces.
- Adhere to the spirit and letter of a plan. If the plan fails, use initiative to accomplish the mission.
- Be prepared to react effectively to a rapidly changing battlefield. Develop procedures to deal with numerous contingencies.
- Think quickly and be decisive and resourceful in accomplishing the mission.
- Conserve fighting strength through the use of combat vehicles with collective NBC protection, dispersal of forces, minimum combat power necessary to accomplish a task, the use of captured enemy equipment, and effective logistics.

These principles are idealistic. They are what the Soviets strive to achieve. They show what the Soviets would like to do, but not, in all cases, what they may be capable of doing. However, the principles serve as a basis from which any examination of Soviet operations and tactics must start.

THE SOVIET CATEGORIZATION OF COMBAT ACTIONS

An important consideration in understanding Soviet military thought is their categorization of types of combat actions. It is important to adhere to their categorization and terminology to fully understand the essence of Soviet operations and tactics. The 1966 Soviet book *Taktika* (Tactics) was written at a time when it was assumed that all major combat activity would take place under nuclear conditions. The book described four major categories of combat action: offense, meeting engagement, defense, and withdrawal. The listing of the meeting engagement as a separate major category of combat reflects the view held at that time that it would be the most prevalent form of combat under nuclear conditions. More recent writings, to include the *Soviet Military Encyclopedia*, indicate that the meeting engagement is looked upon as one element of the broad category of offense, rather than a separate major category. This probably reflects the contemporary Soviet view that both nuclear and nonnuclear warfare are possible and that the attack against a defending enemy may be just as prevalent as the meeting engagement.

Contemporary Soviet writings describe only two basic, diametrically opposed forms of combat action: *offense* and *defense*.

Categories of Soviet Combat Action

OFFENSE

- Attack Against a Defending Enemy
 - Attack from the March
 - Attack from a Position in Direct Contact
- Meeting Engagement (enemy is also on offense)
- Pursuit (enemy is withdrawing)

DEFENSE

- Hasty Defense
- Prepared Defense
- Withdrawal

Offensive actions are divided into three subcategories which key on enemy actions and disposition. When the enemy is stationary, in a defensive posture, the Soviets conduct an attack against a defending enemy. When both the Soviets and the enemy are on the offense and their forces collide, the action that occurs is the meeting engagement. When the enemy is withdrawing, action performed against him is called pursuit.

Defensive actions are not as clearly delineated. Though the Soviets recognize a hasty and a prepared defense, the distinction between them is not absolute. With time and preparation, a hasty defense becomes a prepared defense. Withdrawal is a topic given very little attention in Soviet writings. If not categorically, then at least in perception, it is probably viewed within the larger context of defense.

Adhering to the Soviet terminology is particularly crucial when examining Soviet offensive actions. Too many US analysts have used US tactical terms such as "deliberate attack," "hasty attack," or "movement to contact" to describe Soviet offensive actions. The use of these terms results in a distorted image of Soviet actions. Their tactics are not a "mirror image" of US tactics. To fully understand the Soviet military thought process and the options available to the Soviet commander, the Soviet categorization must be adhered to.

According to the Soviet categorization, there is no such thing as a "breakthrough attack." This is another term used incorrectly and too freely by US analysts. The misuse of this term has resulted in incorrect perceptions of Soviet tactics. The "steamroller attack" of World War II, with troops and equipment massed across a narrow frontage to bludgeon their way through enemy defenses, is no longer the most common type of Soviet attack. The Soviet commander conducting an attack against a defending enemy has other options.

COMBINED ARMS OFFENSIVE WARFARE

Although some aspects of the Soviet concept of combined arms are similar to the US military practice of combined arms and joint (interservice) operations, the Soviet concept has a different meaning than does the US term. For example, within the Soviet Army, units of different branches do not normally cross attach among themselves to obtain the optimum mix of combat elements for a given mission. Instead, *a unit of one arm will attach its subunits to support or reinforce units of another arm without receiving attachments in return.*

The major difference, however, goes beyond variances in methods of attachment and reinforcement. The concept of combined arms is far more comprehensive and formalized in Soviet doctrine. It is the cumulative expression of the principles of military art. Combined arms combat is the primary vehicle for their implementation in operations and tactics.

Over the past 60 years, the development of the Soviet combined arms concept has been essentially a doctrinal response to increases in the lethality and mobility of weapons and armies.

Their initial combined arms problem arose from the need to coordinate artillery and infantry during World War I and the Russian Civil War. During the 1930s, as the range and speed of weapon systems began to increase, the Soviets developed the theory and practice of operations in depth. This theory included a number of tactical prescriptions: the primacy of offensive operations, surprise, "shock power," and the combination of several arms and services to attain decisive operational success to a considerable depth within the enemy's defense.

The Attack in Depth

The principle of attacking in depth was the Soviets' response to the increased capability and mobility of fire support systems (artillery and aviation) and the appearance of mechanized infantry, tank, and airborne forces. Enemy weapons and formations located several kilometers from the FEBA became an immediate threat to forces opposing them and had to be engaged with the same urgency and decisiveness as closer targets. On the other hand, Soviet fire support systems could reach farther, and their tank and infantry formations had increased in mobility. Soviet military theorists concluded that the deeper threat and the potential for deeper fire and maneuver by Soviet forces necessitated a combined arms effort. They decided that simultaneous artillery attack and airstrikes through the entire depth of enemy defenses combined with tank and infantry formations to break through his tactical defensive and to drive rapidly and forcefully into the depth of his operational rear would best attain success in combat. The enemy's lines of communication, command and control would then be destroyed or disrupted and the remainder of the forward edge of his tactical defensive system would begin to fragment and collapse. Disorganized, demoralized, and isolated, enemy commanders would be unable to reestablish an effective and coordinated defense.

The successful execution of this high-speed, deep operation required closely coordinated aggressive

action by tank, infantry, artillery, and aviation. The separate arms and services were required to combine their efforts under a single control element to implement a unified plan. As a consequence, the requirement for thorough and continuous coordination among all combat elements throughout the planning and execution phases of every operation increased markedly. Maintenance of reliable and continuous command and control became at once more difficult and more critical. The roles of the combined arms commander and combined arms staff were expanded and refined. The combined arms commander, advised by his staffs has the overall responsibility for the planning and execution of the operation as well as the authority to carry it out.

To execute the operation in depth successfully, the combined arms force had to maintain a rapid tempo of advance. By tempo, the Soviets mean not only speed but also the flexibility and aggressiveness to create and develop opportunities and to build advantage upon advantage. To accomplish this, the Soviet armed forces adopted the practice of echeloning their formations.

The First Echelon. Typically, the first (assault) echelon attacked and penetrated the enemy's tactical defenses, and the second (exploitation) echelon drove through the penetration deep into the enemy's operational rear. Both echelons were controlled by the same combined arms commander. He assigned missions to the commanders of the first and second echelons in support of his overall mission and controlled the entire force until the operation's ultimate objective had been accomplished.

While the purpose of echeloning has changed little over the years, the circumstances under which echeloning is applied and the manner in which it is applied have varied considerably—depending on the relative strength and defensive tactics of the Soviets' enemies. During World War II, Soviet commanders usually employed a heavy second echelon (one third to one half of the entire formation) at the tactical level only when the enemy defensive formations were strong and deeply echeloned and the enemy had large reserves. When enemy defenses were thin and the defender did not possess significant reserves, the Soviets often attacked in a single large echelon (maintaining a relatively small combined arms reserve) to overwhelm the enemy along his entire front. Use of a single-echelon formation simplified command and control problems for the Soviet commander and denied the weaker defender the opportunity to reinforce laterally and to deal with the attacking force as it presented itself in several "waves."

The Second Echelon. Even when they did not echelon their divisions (tactical echeloning), the Soviets would form an operational second echelon (within armies and *fronts*). The composition, size, and specific employment of the second echelon force was again determined largely by the enemy's strength, tactics, and disposition. When the enemy was able to establish a strong tactical defensive system of several echelons (reinforced by tactical reserves) and had sizable operational reserves available as well, the attacking Soviet second echelon comprised as much as half of the attacking formation (e.g., two divisions of a four-division army). The missions of this standard second echelon included reduction of bypassed enemy forces, exploitation through the penetration achieved by the first echelon, or an attack in a new direction, and possible replacement or reinforcement of the first echelon if the first echelon suffered heavy losses.

The Mobile Group. When the enemy was relatively understrength and lacked credible operational reserves, the army second echelon would take the form of a *mobile group* made up of a tank or mechanized corps (normally one to three divisions reinforced with highly mobile combat and combat service support elements). This group, essentially a large, mobile, operational raiding force, either replaced or supplemented the standard second echelon. The mobile group differed from the standard second echelon in that it was expected to drive to deeper objectives and be able to sustain itself longer without major additional support. It also differed in that while the standard operational-level second echelon usually was primarily nonmotorized infantry, the mobile group was composed of tank or motorized infantry forces. When the mobile group was the only follow-on element, part of its force would usually assist the first echelon to make the initial penetration. When a mobile group and a second echelon were formed to conduct an operation in anticipation of heavier resistance in the tactical defense zone, the mobile group could be committed before or after the second echelon, depending on the actual level of resistance encountered by first echelon units.

The mobile group of the *front* typically consisted of a tank army. The *front* mobile group's missions were similar to the army level group except that the objectives were larger and deeper.

In the post World War II era, the Soviets completely motorized all infantry units and increased the number of tanks in divisions. This full mechanization along with the advent of nuclear weapons resulted in dropping the different roles of a second echelon and a mobile

group. The second echelon was thought capable of both building up the offensive or exploiting success of the first echelon.

The Operational Maneuver Group. The concept of the mobile group and its role in combined arms combat received renewed Soviet interest as the basis for refining their contemporary operational offensive methods. The modern version of the mobile group, the *operational maneuver group* (OMG), can move faster, go deeper, and has better combat and combat service support than its World War II counterpart. The OMG concept significantly contributes to fulfilling the existing requirement for the deep theater offensive operation in keeping with the evolving nature of modern war.

The concentration of the necessary amount of force at the right time and place was critical to the maintenance of the tempo required for successful execution of the deep combined arms operation. During World War II, the Soviet Army concentrated tremendous force against a narrow sector of the enemy's defenses to achieve a rapid breakthrough. For example, in one instance, a guards rifle corps was assigned a zone of advance of 22 kilometers but concentrated 80 to 90 percent of its force into a sector less than one third the width of the zone. As a consequence, in a sector 7 kilometers wide, the corps massed 27 battalions, 1,087 pieces of towed artillery and mortars, and 156 tanks and self-propelled artillery weapons, resulting in a force advantage of 4 to 1 in infantry, 10 to 1 in artillery, and 17 to 1 in tanks.

Nuclear Warfare Implications

The advent of nuclear weapons caused Soviet planners to go through a long period of rethinking and revising their combined arms doctrine. Modern, totally mechanized armed forces—supported and threatened by weapons that can change the face of the battlefield in a matter of minutes—gave a whole new meaning to the high-speed, combined arms operation in depth.

Possible nuclear or chemical attacks by the enemy make concentration inadmissible in its World War II sense. At the same time, the availability of friendly nuclear strikes and the longer ranges of conventional artillery reduce the requirement for massed artillery formations. Improved troop mobility permits both the rapid concentration and quick dispersal essential to the survival of tank and motorized rifle formations as they maneuver on a nuclear-threatened battlefield.

In this context, the Soviets now stress that the "quality" of mass must compensate for the reduced

quantity formerly provided by concentrations of troops and equipment. This quality takes the form of intense strikes with conventional air, artillery, and weapons of mass destruction.

The enemy, being under nuclear threat, also must disperse his formations making himself more vulnerable to penetration by an attacking force. But enemy troops are also highly mobile and capable of rapidly concentrating to protect a threatened sector. Therefore, surprise and timing of operations are extremely critical to complicate enemy targeting and to deny him the time to use his mobility to reinforce.

Mobility. In an NBC environment, the need for mobility on the battlefield increases dramatically. Exploitation forces must be prepared to move great distances while maintaining command and control and combat effectiveness. The ability of Soviet combat vehicles using collective NBC protective systems to move through contaminated areas and the increased emphasis on the use of airmobile forces in combat areas enhance mobility.

In past wars, the numerical relation of opposing forces in a particular sector could be changed only by a slow process of providing more men and equipment. Nuclear and/or chemical weapons can bring a sudden change of great magnitude to the balance. Their use can change ratios of forces and means on any axis of advance and to the entire depth of the enemy's dispositions. This constitutes both a threat and an opportunity to the Soviet commander and strongly reinforces the Soviet policy to preempt enemy use of nuclear or chemical weapons.

Decisive Force Capability. Since the mid-1960s, the Soviets have moved toward a doctrine and force capability to fight decisively at all levels of conflict, with nuclear weapons or without them. Soviet planning and preparation for both nuclear and non-nuclear combat always assume the possibility of enemy use of nuclear weapons. They develop plans and doctrine under the supposition that dispersion and mobility must always be maintained. The Soviets plan for enemy nuclear weapons and delivery systems to be detected and destroyed as the first priority by whatever means is most effective and acceptable at the time. Planning, likewise, assumes that whatever the level of conflict (nuclear, chemical, or conventional), all types of weapons releasable at the time will be employed in an integrated, complementary way to accomplish the objectives of the war.

The Soviets believe a theater war is most likely to commence with a phase of nonnuclear combat that

may include the use of chemical weapons. They further believe this nonnuclear phase is most likely to lead to the eventual use of nuclear weapons. Soviet emphasis on destroying as much of enemy theater nuclear capability during the nonnuclear phase as possible using air and rocket attacks, airborne, heliborne, and special purpose forces, and rapid, deep penetrations by ground forces, might deny a credible enemy nuclear option.

Limited Nuclear War Considerations

In the past decade, the Soviet political and military leaders have discussed the possibility of a limited nuclear war. They accept that a war could be limited to a given theater of military operations (TVD) and would not necessarily escalate to an intercontinental exchange of nuclear strikes.

Attempting to limit nuclear war to a TVD would place even greater pressure on Soviet forces to achieve theater objectives quickly to present enemy decision makers with a *fait accompli* that would make escalation clearly unattractive. In this context, the principles of tempo, decisiveness, and mission take on added importance.

In a war that is nuclear from its start, nuclear strikes would be directed against the strongest sectors of the enemy's defenses and throughout his operational depth. Divisions, in "nuclear-dispersed" formations, would attack through the created gaps led by forward detachments advancing at top speed into the depth of the enemy defenses. Their aim would be to seize or to neutralize remaining enemy nuclear weapons and delivery systems and command, control, and communications facilities. They would try to split and to isolate the enemy by attacks from different directions and across a broad front.

This exploitation force would probably attack in two echelons to take full advantage of the speed of advance that it would expect to achieve. In a nuclear-supported attack, the echelons are essentially an initial exploitation force and a follow-on relief exploitation force. A rapid tempo of advance is assured by assigning tank elements to the first echelon and by using motorized rifle units with the tanks on the main axis. In this instance, the BMP is preferred for employment in the first echelon, since it was designed primarily for this type of combat. The BMP is a fast, highly maneuverable, infantry fighting vehicle, which would be ideal for operations in which nuclear weapons have already softened or breached the defense. In a nuclear-supported attack, tanks are especially effective in the first echelon, since they have maneuverability, fire-

power, lower vulnerability to enemy nuclear attacks, and the capability to achieve penetrations of great depth.

Even when nuclear weapons are not used from the outset, Soviet commanders deploy their troops based on the assumption that the enemy may strike with nuclear weapons at any moment. They continuously update their own plans for nuclear employment so they will be prepared if they are required to preempt such an attack. The Soviets have developed their combined arms concept to fit a nuclear engagement as well as a nonnuclear phase, which is planned within the context of a pervasive nuclear-threatened environment. Thus, the Soviet command does not have to make a complex transition from nonnuclear to nuclear war-fighting modes, since the nonnuclear mode is already adapted to an overall nuclear posture.

The Soviets would prefer to avoid nuclear warfare. They would probably do so as long as their objectives were being achieved and there were no indications that the enemy was "going nuclear." However, the Soviets would attempt to preempt enemy nuclear use by a massive, initial, in-depth, theater nuclear strike.

Theater Nuclear Targeting Priorities

- Nuclear delivery means.
- Command and control.
- Deployed troop formations.
- Reserves.
- Supplies.

They perceive that their decision to go nuclear must be made early so that sufficient nonnuclear offensive power remains to follow up and to exploit the gains of nuclear employment with an immediate, high-speed air and ground offensive.

Nonnuclear Warfare

Nonnuclear warfare is distinguished not so much by major differences in combat deployments as by the extra missions assigned to artillery, helicopters, and tactical air. These conventional fire support systems must provide additional massive fires to take up the slack in destructive firepower that would otherwise be provided by nuclear strikes. Nonnuclear operations are related closely to nuclear operations. Conventional and/or chemical combat can appreciably alter the "correlation of forces" in the Soviets' favor as well as

provide more advantageous positioning of forces when and if the nuclear phase is initiated.

Chemical Warfare

The Soviets do not perceive clear delineations between conventional, chemical, and nuclear warfare. It is possible that chemical weapons would be used early in an operation or from its onset.

Chemical attacks would be directed principally against enemy positions in the forward battle area. Soviet military writings indicate that non-persistent agents would be used across the front of a Soviet attack, while persistent agents would be used to protect their flanks.

Simultaneously with strikes across the front, chemical strikes also could be expected throughout the depth of enemy defenses. These chemical strikes would be combined with other forms of conventional attack to neutralize enemy nuclear capability, command and control, and aviation. Subsequent chemical attacks might be conducted against logistic facilities.

Besides offensive chemical capability, Soviet forces are equipped with the best chemical protective and decontamination equipment in the world. They know that their chemical capability greatly exceeds that of any other nation. Not to use this capability would deprive them of a decisive advantage.

Though they might use chemical weapons, the Soviets would strive to keep a theater offensive nonnuclear. They would attempt to achieve the swift, early destruction or neutralization of enemy tactical nuclear capability by rapid, deep penetrations by ground forces and strikes throughout the enemy depth with all available nonnuclear means.

The vulnerability of densely concentrated formations to nuclear weapons caused the Soviets to alter their method of achieving mass. The "breakthrough" concept of World War II, with its massed troops and weapons, narrow frontages, and fixed echelons, is maladapted to the nuclear-threatened battlefield. Though it is still an option when attacking enemy positions that are well-prepared and arrayed in depth with substantial reserves, densely-massed formations are a least-preferred option.

Under nuclear-threatened conditions, the Soviet offensive concept would have the following features:

- Avoid concentrating forces.
- Concentrate fires, but not firing weapons.
- Attack across broader frontages, on multiple axes.
- Avoid enemy strong points.
- Probe for enemy weak points.
- Penetrate where possible.

- Commit follow-on forces when and where they can best contribute to success.
- Drive rapidly and deeply into the enemy rear to destroy nuclear weapons and enemy defenses.

The desire to keep a theater war nonnuclear has been a driving force behind the vast qualitative and quantitative improvements in Soviet conventional ground forces over the past fifteen years.

ECHELONS AND FORCE RATIOS

A Soviet tactical commander develops his concept for an attack much the same as a US commander does. The Soviet commander considers the same factors which we know as METT-T (mission, enemy, terrain, troops, and time available). He assesses his objectives, the terrain, enemy forces, and avenues of approach. Then he assigns forces necessary to insure completion of the task. One tool that he uses in allocating forces is echelonment.

Forces may be allocated to a first echelon, a second echelon, a combined arms reserve, or special reserves. If enemy defenses are well prepared in depth, the Soviet commander will normally organize his forces into two echelons, special reserves, and, possibly, a small combined arms reserve. If the enemy defends with most of his forces forward, the Soviets normally will attack in a strong, single echelon, followed by a combined arms reserve and special reserves. Combat organization is variable and adaptable to the situation.

First and Second Echelons

A first echelon is a main attack force. It will contain the majority of the combat power of the formation or unit. Missions of first echelon forces are:

- Penetrate or defeat enemy forward defenses.
- Continue the attack.
- Under nuclear conditions, exploit nuclear strikes on enemy defenses.

Second echelon forces are assigned missions at the same time as first echelon forces. Possible missions for second echelon forces include:

- Exploit the success of first echelon forces.
- Conduct a pursuit.
- Destroy bypassed enemy forces.
- Replace or reinforce first echelon forces.


Regardless of a previously assigned mission, second echelon forces are used to reinforce success, not failure. The main goal at all levels is to carry the battle swiftly and violently into the enemy rear. The commander commits second echelon forces in a manner to best achieve this goal.

Second echelon forces are likely to be dispersed laterally, following behind first echelon forces. Dispersal provides both security and flexibility in commitment.

The distance between echelons is not fixed. It is decided by the commander based on the situation. The second echelon is located close enough to the first echelon to insure timely commitment, but far enough back to provide protection and room for maneuver. Second echelon forces normally advance in march or prebattle formation.

The preferred method of committing second echelon forces is through gaps or around flanks of first echelon forces. For example, a second echelon regiment normally would pass between first echelon regiments or around the flank of its parent division.

Commitment of Forces



However, the second echelon could be committed on an axis of a first echelon unit. Whenever possible, the Soviets will avoid a passage of lines and intermingling of forces of two echelons, such as would happen if the second echelon unit were passed through the first echelon unit.

Whereas, second echelon forces have assigned missions, reserve forces do not. This is the key distinction between them. Reserve forces are the Soviet commander's asset for flexible development of the battle and for reacting to contingencies.

Reserve Forces

Combined arms reserves are made up of tank, motorized rifle, and artillery subunits. When a large single echelon is employed in an attack, a combined arms reserve will be used to exploit success. It will advance in a manner similar to a second echelon, but will not have a pre-assigned mission. It is committed when and where the Soviet commander believes it can best lead to deeper penetration and success.

A small combined arms reserve, approximately one-ninth the size of the parent unit, may be formed when two echelons are employed. Such a reserve is used primarily for security and reaction to enemy counterattack.

Special reserves are organized from antitank, engineer, chemical, or other combat support elements. They are used primarily for defense against enemy counterattacks, security, and tasks requiring specialty skills.

Force Ratios

After World War II, but before the introduction of tactical nuclear weapons and the complete mechanization of Soviet ground forces, Soviet military planners routinely weighted a main attack with ratios of 3-5:1 in tanks, 6-8:1 in artillery, and 4-5:1 in personnel. Contemporary Soviet writings indicate that an aggregate ratio of combat power of approximately 3:1 is sufficient in conducting an offensive operation or an attack against a defending enemy.


This 3:1 ratio refers to more than just cumulative numbers of first echelon troops and weapons relative to enemy troops and weapons in a given sector. It is, instead, a more sophisticated calculation of the total force, to include all maneuver units and combat support that a commander can bring to bear relative to the total force with which the enemy can oppose him.

In computing his strength relative to enemy strength, a Soviet commander considers all organic, attached, and supporting combat power. When an attack begins, his actual strength advantage at the FEBA could be as small as 2:1. The remainder of his force may not be readily visible to defending enemy units. Massive artillery and air strikes will pour down on defensive positions from remote locations while second echelon or reserve forces approach in march or prebattle formation. Nevertheless, the commander considers this entire force, which may give him an advantage of 3:1 or 4:1 over the defender, when planning and conducting a mission to penetrate enemy forward defenses.

The Soviet norm for dispersion on the nuclear-threatened battlefield is calculated so that no two equivalent subunits (battalion or smaller) would be destroyed by a single tactical nuclear weapon. The distance between those subunits should be great enough that they could not be totally or partially destroyed by a single tactical nuclear weapon capable of destroying an entire subunit of that size. A Soviet commander may depart from these guidelines and temporarily decrease dispersion to achieve the force ratio necessary for a penetration of enemy defenses. Even if he does concentrate forces, he will rarely, if ever, mass his troops and weapons to the densities that were acceptable before the advent of tactical nuclear weapons.

The concept of echeloning allows the Soviet commander to disperse his unit laterally and in depth. At the same time, he can apply a sizable part of his force rapidly when and where he wants to, based on the developing battlefield situation.

Desired Attack Force Ratio



NORMS, INITIATIVE, AND FLEXIBILITY

Soviet military doctrine includes a system of performance standards, expressed in numerical form, called "norms." Norms define the ideal performance in a multitude of tasks and conditions. They are used to determine things such as interval, rates of march, frontages, logistics requirements, fire support, and training drills.

Norms provide a mathematical prescription for proper action. They are formulated by historical analysis, training exercises, requirements, and gaming

models. Based on norms, a given situation has an approved response. The correctness of a commander's action or his troops' response is often measured by their adherence to the established norms for that situation.

The advantage of this system is that it provides a high degree of combat readiness, at least in the initial stages. Drills at the subunit level (battalion and lower) are well-rehearsed. The tactical level commander is aware in advance of how well his troops can cope with time and space factors.

The obvious disadvantage to strict adherence to norms is less provision for the unexpected. If a situation arises for which there is no established normative response, a lower-level commander might find himself in peril.

The topic of initiative receives much attention in Soviet military writings. When a plan fails, commanders are strongly urged to use initiative as a cure-all.

The Soviet perception of initiative involves finding a correct solution following normative patterns. If the commander adheres to norms and is successful, he is praised. If he violates normative patterns and fails, he is condemned. Success, however, is most important. If a commander solves a problem by his own devices, he is lauded.

Soviet operations and tactics are not as thoroughly rigid as is perceived by many Western analysts. The amount of flexibility exhibited increases with the rank of the commander and the size of force commanded. There is probably little tactical flexibility at subunit level (battalion and lower). The first level where any real tactical flexibility might be found is at regiment, which is the smallest fully combined arms unit.

Flexibility in battlefield thought and action increase by degree, upward through division, army, and front.

Soviet officers today are well-educated and well-trained in their military specialties. Most of them are graduates of branch academies where they receive the equivalent of a college education plus a thorough grounding in their branch skills. Though their world outlook is biased by a lifetime of political dogma, they are not ignorant nor incapable of professional, purely military judgment. It is not likely that they would rigidly adhere to a plan faced with imminent failure if an expedient to success were at hand.

Flexibility in Soviet operations has been evident since the final years of World War II. Since the mid-1960s, Soviet military writers and theorists have emphasized:

- The need for rapid concentration and dispersal of combat power on the modern battlefield.
- The rejection of the classic "breakthrough" achieved by massed forces.
- The need to attack on multiple axes.
- The lack of a continuous front.
- The exploitation of weak points in an enemy defense.
- Swift transfer of combat power from one point to another on the battlefield.
- The achievement of surprise.
- Speed in the attack.
- Independent action by commanders.
- The need to carry the battle deep into the enemy rear.

These concepts are not descriptive of a rigid offensive doctrine, but of one that is both mobile and flexible.

CHAPTER 3

COMMAND AND CONTROL

THE NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND AUTHORITY

The Soviet National Military Command Authority exercises complete control over the military-economic planning and activities of the Soviet Union. It is composed of three major bodies:

- The Council of Defense.
- The Main Military Council.
- The General Staff.


The *Council of Defense* is responsible for planning and preparing the country for war. It is chaired by the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The council is made up of selected Politburo members, including the Minister of Defense. This council is the USSR's highest military-economic planning agency; it deliberates interrelated issues concerning the nation's defenses, economic plans, and government branches. These include the mobilization of industry, transportation, and manpower for war, and the peacetime structure of the armed forces. Its deliberation and decrees are translated into law. In wartime, this body would be reorganized into the State

Committee of Defense—essentially a war cabinet with oversight of the political, diplomatic, and economic aspects of the nation at war, as well as general policy matters concerned with the conduct of military operations.

The *Main Military Council* is immediately responsible to the Council of Defense for the overall leadership and status of the Soviet armed forces in peacetime. The Minister of Defense heads this council. The Chairman of the Council of Defense is a member, as are the First Deputy Ministers of Defense. The ministers include the Chief of the General Staff and the Commander in Chief of the Warsaw Pact Forces. Other members might include the commanders of the five military services, the Chief of the Main Political Administration, the Chief of the Rear Services, and the Chief of Civil Defense.

In wartime, the council would be transferred into the STAVKA (Headquarters of the Supreme High Command), which would represent the top echelon of

Soviet National Military Command Authority



Soviet wartime military control. The General Secretary of the Communist Party, as Chairman of the State Committee of Defense, would become the Supreme Commander in Chief of the Soviet Armed Forces.

The STAVKA will plan and direct strategic operations on a global scale through theaters of military operations (Russian: TVD), sizing and allocating forces to implement its plans. The number of *fronts*, their composition, missions, and the general plans for the conduct of TVD operations will be established by the STAVKA. It also will monitor individual *front* and fleet actions and supervise coordination between them.

The *General Staff* is the major link in the centralization of the Soviet National Military Command Authority. The General Staff is the executive agency for the Main Military Council in peacetime and the STAVKA in wartime. The Soviet General Staff is charged with the basic military planning for the Soviet Armed Forces, both in peace and war. The military services, the military districts, and the Groups of Forces outside of the USSR report to the Minister of Defense through the General Staff in peacetime. In wartime, field forces in a TVD (*fronts* and fleets) would report to the Supreme Commander in Chief and the STAVKA through the General Staff.

THEATER OF MILITARY OPERATIONS

The area of land and sea (and the air space above) on which the armed forces prepare for war, deploy military forces, and conduct war at the strategic level make up the theater of military operations, or "TVD." The theater of military operations usually encompasses a considerable portion of the territory of a continent. The basic types of strategic ground operations are the offense, defense, and counteroffense. The strategic offensive operation is considered the chief and decisive form of strategic operation. Only as a result of such an offensive operation is it possible to defeat and destroy the enemy's field forces within the TVD, to capture vitally important territory, to destroy the enemy's ability to conduct organized resistance, and to insure victory.

A strategic offensive operation can be conducted over one or more strategic axes or across the entire width of a TVD. It can be conducted to the entire depth of the TVD, or may only be planned to obtain intermediate strategic areas; one or more subsequent strategic offensive operations may be required to accomplish all of the strategic tasks required for total victory in the TVD.

A strategic offensive operation is conducted with several *fronts*, (army groups), one or more air armies,

one or more airborne divisions, military transport aviation, and fleets on maritime axes. These are joint operations, conceived by the STAVKA, planned and conducted by the General Staff for the Supreme Commander in Chief. The sizing of the *fronts*, the allocation of other forces, the assignment of missions, and the concepts of operations are responsibilities of the General Staff.

Given the extent and redundancy of communications, the mobility of the forces, the anticipated tempo of operations, and the requirements for the highest level centralized control, the Soviet General Staff will probably exercise direct control over the major operational forces, with close supervision over their coordination.

COMMANDERS

The Soviets recognize that effective command and control is critical for success in modern combined arms warfare. Their method of insuring success is to establish and to maintain a system of tightly centralized control over the combat and supporting forces at each level of command.

The Soviet commander at each level is charged with overall responsibility for his forces. Soviet doctrine emphasizes that under the fluid conditions of modern warfare, even in the course of carefully planned operations, the commander must accomplish assigned missions on his own initiative without constant guidance from above. To do this, the commander must be well informed about the general situation and the intentions of the senior commander.

The *front* commander is responsible for the conduct of the entire operation in which his *front* is involved and for carrying out long-term operational and strategic plans. Army commanders receive their missions from their *front* commander. Division commanders, in turn, receive their missions from their respective army commanders.

ORGANIZATION OF HEADQUARTERS

All headquarters (*front*, army, and division) are organized in the same basic manner, but differ in size and complexity. The higher the level, the larger and more complex the staff is.

The staff, supervised by the chief of staff, assists the commander by planning, monitoring, and controlling operations. The principal functions of a Soviet staff are: operations, intelligence, communications, rocket troops and artillery, air defense, engineer support, chemical defense, aviation, rear services, armaments

and equipment (technical matters), and political support.

The political directorate, a department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, is responsible for propagating Party policy throughout the armed forces. Political officers (deputy commanders for political affairs) are present at all levels down to company. They conduct troop indoctrination and training, assist the commander in maintaining troop morale, motivation, and discipline, and advise him on nonoperational matters. The political officer does not play a formal role in making military decisions, but he does exert considerable influence on the general policy and political direction of his unit.

Arms and services are staff elements for tank, artillery, aviation, air defense, communications, and chemical troops. Each is responsible for the technical aspects of its arm. The senior officer of each arm is also an advisor with direct access to the commander.

The logistic staff is responsible for coordinating rear service activities and for liaison between other staff elements and logistics organizations. Logistic activities are managed by chiefs of rear services and chiefs of technical matters/armaments services through their supporting staffs.

COMMAND POSTS

Control is exercised through a series of command posts. The distance between them is planned so that only one would be put out of action by a single tactical nuclear weapon. The number of command posts and their sizes depend on the level of command. There are seven basic types of command posts: forward command post, main command post, alternate command post, rear services control point, command/observation post, auxiliary command post, and airborne command post.

The commander decides where the posts will be located and how they will move. *Front* and army command posts generally are deployed in depth to facilitate control of their entire areas of operation.

During lengthy moves, command posts may leapfrog forward along parallel routes. They are preceded by reconnaissance parties that select the new locations and act as traffic regulators. While on the move, command posts maintain continuous contact with subordinate units, higher headquarters, and flanking units. Normally, the alternate and main command posts move by leap-frogging each other, one moving while the other is set up and controlling operations.

During movement halts, command posts are dispersed in concealed areas and are camouflaged if

necessary. Radio stations and special vehicles are located some distance from the actual command center.

All headquarters have an administrative element that provides local security and traffic control. Air defense of these headquarters receives a high priority. Due to dispersion in a mobile environment, command posts will often be responsible for their own local ground defenses.

The seven basic types of command posts are described as follows:

- *A main command post* is the primary command post at division, army, and *front*. It is augmented by forward and alternate command posts.
- *A forward command post* is deployed near the first echelon troops to enable the commander to control his unit in combat more effectively, especially in the main sector. It is employed at division level or higher when control is difficult from the main command post, or when the main command post is moving or has been put out of action.
- *An alternate command post*, with reduced staffing, is established to insure continuity of control should the main command post be put out of action.
- *A rear area command post* is established for the deputy commander for rear services. From it, he organizes and directs the rear service support for his unit.
- *A command observation post* is normally an armored command vehicle, an APC, or tank. It is the only command post formed below regiment level.
- *Auxiliary command post* is set up at *front* and army levels when the situation requires an extra command post. It is often used to control an operation on a secondary axis.
- *Airborne command posts* are used at *front*, army, and division levels to provide the commander an airborne platform from which to control operations.

TACTICAL COMMUNICATIONS

The Soviets recognize that they cannot effectively control the battlefield actions of combined arms formations without good communications. They know that the enemy will continually strive to disrupt their communications. To counter this threat, the Soviets stress considerable redundancy in communications modes and equipment.

The organization of communications to meet immediate tactical requirements is a responsibility of the commander at each tactical level. Unit communications officers are charged with establishing and maintaining continuous communications.

The following principles are applied in organizing tactical communications:

- Responsibility for command communications is from higher to subordinate headquarters; however, if communications are not established by the higher headquarters, the subordinate headquarters must provide them using its own equipment.
- Communications with supported units are the responsibility of the headquarters of the supporting units.
- Lateral communications normally are established from right to left; but if such communications are not established by the unit on the right, the unit on the left must do so.
- Radio is the principal means of communications, especially when in contact with the enemy. Messengers and other liaison services are used for augmentation and security.
- Wire is used extensively in the defense and in the preparatory phase of offensive actions.
- Operator discipline is strict, operating procedure is of a high order, and security precautions are to be observed minutely.
- Command nets are designed to provide communications with subordinate units two levels down, in a "skip echelon" manner. This communications structure allows, for example, a division to control a battalion, or a regiment to control a company, if necessary.

Soviet communications equipment ranges from simple, easy-to-operate electronic devices to complex, vehicle-mounted equipment that requires highly skilled operators. Radio is the principal means of communications except in static situations where wire can be employed effectively.

Soviet ground force radios include low power, frequency modulated (FM) and amplitude modulated (AM) sets of manpack and vehicle-mounted types, medium power high frequency (HF) radio stations of a heavy mobile variety, and multichannel radio-relay equipment.

Field telephones are used widely with automatic switching equipment; switchboards are provided down to company level. Teleprinter communications are provided down to regiment level.

Couriers are also used. They are transported by helicopters and a wide variety of ground vehicles.

The following types of communication nets are used:

- *Command nets* are used by the commander primarily to pass combat orders. Channels generally are direct from a superior to his immediate subordinates, but they also permit skipping echelons. The arms and

services have separate nets that are similar and parallel.

- *Staff nets* are used by the chief of staff for directing other staff elements at his level and for keeping subordinate and superior staffs informed of his commander's intentions. The chief of artillery at *front*, army, and division has his own staff communications for control of units subordinate to him and to direct the actions of similar forces at the next lower level; the aviation commander or controller at each level may have similar communications. The chiefs of engineer and chemical troops must use the main staff communications network.

- *Liaison nets* are established between ground force units operating in coordinated action, and from supporting units to supported units. Each liaison officer provides his own communications equipment to operate with his parent unit.

- *Coordination nets* are established between commanders to insure mutual understanding and unity of purpose and action with adjacent units.

- *Warning nets* are used to warn subordinate units of impending air, tank, nuclear, and chemical attack and to disseminate meteorological information.

- *Air defense nets* include air surveillance nets to radar sites, air warning nets, and air defense control nets connecting higher and lower staffs and air defense units.

- *Rear services nets* are used by rear elements to control supply, transport, medical, and other support services at all levels from *front* down to battalion. More reliance is placed on cable and wire for these nets than for the other types.

- *Special purpose nets* are established between main command posts and selected units.

Communications units are assigned at all levels from *front* to battalion to support internal headquarters and to provide communications with higher, subordinate, and adjacent units. At the tactical level, each division has a signal battalion, each regiment has a signal company, and each battalion has a communications platoon.

A variety of communications means are provided to tactical units for use when radio and wire communications are not appropriate. These include flares, tracer rounds, signal flags and lights, and loudspeakers.

DIVISION-LEVEL COMMAND AND CONTROL

The Soviet division commander exercises command authority over his unit and is responsible for its actions. His deputies are responsible, however, for some of the technical operations of the various branches of service

represented in the division. This frees him to concentrate his energies on planning and fighting the battle. The division commander is the only general officer in a division. Many division commanders are senior colonels, who are later promoted to major general (one star) rank.

Dual Allegiance

Each branch of service, except for tank and motorized rifle, is represented on the division staff by a chief of the branch. Collectively, these officers are referred to as the chiefs of the arms and services. They are responsible to the division commander but receive additional instructions and guidance from their counterparts at the next higher level.

The division operates as part of an army which is part of a *front*. The operations of the *front* are directed by an extremely centralized system of command and control. From the *front* commander's point of view, for example, all artillery organic or attached to his *front* is under his control. The artillery, as a branch of service, has certain capabilities that assist the *front* commander in the accomplishment of his mission. He directs the chief of rocket troops and artillery at *front* level to plan and direct the *front's* artillery fires to support his concept of the operation. The division's artillery assets are thus part of the general artillery effort. Centralized fire planning at *front* level insures that proper allocation of resources is made and that weapons engage appropriate targets.

The *division* chief of rocket troops and artillery (CRTA) is responsible for integrating his fire plan with the fire plan from the *army* CRTA. Within the constraints posed by the army fire plan, the division CRTA must satisfy the requirements of his division commander—or resolve any conflicts through proper coordination. While the possibility for confusion exists, the Soviets do not view this as an infringement on command prerogative. On the contrary, it insures unity of command at the highest levels. The fire plan, for example, is viewed as an aid to planning, and not a constraint. The division commander learns from the army fire plan which targets will be attacked by non-divisional artillery. He can then decide which targets to attack with division artillery.

A good example of dual allegiance to the unit commander and a branch chief at the next higher level is the operation of the logistic system. A deputy commander for the rear commands the service support operations of the division. However, all logistic assets in the Soviet Army, from the company to the Chief of the Rear at the Ministry of Defense, are considered to

be part of one system known as the "military rear." The logistic plans of the division are not independent but are part of a centrally directed logistic system. Army and *front* logistic plans directly affect the division, and assets from these levels augment the division rear.

In the Soviet view, proper coordination and transmission of orders result, for example, in first echelon divisions receiving logistic allocations according to established criteria for first echelon divisions in a given type of operation. Because logistic planning has started at *front* level, there should be no fundamental conflict between division requirements and the assets that have been allocated to the division. The division commander also makes his plans and establishes requirements according to the same criteria. The Soviets recognize that all plans do not operate perfectly and that the situation and special problems affect the division's logistic requirements. Since centralized planning has properly allocated resources from the highest levels, the division should be able to resolve any conflicts.

If the system works, the administrative and technical burden on the division commander is reduced, and he can concern himself with the tactical conduct of his maneuver units. The commander at the highest level has centralized control over the assets available to him. The drawback is the increased need for coordination. When the logistic plan, for example, is not properly coordinated at each level, shortfalls and overages occur.

There are two fundamental areas of division-level command and control: the command group and the staff. The command group includes the commander and those officers who work for the commander in a direct command relationship—those who cause the unit to execute his orders. The staff includes those officers who assist the commander in planning and supervision. Some officers are in both categories.

Division Command Group

A Soviet division commander commands through a group of deputy and subordinate commanders. The four maneuver regiment commanders are considered major subordinate commanders. The deputy commanders are the chief of staff, the deputy commander for the rear, the deputy commander for technical matters, the chief of rocket troops and artillery, and the deputy commander for political affairs.

The *division commander* is responsible for the combat readiness of the division. He is answerable for the combat training, political education, and military discipline of his troops; the condition of the division's

equipment; and the logistic and medical support of the division. He is responsible for all troop control measures during the preparation, organization, and conduct of combat.

The *chief of staff* is the primary assistant to the commander. He is a staff officer and also a deputy commander. The chief of staff is the only officer authorized to issue orders in the name of the commander. It is his responsibility to understand not only the commander's specific instructions, but his train of thought and general approach. He insures the execution of the commander's orders during the commander's absence. The commander usually is located well forward at a small mobile command post during offensive combat. The main division command post is located some distance to the rear and is under the control of the chief of staff.

The *deputy commander for the rear* is responsible for the combat service support of the division and commands the logistic assets of the division. He develops plans and orders, is supported by a rear staff, and operates a rear area command post. He can be considered the "installation commander" for the rear area. Small depots which belong to the chiefs of arms and services and assets controlled by the deputy commander for technical matters also are located in the rear area. The deputy commander for the rear has no authority over the officers in charge of these elements in matters concerning their respective technical operations. He is responsible, however, for rear area organization and security and assigns locations in the rear area. Additionally, he establishes policies and plans concerning security and damage control.

The *deputy commander for technical matters* controls the division maintenance battalion. He is responsible for direct support maintenance for both armored and wheeled vehicles, procurement of repair parts, and vehicle replacement. He also oversees maintenance training throughout the division. During combat, he directs the repair and evacuation of disabled equipment, and informs the commander on the status of the division's equipment.

The *chief of rocket troops and artillery (CRTA)* coordinates and plans the artillery fires of the organic and attached artillery of the division. The division commander issues orders concerning artillery support to the CRTA, who has authority to inspect the artillery units in the division and to hold them accountable for their technical proficiency. During the course of the battle, however, he serves primarily as a special staff officer, advising the commander on artillery matters.

The *deputy commander for political affairs* (also called the political officer) is subordinate to the divi-

sion commander. He is also under the staff supervision of the army deputy for political affairs. The potential exists, of course, for the political officer to interfere with operations by reporting on the political reliability of the commander and other officers through political channels.

The *political officer*, who is also secretary of the division party organization, operates through a division political section which includes the *Komsomol* (Communist Youth Organization) subsection, the propaganda and agitation subsection, the political information subsection, and the personnel and welfare subsections. The political officer helps to promote the authority of the commander, to raise troop morale, and to enhance troop effectiveness. He bears direct responsibility for the organization of political work in the division. Elements under his control organize and conduct political indoctrination sessions, politically oriented, club-type activities, and lecture on current events and Soviet history.

Political Officer Responsibilities

Soviet regulations state the political officer must accomplish the following:

- Participate in planning for combat and political training.
- Organize and conduct political work.
- Cultivate unreserved dedication to the Soviet fatherland, the Communist Party and the Soviet government, proletarian internationalism and undeviating observance of the military oath, obedience to and respect for superiors, and absolute adherence to military regulations and orders.
- Conduct propaganda among soldiers concerning the successes in the building of communism, which includes organizing political agitation and propaganda; organizing and supervising political training for officers; educating troops to develop hatred for enemies of the Fatherland; and educating troops to develop a sense of personal responsibility for the condition of their equipment.


The *regimental commanders* command the division's maneuver units. They are responsible for the combat readiness of their units, as well as their combat and political training. They are the instruments through which the division commander fights the battle.

The Division Staff

The chief of staff controls the staff and coordinates its work. He is the primary conduit for information between the commander and his unit. He reports staff findings and acts as the organizer for execution of the command decision. He monitors progress through the

staff and reports problems to the commander. He is responsible for coordination of all staff work, and is personally responsible for the coordination of logistic requirements between the chiefs of arms and services and the deputy commander for the rear.

The Soviet Division Staff



Coordinating Staffs. The eight sections which make up the group the Soviets call the division staff are under the direct control of the chief of staff. The four coordinating staff sections belonging to this group are:

- first section, operations,
- second section, intelligence,
- third section, communications, and
- fourth section, personnel.

The most important coordinating staff section is the *operations section*, headed by the chief of operations. The chief of operations has responsibility for training and formulating operations plans and orders. He monitors the work of all other staff sections, keeps abreast of the situation, and is ready to present information and recommendations concerning the tactical situation. He is present when the commander announces his decision, and he writes combat orders and important combat reports. Inspection troops assigned to the first section check on the execution of assigned missions and adherence of subordinate elements to command directives. In coordination with the intelligence section, the chief of the operations section keeps the commander informed on the progress of operations. His specific duties include—

- Collecting information concerning the tactical situation of friendly forces to include the division, adjacent units, and higher units.
- Preparing and disseminating orders, operational plans and reports, summaries, and situational overlays.
- Providing liaison for the exchange of information within division headquarters and with higher, subordinate, and adjacent units.
- Organizing the main command post and insuring rear area antitank, antiaircraft, and NBC defense.
- Organizing troop movement and traffic control.
- Coordinating the organization of reconnaissance with the intelligence section.
- Controlling the distribution of maps.

The *second section*, or intelligence section, is headed by the chief of intelligence, who is also the chief of reconnaissance troops. He is part of an intelligence chain of command which originates at *front*. In this regard, division-level intelligence efforts fit into an overall intelligence plan.

The chief of the second section is subordinate to the chief of staff, but can report directly to the division commander. In coordination with the operations section, the intelligence section makes collection plans and collects and evaluates information concerning the enemy, weather, and terrain. The section disseminates necessary evaluated information in a timely manner. During combat, the division intelligence officer directs the efforts of subordinate intelli-

gence sections and reconnaissance units. Specific responsibilities of the intelligence officer include—

- Collecting and analyzing information on the enemy, terrain, and weather and its dissemination to the commander and adjacent units.
- Organizing reconnaissance missions, including requests for aerial reconnaissance, in coordination with the first section.
- Preparing the observation plan, in coordination with the first section.
- Preparing the intelligence portion of the division's combat order.
- Preparing periodic intelligence reports.
- Exploiting documents and materiel.
- Interrogating prisoners of war.

The *third section*, or communications section, is headed by the chief of communications, who is also the chief of signal troops. He organizes communications with subordinate, adjacent, and higher headquarters. The section must insure that the commander has continuous and uninterrupted tactical control by planning wire, radio, and mobile communications. The term "mobile communications" includes all means of communications other than radio and wire. Specific responsibilities of the third section include—

- Organizing division radio nets.
- Establishing call signs and radio procedures.
- Organizing courier and mail service.
- Operating the division message center.
- Supervising the supply, issue, and maintenance of signal equipment.

The *fourth section*, or personnel section, is headed by the chief of personnel. He assigns men; requests replacements; records losses; administers awards and decorations; and collects, records, and disposes of war booty. The fourth section keeps complete personnel files on company-grade officers, while files on enlisted personnel are maintained at regimental level. Files on higher ranking officers are maintained at levels higher than division.

Coordinating staff responsibility for logistics rests with the chief of staff. It is evident, however, that the chief of staff cannot devote a large portion of his time to detailed logistic coordination and still fulfill his other duties. Thus, the Soviets operate to a certain degree without a logistic staff officer. This fact increases the burden on the chiefs of arms and services and the deputy commander for the rear. Each chief is responsible for consolidating and forwarding logistic requests for his branch to the deputy commander for the rear.

Special Staffs. The division staff also includes the following four special staff sections:

- The *topographic section* gathers and analyzes terrain data and maintains supplies of maps, catalogs, and map-related equipment.
- The *cryptographic section* encodes and decodes the division's cryptographic communications, designates the codes to be used in communicating with subordinate units, and supervises communications security procedures and cryptographic training. This section's activities are integrated into a large effort, coordinated by the chief of the intelligence section. The intelligence officer operates according to guidance from higher levels in this regard.
- The *administration and finance section* organizes the administration and records necessary for providing quarters, food, supplies, and pay for division personnel. It is responsible for all division financial planning, accounting, auditing, and pay procedures. The division's finance officer supervises subordinate unit finance officers, who are responsible for the distribution of funds.
- The *headquarters commandant* combines the functions (in US Army terms) of the division headquarters commandant and the division provost marshal. He is responsible for insuring that the division headquarters and command posts, in garrison and in the field, are properly sited, organized, supported, and protected. He also directs the activities of the Commandant's Service (somewhat similar to US Military Police), and he operates the division's stockade. He may also be responsible for handling prisoners of war.

Arms and Services. The chiefs of arms and services serve as special staff officers and advise the commander on matters pertaining to their fields.

The *chief of rocket troops and artillery* serves as division fire support coordinator. Acting as the chief artillery advisor in combat, he usually is located at the forward command post with the division commander.

The *chief of air defense troops* acts as a special staff officer for air defense. He advises the commander on air defense tactics and employment.

The *chief of engineer troops* advises the commander on engineer support for all the division's missions. He assigns tasks to engineer units based on the commander's concept of the operation.

The *chief of chemical troops* is responsible for the division's protection from NBC weapons. He is responsible for the supply and maintenance of NBC gear and equipment, for organization of NBC reconnaissance, and for all NBC training and work performed by division personnel.

The *chief of signal troops* is also the chief of the communications section. Likewise, the chief of recon-

naissance troops is also the chief of the intelligence section. Their duties are described in the previous section on coordinating staff.

The relationship between the chief of a given branch and the unit commander is best explained by the rating system. For example, the division commander signs the engineer battalion commander's efficiency report, but the report is written by, or at least greatly influenced by, the chief of engineers. The division commander shows the report to the rated officer, usually in the presence of the chief. When the division commander is displeased with the performance of the engineer battalion, he is likely to express his displeasure to the chief and not to the battalion commander.

Other Advisory Staffs. Besides the chiefs of arms and services, the deputy commander for the rear, the deputy commander for technical matters, and the deputy commander for political affairs may be considered special staff officers.

The *deputy commander for the rear* advises the commander on supply and rear service matters. As noted, he also shoulders part of the coordinating staff responsibility for logistics. Through the rear staff, he prepares logistic plans and orders.

The *deputy commander for technical matters* also serves as a special staff officer. He advises the commander on maintenance and repair procedures and vehicular operational readiness.

Furthermore, although probably not designated a division staff officer, the commander of the helicopter element (or squadron in selected divisions) acts as the division commander's primary adviser for employment of the division's organic and attached air assets. When aircraft are used for fire support, the helicopter element (squadron) commander carefully coordinates his plan and its execution with the division CRTA.

Other Support Sections. Besides the coordinating and special staff, there are several additional sections which may not be considered as the personal staff of the division commander as they are not subordinate to him. These include the KGB section, the military prosecutor, and the military tribunal.

The *KGB section*, staffed by personnel from the Committee for State Security (KGB), is responsible for counterintelligence. It works independently of the political officer. This section investigates and interrogates espionage suspects, enforces the political reliability of division personnel, and participates in determining key assignments.

The *military prosecutor* is in charge of investigating and prosecuting criminal activity by division personnel. He is responsible for enforcing both military regulations and civil laws, including those related to counterintelligence. In close coordination with the KGB special section and the deputy commander for political affairs, the prosecutor and his staff investigate cases and prosecute them before military tribunals. The division prosecutor is responsible to the prosecutor at army level.

The *military tribunal* also lies outside the tactical chain of command and consists of at least one judge and one or more officers trained in law. The tribunal presides over trials of military personnel charged with violating military law and of civilians accused of treason or espionage.

Division Command and Staff Procedures

The Soviet division commander must gather information on which to base decisions, convey his decisions in the form of orders, and supervise the execution of these orders. The commander relies on his staff to assist him in accomplishing his tasks. As a result, the Soviets have formalized staff procedures and have established formats for combat documents. It should be understood that these procedures may be performed completely only when time is not a factor in the decision-making process—for example during preparations for a major offensive. Once fast-moving combat has begun, all procedures will be abbreviated.

As far as can be determined, the Soviet commander follows procedures familiar to US commanders. He makes an estimate of the situation, issues a *warning order*, considers courses of action that have been researched and presented by the staff, and finally makes a command decision which is approved by the army commander. The decision is printed in an approved, detailed format and disseminated according to a fixed distribution list. In their military writings, the Soviets emphasize the need to be able to adjust rapidly to radical changes in the situation which can occur on the modern battlefield. This emphasis is more prevalent than emphasis on rigid adherence to formal procedures. As a result, the commander's estimate and decision may take only a few minutes and may be based on very scanty information. The *combat order* may be nothing more than a sentence transmitted by radio or messenger to a regimental commander.

Warning Order. The Soviets attempt to maximize the time available for combat preparations by issuing warning orders to alert subordinate units that an

operation is upcoming. In the division, the commander receives his mission from the army commander. This order could be delivered by radio, messenger, or at a formal briefing. The division commander studies the mission, the concept of the operation, and scheduled support by army units. He analyzes the role of his division in the overall operation of the army. From this analysis, he extracts information that will permit his staff and subordinate commanders to begin preparation for combat, and issues this information in the form of a warning order.

The chief of staff organizes the staff to present information to the commander concerning the enemy, terrain, troops available, and weather. From this information, the commander makes his estimate of the situation. If time permits, he makes a personal reconnaissance with his subordinate commanders and staff officers as required to better evaluate the situation. Given sufficient time, written staff estimates are prepared and coordinated for the commander.

The operations section prepares several possible courses of action for the commander's consideration, and the chief of staff indicates his preference. Based on the available data and the recommendations from the staff, the commander makes a decision. The decision may be one of the recommended courses of action, a combination of two or more recommendations, or a new solution.

Combat Order. The commander announces his decision in the presence of the chief of staff, the chief of the operations section, and, when possible, other key personnel such as the coordinating staff, the chiefs of arms and services, and the deputy and subordinate commanders. The final decision is issued in the form of an operation order—in Soviet terminology, a "combat order." When time permits, the combat order contains the following information:

- A brief description of the enemy situation.
- The missions of the division and adjacent units.
- Boundaries separating the division and adjacent units.
- Commander's concept of the operation.
- Guidance on NBC measures within the division zone.
- Immediate mission, subsequent mission, and direction of advance for subordinate units.
- Missions for artillery, antiaircraft, engineer, chemical, and other special units.
- The time troops must be prepared for action.
- Detailed coordinating instructions.
- Location of the main command post and its anticipated direction of displacement.

Annexes to combat orders are forwarded with the order. If they are incomplete when the order is transmitted, they are sent out separately to prevent delay in transmission of the order. Types of annexes include coordination requirements, intelligence, security, signal, artillery, engineer, movement order, and counterattack plans.

A separate order for logistics is written by the deputy commander for the rear and his staff. The order organizes the rear area, routes of movement for rear elements, supply routes, supply points, sequence and time of resupply, rear area security, and the location of the rear area command post. The order is approved by the division commander.

Supervisory Control. The issuance of orders does not insure that they will be carried out or even understood. Therefore, the Soviets place a great emphasis on supervision after the order is issued. The chief of staff is responsible to the commander for the overall organization of staff supervision. Each staff section is responsible for checking on the execution of the orders which it prepares and insures that orders have been understood correctly. The chief of staff issues the necessary orders, with the division commander's approval, to resolve the misunderstandings.

Proper supervision may take many forms. Supervision may include personal visits by the commander or appropriate staff representatives, observation from the air and ground observation points, and instructions

and questions passed by radio or messenger. The best method, according to Soviet thought, is personal contact between the commander or staff member and the subordinate organization's commander.


Command Posts. The Soviet division commander also organizes a series of command posts for control purposes. During an attack, the division commander moves well forward, where he can best influence the action. This forward command post is completely mobile and may move 2 to 5 kilometers behind the line of contact. The commander usually will have with him the operations officer and the CRTA. He also may select other officers.

The division's main command post also is mobile, but is much larger than the forward command post. It is controlled by the chief of staff and moves 10 to 15 kilometers behind the line of contact.

Additionally, the rear area is expected to move two to three times a day and is controlled by a rear area command post. This command post usually will not be more than 30 kilometers from the line of contact.

On the march and during the attack, the commander controls the action by radio and messengers. In a static situation, or in the defense, wire communications will be installed. Command posts on the ground can be expected to be well dispersed and camouflaged. Additionally, in a static situation, an alternate command post probably will be established to assume command if the main command post is destroyed.

Divisional Command Posts



Communications. Normal radio nets in the division include command, staff, coordination, warning, and special purpose nets. The command nets link the division commander with regimental commanders and major support units such as the artillery, engineer, and chemical units. Battalion commanders are contacted directly when emergency conditions dictate. The chief of rocket troops and artillery establishes a command net with division artillery units. The staff net provides the chief of staff communications with staff elements of the reconnaissance battalion, the motorized rifle regiments, and the tank regiment. The coordination nets link the main command post with the division rear, and division headquarters with adjacent units. The warning net consists of radio receivers set on a designated warning frequency throughout the division. This net is used for tactical alert and warning messages. The special purpose nets employ radiotelegraph and relay equipment to communicate with units executing special missions and with airborne units behind enemy lines. Division commanders also may establish other nets as required when the necessary equipment is available.

Soviet units usually observe radio silence in, and when departing, assembly areas. While moving toward the enemy, radio transmissions normally are limited to various codewords which inform commanders that assigned tasks have been accomplished or that difficulties have been encountered. Visual signals, such as flags and flares, are used to a great extent during movement.

When contact with the enemy occurs, normal radio procedures are reinitiated. Call signs identify units, and prearranged codewords refer to landmarks. Subordinate commanders inform the division commander, usually by codeword, when phase lines are reached, when NBC contamination is encountered, when contact with the enemy occurs, when the enemy is suspected of conducting a withdrawal, and when other important developments occur.

REGIMENT-LEVEL COMMAND AND CONTROL

The regiment headquarters consist of a commander, a chief of staff, his staff group, three functional groups each headed by a deputy commander, and chiefs of organic or attached support arms or services.

The commander, the chief of staff, and the deputy commanders for technical affairs, rear services, and political affairs form the command group. The commander draws a major part of his decision-making input from them.

The *commander* is usually a colonel or a lieutenant colonel. He is most likely to be in his late thirties or early forties and to have had advanced tactical training at one of the higher military academies. He is expected to maintain strict control over subordinate commanders; to inspect frequently the various training, administrative, and equipment maintenance aspects of his command in garrison; and to set a high personal example. In combat, he has considerable prerogatives in the way in which he organizes and executes his tactical mission.

The *chief of staff* is usually a lieutenant colonel and a graduate of one of the higher military academies. He is the second-in-command of the regiment and is the only officer who may issue written orders in the commander's name. The chief of staff is responsible for mobilization readiness and troop control. He coordinates the work of the functional staff groups and refines and presents to the commander the information which is required for decision making.


The *deputy commander for political affairs* most often is a major or lieutenant colonel. He has a dual reporting responsibility—to the regimental commander and to the deputy for political affairs at division headquarters. It is the political deputy commander's responsibility to conduct political activities directed at insuring full combat readiness, military discipline, and high morale. He directs the work of political and *Komsomol* activists, is responsible for indoctrinating the troops in the political goals and implications of combat actions, and supervises recreational activities.

The *deputy commander for technical affairs* is normally a major or lieutenant colonel and a graduate engineer. He is responsible to the commander for the serviceability and maintenance of the armored and automotive equipment in the regiment. He is the direct superior of the technical officers who are found in each subunit down to company level. During combat he organizes the recovery, repair, or evacuation of disabled armored vehicles. Besides his other duties, the technical deputy is responsible for the military and specialist training of all technical troops in the regiment.

The *deputy commander for rear services*, normally a major or lieutenant colonel, is responsible for transport and the supply of regimental subunits both in garrison and in the field with ammunition, fuel, food, clothing, and equipment. During combat he commands the rear area command post.

The *staff group* is subordinate directly to the chief of staff and comprises the assistant chiefs of staff for operations, intelligence, communications, and personnel. The staff group also includes a finance

The Soviet Regimental Staff



officer, a cryptographic officer, and a headquarters commandant who controls headquarters disposition, security, and traffic control (see tasks, next page).

The chiefs of organic and attached arms and services form an ad hoc group to advise the commander on matters within their expertise. These officers are the commanders of combat support and service support units which are organic or attached to the regiment.

The headquarters of the regiment operates a main command post and a rear area command post (the command post of the deputy commander for rear services). The regimental commander's armored vehicle may be located forward of the main command post, functioning as a command observation post.

Additional observation posts are established by artillery and air observers.

The *main command* post consists of several armored vehicles, including the commander's vehicle. It is staffed by the chief of staff; the deputy commander for political affairs; the assistant chiefs of staff for operations, intelligence, and communications; and the commanders of the regimental engineer and chemical defense subunits. The commanders of supporting artillery units, mounted in their own command vehicles, normally are collocated. The main command post moves in tactical bounds up to 5 km behind the line of contact. When in position, the command post is dispersed and camouflaged.

Tasks of Officers in the Staff Group

POSITION	RANK	RESPONSIBLE FOR
ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR OPERATIONS	Major	Planning operations, liaison and training; serving as the Deputy Chief of Staff
ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR INTELLIGENCE	Captain or Major	Planning reconnaissance missions; collecting, evaluating, and disseminating tactical intelligence; commanding the regimental reconnaissance company.
ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR COMMUNICATIONS	Captain	Establishment and maintenance of communications; supervision of serving of signal equipment; management of the regimental post office; command of the regimental signal company.
ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR PERSONNEL	Major	Maintaining statistical records on personnel, equipment and prisoners of war. Processing replacement leave, and awards and decorations.

The *rear area command post* consists of one or two vehicles. The deputy commander for rear services is aided by the commanders of service support units as required. He is responsible for organizing administrative and logistic support of the regiment from his command post. This involves the receipt and issue of fuel, ammunition, food, and minor equipment. The rear area command post also maintains staff control of vehicle and manpower replacements; maintenance, repair, and recovery of vehicles; medical services; and personnel services. During combat, the rear area command post is expected to operate about 15 km behind the line of contact. Ammunition supply for the artillery is coordinated by an officer from the artillery battalion, who is located in the rear area command post for this purpose.

After receiving a mission from the division commander, the regimental commander, assisted by his staff, makes an estimate of the situation. A warning order is sent to subunits. Intelligence on the enemy and information on friendly units is disseminated. After all factors have been weighed and possible courses of action have been examined, the commander makes his decision. Frequently, details are marked on a map from which the staff formulates written combat orders. If time and the tactical situation allow, commanders will issue orders at a meeting with subordinate commanders. If rapid deployment is necessary, orders are given by radio and then backed up by schematics that are delivered to the subordinate commanders.

The regimental commander controls his subunits by issuing combat instructions over the radio. These fragmentary orders change, supplement, or elaborate on initial combat orders as the tactical situation changes.

BATTALION-LEVEL COMMAND AND CONTROL

The battalion commander is normally a major responsible for—

- The combat and mobilization readiness of the battalion.
- The combat and political training, education, military discipline, political reliability, and morale of the battalion's personnel.
- The condition and security of weapons, combat and other equipment, ammunition, fuel, and other materiel of the battalion.
- The successful accomplishment of the battalion's missions.

The battalion commander is assisted by a staff that includes chief of staff, deputy commander for technical matters, and deputy commander for political affairs.

The *chief of staff* is the commander's "right arm." He has the authority to give orders to all subordinate elements; and he insures compliance with orders from the battalion commander and higher commanders. The chief of staff draws up the combat and training plans (based on the regimental plan and the battalion commander's guidance) for the battalion and insures that they are carried out. He also insures that required reports are prepared and dispatched on time to regimental headquarters. He is the principal organizer of rear service support for the battalion.

The *deputy commander for technical affairs* supervises the battalion's maintenance service element and reports directly to the battalion commander or chief of staff. He is responsible for training of rear services personnel, and for the technical condition of their equipment.


The *deputy commander for political affairs* organizes and conducts political training. He reports to the battalion commander and to the regimental deputy for political affairs.

The *communications platoon leader* acts as the battalion communications officer. It is his responsibility to train battalion personnel in signal procedures and to supervise communications training of the battalion, to include the conduct of classes for radio operators and periodic inspections of communications equipment. In combat, the battalion communications officer receives instructions from the regimental communications officer, battalion commander and chief of staff.

The battalion commander directs the combat actions of his unit from his command vehicle located near his companies.

In an attack, the commander controls his battalion primarily by radio, although he also uses messengers, personal contact, signal flares, signal flags, and other means. Before contact with the enemy, radio silence is observed, except for brief transmissions concerning reconnaissance reports and the crossing of phase lines. In the defense, the battalion relies primarily on wire and telephone communications, but messengers, signal flares, and radios also are used extensively. NBC warnings are provided over a dedicated radio receiver.

Representative Communications Net in a Motorized Rifle Battalion



A Detailed Example: Tank Battalion Command and Control

The radio is the most important of several means of control available to the Soviet tank unit commander. Soviet military writers insist that only the speed and flexibility of radio communications can adequately meet the demands for command and control in modern combined arms combat. At the same time, they stress the importance of being able to employ other means of control to supplement or, if necessary, to replace radio communications. The Soviets train extensively in the use of audio and visual signals, pyrotechnics, and "do-as-I-do" control procedures with well-rehearsed tactical formations and battle drills.

The battalion is the primary unit for execution of maneuver. Consistent with that concept, control of radio communications is centralized at battalion level. When individual tank companies operate with their parent battalion, all of the battalion's tanks may monitor the battalion VHF (FM) command net and receive orders from the battalion commander. In combat, the battalion commander attempts to maintain a position from which he can observe and direct the actions of all his companies. Requests for fire support are almost always coordinated at battalion level. The supporting artillery commander (with fire mission computation capability) is collocated with the tank battalion commander.

Attached units such as a motorized rifle company, an artillery subunit (as large as a battalion), an air defense element, and an engineer support element, as well as organic supply, maintenance, and medical sections, all operate stations in the battalion VHF (FM) command and coordination net. These organic support elements normally do not transmit unless called.

Company commanders also have the authority to transmit on the battalion nets. They have the authority to call for supporting fire in combat, but such calls for fire normally are channeled through the battalion commander. While Soviet tactical communications practices seem restrictive, they do appear to be adequate for the company commander's limited control authority, which normally is confined to fire control of his tanks and the deployment of his company in rehearsed battle drills.

As might be expected, the authority of the platoon leader is even more restricted. He is not

authorized to transmit on the radio except in an extreme emergency or to request support. This communications posture is consistent with his role, which is to lead his platoon in the execution of the company mission. He does not have the responsibility to translate his superiors' mission into a platoon mission.

The noncommissioned tank commander monitors and complies with his superiors' commands and follows his platoon leader in the execution of the company mission. Since he is not issued a map, he has limited capability to relay targets of opportunity to fire support units.

However, a commander of a tank company or a platoon does have greater latitude when his unit is employed as a reconnaissance group or a march security element, or is attached to a motorized rifle battalion. For example, the company commander of a tank company that is reinforcing a motorized rifle battalion will operate his own company VHF (FM) net while maintaining communications with his parent tank battalion using his HF (AM) radio. The reinforced motorized rifle battalion commander normally will communicate with the reinforcing tank company on the tank company commander's net.


The variant of a reinforced tank battalion radio net shown at right approximates the portrayal of radio net structures in Soviet military journals and books. Each long vertical rectangle drawn with a broken line represents a command element or subelement within (or attached to) the battalion. Each solid horizontal line represents a single radio net. A symbol (diamond, circle, etc.) enclosing a number on a given horizontal line within the broken lines of a given command element shows that the command element routinely operates a radio station (of the type represented by the number) in that radio net. The identity of the radio net is written on the horizontal line, and the identity of the command element or subelement is indicated at the top of the command column. A symbol drawn with a broken line (diamond, circle, etc.) that appears within a command element on a radio net line shows that the particular command element may operate in that net either as required, or as the alternative to another net, but it does not have sufficient radio assets to operate in the net on a continuous basis.

A Detailed Example: Tank Battalion Command and Control, continued

RADIO NETS, REINFORCED TANK BATTALION (VARIANT)

Shown here is a radio net diagram of a tank battalion to which an entire artillery battalion is attached for support. A tank battalion normally would be directly

supported by an entire artillery battalion if it were fighting in the first echelon, or if it were operating separately from its parent regiment, as it might in a pursuit.



The battalion command group is represented by columns 7 through 10. Within the command group is the **battalion commander** (column 7) operating from his own tank, which also serves as a mobile command observation post (COP); the **battalion chief of staff** (column 8), who operates the battalion command post from an armored command vehicle; the supporting **artillery battalion commander** (column 9), who operates his battalion command observation post from a van or an armored command vehicle; and the **deputy commander for technical affairs** (column 10), who directs maintenance, recovery, and support operations from an armored command vehicle or APC. Not shown is a second command truck belonging to the signal section which serves as a backup command post. It is equipped with sufficient radio assets to duplicate every station maintained in the battalion command post.

The battalion commander (column 7) has two radios in his tank. One is a VHF (FM) radio, the R123, which can be pretuned to four preset frequencies. The battalion commander normally will operate the radio on his own **FM command and coordination net (CMD NET #2)**. He can switch to the regimental command net (FM) as required. If his companies are operating their own command nets, he is capable of communicating directly with any subordinate company's tanks by turning to that company's net. He normally would use the preset capability on the R123 radio to reduce the time required to change frequencies.

The other radio in the battalion commander's tank is an HF (AM) set, the **R130 transceiver**. The battalion commander normally will operate this radio on his own battalion **HF (AM) command net (CMD NET #1)**, in which only his company commanders and chief of staff may operate. The battalion commander has both command and technical control of this net. The commander will use his R130 to operate in the regimental command net (AM) as required.

The battalion chief of staff (column 8) controls the battalion command post, which is mounted in an armored command vehicle. He normally has three transceivers and one receiver in his mobile command post. One is the R130 HF (AM) transceiver, which he uses to communicate with regimental headquarters on the regimental

command net (AM). He uses an amplifier-equipped R107 VHF (FM) transceiver to communicate with the regiment on the regimental command net (FM). It appears that the chief of staff has primary responsibility for maintaining these battalion stations in the two regimental nets, thereby leaving the battalion commander free to use both his time and his radios to control the battalion. The chief of staff will use his R130 radio to operate in the battalion HF (AM) command net (CMD NET #1) as required. He operates the net control station (NCS) of the battalion command and coordination net (CMD NET #2) using the R123 VHF (FM) radio in his CP vehicle. Finally, the chief of staff maintains the only battalion station in the higher headquarters NBC and air warning net, using the R311 HF (AM) radio receiver. He retransmits any warning messages on the battalion FM command and coordination net (CMD NET #2).

The attached artillery battalion commander (column 9) operates a station in the tank battalion command and coordination net (CMD NET #2) using an amplifier-equipped R107. He rarely transmits on the net, because he normally is collocated with the tank battalion commander. He communicates with his own higher headquarters on the artillery regiment AM command net using an R130/R104 HF (AM) radio.

The artillery battalion commander operates his own command net using another R107 (FM) radio equipped with a power amplifier. Not shown in the diagram is the battalion fire direction net, which is controlled by the battalion fire direction center.

The last element to be considered within the battalion command group is the deputy commander for technical affairs. As the senior officer in the battalion support group, he maintains a station in the battalion FM command and coordination net (CMD NET #2) using an R123 vehicular FM radio. He also uses a second R123 to control the battalion technical support net. Battalion repair and recovery elements also monitor this net, and disabled tanks and other vehicles may tune to the net to request assistance.

The principal subordinate command elements of the reinforced tank battalion are shown on the left side of the diagram. Each of the tank

company commanders (columns 2, 3, and 4) has two radios in his tank. He uses his R130 HF (AM) vehicular radio to operate in the battalion AM command net (CMD NET #1). He operates in the battalion FM command and coordination net (CMD NET #2) on his second radio, the R123. Unlike most other subordinate stations, he has permission to transmit in the net. Under exceptional circumstances, such as when the battalion is widely dispersed in a pursuit, he may use the R123 to control his own FM net, in which case his only radio link with the battalion would be the AM command net (CMD NET #1). The company net alternative is shown by broken lines within each company command element. Each tank below company level normally is equipped with one radio, the R123 VHF (FM).

The **commander of the attached motorized rifle company** (column 5) has two VHF (FM) radios in his vehicle. He uses his R123 to communicate with the supported tank battalion commander on the FM battalion command and coordination net (CMD NET #2). He controls his own company net using the R107 VHF (FM) radio in his vehicle.

Air defense elements and the **combat reconnaissance patrol**, normally composed of a tank platoon, (columns 1 and 6) operate in the battalion FM command and coordination net (CMD NET #2).

Shown within each company command element (columns 2, 3, and 4) is an **artillery battery command observation post**. Normally, the battery commander is collocated with the commander of the tank company that he is tasked to support, and communications between the two commanders are accomplished face to face. The battery commander maintains radio communications with his battalion commander on the artillery battalion command net (FM) using an R107 radio. He uses a second R107 to communicate with his own battery firing position, and forward observation post (shown on the diagram for the first battery only) on his own battery FM command net.

Fire requests generated by the tank company normally are coordinated at battalion level. However, Soviet artillery doctrine and organization do provide a means for direct response to company-level fire requests. These requests can be passed through the supporting battery

commander to his firing battery over the nets shown here. The degree of centralization of fire support coordination will be dictated by the combat situation as reflected in the task organization and combat orders.

Below regiment level, the Soviets do not employ sufficient quantities of secure-voice equipment to be operationally significant. From platoon to regiment level, commands routinely are transmitted by radio in clear text during combat.

Stations are identified by callsigns that are issued in the communications operating instructions compiled by the battalion communications platoon leader. The regimental communications officer issues the battalion a block of frequencies and callsigns. Each radio net "item" created normally remains in effect for the duration of an operation.

Place names are identified on the radio using code names assigned to major terrain features by the battalion commander during the ground reconnaissance phase of a combat operation. This local encoding process may be supplemented by an encoded map reference grid system. Pyrotechnic tables and brevity codes also are generated locally, although some code assignments may come from higher headquarters.

Most information is disseminated orally by the battalion commander and the communications platoon leader during the ground reconnaissance, which normally precedes an operation. At that time, the battalion officers record on their maps codenames, frequencies, callsigns, and perhaps even a simple radio net diagram. For obvious reasons, the Soviets call the map "the officers' encoded map," or "encoded working map."

The Soviets strive to maintain strict radio discipline. In the defense, they communicate by wire whenever possible. In the offense, they maintain radio silence until the outbreak of battle, when those authorized to transmit may do so without restriction. In an attack against a defending enemy, the battle is considered to have begun with the artillery preparation. In the meeting engagement, radio silence is lifted as soon as any element of the Soviet advancing force, other than the combat reconnaissance patrol, makes enemy contact.

CHAPTER 4

OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS: FRONT AND ARMY

The offensive is the only type of combat action . . . , employment of which attains the complete route of the enemy and the seizure of important objectives and areas.

A. A. Sidorenko
The Offensive

TVD OFFENSIVE

Front and army operations normally take place within a theater of military operations (Russian: TVD), encompassing a considerable part of the territory of a continent and comprising a level of command. A TVD offensive has a strategic mission to defeat and destroy enemy field forces, to capture vital territory, and to bring about the political destruction of the enemy.

Offensive operations within a TVD could be supported by—

- Strategic aviation.
- Strategic rocket forces.
- Airborne forces.
- Transport aviation.
- Naval and naval infantry forces.

Within the TVD, the operational formations are *fronts* and armies. A *front* is a wartime formation comprised of several armies or separate divisions. Its size varies with the mission it is given within the overall strategic operation. An army is the largest peacetime ground maneuver formation at the operational level. In wartime, the composition and size of an army also varies dependent upon mission. An army may be either tank or combined arms. Its structure provides adequate control and ground-based support for the divisions assigned to it during the army's participation in a *front* operation.

Divisions and smaller organizations are found at the tactical level. The division has a fixed organization and serves as the "building block" and maneuver element of armies. The motorized rifle and tank divisions are balanced, powerful, and mobile organizations capable of operations in a nonnuclear as well as a nuclear environment. At this level, the Soviets emphasize both sustainability and mobility. Organic logistic assets can sustain the division for several days of high-intensity, high-speed combat and are as mobile as the maneuver units.

The development of air assault brigades has given the theater commander large, flexible, and well-armed formations that he can employ early in the battle

against targets in the enemy rear. The brigade may be deployed as a unit or as subunits. Its mission is to seize, disrupt, or destroy nuclear weapons, airfields, command, control and communication (C³) centers, logistics facilities, and key terrain such as river crossing sites and road junctions. In this manner, it helps shift the focus of the battle away from the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA). If successful, the activities of the brigade facilitate rapid penetration by first echelon formations through the enemy's forward defensive zone and directly support the high-speed movement of large exploitation forces advancing from the *front* into the depths of the enemy's defenses.

FRONT OFFENSIVE

The mission of a *front* offensive is to seize key political and economic centers and concurrently to destroy enemy military forces defending them.

A *front* offensive involves much more than attacks against enemy forward defensive positions. It involves coordinated, repetitive, intensive strikes throughout the entire depth of enemy field forces. These strikes are accomplished by an initial, massive, nonnuclear air operation, heliborne and airborne assault, possibly coordinated with deep attacks by an operational maneuver group, all available unconventional warfare means, surface-to-surface rockets and missiles, electronic warfare, possible chemical warfare, and, if deemed necessary, nuclear warfare.

The overriding aim in a Soviet front offensive is to delay or prevent the war from turning nuclear by the swift, early destruction or neutralization of enemy nuclear weapons by nonnuclear means. High rates of advance by attacking ground forces, coupled with strikes throughout the rear, are intended to cripple the enemy's ability to respond effectively to the Soviet offensive and to resort to tactical nuclear warfare. The top priority target for Soviet weapons would be enemy nuclear delivery systems.

Offensive Planning

In planning an offensive operation for the *front*, consideration is always given to those situations in which either side would employ nuclear weapons. Destruction or neutralization of the enemy's nuclear-capable delivery systems is considered essential. Thus, continuous reconnaissance is planned to target those systems with a nuclear capability accurately. Planning

at *front* level is essentially the same for both nuclear and nonnuclear operations in objectives, employment of forces, main and supporting attacks, and axes of advance. The similarities end, however, in planning the scheme of maneuver and fire support. Normally, conventional operations require successive intermediate operations with a continuous regrouping of forces. *Frontal* aviation is given the mission to engage targets deep in the enemy rear area while the artillery has the mission to neutralize the enemy near the FEBA. In contrast, nuclear operations keep the number of intermediate operations to a minimum. *Front* objectives are attained by employing high speed operations along multiple axes of advance, exploiting the results of the nuclear fire plan (see diagram below).

Planning at *front* level must support the conduct of operations deep in the enemy's rear area. Armies assigned to the *front*—

- Attack along one or more axes to split the defenders into separate or isolated groups. These groups are to be destroyed while the offensive is continued toward the enemy's rear area.
- Attack along converging axes to envelop enemy forces. These forces are to be destroyed as the offensive continues to the depths of the enemy's defenses.

The width of a *front* offensive zone could extend to approximately 350 kilometers. The frontage, organization, rate of advance, and concept of the *front* offensive

are all variable based on missions, enemy defenses, terrain, weather, and time.


Offensive Phasing

To assist in phasing offensive operations at the operational level, the Soviets have defined a series of terms outlining various depths of the enemy defenses and the objectives encompassed within those depths.

The *initial phase* of the operation requires the penetration of the enemy's forward defenses and the neutralization or destruction of the enemy in the area defined as the "tactical depth." This depth includes the reserves of the forward enemy divisions. The *subsequent phase* calls for the neutralization or destruction of those enemy units in the area encompassed by the "immediate operational depth." The enemy corps reserves are found in this area. When the situation permits the introduction of a *front's* second echelon armies as exploitation forces, the enemy's strategic reserves at Army Group and Theater level are attacked. The *final phase* of the offensive is the accomplishment of the *front* final objectives: the capture of logistical, political, and economic centers and the neutralization of remaining enemy forces.

The categories of objective depths which regulate *front* offensive operations are identified and illustrated on the next page.


Front Planning Objectives



ATTACK ALONG ONE OR MORE AXES TO SPLIT THE DEFENDERS INTO SEPARATE OR ISOLATED GROUPS. THESE ARE TO BE DESTROYED IN DETAIL, WITH CONCURRENT FURTHER ATTACKS TOWARD THE ENEMY'S REAR DEPTHS.

ATTACKS ALONG CONVERGING AXES TO ENVELOPE SIZABLE ENEMY FORCES. SURROUNDED FORCES ARE TO BE DESTROYED AS CONCURRENT ATTACKS CONTINUE TO THE DEPTHS.

Front Offensive Objectives and Depths



Rapid Advance

The Soviet offensive is characterized by a high rate of advance. Over a period of several weeks or more, the Soviets anticipate a rate of advance of approximately 50 kilometers per day under nuclear or nonnuclear conditions. Rate of advance is not expected to be uniform. While fighting through enemy defensive positions, the Soviets expect a rate of several kilometers per hour or up to 30 kilometers per day. Once a major penetration has been achieved, the rate would increase considerably.

When confronting an enemy that has taken up defensive positions, the Soviets attempt to strike weak points in the defense and to drive to the enemy's rear whenever possible by bypassing his major force concentrations. They attempt to cripple the enemy quickly by destroying or disrupting his nuclear capability, his command and control facilities, and his logistic system before he could effectively react.


Even if the Soviets are forced to deal with an enemy that is emplaced in defensive positions across their entire frontage, they still attempt to avoid a costly, time-consuming battle of attrition. They would strive

to develop penetrations leading to the enemy rear to topple the enemy defensive structure. They anticipate that elements of a front second echelon probably would not have to combat enemy forces in defensive positions. After the first two to five days of the war, they expect prepared positions to have been overrun and combat to be characterized by rapid movement into the enemy rear interrupted by violent, relatively brief, meeting engagements.

Concentration of Forces

A *front* normally conducts a main attack over one or more axes whose proximity to one another depend upon whether the front is to split or envelop the enemy in its drive towards its objectives. The direction of a main attack would be decisive in the defeat of the enemy and seizure of territory. One or more supporting attacks accompany the main attack. A supporting attack ties down opposing enemy forces to prevent them from reinforcing the sector threatened by the main attack.

Soviet Front Offensive Operation (Variant)



Certain sectors of enemy defenses may be designated as breakthrough sectors. These are areas, normally across a main attack axis, that an operational-level commander deems necessary, desirable, or likely for major penetration. Under nuclear conditions, enemy defenses in a breakthrough sector are destroyed by tactical nuclear strikes, followed by rapid exploitation by maneuver units. Under nonnuclear, but nuclear-threatened conditions, the sector is attacked by massed air and artillery fires and numerous attacks on multiple axes by maneuver units.

The benefit gained by the attacker who uses only conventional weapons on the nuclear-threatened battlefield is that the enemy also must avoid concentrating forces. The defender must leave gaps and/or lightly manned sectors between his units. Whenever possible, the Soviet commander directs his attack against these undefended or lightly defended areas, thereby achieving a favorable force ratio without massing his own forces.

The greater range and increased mobility of modern artillery weapons enable Soviet artillerymen to mass fires against a target without concentrating the weapons themselves. This practice reduces their vulnerability to a nuclear strike and makes it more difficult for the enemy to determine long in advance where a main attack might be made. The fires of combat helicopters and close air support fixed-wing aircraft also are integrated into their overall fire planning. This again enhances the Soviets' ability to focus a great deal of firepower without putting masses of troops at risk to an enemy nuclear strike.

When the Soviets do concentrate forces, they are likely to do so in several locations along the FEBA and in relatively small numbers in any one sector. By narrowing the width of an attack frontage, they achieve superior force ratios at several points along the FEBA. In such a situation, they probably attack with most forces in the first echelon.

The Soviet commander is more likely to use multiple, narrow penetrations when he has a clear numerical advantage over the enemy across his entire frontage and when the enemy has positioned the bulk of his defending forces forward. When enemy defenses are echeloned in depth, the Soviets tend to use an attack force echeloned in depth to maintain the momentum of the attack after the initial penetration.

Attack Echelons

As a very general rule, combined arms armies would be used in the first echelon of a front. Then tank armies would normally appear in its second echelon,

combined arms reserve, or operational maneuver group (OMG).

Tank armies may be placed in the first echelon for attaining greater speed when terrain and other conditions permit this employment. This variant would be likely if a massive nuclear strike preceded the ground offensive or if enemy defenses were not well prepared.

Most forces of a *front* are placed in its first echelon. The mission of the *front's* first echelon would be to overcome enemy defenses and to attack through the immediate operational depth (to enemy corps rear areas).

Front first echelon forces are reinforced by artillery, other combat support, and logistic elements from *front* second echelon forces.

The remainder, or follow-on, forces of the *front* could include—

- A second echelon or a combined arms reserve.
- An operational maneuver group (OMG).
- Special reserves.

A *front* second echelon (or a combined arms reserve), normally at least one army, has a mission of exploiting success achieved by first echelon forces by continuing the main thrust of the offensive to reach deeper objectives. Committed follow-on forces then become part of a new first echelon. Then a combined arms reserve normally is constituted from former first echelon forces.

The *Front* Operational Maneuver Group

Since the late 1970s, important changes in the operational employment and organization of Soviet ground maneuver formations have been observed. The most significant operational change has been the concept of employing a tailored high-speed exploitation force at army and probably *front* level. This force, called the operational maneuver group (OMG), is tailored for the situation and is designed to move deep into the enemy rear area and to seize critical objectives, normally before second echelon Soviet formations are committed to combat. A *front* OMG could be committed well before the *front* immediate objective (enemy corps rear) is attained.

The OMG is an updated version of an older concept infused with new technology. It was widely used in the final stages of World War II when the Germans and Japanese were unable to present a deeply echeloned defense and had no large operational reserves. The predecessor of the OMG was the army and *front* "mobile group" of World War II. Mobile groups were large operational exploitation forces used to move rapidly and decisively deep into the enemy's rear area

to destroy his command and control and lines of communication, to defeat his reserves, to encircle and destroy his forces, and to capture or destroy key political and economic centers.

The mission of an OMG is to help the first echelon penetrate the enemy defenses, if required, and then to raid deep into the enemy rear as early in the offensive as possible. The OMG is to destroy enemy nuclear weapons, air defenses, communications, command and control, to seize airfields or disrupt lines of communication, and to assist advancing main forces by seizing bridgeheads, road junctions, and so forth.

A *front* OMG may be attached from resources controlled by the theater of military operations (TVD) or Supreme High Command. It could be as large as an army, constituted either before or during an operation.

An OMG may not always be formed. Whether one is formed depends on a number of factors the most important of which are the planned direction(s) of the main attack; the tactics, strength, and readiness of enemy forces; and the nature of the terrain over which an attacking force must maneuver. An OMG is most likely to be used when the enemy defense system is seen to be at a low state of readiness or when enemy defenses are relatively shallow and not supported by large reserves.

Nonnuclear *Front* Offensive

A nonnuclear Soviet front offensive probably would begin with a massive air operation, conducted continuously for several days, using massed assets from *frontal*, strategic, and naval aviation. The two main goals of the air operation are to neutralize enemy theater nuclear capability and to gain tactical air superiority for the remainder of the operation. Targets of the air operation are nuclear delivery systems, airfields and aircraft, air defense systems, and command and control facilities.

The Soviets are willing to accept great losses in their own air assets to achieve their goals. They believe that they could conduct the remainder of the offensive with older, possibly obsolescent, aircraft provided they succeeded in crippling enemy tactical air power.

Ground attacks by *front* ground forces are preceded by a massive artillery preparation conducted by first echelon armies. If nuclear weapons are used from the onset, they are used in a massive, in-depth strike before the nonnuclear preparation. Whether they are used or not, nuclear strikes always are included in fire planning.

An airborne operation conducted by a front could be launched either at the start of an offensive, or at a

later time, possibly after completion of the air operation. It could be of airborne-regiment or possibly division size. Linkup may be planned with advancing ground forces, probably an OMG. Possible objectives include nuclear weapons, command and control centers, enemy airfields, major bridges, and logistic facilities.

Soviet airborne forces are equipped with BMD airborne assault vehicles. On the ground, in the enemy rear, they fight as motorized infantry. A *front* may also employ small, foot-mobile, special-purpose airborne forces to conduct reconnaissance and sabotage in the enemy rear.

ARMY OFFENSIVE

An army in the first echelon of a *front* offensive normally has a mission to attack through enemy defenses to the immediate operational depth, the enemy corps rear area. The achievement of an army's mission is the culmination of successive attacks conducted by its divisions.

A combined arms army may have two to four motorized rifle divisions and one or two tank divisions. A tank army may have two to four tank divisions and one or two motorized rifle divisions.

An army offensive normally has a frontage 60 to 100 kilometers wide. The first echelon of an army normally contains most of the army's combat power. Army follow-on forces could include—

- A second echelon or a combined arms reserve.
- An operational maneuver group.
- Special reserves.


Echelonment of Forces

When an OMG is formed at army level, the bulk of the forces available to the army commander probably is distributed between the first echelon and the OMG. This may cause the second echelon or reserve to be smaller in those armies where OMGs are employed.

If enemy defenses are not well prepared in depth and not backed up by operational-level reserves, the army probably attacks in a single strong echelon followed by a combined arms reserve and, possibly, an OMG. If the enemy is well prepared in depth and does have operational reserves, the army probably attacks in two echelons. In other words, if the enemy defense has an operational second echelon (or reserve) the Soviets employ an operational second echelon to sustain the momentum of the offensive.

First and second echelon forces operate in concert to destroy defending enemy forces before them, up to

Soviet Army Offensive Operation (Variants)



NOTES:

- (1) Several variants are depicted.
- (2) Combined Arms Army (CAA) depicted consists of 3 motorized rifle divisions (MRD), a tank division (TD), and an independent tank regiment (TR).
- (3) CAA main attack could be on axis 1 or axis 3. Supporting attack on axis 2.
- (4) Frontage: approximately 60 km.
- (5) Depending on CAA missions and/or development of battle, second echelon could be committed to:
 - maintain momentum on axis 3
 - secure OMG lines of communication on axis 1
 - develop opportune success on axis 2
- (6) Flexibility most apparent at operational (Army and front) level.

assigned mission (objective) depths. Second echelon forces of an army normally are committed after the army's immediate objective is attained. An army OMG, if employed, could be committed as early as the first day of an operation.

One or more divisions in the first echelon probably attack on a predetermined army main attack axis. Other first echelon divisions conduct supporting attacks. Achievement of a "breakthrough" of enemy prepared defensive positions is a probable mission of forces conducting the main attack of an army.

First echelon regiments of the army's first echelon divisions attack from the march at top speed to achieve deeper penetration of the enemy's main defenses, and to exploit surprise and enemy disorganization. Second echelon regiments of the army's first echelon divisions would exploit the best penetrations into the deep tactical rear of the enemy.

The army's second echelon or combined arms reserve, normally about division size, advances behind army first echelon forces. It is dispersed laterally on multiple routes to minimize vulnerability to enemy detection and attacks. Based on the development of the battle and on his assigned mission, the army commander commits his follow-on forces at the most opportune time and place. He does this to achieve a "breakthrough," deeper exploitation, and dissolution of enemy tactical and immediate-operational defenses.

Use of Forward Detachments


The offensive is characterized by surprise, speed, and a striving to preempt or forestall the enemy. Some subunits of first echelon forces may attempt to strike deep into the enemy forward defensive area before enemy defenses are fully organized and solidified. Such

missions are likely given to forward detachments of an army's first echelon divisions, fully supported by artillery and close air support. It is also possible that an army could employ a tank-heavy regimental-sized "operational" forward detachment to achieve similar but deeper results in the enemy main defensive area.

Division forward detachments, normally reinforced tank battalions, could advance during the night before the offensive. They attack on multiple axes across the

army's offensive zone to penetrate enemy covering forces. Then they drive at top speed in prebattle or march formation to seize and hold key terrain within the main defensive area. Battalion-sized heliborne assaults designed for linkup with the forward detachments also could be employed. The purpose of such operationally-planned tactics is to disrupt or preempt enemy defensive structure while opening multiple avenues for swift attacks by larger first echelon forces.

Combined Arms Army Offensive (Variant)



Strong forward detachments probably would be used throughout the operation to continually press the advance into the enemy rear on several axes. Numerous deep penetrations by forward detachments and/or OMGs early in the operation would result in an intermingling of enemy and friendly forces. This

situation would complicate or forestall enemy use of tactical nuclear weapons. The Soviets probably would accept heavy losses in deep-penetration forces if they could cause an early collapse of the enemy's defensive structure before he could resort to use of nuclear weapons.

The Army OMG

Army OMGs likely are formed from resources that are normally part of or supporting the army. OMGs may be established before an operation as part of the initial plan or during an operation to exploit an unforeseen opportunity. At army level, the OMG probably would be as large as a reinforced division. An OMG could operate 100 kilometers or more beyond other army forces.

Command and control of an OMG is conducted by a combination of radio, an airborne command element, and air and ground couriers. Sustaining an OMG requires highly mobile transport and supply. The Soviets attempt to maintain a ground line of communication as well as resupply by air.

The relationship between the OMG and the second echelon in an operation varies depending on the concept of operation. If the OMG is operating away from the main axis of advance, its activities and those of the second echelon may not be directly related. If the OMG is operating on the main axis of advance, the second echelon may be required to destroy forces bypassed by the OMG or to secure the OMG's lines of communications.

Unlike the second echelon, the OMG acts as a large operational raiding force. Typically, it is assigned an ultimate objective or objectives (perhaps located on the main axis) but is expected to disrupt, capture, or seize other objectives along the way, while attempting to avoid a decisive engagement with large enemy forces. The OMG could attack targets en route with its entire force or more likely with units detached for this

purpose. The relative importance of raiding versus seizing an objective varies depending upon whether the OMG is operating in isolation or as part of an encirclement operation.

Other Support Elements

Encirclement of enemy forces is accomplished by blocking routes of withdrawal with forward detachments, OMG, pursuit maneuver units, air assault forces, or air strikes. Encirclement may be achieved by the army itself, with the cooperation of a flanking army or with the support of *front* assets. Surrounded enemy forces are destroyed piecemeal while the army continues to develop the offensive in depth.

An army of a *front* first echelon receives artillery units from the *front* artillery division. The army commander then allocates artillery to his divisions. He may retain some artillery at army level to form an army artillery group. Within the army, artillery from second echelon divisions probably is allocated to first echelon divisions.

A first echelon army probably would receive from *front* additional engineers and river crossing equipment, air defense weapons, chemical units, and transportation assets.

An army offensive could also include an airborne or heliborne assault operating in conjunction with an OMG to seize deep objectives. Smaller special-purpose airborne units could be employed to conduct reconnaissance and sabotage.

CHAPTER 5

OFFENSIVE TACTICS: DIVISION AND LOWER

TACTICAL FORMATIONS AND MOVEMENT

The Soviets emphasize swift, efficient movement, or transfer, of combat power from one point on the battlefield to another. This is accomplished by rapid column movement in *march formation* and successive deployment into *prebattle formation* and *attack formation*. Commanders insure that their unit is constantly ready to perform a march, with minimum warning and preparation. Units frequently rehearse the march, and its conduct is strictly controlled. They practice deployment from march column into prebattle and attack formation in standard battle drills. These formations and drills are designed for a rapid transition into combat while maintaining maximum security, speed, and firepower.

The March

A march is an organized troop movement conducted in column formation on roads or cross country. It may be simply an administrative move from one point to another. In wartime, however, the march often will be governed by the possibility of enemy contact. It is planned and conducted with the expectation of contact.

A march may be conducted—

- When moving from a rear assembly area to a forward assembly area or attack position.
- When leaving an assembly area to launch an attack from the march.
- When moving forward in anticipation of a meeting engagement.
- During a pursuit.
- When conducting a passage of lines.

In any march, the challenge facing the commander is the proper disposition of combat and support elements within the column, to insure efficient transition into combat. The column organization, established before starting the march, should minimize or preclude any reorganizing before commitment in battle.

Having received an order to conduct a march, the Soviet commander issues a warning order to his subordinate commanders. He then conducts an estimate of the situation to include—

- Mission of the march.
- Time available.
- Locations of possible or anticipated enemy contact.

- Enemy strength and disposition.
- Disposition of friendly forces and missions of adjacent units.
- Attachments and supporting units.
- Terrain, weather, and light conditions.
- Possible march routes.
- Nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) conditions.
- Control measures.
- Reconnaissance and security.

Based on this estimate, he selects routes, if they have not been specified by his commander. The following norms apply:

- A division is assigned either a march zone or march routes. As many as four routes are possible.
- A regiment is normally assigned one or two routes.
- A battalion marches on one route.
- Distance between routes should be at least 3 kilometers to reduce vulnerability to nuclear strikes.

Planning the march is carried out in as much detail as time and information will permit. If possible, a route reconnaissance is conducted to determine route conditions; to locate contaminated areas, choke points, or obstacles; and to determine requirements for engineer or decontamination support.

Considering the total length of the march and the time available, the commander determines the average rate of march for the entire march. He then divides the march route into segments. Based on the terrain, he determines the permissible rate of march over each segment and the time to complete each segment. He then determines control measures for conduct of the march and the times associated with each control measure.

Prescribed times for units to pass from assembly areas to march column are indicated below.

March Column Assembly Times

UNIT	MINUTES
Motorized rifle company	5
Motorized rifle battalion	10 to 15
Artillery battalion	15 to 20
Artillery regiment	40 to 50
Motorized rifle regiment (reinforced)	60 to 120

A *start line* or *start point* is designated for the beginning of the march. It must be far enough from assembly areas to allow columns to form and reach the required speed as they pass the start point.

Control lines (points) are established to insure timely and orderly movement. Their number will be a function of the distance to be covered, the terrain, weather, time of day or night, and state of the roads. Usually they are designated for every 2 to 3 hours of movement. Elements of the force must cross these control lines or points at the designated time.

Halts and rests are specified to preserve the strength of personnel and to maintain equipment. Short halts are 20 to 30 minutes duration every 2 to 3 hours of movement. The column formation is not disturbed, and unit intervals are maintained.

Within units, vehicles pull over to the right side of the road with spacings of not less than 10 meters between them. Refueling, minor maintenance, and if necessary, partial decontamination are accomplished. Long halts are used on marches of over 24 hours duration. They are not normally scheduled at night to allow maximum time for night movement. If used, they are 2 to 4 hours duration, usually at the beginning of the second half of a day's movement. Units disperse off-road in camouflaged positions. Maintenance, resupply, and decontamination (if required) are accomplished and troops are fed a hot meal.

Day rest is scheduled after a night march and night rest after a day march. Troops are dispersed and concealed in such manner to facilitate rapid continuation of the march. Necessary logistical functions are accomplished.

March formation normally consists of the following elements:

- Reconnaissance.
- Advance guard (or forward security element of a battalion).
- Flank security elements.
- Main force.
- Rear security element.

The focus for march planning is security of the main force and creation of conditions for its successful commitment into battle.

The organic reconnaissance battalion precedes its division on the march. Scout elements of the reconnaissance battalion may operate 50 kilometers forward of the division. A regiment is preceded by its organic reconnaissance company, whose scouts may operate 25 kilometers forward. Reconnaissance forces are trained to obtain as quickly as possible the following information about enemy forces:

- Nature and location of enemy nuclear delivery systems.
- Movement axes of enemy columns.
- Strength and composition of enemy forces.
- Deployment lines and routes.
- Location of contaminated areas.

The advance guard precedes the main force on the same route and provides movement security and warning. It normally consists of about one third of the total combat power of the main force. The advance guard of a motorized rifle regiment is normally a motorized rifle battalion reinforced with tank, artillery, antitank, antiaircraft, engineer, and chemical elements. The advance guard of a tank regiment is normally a similarly-reinforced tank battalion. In a division marching on multiple routes, the lead regiment on each route forms its own advance guard. There is no "divisional advance guard," as such.

The advance guard, in its turn, will dispatch to its front a forward security element (FSE) consisting of about one third of its combat power. A forward security element of a regiment's advance guard will normally be a reinforced company. (The FSE is known as an "advance party" in some texts.)

The FSE is preceded by a combat reconnaissance patrol (CRP). The CRP is normally a platoon reinforced with engineer and NBC reconnaissance elements. It reports intelligence information and makes the initial contact with any enemy forces encountered.

Flank and rear security elements for a regiment are normally of platoon size. (More detailed information on the organization and function of march elements is found under *The Meeting Engagement* later in this chapter.)

March considerations include dispersion, rate of march, and march order. Particularly under nuclear conditions, march formations must maintain dispersion both laterally and in depth. A division attains lateral dispersion by marching in a zone up to 25 kilometers wide on as many as four routes, each separated by 3 to 4 kilometers.

The average rate of march is based on the total route distance and the time allowed for the march.

Average March Rates for Mixed Columns —————

Day, on roads	20 to 30 KM/HR
Night, on roads	15 to 20 KM/HR
Cross Country	5 to 15 KM/HR

Dispersion in depth is a function of the organization of the forces on each route and the intervals between units and vehicles. The commander balances the requirement for dispersion in depth with the requirement for timely commitment of his forces in case of enemy contact.

The depth of a march formation depends on the number of march routes, the interval between units,

and the interval between vehicles and between subunits in each column.

The average movement intervals and vehicle speeds shown in the tables below apply to marches of some duration. If enemy contact is made, units may move at maximum speeds. Examples of typical march formations for Soviet motorized rifle and tank forces are shown on the following pages.

Unit Dispersion Intervals


UNIT	NORMAL INTERVAL	VARIATIONS
Between vehicles in a company	25-50 M	Increased at high speeds and when traversing contaminated or rugged terrain or on icy roads. May be decreased at night.
Between companies in a battalion	25-50 M	Up to 300 M or more under nuclear conditions.
Between battalions on the same route	3-5 KM	
Between regiments on the same route	5-10 KM	Can vary as contact becomes imminent.
Between regimental rear services and main force	3-5 KM	
Between division rear services and main force.	15-20 KM	
NOTE: Vehicles speeds are determined by road conditions.		

Average Speeds of Vehicles


TYPE OF ROAD	PER (KM/HR)		
	UNDAMAGED SURFACE	10% SURFACE DESTRUCTION	MORE THAN 10% SURFACE DESTRUCTION
Concrete, asphalt-concrete	40-50	20-35	10-20
Gravel and rubble	40-45	20-30	10-20
Dirt	15-25	8-15	5-10

March Formations, Reinforced Motorized Rifle Battalion


MOVING TOWARD THE FEBA



MOVING PARALLEL TO THE FEBA




MOVING AWAY FROM THE FEBA




(NOT TO SCALE)

March Formations, Motorized Rifle Regiment

MARCHING ON A SINGLE ROUTE WITHIN A DIVISION MARCH FORMATION



MARCHING ON A SINGLE ROUTE, ALONE OR IN FOREFRONT OF A DIVISION




NOTES:

1. Above distances are approximate and only serve to depict minimum and maximum expected distances.
2. Although basically identical inorganic structure, the regiment marching ahead of a division may include a motorized platoon at flank, with the advance guard covering up to 25 kilometers and extending 20 to 30 kilometers ahead of the main body of the division.

To assist movement and enforce march control, each regiment employs a traffic control platoon and each division employs a traffic control company. Traffic regulators wear distinctive black uniforms with white belts and helmets. Before the march, they normally are placed at critical points such as turns, intersections, choke points, and control points. Use of traffic regulators permits less reliance on maps and radio communications.

Use of radios is restricted to minimize risk of radio-electronic detection, jamming, and enemy attack. Subunits normally march under radio listening silence. The Soviets are well drilled in and rely heavily on hand and arm signals, flags, and light signaling devices. During long halts, wire communications may be used. Extensive use is also made of motorcycle-mounted couriers.

March Formation Motorized Rifle Division



(NOT TO SCALE) (All distances approximate)

Air defense for the march normally is planned in advance and includes organic and supporting antiaircraft weapons and aviation. Air defense weapons can be located in the column or in stationary positions occupied in advance. Normally, the weapons are distributed throughout the column.

When enemy aircraft appear, the commander gives the signal to open fire. Simultaneously the column speeds up and vehicle spacings are increased to a distance of up to 100 meters between vehicles. If a large group of aircraft attack, the column may be forced to disperse or seek concealment off the road.

Engineer support for the march allows the force to overcome or bypass those areas which would disrupt the march. Engineer subunits may be formed into—

- A movement support detachment (MSD) which performs route reconnaissance, removes obstacles, organizes bypasses, marks the route, and does limited road repair.
- A mobile obstacle detachment (MOD) which provides protection for advancing columns by mechanically laying minefields and creating expedient obstacles on likely enemy approaches.

(The organization and employment of the MSD and MOD are described in *Chapter 14, Engineer Support*.)

Logistic support of the march can be divided into two phases: before the march and during the march.


Before the march, rear services elements are brought forward to replenish supplies, to perform maintenance, and to evacuate the wounded and sick. Refueling and maintenance elements are sent forward to halt or rest areas. Every attempt is made to replenish fuel reserves on the vehicles before combat.

During the march, logistical support is performed in areas of halts or rests. Vehicles which break down between these areas are taken to the right of the road and repaired there. Wounded and sick personnel are given medical aid in place. The seriously wounded are evacuated.

Control of rear services during the march is effected through detailed planning and coordination between rear services chiefs, commanders of rear services units, and the supported commander. A rear command post, headed by the deputy commander for rear services (at regimental and division level) is established. It moves at the head of the column of rear services units (on the main axis if there is more than one column) but will be situated wherever the best control can be maintained.

Under nuclear conditions, units probably will encounter contaminated areas. Bypassing zones of radioactive contamination reduces casualties and saves time spent on decontaminating personnel and materiel but may not always be possible. Some zones could be too large to bypass.

March Formation, Reinforced Tank Battalion



Two methods of crossing contaminated zones are possible. The first is immediate movement across the zone. The other is movement across the zone after waiting for a reduction in radiation levels. The crossing is made on primary routes to insure high speed and control, unless better axes are selected to reduce the distance traveled or to bypass areas of very high radiation.

Units move across the contaminated area at high speeds with increased spacings between vehicles, especially in dusty conditions. Personnel wear protective equipment and use the protective systems of combat vehicles.

When a decision is made to wait for a reduction of radiation levels, forces disperse and camouflage. After radiation levels have fallen, the crossing is made without significant change in deployment.

The Soviets use their best available fire suppression means to preclude an enemy attack during their movement across the contaminated area. This fire suppression mission is an ideal role for self-propelled artillery.

Throughout the march, order, speed, and interval are enforced vigorously. The Soviet penchant for detailed planning and execution dominates such activity.


Platoon leaders normally ride in the lead vehicle of a platoon column. Company and battalion commanders ride near the front of their march formations. Regimental commanders normally are located near the front of the regimental main force.

The march is completed when the last control measure is crossed and the unit enters a new assembly area, or when it enters prebattle formation or combat.

Prebattle Formation

For the sake of speed, the Soviets prefer to remain in column or march formation whenever possible. They normally resort to lateral deployment only by necessity, such as when combat is imminent. The next, successive lateral deployment out of march formation is into *prebattle formation* (known incorrectly as "approach march formation" in some Western publications). In prebattle formation, a unit advances dispersed laterally and in depth. This formation is used when approaching the battlefield, moving in the depths of a defending enemy's rear area, and attacking enemy defenses when preparatory fires have significantly reduced enemy resistance. Prebattle formation also may be used to rapidly cross nuclear-contaminated zones and areas that are burning or obstructed.

Prebattle Formation



Prebattle formation minimizes troop vulnerability to enemy tactical nuclear strikes and conventional artillery and air strikes. It facilitates rapid maneuver as well as quick deployment into attack formation. Units in prebattle formation either deploy into attack formation or return to march formation, depending on the tactical situation. A unit might remain in this formation for a lengthy period of time. It normally would pass through some form of prebattle formation when moving from the march into full deployment for an attack.


In prebattle formation, a battalion advances with its companies deployed on line, deployed in a forward or reverse wedge, or echeloned left or right. Each

company moves in march column within the formation. Deployment into and out of prebattle formation is rehearsed often by set battle drill.

A company in prebattle formation advances with platoon columns in one of the formations described in the examples on page 5-10. In prebattle formation a unit does not laterally deploy beyond platoon columns. The intervals between company or platoon columns in prebattle formation will be large enough to allow full deployment of the subunit into attack formation without additional lateral expansion of the entire formation. Prebattle formation provides a combination of speed, dispersion, flexibility, and firepower in an anticipated direction.


Battalion Prebattle Formations

(COMPANIES IN COLUMNS-NOT TO SCALE)




Company Prebattle Formations (Platoons in Column)

MOTORIZED RIFLE COMPANY (BTR), WITH ATTACHED TANK PLATOON



TANK COMPANY



LINE
(NOT TO SCALE)

LEGEND:

◇ Tank

□ BTR

□ Platoon Leader

□ Company Commander

Attack Formation

Normally, the *attack formation* is assumed immediately before combat. In prebattle formation, platoons, and possibly companies remain in column. Attack formation is assumed when platoons disperse laterally into line formation. Within their company, however, platoons need not be formed on line but may be also arrayed in wedge or echelon formations, based on the situation. However, an array of platoons on line is most common. Tanks on line normally precede BTRs or BMPs. If troops dismount, they normally follow closely behind the tanks. BTRs or BMPs normally follow between 100 to 400 meters behind the tanks. Attack

formation normally is assumed within about 1000 meters of enemy positions.

Platoon leaders normally are located centrally. Company commanders normally are located centrally and slightly to the rear of lead elements.


Attack formation (*boevoy poryadok*) is sometimes referred to as "combat formation" or "battle formation" in Western publications. It is called *attack formation* in this manual to distinguish it from the Russian term *boevoy poryadok voysk*, which is best translated as *battle formation*.

Battle formation is the organization of a unit or

group of forces for offensive or defensive combat. For example, the battle formation of a motorized rifle regiment in the attack may be two tank-reinforced battalions in the first echelon and one in the second echelon, or it may be three battalions in the first echelon with a company held in reserve (see illustrations on page 5-12). The battle formation of a battalion in the defense might require two company strong-points forward and one to the rear, and a platoon-sized antitank reserve. The manner in which artillery and other support elements are deployed for a given battle or operation is also part of the battle formation.


Company Attack Formation (Platoons on Line)

MOTORIZED RIFLE COMPANY (BTR), WITH ATTACHED TANK PLATOON




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Company Attack Formation (Platoons on Line)



Tactical Formations of a Motorized Rifle Battalion (BMP)



Concept

The attack against a defending enemy is employed when the enemy is in a defensive position, and the Soviets know his location. It normally follows a plan, based on intelligence on enemy disposition and the factors of mission, terrain, troops, and time available.

The attack against a defending enemy is the tactic which has been incorrectly described as a "break-through" or "deliberate attack." These terms are incorrect because they do not fully describe all options available to the Soviet commander conducting what he calls attack against a defending enemy.

Principles of Attack Doctrine

- Conduct aggressive reconnaissance.
- Breach enemy defense at weak points or gaps. Maneuver against enemy flanks and rear.
- Bypass strongpoints.
- Rapidly maneuver forces and fires in decisive direction.
- Mass fires.
- Give priority to destruction of enemy nuclear weapon systems.
- Strike rapidly and deeply into enemy rear.
- Maintain momentum under all conditions.
- Employ radioelectronic combat.

The two methods of conducting an attack against a defending enemy are to attack from the march and to attack from a position in direct contact.

An *attack from the march*, the preferred method of attack, is launched from march formation out of assembly areas in the rear. Subunits deploy laterally at designated control lines and assume attack formation within approximately 1,000 meters of enemy defenses.

The Soviets perceive the advantages of the attack from the march to be as follows: The unit is not committed before attack. The attack increases chance of surprise, allows greater flexibility, decreases vulnerability to enemy artillery, and enhances momentum. Preparation for combat is performed out of enemy contact.

Disadvantages of the attack from the march are:

- Commanders may not be familiar with terrain and enemy dispositions.
- It is more difficult to coordinate fire and maneuver and simultaneous combined arms efforts.

An *attack from a position in direct contact*, the less preferred method, is launched from a position which may be part of, or immediately behind, a defensive position. It is most often used when changing over to the offense from the defense.

The advantages of an attack from a position in direct contact are as follows:

- It allows more thorough study of terrain and enemy disposition.
- It permits more refined organization of battle.
- It is easier to coordinate fire and maneuver.

The disadvantages of an attack from a position in direct contact are as follows:

- Unit may be already committed.
- Unit is under threat of attack during preparation.
- There is less chance of surprise.
- There is less chance to build up momentum and to overcome inertia.


Forms of Maneuver

The three basic forms of maneuver in the attack are the frontal attack, the flank attack, and the envelopment.

The *frontal attack* is directed against the enemy's frontline forces to penetrate his defenses along single or multiple axes. A unit conducting a frontal attack attempts to create openings for subsequent exploitation. The frontal attack was previously one of the most frequently employed forms of offensive maneuver. Its success depends on superiority of forces and firepower, the presence of sufficient reserves, and thorough planning. The frontal attack, by itself, is the least preferred form of maneuver. Normally, it is used in combination with a flank attack or an envelopment.


The *flank attack* is conducted to strike enemy forces in their flank or rear at a relatively shallow depth. It normally is initiated through gaps or breaches in enemy formations. Forces conducting the flank attack and those conducting a simultaneous frontal attack coordinate fire support.

Combination of Frontal and Flank Attacks



The *envelopment* is a deeper attack that causes the enemy to turn and fight in a new direction. It is launched against enemy open flanks or through gaps or breaches. There is no requirement for mutual fire support with forces conducting a frontal attack.

Envelopment with Frontal Attack



The Soviets seek to exploit massive suppressive fires through the vigorous, sustained, forward movement of attacking units. Attacking forces attempt to bypass strongpoints and to envelop defensive positions. The maneuvers used vary with the situation. Units attempt to exploit gaps in a defense and to maneuver against its flanks and rear. The objective is a strike into the key points and to the full depth of an enemy defense.

Objectives

Soviet tactical objectives are expressed as dashed lines on a terrain map, arrayed at various depths, based on enemy dispositions and terrain. Assignment of an objective to a maneuver unit requires that unit to attack to the limit of the objective line and to destroy or neutralize enemy troops, weapons, equipment, and support systems.

The objective lines, all normally assigned by the next higher commander, are based on his knowledge of the enemy and his concept of attack. Divisions and regiments normally are assigned an immediate objective and a subsequent objective. Battalions and companies normally receive an immediate objective and a subsequent direction of attack. A battalion may sometimes be assigned a subsequent objective.

At the tactical level, objectives form a progressively higher and deeper hierarchy. The depths of objectives

are not fixed dimensions, but vary with each situation.

In the initial phase of an attack, when configuration of enemy defenses may be evident, commanders may assign objectives to subordinate commanders to create, at each level, a minimum 3 to 1 advantage in combat power.

An idealized, but representative, hierarchy of tactical objectives for an attack in which a 3 to 1 ratio is created at all levels is portrayed in the illustration at right.

This illustration shows a hierarchy of objectives for a division attacking in an army first echelon at the beginning of an offensive operation. If the division attack is successful, it will reach an enemy brigade rear area, or, possibly, the enemy division rear area.

As the offensive continues and enemy resistance decreases, objective depths would increase based again on the situation. If enemy resistance were light (during a later phase of an offensive), a division final objective could be as deep as 80 kilometers.

Planning

Division-level planning and preparation for the attack are based on the objectives and missions assigned by the army commander. The division commander assesses the situation, outlines his concept and intentions, specifies preliminary actions and missions, and directs the preparation of required information and planning. Warning orders are then passed to subordinate and attached units, specifying where, when, and by what means the attack will be conducted.


Preliminary actions are regulated by a strict timetable. The less time available, the more rigidly the work is regulated. Concurrent planning and action at all levels is emphasized.

Soviet attack plans are worked out in great detail. Despite the demands such planning may impose, in favorable circumstances the average reaction times to mounting an attack when already in contact, from receipt of orders or contact report to an H-Hour, are indicated below.

Reaction Times To Mounting An Attack

UNIT	REACTION TIME	PLANNING TIME
Division	2-4 hours	1-3 hours
Regiment	1-3 hours	30 minutes to 2.5 hours
Battalion	25-60 minutes	20-45 min

Possible Hierarchy of Tactical Objectives for a Soviet Division Attack Against a Defending Enemy



OBJECTIVE DEPTHS

UNIT			
DIVISION	ENEMY BATTALION REAR	ENEMY BRIGADE REAR	ENEMY DIVISION REAR
REGIMENT	FORWARD DEFENSE OF ENEMY BATTALION	ENEMY BATTALION REAR	
BATTALION	ENEMY FORWARD PLATOON AND COMPANY STRONGPOINTS	DIRECTION FOR CONTINUATION OF ATTACK	

LEGEND: — — — Immediate Objectives

== == == Subsequent Objectives

NOTE: Objectives assigned based on maintaining a minimum 3 to 1 advantage in maneuver forces combat power.

On receipt of a mission, the division commander and his chief of staff immediately assess the assigned mission, calculate available and required time, and establish what information about the situation they need, what they already have, and what is lacking. Analysis of the assigned mission centers on the role of the divisions in the attack; where, unless told, its main effort should be concentrated; what attack formation should be used; and what rates of advance are possible during the attack.

The division commander reviews the army's offensive plan, the allocation and procedures for employment of nuclear and chemical weapons, and the role of the division in the army's scheme. He notes the axes, objectives, and groupings of flanking division(s).

The basis for his attack planning stems from consideration of—

- Objective(s).
- Enemy dispositions.
- The army's fire plan, particularly the provision for nuclear/chemical fires, and the allocation of artillery.
- The terrain in the assigned attack zone, the weather and light conditions, and time of the attack.
- Combat effectiveness and supply situation of all elements of the division.

The balance of forces directly influences the alignment of Soviet troops for the attack. The calculation of the relative balance of forces is made across the entire zone of the planned action and to the full depth of the assigned mission. When nuclear weapons are employed, the commander assesses the balance of forces after expected nuclear strikes.

In calculating the balance of forces, the Soviets attempt to determine the quantity and quality of the opposing forces. Besides a precise count of battalions and companies, tanks, artillery, mortars and antitank weapons, this estimate also assesses morale, actual strength in personnel and equipment, and the combat experience and readiness of each side.

The assessment of the balance of forces derives from intelligence estimates that primarily pertain to—

- Grouping of forces and the structure of enemy defenses in the attack zone to the depth of the attack mission.
- Presence and location of enemy weapons of mass destruction and their possible employment.
- Distribution of strongpoints in the defense and location of antitank weapons.
- Existence of gaps, breaks, and boundaries in the defense.
- Location of reserves, especially armor, and the possible nature of their commitment.

- Location and organization of enemy artillery and mortars.

- Positions critical to the stability of the defense.
- Perimeters of strongpoints and defensive areas on the FEBA and in the depth of the defense.
- Obstacles.
- Probable areas of nuclear or chemical strikes.

In planning an attack from the march and the required movements of troops to the line of attack, critical attention is given to timing. Usually the next higher commander specifies the routes, start lines or points, lines of deployment, and the line and time of attack. The length of the routes and distances from a start line to other control lines are measured and broken down by 5 kilometer segments. Permissible speeds are determined for different sectors based on the condition of the routes, the time of year and day, the weather, the composition of the columns, and possible enemy action during movement. Average speeds are calculated, and schedules for troop movements are developed. In calculating troop movements, planners reduce the speed of movement from successive lines of deployment to the line of attack by 25 to 50 percent from the march speed.

An attack against a defending enemy may be staged from an assembly area. If an assembly area is occupied, the stay is limited to the time necessary to assign missions to subordinate units, to check preparations, and to organize combat formations. The assembly area is located far enough forward for first echelon regiments to move to their lines of deployment, normally during the hours of darkness, and to reach their attack lines during the artillery preparation.

Troops are dispersed in assembly areas with their attached reinforcements and are grouped by battalions. Their movement routes, with prescribed control and deployment lines, permit rapid, effective movement to the attack line. The attack line is designated in the combat order. It is planned to be as near as possible to the forward positions of the enemy defense.

If a division assembly area is used, it would probably be located about 60 to 75 kilometers from the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) and cover an area of 300 to 600 square kilometers. First echelon regiments could occupy assembly areas as close as 20 to 30 kilometers from the FEBA.

Reinforcements

A first echelon division may receive the following reinforcements from army and *front* resources:

- 2-4 artillery battalions
- 1 engineer company

- 1 engineer (construction company)
- 1 engineer (pontoon bridge) company
- 1 engineer (amphibian) company
- Air defense
- Communications support
- Signal intelligence resources
- Medical support
- Chemical defense
- Motor transport

The division commander assigns some artillery to his first echelon regiments to form regimental artillery groups (RAG) and retains the rest in a division artillery group (DAG). These are temporary groupings which may be modified based on need. (*See Chapter 9, Artillery Support*).

Fire Planning

Fire planning, being highly centralized, integrates conventional artillery and air strikes as well as missile strikes and possible nuclear or chemical fires. The fire plan includes details which specify the time of assignments, groupings, and displacement of artillery. Fragmentary orders provide specifics concerning the missions of designated artillery units and identify the location of observation posts and firing positions. Deadlines for units to be ready to fire are specified. Artillery units are among the first combat forces to deploy.

Artillery units allocated by higher headquarters join the designated elements of the attack force in the assembly area or link up on the march. Artillery designated to support or reinforce the attack take up firing positions early enough to be ready to cover the advance of the division several hours before the attack is launched. Artillery attached to maneuver regiments usually moves near the head of the regimental main forces.

For the attack, fire planning is conducted in the first echelon regiments and divisions based on the scheme of maneuver and fire plan of the division and higher headquarters. The chief of rocket troops and artillery at division level receives instructions from and advises the division commander on—

- Nuclear fires allotted to the division and plans for integrating nuclear, chemical, and conventional fires and available air strikes.
- Fires to create passages through obstacles and obstructions.
- Priorities of sectors of the enemy defense which are to be neutralized.
- Starting time, duration, and phases of the fire preparation.

- Methods of firing in support of the attack.
- Plans for partial decentralization of artillery control during the accompaniment phase in the enemy depths.
- Plan of support for commitment of second echelon forces and reserves.

The CRTA incorporates the planned fires of the RAGs and DAGs into a division fire plan. The completed division plan is forwarded to army level for approval and incorporation into the army plan. Adjustments in the organization for combat and planned fires are made as the planned attack develops. These changes are also forwarded to the army CRTA.

A possible fire plan outlining the timing for an artillery fire preparation is shown below.

Possible Artillery Fire Plan

TIME	PHASE OF FIRE PREPARATION
H-25	Heavy surprise concentration of nuclear strikes or conventional artillery and air strikes on the entire depth of the defense.
H-20	Destruction fire against strong-points, observation points, headquarters, and artillery. Priority fires against enemy's forward defenses.
H-15	Conventional suppressive fire against enemy forward positions.
H-5	Heavy, surprise concentrations against enemy strongpoints.
H-Hour	Artillery fires in support of the attack begin.

Fire planning is basically designed to suppress enemy defensive capabilities, including artillery, and to cover the deployment and initial assault of the attacking maneuver elements. High priority is given to neutralizing enemy antitank defenses and to being able to engage possible counterattack forces. Fire planning also provides for suppressing enemy strongpoints on the flanks of the attack zones.

Fire planning for the attack is methodical and highly quantitative because of the need to determine

ammunition requirements and to distribute planned fires effectively. The availability of artillery and its organization is measured against the numbers and types of targets and the commander's decision for coordinated action in the attack. Targets are allocated to artillery, tanks, aircraft, and nuclear or chemical weapons.

The width and depth of the area for which preparatory fires are planned depends on the strength and deployments of the enemy defense. When time permits, fire planning is based on thorough, detailed reconnaissance and careful study of the attack plan. In any attack, a systematic targeting effort underlies the fire plan at all levels. Accordingly, the commander's *attack order* contains specific details such as—

- Time of start, direction, and plan of fires.
- Locations, times, and methods for clearing passages in obstacles (friendly and enemy).
- Procedures for marking and guarding cleared passages.
- Firing procedures for direct firing weapons.
- Coordination with troop units in direct contact.
- Actions if the enemy fires a counter-preparation.
- Necessary signals.

The commander also specifies in his attack order other actions to be carried out while units move to the attack lines. These include:

- Emergency procedures and alternate routes in the event of enemy use of nuclear or chemical weapons and/or creation of zones of contamination.
- Organization of air defense measures.
- "Safe distance" lines in the event nuclear strikes are to be employed.
- Procedures for relieving units if they lose their combat effectiveness due to enemy nuclear strikes.
- Signal instructions for the attack, calls for fire support and to cease fires.

Division Attack

A division normally conducts an attack as part of its parent army offensive. In some circumstances, it may conduct an attack under control of a corps or front. Attacking divisions have missions which contribute to the accomplishment of the army's missions. Achievement of a division's mission is the culmination of fires and attacks by its maneuver regiments.

A likely mission for a division attacking in the first echelon of its parent army would be to penetrate enemy forward defenses, to attack through the enemy brigade rear, and to continue the attack to the full tactical depth—the enemy division rear area.

A division normally attacks with most of its combat power in a first echelon or a strong single echelon. The

remaining forces are organized into a second echelon, a combined arms reserve, or special reserves (such as engineer, chemical, or antitank subunits).

The main difference between a second echelon force and a combined arms reserve is that the former has an assigned mission while the latter does not. A combined arms reserve is used to exploit developed or developing success or to react to contingencies.

Within the division's attack zone, a main attack axis may be designated based on terrain, disposition of enemy defenses, or the order received from army or higher headquarters. One or two of its first echelon regiments probably would attack along or abreast the main attack axis. Another first echelon regiment probably would conduct a supporting attack. (The illustration on page 5-19 depicts a typical Soviet maneuver plan against a defending enemy.)


A second echelon regiment normally has a mission to continue the attack against a deeper objective along the main attack axis. Normal commitment of a second echelon regiment takes place after the division's immediate objective has been achieved. However, the time of commitment depends on the success of first echelon forces and the manner in which the enemy uses his reserves. The second echelon is committed by the commander when and where it can best contribute to overall success. The division commander could commit the second echelon on an alternate axis, based on his evaluation of the developing situation.

A regiment designated a combined arms reserve would not have an assigned objective at the beginning of an attack. It would be held in readiness to attack along the most opportune axis at a time determined by the division commander.

Before being committed, second echelon or combined arms reserve subunits advance in march or prebattle formation approximately 15 to 30 kilometers to the rear of the first echelon. This distance varies with the situation. The commander keeps second echelon or reserve forces far enough forward to influence the battle in a timely manner, but far enough to the rear to protect them from the bulk of enemy direct fire and direct support weapons. Second echelon or reserve subunits, before commitment, probably would be kept sufficient lateral depth to protect them from enemy nuclear or chemical weapons.

When attacking with three regiments in a single echelon, a division zone of attack is normally 15 to 25 kilometers wide. This width could vary considerably with the situation. Within the zone of attack there probably would be no distinct, continuous division "attack frontage." Each of the three first echelon regiments attacks on its own axis, with situation-variable

Typical Maneuver Plan
Soviet Tank or Motorized Rifle Division Attack Against Defending Enemy




NOTE: Division second echelons/reserves normally are spaced 15 to 30 kilometers to the rear of first echelon force. Distances between elements of a regiment can vary from 5 to 15 kilometers. Regimental attack frontages vary from 3 to 8 kilometers depending on mission.

(NOT TO SCALE)

spaces between regiments. Regimental attack frontages can vary from as little as 3 kilometers to as much as 8 kilometers, depending on the regiment's mission and battle formation.

If enemy defenses are not well prepared and most of the enemy force is deployed forward, a Soviet division may attack on multiple axes with no *obvious* main attack. The division array would be similar to that

Typical Attack Formation, Soviet Motorized Rifle Division



just described, with three regiments about equally dispersed in a single echelon. The leading regiments attack and probe for weak points in enemy defenses, penetrate wherever they can, develop penetrations, and carry the attack as deeply as possible. The division commander allows the battle to develop to a stage where he can determine which penetration promises the best opportunity to drive into the enemy rear. He then commits his combined arms reserve through this penetration.

The challenge facing the opposing commander under such an attack is to maintain the integrity of his main battle area. Otherwise, he may be forced to commit his reserve before the direction of the Soviet main attack becomes obvious.

Another Soviet option, less desirable, especially under nuclear conditions, is the attack with forces massed across a narrow frontage. Such an attack might be conducted to create a breach in well-prepared, deeply arrayed enemy defenses. A division conducting the main attack of its parent army could conduct such an attack to achieve a breakthrough for an offensive operation. A probable array for the division in these circumstances would be two regiments in the first echelon massed across a frontage as narrow as 6 to 10

kilometers, followed by two second echelon regiments and a small reserve.

Because this type of attack makes their forces extremely vulnerable to tactical nuclear strikes, it is not likely the Soviets would employ it under nuclear or nuclear-threatened conditions. Under any conditions, such an attack requires rapid concentration of forces and fires to create the breach and just as rapid a dispersal of forces on the other side of the breach. Though this type of attack is less likely, it must be considered a possible option.

The Soviet division attack options described are not all-inclusive, but representative. The organization, concept, and conduct of a Soviet division attack varies with the division's mission, and the commander's estimate of the situation. The basic concept for an attack is to strike enemy defenses with intensive fires, find or create a gap, slip through, and drive deep at top speed.

A division attack could include a vertical envelopment by a heliborne force of up to battalion size. An organic motorized rifle battalion, stripped of its combat vehicles and reinforced with air mobile combat support, could conduct such an assault.

The locations of division elements in the attack are shown below.

Deployment of Division Elements in an Attack

ELEMENT	DEPLOYMENT
DIVISION FIRST ECHELON	Concentrated to attack on two or three axes each several km wide.
DIVISION SECOND ECHELON OR COMBINED ARMS RESERVE	Moves by bounds 15-30 km behind the first echelon until committed.
REGIMENTAL ARTILLERY GROUP	1-4 km from the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA).
DIVISIONAL ARTILLERY GROUP	3-6 km from the FEBA.
MULTIPLE ROCKET LAUNCHER BATTALION	3-6 km from the FEBA.
DIVISIONAL ANTITANK RESERVE	Between first and second echelons on the axis of the main attack or on a threatened flank.
DIVISION MAIN COMMAND POST	Up to 15 km from the FEBA.
DIVISION FORWARD CP	Up to 5 km from the FEBA.
DIVISION REAR AREA CP	Up to 30 km from the FEBA and located near the rear service elements.
REGIMENTAL MAIN CPs	Up to 5 km from the FEBA.
LOGISTIC UNITS	The divisional medical post, together with repair and evacuation elements, moves behind the first echelon. The rest of the divisional logistic units will be some 5-10 km behind the second echelon.

Heliborne assaults could extend out to 50 kilometers beyond the FEBA. Likely objectives are key terrain such as defiles, bridges, or river-crossing sites. A division may employ a forward detachment, such as a reinforced tank battalion, to link up with a heliborne assault.

The use of forward detachments at the beginning of an offensive operation is discussed in Chapter 4. It is likely that forward detachments also would be employed throughout an offensive operation, particularly after penetrating the enemy main defense area.

A division forward detachment of reinforced battalion size may be dispatched on a swift, independent penetration into the enemy depths to seize and hold a tactical objective until the arrival of main forces. It may also be used for tactical raids. In either case, missions of forward detachments are intended to accelerate the advance of main forces and the dissolution of the enemy defense.

Typical objectives for a forward detachment include—

- Road junctions.
- Bridges.
- River crossing sites.
- A mountain pass.
- Air defense weapons.
- Rockets and missiles.
- Command posts.
- Communications centers.
- Tactical reserves.
- Withdrawing forces.

Advance guards differ from forward detachments in mission. An advance guard is a march security element which protects and warns the main marching force and engages enemy forces encountered on the march route. A forward detachment is a deep attack force detailed to achieve an independent mission. It is not restricted to the route of its main force.

Regimental Attack

A maneuver regiment is the smallest fully combined arms ground force element. It is capable of limited independent action, but normally attacks as part of a parent division.

A regiment attacking in the first echelon of a division normally will have a mission to penetrate, destroy, or neutralize forward strongpoints of defending enemy battalions, to continue the attack to an enemy battalion rear area, and to be prepared to continue the attack into enemy brigade and division rear areas.

A regiment normally is organized for combat into three reinforced battalions and, possibly, a company-

sized reserve. A motorized rifle regiment has three motorized rifle battalions and one tank battalion. The subunits of the tank battalion normally are assigned to the three motorized rifle battalions. A tank regiment of a tank division has three tank battalions and possibly a motorized rifle company or battalion. Motorized rifle subunits may be assigned to the three tank battalions.

Either regiment normally attacks with two reinforced battalions in its first echelon, and one reinforced battalion in a second echelon. A regiment could also attack with three battalions in a single echelon with a reserve of one or two companies.

An antitank reserve of a motorized rifle regiment normally consists of its antitank battery, a tank platoon, and an engineer mobile obstacle detachment.

A regiment's zone of attack can vary from about 3 to 8 kilometers, depending on the attack concept and the situation. The most typical attack frontage of a regiment is 4 to 5 kilometers. The distance between echelons can vary from about 5 to 15 kilometers.

Motorized rifle regiments and tank regiments have an organic 122-mm howitzer battalion. When attacking in a division first echelon, a regiment normally receives additional artillery from division. The regimental commander may assign artillery, up to a battalion, to each of his first echelon battalions. The remainder is formed into a regimental artillery group (RAG). A RAG is normally deployed 1 to 4 kilometers from the FEBA (see illustration on the next page).

A first echelon regiment could also be supported by attack helicopters from *front*, army, or division.

An attack from the march conducted by a motorized rifle regiment follows this sequence:

- The air and artillery preparation, which may be up to 50 minutes duration, is planned and executed to end just before maneuver subunits assault enemy forward defenses.

- The regiment advances out of assembly areas at least 20 kilometers to the rear, concurrent with the fire preparation.


- Subunits normally deploy at distances from enemy forward defenses of approximately 8 to 12 kilometers in battalion columns; 4 to 6 kilometers in company columns, and 1 to 5-4 kilometers in platoon columns.

If enemy defenses are not well prepared, the attack may be conducted in prebattle formation. Attack formation is used against prepared enemy positions. In general, the Soviets do not deploy laterally except when absolutely necessary. They will remain in march or prebattle formation whenever possible, for sake of speed. Even after a lateral deployment, subunits may revert back to march or prebattle formation if enemy resistance is not as great as anticipated.

The most probable attack formation is the line with most firepower forward. Attack formation is assumed before reaching a designated line of attack, normally about 300 to 1000 meters from the forward edge of the

battle area. Ideally, all subunits of a regiment cross the line of attack simultaneously. If conditions are favorable, smoke will be employed. (See Chapter 13, *Smoke*).

Typical Attack Formation, Soviet Motorized Rifle Regiment



NOTES:

1. A tank regiment attacking in two echelons would be of similar configuration, with modifications based on differences in combat support elements.
2. The extreme limits of a regimental zone of attack are 3-8 kilometers. The most typical attack frontage of a regiment is 4-5 kilometers.

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Battalion Attack


A battalion normally attacks as part of its parent regiment. A battalion does not have the organic combat support or combat service support required for independent action. The exception to this is the employment of a battalion as a forward detachment to accomplish a deep, independent mission. In such a circumstance, the battalion would be reinforced to sustain itself for as long as possible.

A battalion attacking in the first echelon of a first echelon regiment would probably have a mission to

attack through strongpoints of defending enemy battalions and to continue the attack in an assigned direction. Soviet subunits normally do not stop on objectives and consolidate them, but continue the attack deeper into the enemy rear.

A motorized rifle battalion has three motorized rifle companies and normally has a tank company attached, as illustrated below. A tank battalion has three tank companies and may have either a motorized rifle platoon or company attached.

Attack Formations, Reinforced Motorized Rifle Battalion




A battalion could attack with three reinforced companies in a single echelon, plus a small reserve, possibly a platoon. A battalion also could attack with two reinforced companies in a first echelon and one reinforced company in a second echelon. When two echelons are employed, a normal distance between echelons is 1 to 3 kilometers. A normal frontage for an attacking battalion is 1 to 2 kilometers, within a zone of 2 to 3 kilometers.

A battalion attacking in a regiment's first echelon

probably would have up to a battalion of artillery attached to it. This artillery is under the operational control of the maneuver battalion commander. It may be used for direct fire.

A typical tank or motorized rifle company attack frontage is from 500 to 800 meters. Platoons normally attack on a frontage of 100 to 200 meters, with 50 to 100 meters between vehicles. The frontage of a 4-tank platoon attached to a motorized rifle company could extend to 400 meters.

Deployment for an Attack from the March



There would probably be little maneuver evident in platoon and company tactics. These subunits normally attack on line, in unison. However, maneuver probably will be evident in the way a battalion commander moves his companies.


Normally, company and battalion commanders are located centrally and slightly to the rear of lead elements in combat vehicles with extra antennas. If com-

manders are killed, the attack probably would not grind to a halt but would be carried forward on its own momentum. However, elimination of tactical commanders would diminish coordination of the attack, especially fire coordination.

Shown below is a reinforced tank battalion attacking from the march against a strongpoint in the depths of the enemy's defense.

Tank Battalion (Reinforced) Attack from the March

ATTACK AGAINST A STRONGPOINT IN THE DEPTHS OF ENEMY DEFENSE



Conduct of the Attack

Mounted assault speed is approximately 12 kilometers per hour (200 meters per minute). This speed allows tanks to fire from a brief halt, allowing one aimed round to be fired from the main gun. There are indications that the Soviets are striving to increase mounted assault speed to 20 kilometers per hour to reduce vulnerability to antitank weapons. Dismounted assault speed is approximately 6 kilometers per hour.

Soviets prefer motorized rifle units to assault mounted. The factors favoring mounted assault are—

- NBC contamination.
- Open terrain.
- Reduced enemy antitank capability.
- Weak enemy defenses.

If a dismounted attack is planned, a dismount line is designated, within about 400 meters from the FEBA. If possible, dismount is performed with the BMPs or BTRs in defilade to protect riflemen from machine gun fire and vehicles from antitank fires. Factors favoring dismounted assault are—

- Strong enemy antitank capability.
- Well-prepared enemy defenses.
- Fords or bridges.
- Obstacles or minefields.
- Rough terrain: no high speed avenues of attack.
- Maximum firepower needed.

Combined Tank and Motorized Rifle Assault

The most probable array is:

- Line of tanks
- Line of dismounted infantry
- Line of BMPs or BTRs
- or
- Line of tanks
- Line of BMPs or BTRs

Dismounted riflemen follow closely behind tanks. The BTRs or BMPs normally remain within 100 to 400 meters behind tanks and fire through gaps between tanks. If the terrain is rugged or heavily wooded, motorized rifle subunits might lead the assault.

A first echelon battalion may have a section or platoon (two or four) of self-propelled anti-aircraft guns (ZSU) attached. The ZSUs follow approximately 400 meters behind attacking maneuver elements, with 150 to 250 meters between vehicles.

Minefields are breached by a combination of—

- Tanks with mine rollers and plows.
- Line charges.
- Sappers.
- Artillery fire.

Mine-clearing is covered by smoke and intensified fire on enemy defensive positions. Ideally, the Soviets would like to create one lane through an obstacle or minefield per platoon. Normally one tank per tank platoon is equipped with a mine roller. In addition, each tank company has a mine roller/plow. Mobile mine-clearing vehicles hurl line charges out to several hundred meters to clear lanes several meters wide. Combat vehicles cover each other's passage through the minefield. If dismounted, riflemen follow in column behind tanks.

The artillery preparation should end just before first echelon elements reach the FEBA. Fires are normally shifted on command of maneuver commanders within about 200 meters of lead elements, depending upon weapon caliber. There is no pause between the preparatory fires and the start of fires in support of the attack. While fighting through enemy defenses, maneuver elements will be preceded by a pattern of intense artillery and mortar fires. Fires like the rolling barrages of World War II are unlikely; however, fires on successive concentrations or lines will be provided.

Fixed-wing air strikes normally are used for targets beyond artillery range. Attack helicopters provide close air support on the FEBA in direct support of ground units.

Subunits go into the final assault moving at maximum possible speed.

Combined Arms Tactics

The essence of the attack and final assault is combined arms cooperation based on the close and uninterrupted interaction of all forces to best exploit their capabilities. Each arm provides strength and protection where another arm is weak or vulnerable.

The Soviets believe the tank is the major ground force weapon. The tank is the keystone of combined arms cooperation in the attack. Concern for the enemy antitank threat is the dominating factor in coordinating the combined arms effort. For this reason, Soviet tanks normally carry more high explosive (HE) rounds than antitank (AT) rounds.

Tank fires are directed by tank company commanders and platoon leaders. An entire tank company may engage an area target with salvo fire. Tank platoons engage area or point targets at the direction of platoon leaders. Platoon leaders direct fires by visual signals, radio, and designation with tracer rounds.

Motorized rifle subunit fires are directed primarily against enemy personnel and antitank weapons. Artillery attached to motorized rifle battalions may

initially be used for indirect fire then revert to direct fire from the immediate rear of assaulting maneuver subunits.

Consistent with their principle of doing the unexpected to surprise the enemy, the Soviets would attack through difficult terrain against lightly defended or undefended areas. Attacks by motorized rifle subunits along forest trails or ridge lines are likely.

The bulk of responsibility for neutralization of antitank weapons falls upon artillery. The massive, continuous artillery fires in the attack would be extremely intense. Even if enemy antitank weapons are not destroyed, the Soviets expect the enemy gunners to be forced to keep their heads down.

After penetrating the forward edge of an enemy defense, the Soviets strive to attack further into the depths of the defensive position. Enemy strongpoints that cannot be reduced immediately may be bypassed.

If strongpoints cannot be bypassed, they are attacked, preferably from their flanks or rear. Close and continuing fire support by massed fires is employed. Smoke is used, as well as flame weapons, against strongpoints.

If required to repel counterattacks, part of the attack force meets the counterattack head on while the main strength of the attacking unit strikes the counterattack on the flanks and in the rear. Artillery fires are called for immediately. Regimental or division antitank reserves move forward to lay down a base of fire and lay hasty minefields. If necessary, the attacking force may temporarily take up the defense to defeat counterattacks, then resume the attack. The chart below identifies combined arms tactics.

Penetration by First Echelon. When a first echelon regiment's battalions have achieved a major penetration, the area of penetration will be widened for exploitation by second echelon forces or, if still capable, first echelon battalions will continue the attack into the enemy depth. Battalions may revert to prebattle formation and advance rapidly to deny enemy movement of reserves and to prevent the organization of the defense on new positions.

The Soviets expect a defending enemy to attempt to rapidly assess the direction and weight of a main attack and to allocate available forces to defeat the attack.

Soviet Combined Arms Tactics (Who does what to whom?)

ARM

MAJOR TASKS: DEFEAT ENEMY—

MOTORIZED RIFLE

Antitank Weapons
Troops
Infantry Fighting Vehicles

ATTACK HELICOPTERS

Tanks
Infantry Fighting Vehicles
Antitank Weapons

REGIMENTAL AIR DEFENSE WEAPONS

Attack Helicopters
Fixed-Wing Aircraft

Therefore, as the first echelon battalions move to deeper objectives, the regimental commander stays particularly alert for enemy counterattacks.

A first echelon regiment which has successfully penetrated the enemy forward defenses may establish and secure the gap through which the division follow-on force will attack. The first echelon regiment also could be used as a forward detachment to move ahead of the division to seize important objectives in depth. Often such actions take place in coordination with heliborne forces. Regiments may send out forward detachments of battalion strength. An independent tank battalion of a motorized rifle division is likely to be used as a forward detachment.

Commitment of Second Echelon or Reserves.

The division second echelon or combined arms reserve is ideally committed upon achievement of the division's immediate objective. This commitment must take place before the momentum of the advance decreases.

The commander of a second echelon or combined arms reserve regiment normally is collocated with the division commander. This enables him to keep abreast of the battle as it develops. It also simplifies the division commander's task of amplifying or assigning the mission of the second echelon or reserve when he decides to commit it to the battle. The commitment of the division second echelon or reserve is usually marked by an intensification of reconnaissance activity, artillery fire, air strikes, and the use of smoke to screen the force from enemy observation.

A second echelon or reserve regiment converges in battalion march columns toward the penetration. It may remain in battalion columns for the sake of speed if enemy resistance has been minimized. Otherwise, battalions assume prebattle formation or, if required by enemy dispositions, assume attack formation. Ideally, the regiment passes through developed penetrations to drive swiftly into the enemy rear to seize deep objectives.

The division commander constitutes a combined arms reserve from first echelon forces or uncommitted combat assets as soon as the original follow-on force is committed. Surviving pockets of resistance are attacked by follow-on forces or are destroyed by concentrated fires of artillery and aviation, including attack helicopters.

Hastily occupied positions in the enemy rear are attacked from the march in mounted formations. A dismounted attack may be required due to the presence of minefields or a density of antitank weapons. As a basic rule, exploitation units attempt to

remain in prebattle or march formation for ease of control and speed, unless confronted by a stubborn enemy defense.

Intensified reconnaissance, artillery and air strikes, and rapid ground attacks are employed to locate and destroy enemy nuclear delivery systems and reserves.

If enemy defenses are stronger than anticipated and cannot be penetrated, second echelon or reserve forces may be committed earlier. If, however, first echelon forces succeed in penetrating enemy forward defenses and are capable of continuing toward deeper objectives, second echelon or reserve forces may not be committed until much later in the battle.

Assuming the division commander commits his second echelon or reserve on the axis of the most successful penetration and the attack continues successfully, this penetration could be developed further by the parent army's commitment of its follow-on forces. Additional divisions could be committed on a widening and ever deepening rapid penetration and exploitation. This is the fundamental concept behind achievement of an operational "breakthrough".

THE MEETING ENGAGEMENT

Objectives and Characteristics

The Soviets define the meeting engagement as follows:

A clash between opposing sides when they are simultaneously striving to fulfill assigned missions by means of offensive actions. A meeting engagement is characterized by obscurity of the situation and by abrupt changes in it . . . by rapid changes in . . . formations.


Soviet Dictionary of Basic Military Terms

The objectives of the meeting engagement are destruction of the enemy's forces, seizure of key terrain to insure favorable conditions for future operations, and continuation of the advance.

The meeting engagement may occur under widely differing circumstances, either offensive or defensive. The circumstances in turn influence its organization and conduct. There are four likely circumstances at the beginning of war: when the defender is advancing to forward positions; after penetrating enemy forward defenses, in a clash with advancing reserves; during pursuit; and during counterattack. These circumstances are illustrated on the next page.


Circumstances Under Which a Meeting Engagement May Occur

BEGINNING OF A WAR




Could also occur at the outset of any attack when opposing forces are not in initial contact, and both assume the offensive.

AFTER PENETRATION OF ENEMY'S FORWARD DEFENSES




Would involve the penetrating force meeting the defender's advancing reserve elements.

DURING PURSUIT



Meeting engagement likely during counterattack by either side.

DURING COUNTERATTACK



Strong probability that the counterattacking force could be met head-on or from the flanks by the enemy.

Because, in the Soviet view, an offensive generally develops unevenly over a wide front, meeting engagements are characterized by—

- Intense combat over a wide front with considerable room to maneuver.
- Extremely limited planning time, resulting in heavy reliance on battle drills.
- Continuous effort to seize and maintain the initiative.
- Deployment into combat from the march at high speed.
- Uncertainty due to lack of detailed intelligence.
- Sudden changes in the situation.
- Open flanks on each side.
- Both sides seeking advantageous maneuver room.
- The rapid approach of the opposing forces.
- An unclear and fluid situation.

The Soviets do not look upon the meeting engagement as a purely chance occurrence.

One of the most important tendencies in the development of the meeting engagement . . . is the ever greater tendency for early initiation of the meeting engagement instead of its accidental rising. As a result of . . . the depths of action of modern reconnaissance . . . commanders of both sides, more often than not, will already have some indication of the strength and firepower of the enemy far before the meeting. The decision for the meeting engagement will be taken as a result of real assessment . . .

A. I. Radzievskiy
Tactics in Combat Examples-Regiment

Soviet commanders are trained to anticipate a meeting engagement, to identify a likely point of contact, to choose terrain, and to take the initiative. They believe that the side which aggressively seizes the initiative with fire and maneuver will win the meeting engagement.

The commander anticipating a meeting engagement must consider these factors in his planning and decision making:

- Continuous and thorough reconnaissance from his own reconnaissance means and the correct interpretation and use of reconnaissance information furnished from higher levels.
- The requirement for speed in his troop leading procedures—the making and transmitting of decisions.
- Anticipation of enemy air and artillery strikes, nuclear or nonnuclear, and the use of such information in gaining fire superiority.
- Achievement of the initiative through immediately responsive deployment of maneuver forces.
- Adequate flank and rear security.


Organization of the March

The organization of a march formation anticipating a meeting engagement varies with the situation. The general organization for a march when enemy contact is possible is described in Section I of this chapter. A more detailed description of such a march formation follows, using a reinforced motorized rifle regiment as an example. (The BTR-equipped motorized rifle regiment is used as an example because it is the most numerous type of maneuver regiment. The description also applies to BMP and tank regiments, with substitutions or deletions of subunits based on organizational differences. *See FM 100-2-3.*)

A regiment conducting a march usually is preceded by its organic reconnaissance company, out to about 25 kilometers, and possibly by elements of the division reconnaissance battalion, out to about 50 kilometers. These elements attempt to avoid enemy contact and to obtain as much information as possible on the enemy.

The advance guard of a motorized rifle regiment usually consists of a motorized rifle battalion reinforced with artillery, tanks, air defense, engineer, and chemical elements.

Soviet Concept of the Meeting Engagement



The advance guard has the tasks of—

- Insuring that the main force moves unhindered.
- Insuring suitable conditions for the commitment of the main force.
- Warning the main force of surprise attack.
- Preventing the penetration of the main force by enemy reconnaissance.

The advance guard dispatches a forward security element (FSE), which in its turn dispatches a combat reconnaissance patrol (CRP).

The *combat reconnaissance patrol* is a fighting patrol consisting of a motorized rifle platoon augmented with chemical/radiation and engineer reconnaissance personnel. The mission of the patrol is to provide prompt information on the enemy's strength, composition, and direction of movement. The patrol attempts to penetrate and report on the enemy main body. The patrol also reports information on routes, the radiological and chemical situation, and the nature of the terrain.

The *forward security element* (called the "advance party" in some texts) is normally a motorized rifle company reinforced with tanks, artillery, mortars, engineers, and chemical defense. The mission of the FSE, moving up to 10 kilometers behind the CRP, is to advance at maximum speed and to engage lead enemy elements. Through use of its mobility and fire power, it seizes and holds a position advantageous for subsequent commitment of the advance guard main body.

The *advance guard main body* constitutes the bulk of the combat power of the advance guard.

The advance guard main body has the mission of either eliminating enemy opposition, permitting continuation of the march, or fixing the enemy force to permit a flank attack by the main force. Artillery and tanks are habitually placed forward in the column. If a

threat comes from the flank, artillery and tanks may be placed in the middle of the column.

Typical Composition of Advanced Guard Main Body

- Motorized rifle battalion commander, staff, artillery commander.
- Signal platoon.
- Antitank platoon.
- Antiaircraft section.
- Artillery battalion (minus 1 battery with the FSE).
- Tank company (minus 1 platoon with the FSE).
- Two motorized rifle companies.
- Rear, including medical post.

The *main force*, about two thirds of the combat power of the regiment, maneuvers to destroy enemy forces that cannot be quickly overcome by the advance guard. The composition of the main force may vary.


Typical Composition of Main Force

Regimental commander, staff, fire support commanders.

Antitank battery.

- Antiaircraft artillery and missile battery (minus elements with advance guard).
- Artillery battalion.
- Tank battalion (minus one company with advance guard).
- Two motorized rifle battalions.
- Rear.

Elements of March Formation




Elements of the regimental engineer company (minus elements in the advance guard) are dispersed throughout the formation. The signal company and chemical defense company (minus) are probably in the middle or rear of the formation.

In addition, there may be additional engineer, antiaircraft, artillery, and signal support furnished from

division, army, or *front* assets.

Rear security elements of up to platoon strength normally are positioned up to 3 kilometers from the advance guard and the main force. Depending on the enemy threat, flank security elements of up to platoon strength are dispatched up to 3 kilometers from the column.

Typical March Formation of a Reinforced Motorized Rifle Regiment (BTR) In Anticipation of a Meeting Engagement



Initial Phase

The initial phase of the meeting engagement is that period of combat from the time of enemy encounter by the leading element (the combat reconnaissance patrol) up to the commitment into battle of the main force. The initial phase is carried out by the elements of the advance guard. The subsequent employment of the main force depends on the outcome of the initial phase.

With current reconnaissance capabilities, the initial enemy encounter by the CRP should not be a complete surprise. Rather, the use of reconnaissance reporting may permit employment of long-range fires, both artillery and air, to inflict damage on the enemy and to delay his advance. A one hour delay could permit the further advance of the march column by 25 to 30 kilometers.

The actions of the elements of the advance guard are indicated on the following pages. The buildup of major weapons, based on the typical organization described above, is also shown.

Upon contact, actions of the CRP are to—

- Report contact to advance guard commander.
- Attempt to penetrate to enemy main force, bypassing his advance elements.
- Perform chemical and engineer reconnaissance.
- Collect all information on the enemy that will expedite the commander's decision.

Buildup of Firepower (CRP)

Time: 0 minutes

Soviet Forces Committed: 3 BTRs

Actions of the FSE, moving in column behind the CRP by up to 10 kilometers, are to—

- Advance at maximum speed.
- Engage the enemy with all weapons.
- Develop the fight.
- Seize and hold a position until arrival of the advance guard main body.

Buildup of Firepower (FSE)

Time: +20 minutes

Soviet Forces Now Committed:

10 BTRs
4 Tanks
6 Mortars, 120-mm
6 Howitzers, 122-mm

At the time of initial contact, the advance guard main body is moving in march column 5 to 10 kilometers behind the FSE. The commander—

- Defines the plan for engagement.
- Issues orders to the commanders of the CRP and FSE.
- Moves forward, with the artillery commander, at maximum speed to an observation point.
- Issues orders for the deployment of the advance guard main force.
- Launches the attack.

Buildup of Firepower

(Advanced Guard)

Time: +60 minutes

Soviet Forces Now Committed:

31 BTRs
13 Tanks
6 Mortars, 120-mm
18 Howitzers, 122-mm
2 Antiaircraft Guns
4 ATGMs

As the forward elements of the advance guard encounter the enemy, the regimental commander is at or near the head of his main force, some 20 to 30 km to the rear of the advance guard. This deliberate spacing is calculated to give the commander about 2 hours for planning and execution of his battle.

Deployment of Main Force

When the advance guard becomes engaged, the main force continues its forward movement. The deployment of the main force depends on the outcome of advance guard action. Four possible outcomes of advance guard action are shown below:

- Attack by FSE and/or advance guard is successful.
- Advance guard achieves no immediate success.
- Enemy forces deny further offensive action by advance guard.
- Advance guard is unable to hold the enemy.

Possible outcomes for this advance guard are illustrated on the next page.


When the outcomes of the advance guard action require deployment of the main force, the commander decides what form of maneuver to use. There are three basic choices:

- *Envelopment* - A deep maneuver, executed through gaps or from an open flank, requiring the

Possible Outcomes of Advance Guard Action in a Meeting Engagement


ATTACK BY FORWARD SECURITY ELEMENT AND/OR ADVANCE GUARD SUCCESSFUL

- Enemy element destroyed.
- Advance guard resumes march.
- Main force of regiment does not deploy.




NO IMMEDIATE SUCCESS BY ADVANCE GUARD

- Advance guard continues attack.
- Main force continues march forward and prepares to deploy.




ENEMY FORCES DENY FURTHER OFFENSIVE ACTION BY ADVANCE GUARD

- Advance guard shifts to defense.
- Main force deploys and attacks.



ADVANCE GUARD UNABLE TO HOLD ENEMY

- Main force defends on the best available terrain.
- Advance guard withdraws and joins the defense.
- Follow-on division forces are committed to attack.
- Division assumes defense if enemy force is too large to attack.



enemy to turn and fight in a new direction. The double envelopment involves a deep maneuver around both flanks.

- *Flank attack* - A more shallow maneuver, which may be executed through gaps or breaches.
- *Frontal attack* - A direct maneuver against enemy defenses, most often conducted with an envelopment or a flank attack.

The envelopment and the flank attack are the preferred forms of maneuver. However, in some cases the frontal attack is required.

The time available to execute a maneuver may be a major factor in the commander's selection of a form of maneuver. If an envelopment occurs, space could be the controlling factor. Terrain must be trafficable and

should provide covered or concealed routes for the enveloping force, open ground for deployment, and good fields of fire. The area adjacent to the original route of advance must be 3 to 5 kilometers wide for an envelopment by a battalion-sized advance guard. Envelopment by a regimental-sized main force requires an area 10 to 15 kilometers wide.

The Soviets consider the major contributing factors to a successful envelopment to be—

- Effective real-time intelligence and counterintelligence capability.
- Effective utilization of terrain.
- Coordination between forces.
- Appreciation of enemy tactics and capabilities.
- Capable, ingenious leadership and staff work.

Follow-on Forces

The preceding description of the meeting engagement focuses on the actions of a motorized rifle regiment. Unless such a regiment has been assigned an independent mission, such as pursuit or acting as a forward detachment, it is marching as part of a division force. Consequently, the development of battle might require the commitment of the follow-on elements of the division. The procedures are substantially the same as in the example of the lead regiment.

Before his lead regiment is fully engaged, the division commander's forward command post normally is near the head of the main division force and most likely with the next following regiment. He monitors the action of the lead regiment and, after its engagement, moves his command group to the best location to control subsequent deployments.

The Soviets believe that the disadvantage of a hastily planned attack is more than offset by the advantage of a quick strike against the enemy before he has sufficient time for his own preparation. Division follow-on forces can be fully engaged in less than three hours after the lead regiment's main force is engaged.

The employment of division follow-on forces is dictated by the progress of the initial actions of the lead regiment and is shown below.

The division's actions in a meeting engagement have been portrayed as a sequential, front-to-rear unfolding

of combat. There are many other possibilities as formations move on a fluid battlefield and encounter one another. The meeting engagement will not always unfold in the sequence of encounters by reconnaissance elements, advance elements, and main bodies. Neither will it always begin with a head-to-head meeting; it may arise from direct encounter by main bodies, or from oblique encounters.

Whatever the patterns and condition, the Soviet formula for a successful meeting engagement requires surprise, rapid and decisive maneuver, and concentrated preemptive fires against the enemy.

PURSUIT

The Soviets define the pursuit as follows:

An attack on a withdrawing enemy, undertaken in the course of an operation or battle for the purpose of finally destroying or capturing his forces. Destruction of a withdrawing enemy is achieved by hitting his main body with (fire) strikes, by relentless and energetic parallel or frontal pursuit, by straddling his withdrawal route, and by . . . attacking his flanks and rear.

Soviet Dictionary of Basic Military Terms

Employment of Division Follow-on Forces

SUCCESSFUL ATTACK BY THE LEAD REGIMENT

- Lead regiment exploits success or resumes march.
- Follow-on regiments initiate pursuit or resume march on one or multiple routes.
- Depending on the assigned mission and degree of success, units could consolidate positions and await orders, or resume march in new direction.

ENEMY ESTABLISHES HASTY DEFENSE

- Lead regiment attacks enemy defenses and, by fixing enemy force, facilitates commitment of division follow-on forces.
- Depending on availability of maneuver space and size of enemy force, follow-on regiments flank or envelop enemy.
- If follow-on forces succeed, exploitation or pursuit are carried out. Alternatively, the position may be consolidated, forces regrouped, and the march resumes.

LEAD REGIMENT FORCED TO ESTABLISH HASTY DEFENSE

- Lead regiment holds pending arrival and deployment of follow-on forces.
- Follow-on forces counterattack and attempt to envelop enemy. If successful, subsequent actions are as above.
- Follow-on forces may be required to augment defense.

LEAD REGIMENT UNABLE TO CONTAIN ENEMY ATTACK

- Follow-on forces conduct counterattack. If successful and the enemy withdraws, exploitation or pursuit is initiated; alternatively they may consolidate the position, regroup, and later resume march.
- Follow-on forces establish defensive positions to or through which the lead regiment withdraws.
- Division holds pending commitment of army follow-on forces.

Pursuit features swift and deep movements of forces to strike the enemy's most vulnerable areas. Three basic requirements for successful pursuit are planning and organization, detection of withdrawal, and maintenance of high tempo.

By definition, a pursuit occurs when the enemy withdraws. An enemy could be forced to withdraw—

- As a result of a meeting engagement.
- After a penetration of his defensive position.
- Following a nuclear strike.

An enemy may deliberately withdraw—

- When threatened with encirclement.
- If he is making a redistribution of forces.
- When he attempts to draw the opposing side into a kill zone.
- When he withdraws for safety before launching a nuclear strike.

Normally, a regimental commander is the lowest command level to order initiation of pursuit. However, commanders at all levels are expected to move independently into pursuit when indicators of withdrawal are seen.

The scale of a pursuit is governed by the size of the force involved and is categorized as—

- *Tactical pursuit* - Conducted by a regiment or a division. In the case of a regiment, pursuit would probably begin about 10 to 20 km in the enemy depths; in the case of a division, from 20 to 30 km.
- *Operational pursuit* - Conducted by army or higher headquarters on a broad front; may extend to a depth of several hundred kilometers.

Tentative planning for pursuit is included in the initial attack plan. The amount of detail in such planning depends on the anticipated actions of the enemy, the battle formation of attacking troops, and the amount of planning time available.

Planning Considerations For Pursuit

- Possible enemy routes of withdrawal.
- The scheme of maneuver.
- Availability and condition of pursuit routes.
- Forces available.
- Critical terrain features (high ground, road junctions, river crossings, bridges, defiles).
- The use of forward detachments and helicopter assault forces.
- Allocation of nuclear weapons and delivery systems.
- Combat support and combat service support resources.

Active reconnaissance, appreciation of enemy tactics, and knowledge of the current tactical situation are essential in obtaining indicators of enemy withdrawal. Signs of preparation for withdrawal include—

- Nuclear strikes against first echelon attacking formations.
- Intensified movement to the rear, especially artillery and reserves.
- Increase in fires in individual sectors of the front.
- Conduct of heavy fire concentrations in separate areas which apparently are not in accord with the developing situation and at a time when there appears to be a general reduction of fires.
- Intensified reconnaissance.
- Preparations for demolitions and/or destruction of facilities, installations, and equipment.
- Limited local counterattacks.

Once pursuit has been initiated, its success depends on the maintenance of a high rate of advance with continuous application of force.

The forms of pursuit are frontal, parallel, and combination frontal and parallel. The preferred and most effective form is combination frontal and parallel.

The *frontal pursuit* is conducted by forces in contact. It is the most likely type of pursuit at the very beginning of the enemy withdrawal, at night, in difficult terrain, when overcoming obstacles, or when off-road maneuver is limited. Frontal pursuit applies constant pressure on the enemy. It limits his freedom of maneuver, his ability to take up defensive positions, and his ability to disengage. The aim of a frontal pursuit is to force the enemy to deploy and to accept combat under unfavorable conditions, and to delay the withdrawal. Maneuver and flank attacks, though limited, are conducted. The frontal pursuit normally is not decisive since it only pushes the enemy back on his approaching reserves.

In the *parallel pursuit*, the pursuit force advances on routes parallel to the withdrawing enemy. High-speed parallel pursuit may permit either attack on the enemy's flank or cutting his main withdrawal routes. Under threat of flank attack, the enemy may be required to split his force and delay withdrawal while defending against the pursuer's attacks. Unless accompanied by frontal pursuit, this method gives the enemy some opportunity to maneuver and counterattack.


In the *combination frontal and parallel pursuit*, the main pursuit force moves parallel to the withdrawing enemy. A smaller force pursues directly, maintaining constant contact with the enemy. The combination form has the advantages of both frontal and parallel pursuit. It hinders disengagement, leads to flank attacks, and cuts the enemy's withdrawal routes.

Forms of Pursuit

FRONTAL PURSUIT—


Used at initial enemy withdrawal to—

- Pressure the enemy.
- Limit maneuverability.
- Delay withdrawal.
- Force enemy to deploy.


**PARALLEL PURSUIT—**

High speed pursuit to—

- Permit flank attack.
- Cut off withdrawal routes.

**COMBINATION
FRONTAL AND
PARALLEL PURSUIT—**

Combines both methods of pursuit to maintain high rate of advance with continual force to hinder disengagement and cut withdrawal routes.



The Soviets believe that a timely and correct decision to initiate pursuit is critical to its success. If the enemy is able to begin an undetected withdrawal, he avoids the constant pressure that disrupts his action. Further, if the enemy can gain a safe distance of withdrawal, the attacking forces are vulnerable to tactical nuclear strikes.

The enemy will attempt to withdraw at an advantageous time, usually at night. Timely actions are

taken to insure maintenance of contact. Artillery fire and air strikes harass and disrupt the enemy's withdrawal. In the initial phase, tank and motorized rifle pursuit groups attempt to take up routes parallel to the enemy withdrawal route. This helps establish the combination frontal and parallel method of pursuit.

Units in contact initiate frontal pursuit immediately on detection of withdrawal, moving in whatever formation they have at the moment. As the situation

permits, they reform into march or prebattle formation, and then into attack formation when required.

The actions of the frontal pursuit force are aimed at facilitating the commitment of a parallel pursuit force, which is preferably tank heavy. The parallel force, with security elements in the lead, also uses march or prebattle formations until deployment for the attack is required.

In pursuit the commander attempts to employ the maximum available combat troops. Pursuit is conducted in a wide zone — up to 30 km for a division. The commander retains the tactical options to converge on the most important axis or to redirect the effort on a new axis. This flexibility also is required when engaging advancing enemy reserves or counterattack forces.

Centralized planning and decentralized execution characterize the pursuit. Preservation of control is a primary concern in such a fast-moving situation. At the same time, the Soviets attempt to disrupt the enemy's command and control, as an integral part of destructive pursuit. Continuity of their own control is achieved by—

- Designating the direction of advance, routes or zones of advance, phase lines, and objectives.
- Fixing times for completion of specific missions.
- Altering missions as subsequent developments require.
- Augmenting normal radio communications with aerial relays.
- Using two command groups. The commander will be at an observation post behind the leading combat elements. The second group, headed by the chief of staff, will be with the main force.
- Designating the phase lines from which the artillery must be prepared to fire by specified times.

As the pursuit is developed, reconnaissance elements provide information on the disposition of retreating enemy formations and on the forward movement of his reserves. Because of the potential depth of the operation, aerial reconnaissance may be the primary means of identifying significant threats to pursuit forces. This intelligence is vital at the stage when a pursuit force faces the risk of becoming overextended. It could be the basis for termination of the pursuit.

Before or during the course of pursuit, forward detachments may be designated to move ahead of main pursuit forces and to operate independently to outdistance withdrawing enemy forces. These detachments avoid combat until they reach their assigned objective area. Their missions may include concurrent

reconnaissance reporting, seizure of critical points on withdrawal routes, destruction of the enemy's means of nuclear attack, and link up with tactical airborne or heliborne landings.

Heliborne or airborne forces may be assigned missions similar to those described for forward detachments. Vertical envelopment permits operations much deeper into enemy territory.

When pursuit is initiated, the parallel pursuit force normally is formed from uncommitted second echelon elements. The control of artillery is decentralized to maneuver battalions. Batteries and even individual guns move with lead elements to deliver direct fire. Artillery elements also are a normal component of forward detachments.

During pursuit, artillery missions include fire on columns and concentrations at road junctions, defiles, bridges, and crossings. They also include repulse of enemy counterattacks, destruction or delay of enemy reserves, and destruction of enemy means of nuclear attack.

Air support complements other fire support in the destruction and disorganization of the retreating enemy, particularly mobile targets. The situation during the course of a pursuit may become obscure. Consequently, air reconnaissance is an important factor in insuring the success of the pursuit.

Air Support During Pursuit


AIR RECONNAISSANCE IS USED TO DETERMINE—

- The beginning of the withdrawal of rear area forces.
- The composition of withdrawing forces and direction of movement.
- The composition and direction of movement of reserve force moving forward.
- The nature of obstacles and intermediate defensive positions.

The actions of the pursuing force, in conjunction with forward detachments and air-landed forces, act to create nuclear targets. Priority nuclear targets include—

- Approaching reserves.
- Main groupings of retreating force.
- Enemy concentrations at critical areas (bridges, road junctions, defiles).
- Means of nuclear attack.

Soviet Tactical Pursuit (Attack of a Withdrawing Enemy)



Movement support detachments and mobile obstacle detachments provided by engineer troops are instrumental in sustaining the rate of advance. In the initial phase, their missions include operating from forward positions to breach obstacles and minefields. In the course of the pursuit, their mission is to provide bridging and road repairs and to block withdrawal routes of bypassed units with mines, demolitions, and obstacles.

With maximum commitment of forces, requirements for fuel, ammunition, and maintenance increase. Priority of logistics is given to units having the greatest success. The depth of pursuit is governed by the capability for logistic support. One yardstick for

sustaining pursuit is the requirement that, in a large scale offensive, a tank division with reinforcing transportation units should be self-sufficient for up to five days.

The pursuit is terminated on order of the next higher commander. Conditions under which pursuit is terminated include the following:

- The enemy has been destroyed.
- The pursuing force has outdistanced its logistic support.
- The pursuing force has become overextended and is in danger of being cut off.
- The advantage no longer belongs to the pursuing force.

CHAPTER 6

DEFENSE, WITHDRAWAL, AND RELIEF

THE ROLE AND NATURE OF THE DEFENSE

Soviets consider the offensive as the only means to achieve decisive victory. However, defensive doctrine has not been totally overlooked. Grounded in the histories of World War II and the great defensive battles of Stalingrad, Moscow, and Kursk, the Soviets have developed a doctrine that is mindful of recent technological developments such as ATGMs and nuclear weapons. Stated reasons for assuming the defense are—

- To consolidate gains.
- To await additional resources when temporarily halted by the enemy during the course of an offensive.
- To protect the flanks of a formation or a seacoast.
- To repulse an enemy counterthrust.
- To regroup after severe losses suffered from nuclear weapons.
- To free resources for other units that are on the offensive.
- To await logistic support.

The Soviets define the defense as follows:

A type of combat action conducted for the purpose of repulsing an attack mounted by superior enemy forces, causing heavy casualties, retaining important regions of terrain, and creating favorable conditions for going over to a decisive offensive. Defense is based on strikes by nuclear and all other types of weapons; on extensive maneuver with firepower, forces, and weapons; on counterattacks (or counterstrikes) with simultaneous stubborn retention of important regions which intercept the enemy direction of advance; and also on the extensive use of various obstacles. Defense makes it possible to gain time and to effect an economy in forces and weapons in some sectors, thereby creating conditions for an offensive in others.

*Soviet Dictionary of
Basic Military Terms*

In most of these cases, the defense is temporary and leads to the resumption of the offense.

The two major forms of the defense are the *prepared* defense and the *hasty* defense (sometimes called "defense in the course of the offense"). A hasty defense may turn into a prepared defense if conditions and

availability of resources do not favor resuming the offense in that sector.

The defense at *front* and army levels may involve the entire formation during the initial stage of hostility where an enemy attacks across international borders, or in a sector where no offensive action is planned. Usually only part of the formation is on the defense while the rest takes offensive action.

During World War II, entire theaters were on the defense. Extremely dense defenses sometimes were developed, consisting of three or more static defensive belts with the majority of the combat forces deployed in the first defensive belt.

The development of nuclear weapons required modification of this concept and increased the importance of a security echelon and a reserve. Modern defensive doctrine at *front* and army levels stresses defense in depth; but rather than multiple continuous belts, the defensive area consists of clusters of strongpoints. At both *front* and army levels, the key is stubborn defense of the forward area by motorized rifle forces deployed in depth and decisive counterattacks by highly mobile, tank-heavy forces of a second echelon and a reserve. The increased fluidity of combat has required an increase in the size of reserves.

The operational reserve and second echelon may make up half of the force. While second echelon divisions of an army will occupy defensive positions, their major tasks will be to counterattack and to destroy enemy forces penetrating the forward defenses.

It is the first echelon divisions that hold the forward edge of the army and *front* defenses. It is at division level that we find all the principles of defense employed. Therefore, the remainder of this chapter will examine the defense as conducted by a first echelon division.

CONCEPTS OF THE PREPARED DEFENSE

In organizing and establishing a prepared defense, the Soviet commander considers the same factors addressed by a US commander:

- Mission
- Enemy
- Terrain
- Troops
- Time

In analyzing his mission, the commander determines what it is he must accomplish and for how long. The destruction of an amphibious assault along the coast will require different measures than will the protection of an exposed flank.

The enemy and his weapon systems influence the mix of weapons and the type and amount of preparation required. Whether or not he is in contact makes a great difference to the defender.

The terrain and vegetation also affect the force composition and deployment. This includes consideration of natural features such as high ground and other key terrain, rivers, and marshes.

The troops available for commitment to the defense seriously affect the force dispositions.

Finally, the amount of time available to establish the defense will temper all these considerations.

Requirements for Establishing the Defense

- The deployment and employment of a security echelon.
- The location and deployment of forces in a main defensive area.
- The location of "fire sacks" (kill zones) and ambush sites.
- Construction of minefields and obstacles.
- The location, composition, and employment of the reserve.

Security Echelon

The security echelon or zone is that portion of the battlefield forward of the main defensive area. It is occupied by a force whose mission is to delay and deceive the enemy as to the location and deployment of the main defensive forces. The security force engages the enemy at the longest possible range and attempts to cause him to deploy prematurely.

The security force's size and composition depend on those factors mentioned earlier. The zone may extend to a depth of 30 kilometers at army level and 15 kilometers at division level. It is at least far enough forward to prevent aimed direct fire from being placed on the main defensive area.

The security force deploys on the best terrain to effect maximum damage to the attacking enemy. Obstacles and barriers are used extensively. When faced with encirclement or decisive engagement, the forces of the security zone attempt to withdraw under cover of artillery fire and to return to the main defensive area.

Main Defensive Area

The main defensive area may appear as bands, belts, or layers, but it is simply a defense in depth. The basic element of the main defensive area is the company or platoon strongpoint. This is established on terrain that is key to the defense and must be retained at all costs. The subunit occupying the strongpoint prepares an all-round defense with alternate and supplementary firing positions for all weapons. Fires are planned to be mutually supporting as well as provide for fire sacks. Vehicles are dug in, and a network of communication trenches is constructed linking weapon positions with supply, command and control, and fighting positions. Everything that can be is dug in and given overhead protection. Wire provides the primary means of communication. Minefields, obstacles, and barriers are emplaced and covered by fire. In addition, the Soviets rely heavily on the use of maneuver by fire and fire sacks to damage or destroy the enemy force.

Fire Sacks

Maneuver by fire is the concentration of fires from many guns from dispersed firing positions. Fire is concentrated on an advancing enemy in a sudden and devastating strike or series of strikes. Fire sacks are formed based on key terrain, enemy avenues of approach, defensive strongpoints, obstacles and barriers, and preplanned fires. (The Russian term for this defensive deployment translates to "fire sacks" and is so used herein.) Fire sacks are similar to the US concept of a kill zone. Obstacles and barriers are planned along the edge of the fire sack to contain the enemy force, and reserves are placed where they can counter-attack into the "sack" after the fires are lifted to destroy any remaining enemy.

Fires are planned to cover all approaches to the position. Finally the entire position is camouflaged. This may include the use of dummy positions to draw fire and to deceive the enemy as to the true location of the defenses.

Strongpoints are linked with other strongpoints until a defensive area or belt is formed. This occurs at every level, thus multiple belts are formed. Included in and between these belts are headquarters, logistic facilities, reserves, and combat support forces. Each of these elements is responsible for its own security.

Minefields and Obstacles

Minefields are placed forward of the defensive position to slow the enemy and to force him to concentrate. Fires are planned to attack these concentrations and to prevent or delay breaching. Minefields are

designed to break up the enemy's assault and to strip away the infantry's supporting armor. They are also designed to force the enemy into areas where concentrated fires of all weapons may be brought to bear. Minefields within the main defensive area are placed to confine the enemy within fire sacks and to make the employment of the reserves easier.

Besides preplanned minefields, the Soviets also employ hasty antitank minefields laid by engineer mobile obstacle detachments, by mechanical mine-layers, or by helicopter. Hastily laid minefields normally are used with an antitank reserve to counter enemy tanks that may have penetrated the depths of the defense.

Obstacles (including minefields) are used to slow, disorganize, and canalize the enemy force. They are used alone or with preplanned fire concentrations. The use of natural obstacles is stressed; they include lakes, rivers, marshes, escarpments, and densely forested areas. Artificial obstacles may include antitank ditches, wire entanglements, abatis, and antihelicopter and antiairborne stakes.

Anti-Tank Defense

Antitank defense is essential to any defense and is of great concern to Soviet tacticians. (See Chapter 10, Antitank Support.) The system of antitank (AT) defense is composed of—

- Subunit strongpoints containing well-sited AT weapons.
- Tank ambushes set up throughout the defense.
- Antitank reserves placed to respond to enemy tank penetrations.
- Tanks within the second echelon to bolster the first echelon or to counterattack.
- Mobile obstacle detachments. (See Chapter 14, Engineer Support.)
- Artillery in the direct fire role, both in forward positions and from positions in the depths of the defense.
- Antitank obstacles covered by fire and complementing the maneuver of fires and forces.
- Maneuver by antitank forces and weapons.

Antitank guns and ATGMs are concentrated by platoon and battery. They employ multilayered cross-fires, long-range fires, and all-around fires. Cooperation between guns and ATGM systems is considered essential to adequate antitank defense. As with all facets of combat, the integration of combined arms is considered paramount.

Attack helicopters mounting rockets and antitank missiles are used as mobile, quick-reaction, antitank

reserves. Emphasis is placed on their use to defeat tank penetrations or flanking maneuvers.

The reserve is positioned to undertake multiple missions: blocking, counterattacking, reinforcing, and providing rear area security.

Counterattacks

Counterattacks are planned at every level for use if the enemy succeeds in breaching forward defensive positions. Commitment of this force requires the authority of the next higher commander. With the exception of first echelon battalions, whose reserve companies may have to conduct a frontal counter-attack, this force generally is launched from a flank. Regimental and higher counterattacks normally are spearheaded by tanks, preceded by an intense air and artillery preparation, and supported by the fires of adjacent units. A counterattack normally is conducted from the march. While tactical counterattacks usually are planned to restore the defenses, those at operational level may be the opening phase of a counteroffensive.

CONCEPTS OF THE HASTY DEFENSE

The writings of Soviet tacticians indicate that the hasty defense will be more prevalent than the prepared defense. They acknowledge that there may be diverse situations in which the hasty defense must be established. The force making the transition to the defense may be in contact with the enemy. If so, a limited attack could be required to gain defensible terrain. Conversely, it may be necessary to establish a defense to the rear and withdraw to it. In any case, the nature of a hasty defense does not provide time for detailed preparation.

The same factors of mission, enemy, terrain, troops available, and time available considered in a prepared defense are the primary considerations in establishing the hasty defense. They may differ in that—

- The mission of hasty defense is more transitory.
- The enemy situation is clearer, and attack is imminent.
- The terrain may be unfavorable for organization of a defense; it may be better suited for the attacker.
- Time will be short.

Reverse Slope Defense

Establishing the defense when in contact with the enemy poses particular problems, since forces may have to dig in while under fire and observation of the

enemy. For this reason, a reverse slope defense is often chosen. Part of the force is left in contact with the enemy on the forward slope(s), while the remainder of the force prepares the position on the reverse slope(s). The Soviets recognize the following advantages of a reverse slope defense:

- It hinders or prevents enemy observation of the defensive position.
- Attacking forces will not be able to receive direct fire support from following forces.
- Enemy long-range antitank fires will be degraded.
- Attacking enemy forces will be silhouetted on the crest of the hill.
- Engineer work can be conducted out of direct fire and observation from the enemy.

A disadvantage is that the maximum range of all weapon systems cannot be exploited. When possible, both forward and reverse slope defense are used to take maximum advantage of the terrain.

When the force going over to the defensive is in contact with the enemy, it is extremely difficult to establish a security echelon. If established, its depth is not nearly as great as in the prepared defense. Additionally, long-range fires do not play the part they do in the prepared defense because the opposing forces are, for the most part, within direct fire range. Deception is difficult to achieve, since friendly forces may be under direct observation of the enemy. Obstacles are emplaced but are not as extensive as in the prepared defense.

Support Elements

Differences in mission arise from the temporary nature of a hasty defense. Normally, the primary objective is to deny enemy access to a specific area. However, attrition of the enemy force is essential to any defense. In many cases, defensive positions are chosen to support resumption of offensive action rather than for a prolonged defense.

Combat support remains basically configured for continued offensive action. Artillery groupings may be organized to support the next offensive phase.

Engineer mobile obstacle detachments lay minefields across critical avenues of approach. Maximum use is made of armored mine layers, armored engineer vehicles, and dozer blades attached to tanks to prepare obstacles and hasty positions. Engineer works are carried out in a sequence that insures readiness to repulse an enemy attack.

Combat service support also remains configured to support offensive action. Primary effort is devoted to preparing units for future offensive actions, with

priority of support going to units selected to initiate offensive actions.

CONDUCT OF THE DEFENSE

At division level, the tactical defense is very important and can be an integral part of a larger offensive operation. A typical Soviet response against a counterattack is to place a division on the defense to halt the attack while other divisions continue the advance.

Defensive Planning

In the Soviet view, the prepared defense is distinguished from the hasty defense by the amount of time and engineer support available for preparation of the defense. The types tend to merge as a function of time. The latter stages of a hasty defense may approximate the early stages of a prepared defense. The prepared defense is more detailed than the hasty defense, so this section will deal mainly with it for descriptive purposes.

Two fundamental considerations affect the division commander's defensive planning. First, the defense should provide protection against nuclear weapons. Defense under nuclear conditions demands dispersion, deception, and field fortifications. The advent of small-yield nuclear weapons has complicated the problem of dispersion. When the minimum yield of a warhead was approximately 20 kilotons, dispersion was achieved by maintaining intervals between battalions. The development of warheads of less than 1 kiloton increased the need for dispersion so that now, according to the Soviets, company and platoon strongpoints are the basis of the defense. Increased dispersion leads to problems in fire support coordination and troop control. Furthermore, a defense that is too dispersed does not offer sufficient resistance to accomplish the defensive missions. As a result, the Soviets caution that dispersion must not be accomplished at the price of effective defense.

The second fundamental consideration is that the defense must be organized in sufficient depth to provide effective fire and maneuver. The enemy must be engaged at as great a range as possible and must continue to meet an ever-increasing volume of fire as he nears the defensive positions. Fire support weapons must be positioned so that they can shift their fires against threatened axes within the defensive position. To counterattack enemy penetrations, units deployed in the depth of the defense must be in position to maneuver and concentrate rapidly.

A system of fire is constructed to bring all available fires on the enemy as he approaches and to provide for continuous fire at the forward edge, the flanks, and within the defensive position. In addition, it should provide for the rapid concentration of fire against threatened axes.

Division-level Defense

When a division is ordered to assume the defense, the commander issues orders based on a map reconnaissance and personally clarifies missions on the ground. He determines key terrain, enemy avenues of approach and probable main attack axis, areas for possible nuclear and chemical strikes, organization for combat, maneuver requirements, organization of strongpoints, probable counterattack axes, and locations of command posts and command observation posts. Soviet commanders are expected to make maximum use of the terrain and to avoid establishing patterns that would make enemy targeting easier.

A tank or motorized rifle division typically defends a sector 20 to 30 kilometers in width and 15 to 20 kilometers in depth. The commander normally organizes the main defensive area in two echelons and a reserve. The first echelon's mission is to inflict losses on the enemy, to force him to concentrate, and to canalize him into fire sacks. The second echelon's mission is to stop and destroy enemy penetrations or to reinforce or replace troops of the first echelon.

While there is no rigid requirement for the composition of echelons, normally at least two regiments are placed in the division's first echelon. In a motorized rifle division, the first echelon consists of motorized rifle regiments. A tank regiment usually is employed as a division's main counterattack force.

The division commander issues a combat order which contains information about the enemy, the mission, the concept of the operation, the location of the FEBA, and the position to be occupied. The order further specifies the following details:

- For first echelon regiments: reinforcements, missions, defense sectors, and axes and areas in which main efforts are to be concentrated.
- For second echelon regiments: reinforcements, missions, defense sectors, and axes and deployment lines for counterattacks.
- The time that positions are to be occupied.
- Coordination requirements.

When the defense is established before contact with the enemy, the Soviets establish a security echelon up to 15 kilometers forward of the main defensive area. The elements which make up the security echelon

come from the division's second echelon. A security force of up to battalion size may be deployed in front of each first echelon regiment.

A detailed and coordinated fire plan is developed. Weapons are positioned so that the maximum amount of fire can be brought to bear directly in front of the FEBA. Enemy penetrations are blunted by shifting artillery fire and by conducting counterattacks.

The commander controls the defense through a series of command posts and command observation posts. At division level, there are normally four command posts: a main command post, a forward command post, an alternate command post, and a rear area command post.

The main command post is located in the rear of the defensive sector and contains the bulk of the staff. The chief of staff directs its operation.

The division commander establishes a forward command post with a small group of selected staff members. The composition of this group varies but usually includes the operations officer and chief of rocket troops and artillery (CRTA). This post may be as close as 3 kilometers from the FEBA.

An alternate command post contains representatives from key staff sections. Displaced from the division main command post, it is ready to take over direction of the division if the main command post is damaged or destroyed.


The rear area command post is established and controlled by the deputy commander for rear services.

Besides the command posts, the commander may establish command observation posts which are controlled from the forward command post. These posts have radio and wire communications and permit the commander and his CRTA to better observe different sectors of the battlefield.

There is no rigid structure for the location of command posts. Command posts are established where the commander orders them established. He makes use of terrain to camouflage command posts and places them according to his mission concept. The Soviets avoid establishing command posts on distinguishing terrain features.

They anticipate radio communications to be difficult and often impossible or undesirable in combat and they train accordingly. During training exercises, the Soviets regularly practice the use of radio, wire, pyrotechnic (visual signals), sound, and courier communications. It is standard procedure for them to employ wire communications in a defensive position or an assembly area. This means of communication—including the prompt restoration of destroyed lines—receives heavy emphasis in Soviet tactical exercises.

Defense of a Motorized Rifle Division, Variant



Shown above is a simplified diagram of the defense of a motorized rifle division. Not all details or weapons are shown, but the primary elements found in the division and its regimental echelons are typical.

Regimental-level Defense

A regiment may be used in the first or second echelon of the division defenses. As part of a division's

first echelon, its mission is to prevent penetration of the main defenses by repulsing enemy assaults with intense fire and counterattacks by its reserve. When given the mission to defend in the division's second echelon, a regiment attempts to defeat any enemy penetration of the division's first echelon.

Regimental subunits normally are dispersed so that a single low-yield nuclear strike can destroy no more than one company. Dispersion is also limited to insure the stability of the defense and to maintain the

capability to mass fires. The defensive frontage for a regiment is normally 10 to 15 kilometers. The depth may vary from 7 to 10 kilometers.

A regimental reserve normally is positioned near the regiment's second echelon. It is usually of company size and tank heavy. Its mission is to conduct counterattacks against an enemy penetration.

A regimental antitank reserve normally is formed from the antitank missile battery (found only in motorized rifle regiments), the engineer company,

and either a tank or motorized rifle platoon. The engineer company probably operates as a mobile obstacle detachment to emplace hasty minefields and obstacles. The antitank reserve occupies an assembly area generally near the regimental command post.

A regiment in the division first echelon has its command post centrally located between its first and second echelons. A regimental command observation point may be established in the area of one of the subordinate battalions. Regimental logistic units and the rear area command post are positioned to the rear of the regimental second echelon. Communications are established between the command and observation posts. Wire is the primary mode, supplemented by messengers, pyrotechnic signals, and radio.

The division commander is responsible for security forward of the FEBA. The regiment is responsible for local security in front of the defensive positions of its first echelon battalions. When time and terrain limit establishment of a security echelon by division, regiments in the first echelon organize combat outposts. Each first echelon battalion places a reinforced motorized rifle platoon forward, across the main expected enemy avenue of approach into the battalion defensive area. The reconnaissance company of the first echelon regiment performs screening and reconnaissance activity in front of the combat outposts. Each battalion organizes its own observation and listening posts.

Battalion-level Defense

After receiving the mission from his regimental commander, a battalion commander begins organizing his assigned sector. The regimental order is as complete as possible. As a minimum, it contains the battalion's mission, trace of the FEBA, and battalion boundaries.

In a hasty defense, there may be no time for the regimental commander to issue an order with detailed supplementary instructions. Consequently, the motorized rifle battalion commander is allowed more initiative and flexibility in organizing his defensive position in this situation. The battalion initially consolidates on the terrain it occupies or attempts to seize critical terrain favorable for the defense. In contrast, organization of a prepared defense is centrally planned by the regiment.

A typical battalion defensive area is 3 to 5 kilometers wide and up to 2 kilometers deep. A battalion usually defends with companies in a single echelon. Single echelon deployment permits the greatest concentration of firepower but it also reduces defense in depth. When a battalion defends on a narrow frontage and/or

greater depth is required, it may deploy in two echelons, with two companies in its first echelon and one in its second echelon. Reserves are located behind the second echelon. The distance between the first and second echelons can be up to 2 kilometers.

A company occupies a strongpoint 500 to 1000 meters in width and up to 500 meters in depth. Normally, all three platoons of a company defend in one echelon. (See diagrams on pages 6-8 and 6-9.)

Artillery, tanks, engineers, and chemical defense troops attached to a battalion may be allocated to the companies. This allocation depends on the number and types of attachments received by the battalion and the importance of the sectors the companies are defending. Although artillery may be assigned to the companies for direct fire support, artillery is usually positioned to provide the best fire support for the entire battalion.

The battalion commander positions a small reserve (normally a platoon) where it can most rapidly and effectively stabilize the defense in the event of an enemy penetration. Key terrain and likely enemy avenues of attack are factors in determining where the battalion reserve will be positioned. Reaction time for a mounted reserve is based on speeds of 20 to 30 kilometers per hour in daytime and 15 to 20 kilometers per hour at night.

The mortar battery of a motorized rifle battalion is deployed in accordance with the overall fire plan and is positioned to provide close-in fires for the company strongpoints.

The battalion's rear service elements are located in covered and concealed positions within the battalion area. Rear service elements are responsible for their own security and should change locations frequently to avoid destruction from enemy air and artillery fire.

Defensive fires are centrally organized and are planned as far forward of the FEBA as possible. Fires are concentrated on avenues of approach using a series of designated fire lines. The distance between these lines is 400 to 600 meters on high-speed avenues. The distance is less on less-likely avenues of approach because of a probable slower rate of advance. Artillery fire is used to separate attacking infantry from their tanks approximately 200 to 400 meters from the FEBA. Final protective fires are planned within 100 meters of the FEBA, with concentrations to halt the advance of enemy forces that have penetrated the defenses.

Antitank defenses are organized to engage enemy tanks at an effective range up to 3 kilometers forward of the FEBA. Normal distance between tanks and antitank weapons in defensive positions is about 100 meters. On open terrain, there may be up to 200


meters between tanks in defensive positions. The terrain is a dominant factor in positioning tanks and anti-tank weapons. Each tank and antitank weapon has a primary and secondary sector of fire as well as primary and alternate positions.

Barrier plans and the system of fire complement each other. Both antitank and antipersonnel minefields are laid forward of the FEBA and throughout the depth of defensive positions. Antitank obstacles are covered by direct and indirect fires. Shown below is an example

of a typical defense by a reinforced motorized rifle battalion.





The Soviets constantly emphasize that the defense is a temporary form of combat that makes the transition to the offense easier. This transition can be made, however, only when each level of command is able to counterattack. The Soviets stress that counterattacks should be made when the enemy attack is stalled and he is unable to secure the terrain seized and to bring his reserves forward.

Typical Defense by a Motorized Rifle Battalion (Reinforced)



NOTE: A battalion usually defends in a single echelon, in an area 3 to 5 kilometers wide and up to 2 kilometers deep. When defending a narrow frontage or if greater depth is required, it may deploy in two echelons as above. Distance between echelons can be up to 500 meters in depth. Reserves are located behind the second echelon.

LEGEND:


- | | | | |
|---|--|---|---------------------------------------|
|  | Mixed minefield
(antipersonnel and
antitank) |  | Preplanned artillery
concentration |
|  | Barrier |  | Probable enemy avenue of
approach |

Each level of command is prepared to conduct a counterattack. If the enemy's forces and fires overwhelm the Soviets' first echelon defenses and prevent them from conducting a counterattack, subunits hold their position, strike the enemy with all available fires, and create sufficient resistance for a counterattack by forces of the next higher command. As the enemy advances into the depths of the Soviet defense, he advances on positions that have been better prepared; and he encounters progressively larger, more powerful

(primarily tank-heavy) second echelon formations, which act as counterattack forces.

As previously discussed, the Soviets emphasize dispersion into company-sized strongpoints, while maintaining mutual fire support as a defense against tactical nuclear weapons. By forming company strongpoints, adequate maneuver space is created to shift forces and to counterattack once the enemy's main attack is determined. The strongpoint is usually centered on the platoon in the second main trench.

A Motorized Rifle Company Strong Point



The next higher commander authorizes a counterattack to be launched. In most cases, counterattacks are initiated from the flanks. Counterattacks are preceded by intense air and artillery fires and the fires of adjacent units. The counterattack force attacks from the march. Counterattacks at army or division levels may be the opening phase of a Soviet counteroffensive.

WITHDRAWAL

The Soviets view the withdrawal as a combat action designed to disengage troops from attack by superior enemy forces. The experiences of World War II taught the Soviets the complicated nature of retrograde operations under pressure. On the modern battlefield, a withdrawal will bring the full application of the enemy's combat power to destroy withdrawing units. The Soviets can be expected to resort to deception, movement at night and during periods of reduced visibility, and covert preparations to avoid alerting the enemy.

The Soviet commander's withdrawal order is detailed and includes the mission, routes, formation to be used, delay positions, control measures, and


information on the new defensive position. Withdrawals are organized and executed under strict secrecy and security. The mission is to disengage the force in a timely, organized manner without losing its combat capability. The force executing the withdrawal is divided into three groups.

The *covering force* has the mission to deceive the enemy and to cover the initial withdrawal of the main body. This force normally comes from units along the forward edge of the defense. It normally consists of a reinforced platoon from each forward-deployed company.

The *rear guard* covers movement of the main body and fights a delaying action if the enemy attempts to maintain contact in the pursuit. It is organized to fight independently of the main body and covering force. Normally, it is organized as a combined arms force consisting of tank, motorized rifle, artillery, and engineer elements. Maximum use is made of artillery, mortar, and long-range ATGM fires through a series of delay positions to prevent enemy interference in the withdrawal of the main body.

The *main body* breaks contact and attempts to withdraw without disclosing its intentions to the enemy.

Basic Concept of the Withdrawal



Deception may be achieved by withdrawing under the cover of darkness or adverse weather conditions, by using supporting fires to cover noise, or by employing a ruse. A route reconnaissance and a reconnaissance of the new positions to be occupied are conducted and guides posted to expedite movement. Air strikes and artillery support are closely coordinated and planned to cover the withdrawal.

A regiment conducts a withdrawal in the following sequence:

- First echelon battalions designate platoons to act as covering forces which attempt to portray a normal defensive posture to the enemy.
- The regimental commander designates a rear guard, normally a reinforced second echelon battalion.
- On order, the main body (first echelon battalions, minus covering forces, plus support elements) withdraws through the rear guard, in the following order: rear services first, then combat support elements, and finally the maneuver subunits.
- The main body proceeds, without pause, on multiple routes, all the way back to a new defensive position or assembly area.

Once the main body has completely passed through the rear guard, the covering force breaks contact on order and withdraws through the rear guard to join the main body. Minimum radio communications or listening silence is observed.

The rear guard fights a delaying action, leapfrogging to successive positions, using to the maximum:

- Smoke.
- Mobile obstacle detachments to lay minefields and to create obstacles across enemy avenues of approach.
- Artillery fire concentrations.
- Ambushes.
- Attack helicopters.
- Fixed-wing air strikes.

If the enemy does not pursue, the rear guard assumes march formation and joins the main body as quickly as possible.

RELIEF

The Soviet term "relief of troops" involves an organized transfer of positions, areas, and zones in a combat situation from one unit to another. The units being relieved have usually sustained considerable losses and are on the defense. A relief also may be conducted to enable a fresh unit to occupy the defense positions of the relieved unit in preparation for a renewed offensive. Because units being relieved are normally in direct contact with the enemy, they are subject to enemy fire and ground attacks. The relief is

carefully organized and is executed quickly and secretly. It attempts to preserve as much of the unit's combat capability as possible. As a rule, a relief is conducted at night or during periods of reduced visibility.

Soviet doctrine stresses the temporary nature of the defense and emphasizes the need for counterattacks as soon as it is feasible to initiate a renewed offensive. The relief operation is a means to achieve this end.

A battalion relief usually is conducted with the regimental commander establishing the relief sequence. The two battalion commanders (the one relieving and the one being relieved) conduct a joint reconnaissance of the defensive position. During this reconnaissance, they coordinate routes to and from the relief areas, traffic regulation posts, locations for guides to meet the relieving units, and the sequence of relief. In addition, the battalion commanders review the present system of fire and observation as well as obstacles and minefields that have been prepared for the position.

The commander of the battalion which is being relieved specifies to his subordinates the following:

- The sequence of turnover of the defense area.
- Assembly area(s) after the relief.
- Camouflage and security measures.
- Instructions for guides to meet and accompany the arriving relief units.
- The location of traffic regulation posts.
- The times for commencing and completing the relief.
- Actions in the event of an enemy attack during the relief.

The commander of the battalion which is being relieved exercises overall control until the relief is completed. Should the enemy attack during the relief, the relieving battalion, under the command of the outgoing battalion commander, attempts to repel the attack.

At the appointed time, the relieving battalion moves to the relief area by concealed routes. The relief is carried out successively by platoons. The first to be relieved are motorized rifle and antitank subunits. They are followed by mortar, artillery, and tank subunits. Tanks may be reassigned and left in place if the relief is carried out by battalions of the same motorized rifle regiment. Once in position, the relieving subunits establish observation posts and their system of fire.

Relieved commanders transfer their positions, provide information on enemy activities and routines, and acquaint relieving commanders with the location of obstacles, minefields, and primary directions of fire. Established communications are maintained, and wire lines are left in place and passed on to relieving units.

All engineer installations, to include minefields and obstacles, are thoroughly checked and verified with respect to boundaries, passages, and degree of readiness.

If the enemy attacks, all available subunits—under the command of the commander being relieved—are used to repulse the attack. The reserve of the subunit being relieved may be used to counterattack. It is the last element to be withdrawn from the defensive area.

The relieving battalion commander checks the locations and weapon positions of his subunits to insure they are prepared for combat. The relieving battalion attempts to maintain the same routine and level of activities that existed before the relief. When the relieving commander reports to his superior that the relief is completed, the relief is officially terminated. The relieved battalion withdraws to assigned assembly areas and carries out its subsequent assigned mission.

CHAPTER 7

RECONNAISSANCE

The tactical concepts of Soviet ground forces require timely, accurate, and continuous information on the enemy, terrain, and weather. Reconnaissance, as defined by the Soviets, is the collection of information about the location, activity, disposition, composition, size, armament, combat readiness, and intentions of the enemy. The Soviets recognize that reconnaissance will be met by enemy countermeasures and deception. They employ multiple, overlapping collection means to insure success of their reconnaissance efforts.

Principles of Soviet Reconnaissance

- **Aggressiveness.** The decisive actions and initiative used by commanders and headquarters to obtain necessary information by all means available.
- **Continuity.** The conduct of reconnaissance at all times regardless of the intensity of combat, time of day, or weather conditions. Established contact with the enemy must not be broken and observation must be continuously maintained.
- **Timeliness.** The gathering and reporting of reconnaissance information in sufficient time to counter enemy actions.
- **Reliability.** The degree to which the intelligence information accurately portrays the enemy situation. This involves verifying the intelligence with data from other sources and assigning additional reconnaissance missions to confirm or deny the information.
- **Accuracy.** The accurate determination of coordinates of important enemy targets such as missile installations, nuclear capable artillery, nuclear storage sites, etc.

ELEMENTS USED IN RECONNAISSANCE

The effective ranges of the reconnaissance means at *front* level vary at each level of command. These ranges are also dependent on weather and terrain.

Aerial reconnaissance by high performance aircraft normally is conducted by aviation units at front and army level. Aviation units conduct visual, photo, and electronic intercept and direction-finding reconnaissance missions. Ranges of reconnaissance aircraft vary. Missions of 350 to 400 km usually are flown by pairs of aircraft to support armies or divisions. Long-range missions in excess of 400 km also are flown in support

of *front* operations. Visual reconnaissance is a secondary mission of all aircraft in the divisional tactical area. In-flight observations are transmitted to the maneuver elements on the tactical air net.

Helicopters flying in the vicinity of the FEBA depend on local air superiority. When air superiority is denied, helicopters are used to emplace observation posts or reconnaissance patrols rather than perform as air reconnaissance platforms. All helicopters performing any missions may be expected to pass tactical information to those headquarters and units with whom they have radio communications.

From *front* to regiment, there are chemical defense units which monitor nuclear and chemical contamination. Chemical defense troops from these units provide direct combat support to the maneuver units down to company level. Equipped with radiological-chemical reconnaissance vehicles, these troops monitor radiation and chemical agents and mark contaminated areas. Helicopters or fixed-wing aircraft also may conduct NBC reconnaissance.

Soviet artillery from *front* to division has organic target acquisition units which obtain and transmit meteorological and topographic information. The division artillery regiment has a target acquisition battery which gathers information from a topographic survey platoon, sound/flash ranging platoon, a reconnaissance platoon, a surveillance radar section, and a meteorological section.

Engineer units from *front* to regimental level may be used in reconnaissance detachments. Engineer specialists normally accompany maneuver unit reconnaissance patrols. The Soviets are particularly aware of the need for engineer intelligence to assist in maintaining a rapid rate of advance. The reconnaissance resources of the division's combat engineer battalion also include mine detection equipment and the means for detailed bank and bed survey of water obstacles.

Airborne or airmobile forces may be employed behind enemy lines to locate enemy headquarters, communications systems, and nuclear weapons. They also may be given the mission to attack these targets.

Radio intercept and radio direction finding are the primary electronic means of gathering enemy intelligence. Radio intercept is the ability to monitor and understand message content. Radio direction finding is designed to locate broadcast stations.

Medical reconnaissance is conducted to identify areas potentially dangerous to health, including the presence of biological agents.

Rear services officers reconnoiter and establish observation posts to facilitate recovery and repair of damaged equipment, to identify sites for forward supply points, and to determine local sources of supply.

CONTROL OF RECONNAISSANCE ELEMENTS

Soviet divisions and regiments have dedicated reconnaissance organizations, i.e., a reconnaissance battalion for the division and a reconnaissance company for the regiment. These units gather and produce intelligence which will assist the accomplishment of the division and the regimental mission. At division, reconnaissance elements are controlled by the chief of reconnaissance and supported by a small staff. The division's long-range reconnaissance company can operate up to 100 km forward of the main body; other elements of the battalion operate up to 50 km forward. Regimental reconnaissance company elements may operate up to 25 km forward and closer once contact is established.

During tactical movement, a divisional reconnaissance battalion usually moves one or more hours ahead of leading elements of the division. The division normally moves on two or more routes and the reconnaissance battalion organization depends on the division formation. The battalion may form one or two reconnaissance groups and several patrols; however, this depends on the combat situation and the overall mission of the division. Even when the reconnaissance battalion advances on more than one route, movements of each element are controlled by the battalion commander. At each successive objective, he establishes a reconnaissance base from which he directs the employment of reconnaissance groups and patrols operating in advance of the base. Radio contact is maintained with the division headquarters. The battalion commander is expected to be able to implement supplementary reconnaissance missions or to make changes in the direction or rate of advance. He is also expected to request additional support from the main body if his unit becomes too heavily engaged with an enemy unit.

Generally, elements of the battalion seek to avoid sustained combat with an enemy force. They cross open areas at high speeds and cross closed and broken terrain by bounds, moving from one vantage point to another. At the vantage points, they may dismount from the vehicles to get better observation. Upon contact with an enemy element, reconnaissance subunits attempt to use feints and flanking maneuvers

to determine the strength, composition, and disposition of enemy elements. Whenever possible, reconnaissance subunits bypass enemy groupings and continue the advance along the prescribed route.

Engineer reconnaissance detachments and chemical defense specialists usually accompany reconnaissance patrols at division and regiment. Other specialists accompany reconnaissance patrols as needed.

Typical Reconnaissance Patrol Tasks

- Identify, locate, and report on enemy headquarters, nuclear weapon systems, troop locations, communication centers, and movement of enemy units.
- Determine the disposition of enemy defenses, locate enemy boundaries and artillery positions, and provide topographical information on approaches to enemy defensive positions.
- Report enemy emplacement of demolitions and the location of minefields.
- Determine obstacle-crossing sites and provide hydrographic information on water obstacles.
- Monitor areas of suspected NBC contamination.
- Identify routes for advance, withdrawal, and lateral communications.
- Identify key terrain.
- Identify possible sites for friendly communication installations.

RECONNAISSANCE ORGANIZATIONS

To obtain timely intelligence Soviet commanders sometimes organize and dispatch *reconnaissance* groups. These groups may be formed by the commander from army through regiment. A reconnaissance group is a temporary tactical subunit formed for the execution of a specified reconnaissance mission. The composition of such groups, usually reinforced platoons or companies, depends on the situation and the assigned mission. In an attack, a division could form a reconnaissance group consisting of a motorized rifle company, reinforced with a platoon of tanks and engineer and NBC reconnaissance squads. Reconnaissance groups conduct reconnaissance by observation as well as by more active methods such as ambushes and raids. In an extreme case, they may destroy covering subunits of a withdrawing enemy. Along with their primary reconnaissance mission, they may be assigned missions to destroy enemy means of nuclear attack and

to seize and hold important terrain features in the enemy rear until the arrival of the main attacking force.

A *reconnaissance detachment* is a temporary tactical subunit of reinforced company or battalion strength. The basic subunit (*motorized rifle or tank*) is almost always reinforced with elements of the other arm to make it a balanced combat force. Depending on the mission, specialized reconnaissance elements such as artillery, engineers, or NBC may be assigned or attached. A reconnaissance detachment of battalion strength is assigned a zone approximately 7 kilometers wide and 35 kilometers in depth, or it may be assigned an axis of advance. A reconnaissance detachment fulfills its mission by observation, by ambush, and by direct attack if necessary.

A *separate reconnaissance patrol* is a temporary tactical subunit composed of a reinforced squad or a platoon. It normally is assigned a specific objective and/or route instead of a zone. A squad-sized patrol may operate away from its parent unit at a distance of 8 kilometers during the day and 3 kilometers at night, while a platoon-sized patrol may operate at a distance of up to 15 kilometers during the day and up to 5 kilometers at night. A separate reconnaissance patrol accomplishes its mission by observation, but may engage in limited combat if necessary. Limited combat in this case means that the patrol may use reconnaissance by fire to determine enemy positions when no other means are available. The separate reconnaissance patrol also is frequently used to capture prisoners for intelligence exploitation.

Combat reconnaissance patrols in reinforced small subunit strength are employed to attack known or

suspected enemy positions to gain information. Their mission is to cause the enemy to react and thereby reveal his dispositions, strength, and fire plan. The patrol conducts its reconnaissance by feints or demonstrations employing fire and maneuver against actual or suspected enemy positions. These positions generally are assigned to the patrol as reconnaissance objectives by the controlling headquarters.

A *reconnaissance in force* is employed when ordinary air and ground reconnaissance activities fail to provide sufficient intelligence on which to base a plan of attack. Like the combat reconnaissance patrol, the reconnaissance in force is intended to force the enemy to expose his defensive system. Its specific objectives are to fix the true trace of enemy defense and to locate troop concentrations and weapons; to determine the enemy defensive fire system and the types and locations of fortifications and obstacles; to locate tactical reserves, boundaries between units, and secondary troop dispositions; to capture prisoners and documents; and to seize and hold important objectives which permit surveillance of the defensive position until the main force attack takes place. The subunit which conducts a reconnaissance in force for a division is normally a reinforced battalion and for regiment, a reinforced company. Reconnaissance in force is conducted to convince the enemy that an all-out attack is under way. The attack is made on a comparatively wide frontage and is accompanied by feints and demonstrations by subunits in contact in other sectors. An artillery preparation normally precedes the assault.

CHAPTER 8

FIRE SUPPORT

CONCEPT

The Soviet concept of fire support embraces all combat support provided to the ground-gaining arms by rocket and artillery troops and aviation using conventional ammunition. Nuclear fires are excluded from this concept. The Soviets consider nuclear weapons to be so powerful that they cannot be said to support the combat operations of the ground-gaining arms. Instead, they constitute a separate and independent element of combat power which can accomplish the missions of destroying major enemy combat formations, command and control facilities, and logistics centers.

Even though Soviet military doctrine distinguishes between fire support and nuclear attack, the two are closely related. First, fire support units must plan and deliver nuclear strikes. Second, they must adjust the fire plan to take into account the effects of nuclear strikes on the enemy. Finally, nuclear strikes greatly affect the tempo of combat activity, which, in turn, influences the type of fire support required (mobile fire support systems, such as combat aircraft, will be more in demand) and the kind of logistics support needed (fuel and ammunition).

Artillery support is planned and coordinated by the chief of rocket troops and artillery (CRTA) assigned to the staff of the supported maneuver element at each level of command. (At regimental level, the artillery staff officer is called the chief of artillery.) The CRTA is not the commander of the organic field artillery unit. Air support normally is planned by the aviation commander and his staff at *front* and army level and coordinated by air representatives at lower levels of command (in some cases down to maneuver battalion) who function as forward air controllers.

FIRE SUPERIORITY

Fire superiority is a firepower advantage over the enemy in the course of a given battle or operation. Fire superiority is a unit's ability to execute its own fire missions successfully while suppressing substantive counterfire by the enemy. The Soviets believe that fire superiority is relatively assured for the side that opens fire first; achieves surprise; renders highly accurate, effective fire; masses fires effectively either through maneuver by fire or maneuver of the fire support means. To achieve and maintain fire superiority, a Soviet unit maintains continuous fire on the fire support means of the enemy, especially his artillery.

In the offense, fire superiority is achieved by fire preparation and normally is maintained during the entire battle. In the defense, fire superiority may be achieved in selected sectors for a given period of time—for example, in a sector selected for a counter-preparation or a counterattack.

TARGET DAMAGE CRITERIA

Target damage is the effect of fires on a given military target and results in total, partial, or temporary loss of the target's combat effectiveness.

Categories of Target Damage

Destruction. A destroyed target has completely lost its combat effectiveness. Prepared defenses are considered destroyed when they are no longer usable without major reconstruction. A point target is considered destroyed when there is a 90 percent probability that it has suffered serious damage. An area target is considered destroyed when it is highly probable (90 percent) that no less than 50 percent of the target's subelements or no less than 50 percent of the target area has suffered serious damage.

Suppression. A suppressed target has suffered sufficient damage to lose its combat effectiveness temporarily or to restrict its ability to maneuver or effect command and control. An area target is considered to be suppressed when it is highly probable (90 percent) that no less than 25 to 30 percent of the target's subelements, or 25 to 30 percent of the target's area, has suffered serious damage.

Harassment. Harassment fire is conducted sporadically to prevent troop movement in the open and to lower the morale of the enemy.

PHASES OF FIRE SUPPORT

Offensive fire support is divided into four phases: fire support for a force's movement forward, fire preparation, fires in support of the attack, and fire accompaniment.

Fire support for a force's movement forward consists of long-range fires designed to protect a force moving from an assembly area to the line of departure.

Fire preparation for the attack or counterattack is the combat support rendered by rocket forces, artillery, and combat aircraft before the attack by maneuver elements. Fires for the preparation are pre-planned and may be delivered simultaneously or sequentially. In the offense, the preparation immediately precedes an attack. It also could be used before the introduction of second echelon or reserve forces. In the defense, it is used before the execution of a counterattack. The preparation is intended to destroy and to suppress enemy weapon systems, command and control elements, and troops in the tactical and immediate operational depth of the enemy's defenses. The Soviets strive to achieve fire superiority early in order to deny any real opposition by the enemy.

Fire preparation consists of artillery and air preparation and includes fires from rocket forces, artillery (including mortars), combat aircraft, and sometimes tanks and other direct fire weapons. Targets for the preparation phase are allocated (depending on the target's type, dimensions, degree of fortification, mobility, and depth in the enemy's defenses) to rocket forces, artillery, or aviation.

The length and organization of the preparation will depend on the nature of the enemy's defenses, the type and density of fire support means being used for the preparation, the role of nuclear strikes in the attack plan, and the nature of the ground attack. It could last up to 50 minutes or longer or it could be repeated against well-fortified, deeply echeloned defenses.

The preparation consists of intense artillery and air strikes against nuclear delivery systems, artillery and mortar batteries, antitank weapons, enemy strongpoints, and command and control centers.

Fires in support of the attack are rendered by rocket and artillery forces and combat aircraft during the maneuver unit's assault on enemy defenses. Fire support involves the destruction or suppression of enemy troops and weapon systems forward of friendly attacking troops. This phase is designed to prevent the enemy from restoring fire, command and control, and observation systems that were disrupted during the preparation phase. Fires continue to suppress enemy troop activity and weapon systems and to maintain fire superiority, thereby facilitating the forward movement of assaulting tank and motorized rifle troops.

The fire in support of the attack phase is planned and organized at army, division, and sometimes regimental level. It starts immediately after the end of the fire preparation and continues at least until Soviet attacking units have overrun enemy front-line battalions.

Fire accompaniment is rendered by rocket, artillery, and combat aviation forces to maneuver forces attack-

ing in the depth of the enemy's defenses. Fire accompaniment includes artillery, rocket, and air strikes against troops and weapon systems opposing the attacker's advance as well as against enemy reserves deep in the rear. During this phase, previously established fire superiority must be maintained. Fire strikes must destroy nuclear delivery systems, enemy aircraft remaining on the ground, artillery units, command and control centers, antitank weapon systems, and enemy troops. Fires must keep the enemy from using his reserves for counterattacks and must support the commitment of the attacker's second echelon forces to insure a high rate of speed.

Rocket, artillery, and combat aviation units coordinate mutually supporting fires with each other and with the supported maneuver unit. The fire accompaniment phase begins with the end of the fire support phase and continues until the supported maneuver forces have accomplished their missions.

The Soviets consider fire support (artillery and air) the most decisive element in modern combat. They stress the need to integrate all means of fire support closely and to execute a well-coordinated fire support plan throughout the depth of the enemy's defenses.

FIRE SUPPORT ZONES

The Soviets distinguish between close and long-range fire support zones. The close fire support zone extends as far as the range of the attacker's direct fire weapons—approximately 3 kilometers into the enemy's defenses. Domination of the close fire support battle is important to ensure the destruction of forward defending troops and their supporting weapons.

The depth of the long-range fire support zone has increased greatly since World War II because of improved mobility of modern weapon systems and combat fighting vehicles. In the tactical context (division and lower), the long-range fire support zone extends out to the limit of a division's subsequent (or final) objective. Domination of the long-range fire support battle is very important today because of critical targets such as nuclear weapons and delivery systems deep in the enemy's rear area.

AIR SUPPORT

Air support is extremely important for maintaining a high rate of advance. Maneuver units could outrun their artillery support. Artillery units could outrun their logistic support. In any case, air support is needed to cover and support the advance of maneuver units.

In the past decade, the Soviets have tried to integrate air support into the total fire support effort. Major field exercises feature joint air and ground operations. The quantity and quality of fire support means available to the commander have been increased in recent years.

Helicopters have become increasingly important in execution of both the close and long-range fire support battles and have begun noticeably to influence Soviet thinking about the tactics of ground combat. Combat helicopters provide fire support to tank and motorized rifle units during both the offense and defense. Helicopters are used also for reconnaissance and heliborne operations, as observation platforms for artillery forward observers and as mobile means of control and communications.

The establishment of army aviation has given ground maneuver formations a vertical dimension. The helicopter now provides combined arms and tank armies with a highly maneuverable, versatile platform for reconnaissance, command and control, and fire support. General-purpose and attack helicopter units can move with armies and divisions at the high rates of advance they will seek to achieve in conducting combined arms operations in depth.

FIRE SUPPORT ASSETS

Divisional and nondivisional artillery units are being expanded. Older, towed howitzers are being replaced by self-propelled versions. A 122-mm howitzer battalion is being added to the tank regiment of the tank and motorized rifle divisions. The addition of large-caliber, self-propelled howitzers and long-range multiple rocket launchers to the artillery available to army and front commanders greatly enhances their ability to provide area and counterbattery fire support to subordinate divisions as they maneuver at considerable depth in the enemy's rear.

The increasing densities of artillery enable entire battalions to fire missions that were previously fired by individual batteries. Improvements in target acquisition radar allow the Soviets to achieve greater surprise and shorter, more intense fire preparations. Fire missions may be initiated without registration from battalions and batteries. Artillery pieces may be laid using shorter, emergency occupation procedures.

Soviet artillery battalions are beginning to receive electronic field artillery computers. Automation of gunnery computations should help Soviet artillerymen to reduce their mission times and to deploy their firing batteries with more flexibility.

The size of helicopter forces has been expanding at a constant rate. Older combat helicopters are being

replaced with newer models equipped with ATGMs that have greater standoff range. Newer attack helicopters can maneuver after missile launch. Assault helicopter tactics are being more closely aligned with ground maneuver unit tactics, while fixed-wing aviation is being reorganized to provide more flexible employment.

Third-generation high-performance aircraft with improved avionics, ECM-ECCM equipment, and increased combat radius and payload have replaced older models. The Soviet Union has in production or development precision-guided munitions (PGM) similar to those deployed by US forces.

The deployment of a wide array of mobile and semi-mobile air defense missile and gun systems has given ground formations greater freedom of maneuver, while simultaneously freeing aircraft from air defense missions for ground support roles.

TRENDS IN FIRE SUPPORT

Soviet fire support concepts are undergoing considerable modification. The introduction of a significant variety of modern equipment in a relatively short time has raised command, control, and coordination problems. The need to improve interaction between supporting and supported units is constantly emphasized, as officers are exhorted to learn the tactics and the capabilities of the units which comprise the combined arms team.

Present Soviet efforts are directed toward upgrading employment procedures and personnel proficiency to maximize the capabilities of new fire support assets. The Soviet aim is to achieve ever greater rates of advance and deeper penetrations into the enemy's rear, while minimizing the enemy's capability to release destructive power on attacking Soviet forces.

Soviet fire planning and execution are still extremely centralized. While this could be an advantage in the preparation and during fires in support of the attack, it could cause considerable difficulty in the accompaniment phase.

The command and control system for air support is even more centralized than that of the artillery. Communications are limited between air and ground commanders, especially below division level. This is true even in attack helicopter units, where close coordination with ground units is critical. The Soviets recognize the limitations of their present command and control system. They are trying to improve communications equipment and coordination to enhance the ground commander's influence over combat support assets.

CHAPTER 9

ARTILLERY SUPPORT

ARTILLERY ASSETS

In the Soviet ground forces, the branch of rocket troops and artillery is responsible for the following:

- Surface-to-surface guided missiles and free flight rockets of *fronts*, armies, and divisions.
- Field artillery (multiple rocket launchers, field guns, howitzers, and mortars 120-mm and larger).
- Antitank artillery (See Chapter 10).

Motorized rifle units from division to battalion are assigned their own organic field artillery element—an artillery regiment to a division, an artillery battalion to a regiment, and a mortar battery to a battalion. The same is true of the tank division except that the tank battalion has no organic artillery or mortar unit. Both the motorized rifle and tank divisions are assigned their own surface-to-surface missile (SSM) battalion.

The combined arms army, and sometimes the tank army, has an artillery regiment or brigade with at least two long-range gun battalions and a howitzer battalion. The army usually has an SSM brigade and may also have an MRL regiment.

A *front* would contain an artillery division made up of several long-range gun and howitzer regiments/brigades, an MRL brigade, and at least one antitank regiment/brigade. It may be supported by a heavy artillery brigade in addition to the artillery division. A *front* would also have at least one SSM brigade. (For more information on fire support organization, see FM 100-2.3).

Allocation Procedures

The following are general procedures for the allocation of artillery by a higher headquarters to a maneuver force for the execution of a given operation:

- *Front* and army normally allocate artillery battalions in accordance with the importance of the missions to be carried out by armies and divisions.
- A division will allocate some of its organic and attached artillery to leading regiments.
- A regiment may attach some artillery to leading maneuver battalions.
- Motorized rifle regiments in a division second echelon normally retain their organic artillery.
- Second echelon divisional artillery may be temporarily attached to first echelon divisions.
- Second echelon divisions, regiments, and battalions are not normally reinforced with additional artillery until they are committed.

Organization for Combat


The command and organizational structure, which insures flexibility in concentrating artillery fire, is established by temporary, mission-oriented groupings. Organizing artillery into army, divisional, and regimental artillery groups provides maneuver commanders continuous artillery support with the required degree of centralized control. Artillery groups usually consist of at least two battalions of similar or mixed type units, to include field guns, howitzers, and multiple rocket launchers. Command and control of the group is provided by a designated commander and staff, usually the commander and staff of the artillery regiment or battalion which is the core of the group.

Army Artillery Group (AAG). *Front* artillery assets normally are allocated among committed armies, proportionate to the importance of the assigned tasks. When an army commander receives *front* artillery assets, he decides, based on the concept of the operation, what artillery will be suballocated to his first echelon divisions. The division executing the *major army mission* gets the most artillery. The remaining artillery battalions may be formed into an AAG which will then assume the primary counterbattery mission for the army.

Division Artillery Group (DAG). The division commander also allocates artillery, resulting in the formation of a DAG and several regimental artillery groups. The division may organize more than one DAG if necessary due to span of control, number of battalions available, and assigned missions. The DAG may vary in size from two to four battalions and is employed in general support of the division. The DAG assists the army with the counterbattery mission or, if capable, may perform this mission itself.

Regimental Artillery Group (RAG). Regimental artillery groups are formed from organic and attached artillery and reinforcing nondivisional artillery battalions assigned to provide support to the first echelon maneuver regiments. Normally RAGs are composed of two to four artillery battalions and temporarily are assigned the numerical designation of the supported regiment. The RAG destroys targets that hinder the advance of the attacking forces. An example of the formation of artillery groups is illustrated on the following page.

Formation of Artillery Groups (Example)



NOTES:

1. The artillery division has 20 battalions of field guns, howitzers, and multiple rocket launchers.
2. In addition to its organic artillery division, the *front* may be allocated a heavy artillery brigade from the Reserve of the Supreme High Command, but these assets are not likely to be suballocated to armies.
3. A first echelon division may receive artillery battalions from a second echelon division.
4. Antitank and SSM battalions are not normally included in artillery groups.
5. The regimental howitzer battalion is part of the RAG.
6. An artillery battalion or battery assigned to a RAG may be further allocated to a motorized rifle or tank battalion.

Artillery groups established for the defense are normally maintained intact until the offense is resumed. Groups formed to support the offense are generally dissolved or reorganized when the supported maneuver units enter the exploitation phase of an operation. DAGs and RAGs are formed or dissolved in accordance with plans and orders of higher headquarters. Through his CRTA, the division commander may assign specific artillery units to provide support to designated maneuver units. In a fluid situation, such as in exploitation or pursuit, artillery support will be provided to lead maneuver units. Through the division command and control net, the division commander retains the ability to form new groups as the situation may require. When groups are dissolved, army and front assets may revert to centralized control to provide long-range reinforcement for divisional and regimental artillery.

An artillery battalion or battery assigned to a RAG could be directed to support a maneuver battalion. The release from centralized control would permit the artillery subunit to carry out missions in support of the specific maneuver battalion while remaining subordinate to the RAG. Motorized rifle battalions also have a significant organic capability in the mortar battery. Its deployment is coordinated with that of other artillery weapons, as authorized by the maneuver battalion commander.

COMMAND AND CONTROL


At regiment and above, an artillery officer who plans and coordinates artillery fires serves on the staff of maneuver unit commanders. He is called the chief of artillery at regiment and the chief rocket troops and artillery (CRTA) at division and above. The artillery staff officer (chief of artillery or CRTA) is responsible for controlling the artillery units organic or attached to his maneuver unit, although he does not command them. The commander of the organic artillery unit assigned to the maneuver unit is directly responsible for the performance of his artillery unit.

At maneuver battalion level, the commander of an attached artillery subunit acts as the fire support coordinator to the battalion commander.

The division CRTA controls the division artillery regiment (including the MRL battalion), the SSM battalion, the AT battalion, and the ATGM batteries, mortar batteries, and howitzer battalions of the subordinate maneuver regiments, though he does not command any of these units. The CRTA also has the authority to inspect the artillery units in the division and to hold them accountable for their technical proficiency.

In combat, the artillery groups form the basic framework for the control of artillery fires in the division. Decisions about the employment of artillery are made on a centralized basis. The division commander, with recommendations from his CRTA, exercises

The Role of the CRTA in the Motorized Rifle Division



NOTE: The CRTA coordinates the fires of all the above units through the command battery, though he commands none of the units. The mortar batteries must satisfy the requirements of their battalion commanders, and the howitzer battalions and ATGM batteries must satisfy the requirements of their regimental commanders.

control over all organic and allocated artillery within the division. The following procedures are observed:

- The division commander specifies the artillery organization for combat and the tasks to be carried out by the artillery.
- The CRTA conducts and coordinates fire planning.
- Artillery commanders normally are collocated with the commanders of the supported maneuver force.
- The DAG commanders report directly to the CRTA.
- RAG commanders report directly to the supported maneuver regimental commander while retaining contact with the CRTA.
- Artillery battery and battalion commanders keep their supported maneuver commanders informed and report to their controlling artillery headquarters.

The division CRTA coordinates the artillery fires of the division through the command battery, though he commands none of the units. The mortar batteries must satisfy the requirements of their battalion commanders, and the artillery battalions and ATGM batteries must satisfy the requirements of their regimental commanders.

Command Relationships

An *attached* artillery battalion or battery is under the operational control of the maneuver force commander. A *supporting* artillery battalion or battery remains under the control of its parent artillery organization, with its fires delegated to a particular maneuver force.

An artillery battalion *attached* to a maneuver battalion takes its orders from the maneuver battalion commander. Its batteries can be assigned to support motorized rifle/tank companies, but the battalion still can be called on to support the maneuver regiment and to receive missions from the RAG commander.

A *supporting* battalion remains subordinate to the parent artillery unit or the RAG; but, if it has no regimental missions, it will fire missions for the motorized rifle or tank battalion that it is tasked to support. Its batteries, however, cannot be tasked separately to support subordinate companies of the maneuver unit, even though supporting and supported commanders may be collocated. Thus, a *supporting* artillery battalion will carry out missions for the maneuver battalion only if the RAG commander permits or specifically directs the action.

The fire plan of an *attached* battalion will reflect the specific support of the battalion to which it is attached, but the fire plan of a *supporting* battalion will reflect


the tasks of the motorized rifle regiment and its RAG. The senior commander who allocates the artillery unit can change the mission of attached or supporting artillery during the course of combat. The period of attachment normally will cover the time needed to accomplish a particular tactical mission. Such a period could vary from a matter of hours to several days.

Coordination and Communications

The artillery commander normally is collocated with the commander of the maneuver unit he is supporting and thereby effects coordination face-to-face. Provision also is made for the artillery commander to enter the VHF (FM) command net of the supported unit. Except when subunits have been detached for special missions, artillery commanders retain rigid control of the deployment of weapons and observation posts to provide continuous artillery support in all phases of combat.

Radio and wire are the primary means of communication, although Soviet artillery units also use messengers as well as visual and sound devices. By regulation, communications are established from senior to subordinate and from supporting unit to supported unit.

Radio Communications of a Division's Artillery Regiment



Soviet artillery units may send radio traffic over supported unit command nets, artillery command nets, and fire direction nets. Artillery group command nets (e.g., RAG or DAG) have battalion commanders as substations. Battalion nets have battery commanders and the battalion command observation post as substations. Batteries have their own nets but can switch to the battalion fire direction net if required. The battalion command observation post has direct radio communications with battery firing positions on the fire direction net.


Towed artillery units rely primarily on the R107 (VHF) portable radio for internal radio communications, whereas self-propelled units use the R123

(VHF) vehicular radio, which is installed in every howitzer. At higher levels of command, longer-range HF (AM) radios such as the R130 are also used for artillery command communications.

The Soviets use wire communications whenever subunits remain in one location for any length of time—normally in assembly areas of defensive positions. To provide redundancy, artillery wire nets normally parallel the wire nets of the supported units.

Soviet subunits also use pyrotechnics, especially in coordinating prearranged artillery fire with the advance of attacking maneuver forces. Signal flags are used to acknowledge fire commands at the gun position, for convoy control, and for signaling between the

Towed Artillery Battalion Radio Nets



NOTE: In self-propelled battalions equipped with the new artillery command and reconnaissance vehicles (ACRV), the R123 vehicular VHF radio is used in place of the R107. Besides replacing R107s shown here, the R123 is also found in each self-propelled howitzer. The LOP normally communicates with the BN COP, but may also communicate with the BTRY COP.

firing point and the truck park (prime movers and ammunition carriers) in a battery firing position.

FIRE CONTROL AND TARGET INTELLIGENCE

Observation Posts

Artillery fire is controlled through a network of observation posts. The network of artillery observation posts established in a division zone may include command observation, forward observation, mobile observation, lateral observation, dummy observation, close-in, and alternate observation posts. The number and type of observation posts depend on the mission. During high-speed offensive operations, personnel in these posts often operate out of armored command and reconnaissance vehicles. The most important types of observation posts are discussed below.

The *command observation post* (COP) serves as both an observation post and command post. The COP is located where the artillery commander can observe his zone or sector of fire, study the target area and terrain, follow the progress of friendly forces, and direct or coordinate artillery fires. In most cases it will be collocated with the forward command posts of the supported maneuver unit commander.

The COP normally is manned by the artillery commander, and fire direction, communications, and reconnaissance personnel. Although both battalions and batteries have fire direction centers (FDCs) at the firing position, fire direction computations normally are accomplished at the COP and the FDC simultaneously.

Artillery commanders may establish one or more *forward observation posts* (FOP) to supplement the COP. At the battery and battalion levels, the FOPs are manned by the headquarters platoon leader, a scout, and a radioman. A FOP may be located with the supported unit commander or with one of the advance maneuver elements. FOPs are employed especially in the offense, during combat in the depth of the enemy's defenses. When the COP can no longer cover its zone of responsibility—or if the commander displaces, causing the COP to displace—the FOP assures continuous close fire support for the maneuver forces.

A *mobile observation post* (MOP) may function either as a COP or FOP. The Soviets have a number of artillery command and reconnaissance vehicles (ACRV) that are used as MOPs. The crew of the MOP consists of five men: commander, driver/mechanic, RTO/gunner, navigator, and rangefinder operator. The vehicle contains day/night observation and range-

finding equipment, topographic survey equipment, artillery fire direction computer equipment (manual and electronic), and communications equipment. The topographic survey equipment provides constant position data on the vehicle's location. Communication equipment consists of crew intercom, two radio sets, two telephones, and two reels of wire. The latter are used to establish communications with supplemental observation posts that are established by the crew of the mobile observation posts, using instruments carried in the vehicle.

In the offense, the mobile observation post advances closely behind lead motorized rifle or tank subunits, conducting reconnaissance and fire missions on the move or during short halts. During a march, the mobile observation post moves as part of an artillery reconnaissance party in the lead security element of the supported motorized rifle or tank unit. In the defense, mobile observation posts may form part of the combat outposts in the forward security zone.

A *lateral observation post* (LOP) is established in addition to the COP or FOP so that the same sector of the battlefield can be observed from two of the observation posts. At battalion level and higher artillery echelons, the LOP is used for accurately locating targets, reference points, and registration points and for adjusting fire. LOPs also are used to study enemy defenses, dispositions, and activity. The LOP also is used for observing high-burst or center-of-impact registrations. The controlling observation post is usually the COP, and the LOP is situated on the flank in a position that will give good observation of the artillery unit's zone of responsibility.

A *dummy observation post* may be used to confuse the enemy as to the actual position of the COP. After the COP is established and functioning, scout observers construct a dummy COP. They use materials found on the battlefield to simulate radio antennas and other equipment. Although field training regulations call for a dummy observation post, it normally is used only in static situations.

Reconnaissance and Target Acquisition

Observation posts frequently combine several target intelligence capabilities (i.e., flash ranging and visual observation). Lone ground observers can be located in trees or buildings. Air observers may use light observation helicopters such as the Mi-2/HOPLITE.

Artillery reconnaissance patrols are used primarily to locate enemy artillery units, especially those capable of nuclear strikes. The patrols may set up observation posts behind enemy lines to adjust the artillery fire.

They also report on enemy organization and deployment. Intelligence data from other observation posts and stations are transmitted to the COP, which apparently relays them to the firing position.

A target acquisition battery is organic to the Soviet division artillery regiment. This battery and the division reconnaissance battalion provide the bulk of the division's artillery intelligence. The battery subunits include the following:

- Radar section. (This has a mortar- and artillery-locating capability.)
- Sound ranging platoon.
- Surveillance radar section.
- Reconnaissance platoon.
- Topographic survey platoon.
- Meteorological survey section.

The sound ranging platoon is capable of operating a six-microphone sound ranging base that can locate targets up to a range of 20 kilometers in a zone 6 to 8 kilometers wide.

EQUIPMENT

Soviet field artillery is subdivided into field guns, howitzers, mortars, and multiple rocket launchers. Until the mid-1970s, Soviet field artillery was all towed, with the exception of multiple rocket launchers, which are mostly truck-mounted. Towed guns are lightweight, low-cost, and simple. Their disadvantages are lack of cross-country mobility and absence of gun crew protection against nuclear, chemical, or conventional counterbattery strikes. The Soviets continue to bring self-propelled weapons into their field artillery inventory.

Field guns are used by the Soviets for—

- Killing troops in the open.
- Destroying buildings above ground level.
- Engaging of rapidly moving targets.
- Bombarding of distant targets such as artillery batteries, headquarters, and columns moving in the rear areas.
- Destroying tactical nuclear delivery means.

Howitzers are used by the Soviets for hitting indirect targets and for destroying or neutralizing enemy defensive positions. Tank and motorized rifle divisions have three howitzer battalions in their artillery regiment. Each motorized rifle regiment and some tank regiments have one battalion of howitzers. This enables the regimental commander to engage targets of opportunity quickly.

Tracked, *self-propelled (SP) howitzers* have been introduced in recent years, considerably enhancing the Soviet artillery's ability to give continuous support

to motorized rifle and tank regiments in a conventional, nuclear, or chemical environment. The SP howitzers are equipped with filtration and overpressure NBC protection systems. Ammunition resupply for self-propelled howitzers is likely to be limited as long as they have to depend on wheeled trucks for logistic support.

The self-propelled howitzers are complemented by a new, tracked, artillery command and reconnaissance vehicle (ACRV). There are two of these ACRVs in each battery, one for the battery command observation post (COP) and one for the battery fire direction center (FDC). Two ACRVs are also assigned to the battalion headquarters. One serves as the battalion COP and one as the battalion FDC. A surveillance variant of the BMP is also in service with the artillery.

The Soviets use *multiple rocket launchers (MRLs)* to deliver strikes at decisive moments in a battle. The MRL is an excellent area coverage weapon. The area covered by a salvo and its rapid ripple fire make it an excellent delivery system for chemical agents.

Each motorized rifle battalion has an organic 120-mm mortar battery. These indirect fire support weapons are also used to assist the regiment in accomplishing its mission. For more information on fire support equipment, see FM 100-2-3.

ARTILLERY AMMUNITION

Conventional shells consist of HE, fragmentation, and HE fragmentation types. The HE shells are used for destroying fortifications. Fragmentation shells are intended mainly for attacking personnel and equipment in the open. The HE fragmentation shells are fitted with fuzes for either instantaneous or delayed detonation and are the standard projectiles for all howitzers and guns. A time-delay fuze is also fitted for airburst effects.

The impact area of fragments from one HE fragmentation shell are—

- 122mm: 800 square meters.
- 152mm: 950 square meters.

The sizes of craters caused by one HE shell can vary according to the surface struck, its condition, and also the type of fuze. These are average dimensions for point detonation fuzes striking flat ground:

- 122mm: 1.5 meters at widest point and 0.5 meter maximum depth.
- 152mm: 1.5 meters at widest point and 1.5 meters maximum depth.

Field artillery pieces (152-mm and smaller) have an antitank capability, and about 10 percent of their combat load may be armor-defeating ammunition.

Smoke is used to obscure the view from observation posts and fire positions, especially antitank positions. Smoke shells are most likely to be used when the wind is blowing towards or across the enemy position. Smoke is also used for marking enemy positions, and deceiving the enemy by concealing the size and direction of an attack. (For more information on the use of smoke, see *Chapter 13, FM 100-2-1*).

Illuminating shells are used widely by the Soviets in night combat to observe enemy movements, to acquire targets for all arms, and to provide reference points. The standard illuminating shell lights up an area of up to 1.5-km radius for 30 seconds. One gun firing two to three rounds per minute is required to provide continuous illumination for every 750 to 1,000 meters of frontage. Other types of ammunition include—

- Nuclear.
- HE rocket-assisted projectiles.
- Chemical.
- Incendiary.
- Canister.
- Propaganda.

Planning for ammunition consumption is based on the *unit of fire*, which is a fixed number of rounds per weapon or weapon system that is used for planning and accounting purposes. It is not an authorized allowance or daily expenditure rate. For example, the unit of fire for the 122-mm howitzer is 80 rounds. For each operation, planning factors for ammunition expenditure are established in units of fire. Ammunition distribution and stockage also are measured in units of fire.


TACTICAL DEPLOYMENT OF AN ARTILLERY BATTALION

Battalion firing positions normally are laid out in the form of a large triangle with three batteries dispersed to each of the three points of the triangle. Normally, batteries in the battalion area emplace 500 to 1500 meters apart. The triangle will form a forward or reverse wedge pointed toward or away from the enemy (see illustration at right).

The battery firing position is selected by the artillery battalion commander. Certain factors must be considered in the selection of a firing position. Wooded areas, foothills, and thickets are the most desirable areas for concealed gun positions. If a concealed position is desired in the vicinity of a heavily populated area, gun positions are located in orchards or garden plots. The entrance to and exit from all gun positions is concealed as much as possible.

For an unconcealed or open gun position, sufficient range must be allowed for the battery to accomplish a

Combat Formation of an Artillery Battalion




NOTE: Within the battalion firing position, batteries are normally separated from each other by 500 to 1500 meters.

direct fire mission at the weapon's maximum effective direct fire range. The fire position also should afford cover for the gun crews and their ammunition and should have interlocking fires with adjacent weapons. Unconcealed firing positions could be found near fences, thickets, and roads, or in ditches.

Within the batteries themselves, gun positions normally are laid out at right angles to the axis of advance. The battery is deployed in a straight line with equal intervals between guns. This pattern of deployment reduces emplacement/displacement time. It also

simplifies the computation procedures required for battery fire missions because it reduces the need for individual piece corrections. The Soviets continue to favor this disposition, despite its obvious vulnerability to enemy counterbattery fire and air attacks, because they rely largely on manual computation in their fire direction procedures. The reduced computation and mission time enables batteries to complete missions and relocate more quickly, thereby reducing their exposure to enemy fire and compensating somewhat for the vulnerability inherent in the formation.

Artillery Battery Firing Position



Soviet artillery does use formations that vary the interval between guns and disperse the guns in depth with the aid of electronic field artillery computers. The Chief of Soviet Rocket Troops and Artillery, Marshal Peredel'skiy, indicated in December 1980 that such computers were available and being deployed. Even with computers, the Soviets may retain the linear formation for the sake of speed and simplicity. They are trying to reduce the time that a firing battery remains in position after the first round is fired to as little as 4 minutes. Soviet artillerymen are now required to render effective fire from emergency positions without firing a registration. Under these conditions, the linear deployment retains its utility and attractiveness to Soviet artillery commanders.


Possible variants in battery firing position deployment are illustrated below.

Main and alternate gun positions are selected for a battery in the offense, but only a main one is used in a meeting engagement. Main, temporary, alternate, and dummy sites are used in defense.

In the offense, minimal work is done on gun positions. When time allows, positions will be developed progressively and camouflage nets may be used to conceal gun pits.

Battery firing positions are organized by platoons (two firing platoons of three guns each). Each platoon has a platoon headquarters and three gun sections. The platoon leader of the first firing platoon is the senior firing position officer and performs most of the functions carried out by the battery executive officer in a US Army howitzer battery. (The battery commander is normally at the COP with the supported unit commander.)

Deployment of a Howitzer Battery (Variants)



TACTICAL DEPLOYMENT OF MULTIPLE ROCKET LAUNCHERS


Rocket launchers are used to place heavy fire on important targets at decisive moments in an engagement. They also may be used for roving gun missions and counterbombardment. Rocket launcher batteries move forward 1 to 5 kilometers from their camouflaged positions to occupy fire areas, usually loaded and accompanied by one or more ammunition trucks per launcher. To evade counterbattery fire, rocket launchers normally move to either a camouflaged position or to a new fire area immediately after firing. Since they move often, rocket launchers are seldom dug in.

Some protection from fire and observation may be gained by siting the battery behind high cover.

During meeting engagements, the battery may deploy in line on one or both sides of a road. The headquarters and ammunition trucks may remain drawn up at the side of the road.

Normally bullhorns are used on the battery fire position. A land line is laid when time permits. The battery COP issues fire control orders by radio or field telephone. Deployment of a BM-21 rocket launcher battery is illustrated below.

Deployment of a BM-21 Rocket Launcher Battery



METHODS OF FIRE

The following Soviet definitions are furnished as necessary background:

Rapid fire is a method of conducting artillery fire whereby the weapon is fired as quickly as possible while not exceeding its maximum rate of fire and not sacrificing accuracy. When the command for rapid fire is given, each individual weapons crew begins to fire independently when ready.

Systematic fire is a method of artillery fire where every round (salvo) is fired on command at a set interval. This method is used for firing on observed targets during registration (individual rounds) or when the unit is firing a destruction mission (salvos). Systematic fire is used against unobserved targets in the course of fire assaults* of a given duration, during controlling fire*, and during harassing fire, usually alternating with rapid fire. The tempo of systematic fire against observed targets depends on the capabilities and equipment of the observer, whereas the tempo of fire against an unobserved target is determined by the amount of time allotted for the expenditure of a given amount of ammunition. The tempo of systematic fire is constant during a fire assault but may be intermittent for harassing fire. Systematic fire may be fired by a single weapon, a firing platoon, or an entire battery. On receiving the mission, the firing unit also receives a rate of fire and an ammunition expenditure requirement.

Counterbattery fire is the use of artillery to accomplish the suppression and/or destruction of enemy artillery batteries located in screened firing positions.

that the concept it represents is still valid and necessary.) Combat with enemy artillery is one of the Soviet Army artillery's most important missions because it enables Soviet ground forces to achieve fire superiority on the battlefield. However, combat with enemy artillery today requires more than counterbattery fire. It now requires the destruction of the enemy command and control centers as well as his artillery and requires the cooperation of the other combat arms and combat aviation.

Maneuver by fire is the shifting of a unit's fire from one target (or group of targets) to another without changing firing positions. This is a combined arms concept in which the artillery plays a critical role. It is used to mass fires on the most important enemy objectives and troop formations to destroy them in a short period of time or to redistribute fires to destroy several targets simultaneously. Maneuver by fire also may be used to shift the main combat effort from one direction to

another. In the offense, maneuver by fire is used in the depth of the enemy's defenses to suppress enemy strongpoints, to repulse counterattacks, and to cover by fire the attacking unit's flanks. In the defense, maneuver by fire is used to destroy the enemy as he deploys to attack; repulse the attack; support a counterattack; protect gaps in the defenses, including gaps created by enemy nuclear strikes; seal off enemy penetrations; render assistance to neighboring units; and support a unit that is defending all directions. Wide use of maneuver by fire helps compensate the defending unit for having fewer weapons and enables the defending commander to achieve fire superiority at the critical time in decisive sectors. Plans for maneuver by fire are normally a part of the defensive fire plan. In such planning, artillery units are assigned several supplementary sectors of fire covering areas along the supported unit's flanks and the gaps between units.

In conducting *fire with direct aiming* (often confused with "direct fire"), the gunner of the artillery weapon can aim the piece using direct visual contact with the target. An artillery gunner who can sight directly on the target will usually engage it with direct fire, but because of the target's range or characteristics of the weapon, he may engage it with indirect fire. A mortar crew, for example, could sight directly on a target but would have to engage it with indirect fire. The Soviets write at great length about direct aiming advantages like the reduction in mission time and a drastic reduction in ammunition expenditure. Direct fire is recommended against targets at relatively short ranges (under 1,200 meters). Indirect fire with direct aiming is considered feasible at ranges out to 3 kilometers and perhaps farther, depending on the weapon sighting equipment and visibility.

Offensive Fire

The offensive *fire assault* is characterized by surprise and a high density of fire on the target. Several batteries or battalions fire against an individual target. Fire assaults constitute the major subelements of an artillery preparation for an attack. All (or at least the larger part of) the artillery of a division or army carry out these assaults simultaneously on a large group of targets. Targets may be destroyed or suppressed by fire assaults (see *Target Damage Criteria, Chapter 8*). The number of fire assaults is determined by the nature of the target to be destroyed (dug-in, covered, armored, etc.), the number of rounds allocated for its suppression/destruction and the time required for available artillery to expend the rounds allocated. The duration of the fire assault is determined by the tactical

*These methods of fire are identified and discussed in subsequent paragraphs.

situation and by the maximum rate of fire of the weapons firing the mission. Soviet experience in World War II indicates that a fire assault would not exceed 15 to 20 minutes. A fire assault of a given duration typically begins with rapid fire (2 to 4 rounds per minute per weapon) and continues with *systematic fire* at a rate that will use the allocated ammunition in the time allotted for the mission. When a target must be destroyed in the shortest possible time, the duration of the assault is not fixed and the mission is conducted at rapid fire until the allocated ammunition is expended. A fire assault also is fired at the rapid rate of fire when a target is to be destroyed rather than suppressed and when a moving target or a target deployed in the open is to be suppressed. In the time intervals between fire assaults, controlling fire (see below) may be used against the target.

Controlling fire is directed at an enemy target in the intervals between fire assaults on the same target. Controlling fire is intended to deny the enemy the freedom to conduct combat activity or to allow escape before the next fire assault. It normally is used when the interval between fire assaults exceeds 15 minutes. Usually it is conducted by a single battery firing at a systematic rate of fire, rapid fire, or a combination of the two, and will expend one tenth to one fifth of the rounds allocated for the engagement.

Safety Distances for Fire Support

The minimum *safety distance* between artillery and aircraft fire and friendly troops varies depending on the weapon caliber, type of projectile, and the range from which the projectiles are being fired.

GUNS AND HOWITZERS:

- Firing without registration over troops in the open at
 - Range less than 10 KM 500 M
 - Range greater than 10 KM 700 M
- Firing without registration over troops in armored vehicles or fortifications at
 - Range less than 10 KM 300 M
 - Range greater than 10 KM 500 M
- Firing after registration over
 - Troops in the open 400 M
 - Troops in armored vehicles or fortifications 200 M

MULTIPLE ROCKET LAUNCHERS: 1000 M

AIR STRIKES: 200-700 M

A *fire concentration* is conducted simultaneously by several batteries or battalions against a common target. The fire concentration is used against enemy troop concentrations, strongpoints, artillery batteries, command and control centers, and other targets. The dimensions of the fire concentration target area depend on the fire mission and the firepower of the artillery subunit firing the mission.

Batteries and battalions conduct fire concentration with all weapons firing at once on the center of the target area. Depending on factors such as target disposition and whether the target is "observed," all weapons may fire on the same elevation and deflection settings or some units may be assigned different settings.

Massed fire is conducted against an important enemy objective by all or most of a given formation's artillery to destroy it in the shortest possible period of time. It consists of one large fire concentration or several large fire concentrations fired simultaneously. Before massed fire is conducted, target areas are designated and each area is assigned a codename. If the dimensions of the target area do not exceed 800 by 800 meters, all participating artillery groups (regiments, battalions) will fire simultaneously on the center of the target area, applying the principles used for fire concentrations. If the target area is larger than 800 by 800 meters, it is subdivided into numbered targets or target sectors. (Areas have codenames; targets and sectors have numbers.) The targets/target sectors are then distributed among the assigned artillery groups or subunits for destruction or suppression with fire concentrations. To the extent possible, the mission will be fired simultaneously.

Successive fire concentrations are used in the attack when the supported maneuver unit has begun the final assault on enemy defensive positions. Successive fire concentrations are used when the successive suppression/destruction of specific targets or target groupings (such as strongpoints, weapon systems, and command/control points deployed to the front and on the flanks of attacking troops) is required. Although successive fire concentrations are used primarily to support the offense, it can be used to support counterattacks in the defense. Successive fire concentrations may be single or double. In conducting a single successive fire concentration, the artillery unit fires initially on the single line of targets closest to the attacking troops and shifts the single fire concentration to progressively deeper lines or groups of enemy targets as the supported attacking troops advance. A double successive fire concentration requires the simultaneous fire of two artillery groups.


The first group fires on the line of targets closest to the supported attacking troops, while the second group fires on the next line of targets. The first artillery group then shifts its fires from the first line of concentration to the second line, while the second group shifts its fires from the second line to the third—and so forth. In a double successive fire concentration every line of targets, except the first, is attacked twice.

The first line of concentration covers the defender's forward positions. Subsequent lines of concentration are 300 to 1,000 meters apart through the depth of the enemy's defenses. On each successive fire concentration, concentration sectors are assigned to every battalion or battery firing the mission. The duration of fire on the initial line of concentration (line of targets) is determined by the amount of time required to get the attacking troops from the line of attack (where normally they deploy into attack formation, and preparatory fires become supporting fires) to the artillery fire troop safety line. The duration of fire on subsequent lines of concentration is determined by the distance between the lines of concentration and is

initiated on a signal from the combined arms division commander when the ground assault begins. The supported maneuver regiment or battalion commander gives a signal to shift fire to each subsequent line of concentration. The successive fire concentration was used widely with the rolling barrage (see below) during World War II and it is still given prominence today.

The *rolling barrage* normally is used in the support phase of the attack. It is a continuous curtain of fire which is successively shifted from one phase line to another in front of attack troops. Like the successive fire concentration, it may be fired against a single line or against two lines simultaneously, and fire is shifted in a similar way. The rolling barrage differs from the successive fire concentration in that it is planned assuming a uniform distribution of targets throughout the target area. It then shifts fire between phase lines that are uniformly spaced. (The successive fire concentration focuses on targets that require concentrated fires, and the intervals between lines of concentration are determined by target location.) Fire

Successive Fire Concentrations



NOTES:

1. Average target size (200 × 300 meters) would be engaged by up to one artillery battalion.
2. Targets would have already been engaged by preparatory fire.

(NOT TO SCALE)

concentrations may be superimposed on the rolling barrage to insure the destruction of the most important targets.

In the rolling barrage, concentrations are planned on phase lines every 400 to 800 meters, depending on the density of targets in the target area. Intermediate phase lines are planned for every 100 to 200 meters. Artillery units will fire on each phase line for at least 5 minutes at a rate of 4 to 6 rounds per 100 meters per minute and on each intermediate line for 1 or 2 minutes at the same rate.

A rolling barrage is divided into battalion and battery sectors. Standard sector widths are as shown below.

Sector Width for Rolling Barrage

TYPE OF WEAPON	METERS		
	Per Weapon	Per Battery	Per Battalion
Field guns	20-25	150	450
Howitzers	35	200	600-650

The division or regimental commander gives the order to shift from a phase line, but fire is shifted automatically from intermediate lines in accordance with a timed firing program. Phase lines are given the names of animals of prey (lion, tiger, etc.).

The depth of a rolling barrage depends on the nature of the enemy's defenses, the attack plan, and the availability of artillery and ammunition. Normally, the rolling barrage is conducted through the depth of the defenses of the enemy's first echelon battalions. The rolling barrage requires a great deal of ammunition and is not, therefore, the most likely method of offensive fire. It may be used, however, to support a penetration of well-prepared defensive positions and assault river crossings.

Defensive Fire

Barrier fire is a continuous curtain of defensive fire across the approach of attacking tanks and infantry. It is used normally in the defense but also may be employed in offensive operations against enemy counterattacks. Barrier fire is used with fire concentrations, massed fires, and directly aimed fire from tanks and guns. Barrier fire is further divided into standing barrier fire, fired on one line of concentration, and rolling barrier fire on successive lines of concentration.

Standing barrier fire is fire placed on a single line of concentration to disrupt an enemy attack. In the

defense, standing barrier fire normally is planned well in advance. It is fired in front of and to the flanks of the defensive positions, and is observed from a ground observation point. All the artillery of a formation except rocket artillery is used to fire the standing barrier fire. Each battalion or battery is assigned a fire concentration sector on the line of fire concentration. The width of each unit's sector is computed based on 50 meters of coverage per gun (howitzer) or mortar. Every standing barrier fire line of concentration is assigned a code name.

The line of concentration for the standing barrier fire must be no closer than 300 to 500 meters from friendly troops for troop safety and so gunners can fire antitank weapons in direct fire at enemy tanks and APCs as they come through the barrier fires. Standing barrier fires begin the moment enemy tanks and infantry approach the planned line of fire concentration and continue at rapid fire until the infantry is cut off from the tanks and halt their attack. If the infantry goes around the fire concentration line, the fires will be shifted to the new approach.

Standing barrier fire is used with other artillery fire and fire from tanks and infantry. For example, if dismounted infantry should lie down to escape the effects of the standing barrier fire, a fire concentration would be fired to destroy them. Tanks penetrating the barriers would be destroyed with direct fire.

Rolling barrier fire is placed on several successive lines of concentration, each closer to Soviet defending troops. Lines of concentration for the rolling barrier fire are planned for terrain that can be observed from a ground observation point. Distances between lines of fire concentration will be 400 to 600 meters and more. The final line of concentration closest to friendly troops will be 300 to 400 meters from forward defensive positions. Every battalion or battery participating in the fire mission will be assigned a sector of fire on each of the lines of fire concentration. The width of each sector is based on the assignment of 25 meters of coverage for each gun (howitzer) or mortar. The entire barrier fire concentration area is given a general codename, and each individual line of concentration is given a number in sequence beginning with the one farthest from the defensive positions. Lines of concentration might be coded "Lion-1," "Lion-2," or "Shark-1," "Shark-2," etc. The rolling barrier fire begins the moment the lead tanks or APCs approach the initial line of fire concentration. The fire continues on that line until the bulk of the advancing force has moved out of the zone where rounds are impacting. Then the fire is shifted to the next line of concentration. Fires continue to be shifted until surviving enemy APCs or

tanks have passed through the last zone of fire concentration.

FIELD ARTILLERY CONDUCT OF FIRE

Massed artillery, "hub-to-hub" weapons, unsophisticated fire direction procedures, and weak logistical support may have been the case during World War II, but are not descriptive of Soviet artillery today.

There are numerous historical examples in which Soviet artillery massed against German forces, particularly in the latter stages of World War II. The Soviets have studied these battles, observed conflicts since that time (especially the 1973 Arab-Israeli conflict), conducted exhaustive weapon effects studies, and incorporated these findings into professional papers.

Soviet *offensive* doctrine calls for intense artillery preparations of *short* duration, if possible, that require a certain number of rounds by type to be delivered to achieve destruction. *Defensive* doctrine calls for *prolonged*, high volumes of artillery fire in depth to break up and to destroy the enemy's attack. To achieve surprise and to limit susceptibility to enemy fires, Soviet artillery tries to be short but violent in the offense and more prolonged in the defense. The fires are massive and are concentrated on critical points in the offense or are dispersed throughout the sector in the defense. This requires not only a numerical superiority in artillery pieces but also rapid fire, long range, and mobility. Above all, the Soviets stress the importance of thoroughly integrated fire and maneuver plans.

While the regimental artillery battalion provides the flexibility and responsiveness required in a fluid combat situation, numerous longer-range tube artillery and multiple rocket launcher battalions from division, army, and *front* provide massive reinforcing fires when required. In this way, the Soviets seek to achieve the densities of fire that they believe necessary without sacrificing the mobility that artillery units need to survive and to perform their mission on the modern battlefield.

In the offensive, an artillery battalion leapfrogs its batteries forward individually in bounds of some 3 to 4 kilometers. By day, it takes a towed howitzer battery about 30 minutes to move, from receipt of the movement order until it is ready to fire the first round in its new position. At night, the same move requires about 40 minutes.

An artillery march column has 25- to 30-meter intervals between vehicles and 100 meters between batteries. A column normally moves at a speed of 15 to

25 kilometers per hour, each subunit being headed by its commander. An artillery battalion occupies some 1.5 to 2.5 kilometers of road space, depending on vehicle spacing.

The ability of field artillery to keep up with maneuver units may be reduced if numerous small attacks require the artillery to deploy. There also are problems in moving artillery pieces across water obstacles. Normally the Soviets use amphibians or ferries for towed artillery, or wait for a bridge to be constructed before the bulk of field artillery crosses. When minefields are encountered, artillery often is delayed until combat engineers have cleared a lane.

These problems have diminished considerably for units equipped with self-propelled howitzers. First of all, the 122-mm SP howitzer is amphibious. Both the 152-mm and 122-mm self-propelled howitzers have excellent mobility on the road and cross-country. The 152-mm SP howitzer requires only one fifth of the time required by an equivalent towed battery to move from one position to another and be ready to fire.

Because of the increased mobility of self-propelled artillery, the Soviets probably move artillery batteries, platoons, and individual guns *within* an assigned firing position *area* to escape enemy counterbattery fire. Within his assigned area, the battery commander selects a primary position and one or more temporary firing positions each 300 to 400 meters away from the previous position. The battery/platoon fires a mission of 3 to 4 minutes duration and then moves to an alternate position. This technique might be used during a long offensive preparation or in the defense when forward or rearward movement is limited. Such frequent and disjointed movement within a firing battery would force fire direction personnel to make numerous time-consuming corrections in elevation and deflection for each firing platoon and possibly for each weapon. Therefore, it is probable that this is practiced only in artillery units with electronic fire direction computers. Average reaction times from receipt of fire orders to first rounds on the ground (on preplanned targets) are as indicated below:

Reaction Times for First Rounds of Fire

Mortar battery	1 to 1.5 minutes
Artillery battalion	2 to 3 minutes
MRL battery	4 minutes
RAG	4 minutes
DAG	5 minutes

The standard minimum firing time is 2 minutes.

Time Frames for Repositioning of Artillery

WEAPONS	UNIT	TIME IN MINUTES REQUIRED FOR					
		EVACUATION OF FIRE POSITIONS OR ASSEMBLY AREAS		MOVEMENT (PER KM)		OCCUPATION OF FIRE POSITIONS	
		BY DAY	BY NIGHT	BY DAY	BY NIGHT	BY DAY	BY NIGHT
122-mm HOW D-30	BTRY	5-7	9	3 (20 kph)	3.5	10-12	18
	BN	11	14	3	3.5	23	32
152-mm HOW, D-1	BTRY	5-7	9	3	3.5	10-15	15-20
	BN	11	14	3	3.5	23	32
152-mm HOW, D20	BTRY	10	13	3	3.5	12	18
	BN	11	14	3	3.5	23	32
130-mm GUN, M46	BTRY	10	13	3	3.5	12	18
	BN	11	14	3	3.5	23	32
122-mm MRL, BM21	BTRY	3-5	6.5	3	3.5	10-12	18
	BN	7	9	3	3.5	23	32
120-mm MORTAR	BTRY	5.5	8	2.5	3	12	18

NOTE:

Officially, self-propelled artillery (152-mm SP, 122-mm SP) can emplace or displace in 5 minutes; but self-propelled batteries may require as little as one fifth of the time required by equivalent towed artillery to relocate and be ready to fire.

Battery firing procedures of Soviet tube artillery differ significantly from those of the US Army. The most significant difference is probably the location of the battery commander. During the conduct of fire, the Soviet battery commander (a captain or senior lieutenant) is placed in a command observation post several kilometers to the front of the firing battery. From this observation point, he conducts target observation, assists in the computation of fire missions, maintains contact with the ground forces his battery supports, and controls the actions of his firing battery. The Soviets place great emphasis on the experience of the senior officer and his ability to make the most tactically sound decisions about target identification, acquisition, and engagement.

In executing his duties as battery commander/forward observer/computer, he is assisted by several individuals assigned to the reconnaissance section and headquarters platoon. These include the headquarters platoon commander, the commander of the reconnaissance section, an observer, a range finder, a computer, and a radio telephone operator.

Operations in the firing position also have many dissimilarities when comparing Soviet doctrine with that of the US Army. The Soviet's method of fire direction, gun supervision, and gun positioning are all different. The only similarity between a US and Soviet firing battery is probably that each has six guns, although the Soviet battery is broken down into two platoons containing three guns each. The battery FDC

is manned by the battery senior officer (platoon leader of the first firing platoon), assisted by fire direction computation and communications personnel, and has direct radio communications with the battery COP, the battalion COP, and the battalion FDC. The battery senior officer relays firing data to the guns.

The command "to battle" is acted on with the same sense of urgency in the Soviet firing battery as the command "fire mission" in the US firing battery, but the individual steps to bring fire on the target vary significantly. As stated, the battery commander in the COP decides what targets of opportunity will be taken under fire. He also decides how to attack the targets relayed to him by the maneuver forces he is supporting.

In the Soviet system, there are four individuals responsible for the preparation of firing data:

- The battery commander.
- The commander of the headquarters platoon.
- The computer located in the COP.
- The computer located in the firing position.

The computer positioned in the firing position is usually the first to solve the gunnery problem. The senior officer in the firing battery immediately relays the data to the gun platoons. The data is then set on the six guns in preparation to fire.

The battery commander and the computer in the COP also are required to solve the gunnery problem to provide a separate check on the data supplied by the firing battery computer. If, for some reason, the data from the COP is ready before that of the firing position, the battery commander transmits his data directly to the firing position. If a discrepancy exists between the firing data supplied by the two computers, the battery commander decides which is the more accurate. This system demands that the battery commander be as proficient in computing the various gunnery problems as the computers. *The Soviets feel that the independent computation of each gunnery problem by four different computers significantly reduces the chances for a large error.* This technique also insures that a fire direction system is readily available in the event that either the fire direction capability at the COP or the firing position is destroyed or suppressed.

When the battalion controls the conduct of fire, the observation, computation, and firing are conducted similarly to battery level. The battalion commander, normally a major, is located at the battalion COP near the command post of the supported commander. Target acquisition and fire direction computation personnel assist him in acquiring targets, computing fire missions, and adjusting fire. Normally the battalion chief of staff will be in charge of the

battalion firing position. He will be assisted by fire direction computer personnel. Depending on the type of mission, battalion dispersion, and time available, battalion fire direction personnel may compute the gunnery problem for the entire battalion or run check computations while each battery computes the data for its own guns. In any case, all computers should begin computation simultaneously because all battalion stations hear the battalion commander transmit the fire mission.

The order to commence fire comes from the battalion commander. The battalion commander can require each battery commander to adjust fire for his own unit by weapon or by battery salvos. Battery and battalion COPs may be supplemented by forward ground or air observation posts. Lone ground observers can be located in trees or in the garrets of buildings. Teams are sometimes located forward in armored vehicles. Air observers may use light observation helicopters to see deeper into the enemy's area. (Air observation is considered essential to the success of counterbattery missions.) Forward and air observers transmit target data to the COP where computation is accomplished.

As electronic computers are introduced into Soviet field artillery battalions, the procedures can be expected to change to accommodate and exploit the new capability. It is unlikely that there will be more than one computer available to each battalion, so fire mission computation and fire control are likely to be centralized at battalion. Battery fire direction personnel will probably receive from battalion fully computed data that is ready to be passed to the guns. They may run check computations manually on a routine or random basis.

Centralizing electronic computation at battalion level is consistent with establishing the battalion (rather than the battery) as the basic firing unit in Soviet artillery. It may be some time before these changes in organization, doctrine, and equipment are seen in all the field artillery units of the Soviet Army. However, the forward areas will probably be equipped first.

FIRE PLANNING

The fire planning process includes target acquisition, organization for combat, assignment of tactical missions, determination of ammunition requirements, and formulation of a detailed fire plan. The fire plan is coordinated and approved at the highest level of participating units and includes input from subordinate units.

Illustrative Fire Plan, 122-mm Howitzer Battalion

PREPARATORY FIRES

TIME	METHOD OF FIRE AND TARGETS	SIGNALS	1ST BATTERY	2ND BATTERY	3RD BATTERY
H-40 to H-27 (13 Min)	FIRE ASSAULT: Artillery and mortar batteries, CPs, radar, platoon strongpoint of companies in first echelon of defense.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Green flares SNOWSTORM 2121 (Radio/telephones) 	TGT 60 90 rds Sector 11 120 rds	TGT 18 140 rds Sector 11 90 rds	TGT 40 80 rds Sector 11 120 rds
H-27 to H-17 (10 Min)	FIRE ASSAULT: Platoon strongpoints within deeper defensive positions; destruction of targets by direct fire; controlling fires against artillery and mortar batteries.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Star flares HAIL 3131 (Radio/telephones) 	Sector 16 120 rds TGT 69 14 rds	Sector 16 165 rds	Sector 16 165 rds
H-17 to H-5 (12 Min)	FIRE ASSAULT: Platoon strongpoints within companies of first echelon of defense.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Yellow flares RAIN 4141 (Radio/telephones) 	Sector 11 120 rds	Sector 11 150 rds	Sector 11 150 rds
H-7 to H-1	OVERLAPPING FIRE: 1st Battery fires at artillery and mortar batteries. (Overlaps H-Hour transition from preparatory to supporting fires.)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Yellow flares RAIN 4141 (Radio/telephones) 	Target 60 60 rds	TOTAL ROUNDS PREPARATORY 1584	

SUPPORTING FIRES

TIME	METHOD OF FIRE AND TARGETS	SIGNALS	1ST BATTERY	2ND BATTERY	3RD BATTERY
H-Hr to H-5	SUCCESSIVE FIRE CONCENTRATIONS On Line 1 WOLF (Sector 11)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Line 1 WOLF Green flares HURRICANE 5555 (Radio/telephones) 	Overlapping Fires, as above	45 rds	45 rds
ON CALL	5 minute fires on Line 2 RAT (Sector 21)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Line 2 RAT Star flares THUNDER 6666 (Radio/telephones) 	50 rds	50 rds	50 rds
ON CALL	5 minute fires on Line 3 TIGER (Sector 18)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Line 3 TIGER Yellow flares TYPHOON 7777 (Radio/telephones) 	32 rds	32 rds	32 rds
ON CALL	FIRE CONCENTRATIONS Individual targets BARRAGE FIRES	Readiness to open fire on Targets 20, 25, 32, 33, 69, 71 Targets A and B			

NOTE: These fire concentrations and barrage fires are contingency plans and will be used depending on the progress of the attack.

TOTAL ROUNDS, PLANNED
SUPPORTING 1152

Foldin 9-19

Illustrative Fire Plan, 122-mm Howitzer Battalion

PREPARATORY FIRES

TIME	METHOD OF FIRE AND TARGETS	SIGNALS	1ST BATTERY	2ND BATTERY	3RD BATTERY
H-40 to H-27 (13 Min)	FIRE ASSAULT: Artillery and mortar batteries, CPs, radar, platoon strongpoint of companies in first echelon of defense.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Green flares SNOWSTORM 2121 (Radio/telephones) 	TGT 60 90 rds Sector 11 120 rds	TGT 18 140 rds Sector 11 90 rds	TGT 40 80 rds Sector 11 120 rds
H-27 to H-17 (10 Min)	FIRE ASSAULT: Platoon strongpoints within deeper defensive positions; destruction of targets by direct fire; controlling fires against artillery and mortar batteries.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Star flares HAIL 3131 (Radio/telephones) 	Sector 16 120 rds TGT 69 14 rds	Sector 16 165 rds	Sector 16 165 rds
H-17 to H-5 (12 Min)	FIRE ASSAULT: Platoon strongpoints within companies of first echelon of defense.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Yellow flares RAIN 4141 (Radio/telephones) 	Sector 11 120 rds	Sector 11 150 rds	Sector 11 150 rds
H-7 to H-1	OVERLAPPING FIRE: 1st Battery fires at artillery and mortar batteries. (Overlaps H-Hour transition from preparatory to supporting fires.)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Yellow flares RAIN 4141 (Radio/telephones) 	Target 60 60 rds	TOTAL ROUNDS PREPARATORY 1584	

SUPPORTING FIRES

TIME	METHOD OF FIRE AND TARGETS	SIGNALS	1ST BATTERY	2ND BATTERY	3RD BATTERY
H-Hr to H-5	SUCCESSIVE FIRE CONCENTRATIONS On Line 1 WOLF (Sector 11)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Line 1 WOLF Green flares HURRICANE 5555 (Radio/telephones) 	Overlapping Fires, as above	45 rds	45 rds
ON CALL	5 minute fires on Line 2 RAT (Sector 21)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Line 2 RAT Star flares THUNDER 6666 (Radio/telephones) 	50 rds	50 rds	50 rds
ON CALL	5 minute fires on Line 3 TIGER (Sector 18)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Line 3 TIGER Yellow flares TYPHOON 7777 (Radio/telephones) 	32 rds	32 rds	32 rds
ON CALL	FIRE CONCENTRATIONS Individual targets BARRAGE FIRES	Readiness to open fire on Targets 20, 25, 32, 33, 69, 71 Targets A and B			

NOTE: These fire concentrations and barrage fires are contingency plans and will be used depending on the progress of the attack.

**TOTAL ROUNDS, PLANNED
SUPPORTING 1152**

Foldin 9-19

Fire planning for an attack is a deliberate and precise process. Weapons and ammunition, target characteristics, and the plan of the maneuver commander are considered in terms of the target damage criteria. (See *Target Damage Criteria, Chapter 8*). If ammunition is limited, the maneuver commander may have to accept a lower level of damage.

In the example fire plan, 1.9 units of fire are expended to attack the prepared enemy defense. Thus, the total expenditure of rounds is expected to be 18 guns x 1.9 units of fire x 80 rounds per unit of fire, or 2,736 rounds.

Of the total, 1.1 units of fire are planned for preparatory fires (1,584 rounds) and 0.8 units of fire (1,152 rounds) for the rest of the day.

If time is available, it is normal to lay out on the ground the ammunition planned for use during the preparation. The ammunition loaded on battery and battalion (possibly regimental) transport is kept for later use.

FIELD ARTILLERY IN THE OFFENSE

There are four phases of artillery support for an attack against a defending enemy: fire support for a force's movement forward, preparation, support of the attack, and accompaniment.

Fire support for a force's movement forward is used to cover a unit's movement to contact with the enemy. It may be used to cover a first echelon's movement from an assembly area to an attack position, or to cover a follow-on force's movement forward before actual commitment to battle.

Artillery preparation for an attack is the phase of artillery fire that precedes the tank and infantry assault against the enemy. The artillery preparation is to suppress and/or destroy a defending enemy with organized, thoroughly planned, massed fires so as to deny him the opportunity to organize resistance. During the preparation phase, artillery fires are directed against enemy troops, weapon systems, command and control centers, supporting communication systems, and defensive structures.

The duration and organization of the artillery preparation is determined by the overall attack plan, the nature of the enemy's defenses, the level of destruction required, the number and type of fire preparation missions allocated to rocket troops and aviation, and whether and in what quantity nuclear or chemical weapons are employed. The length of the preparation depends on the time required to achieve the planned level of destruction. In an attack from the march, the preparation lasts until first echelon maneuver units are

ready to deploy into attack formation. The fire preparation might consist of several artillery strikes, the first and last of which normally would be the most powerful. The final strike concentrates on the enemy's artillery and mortar batteries, and overlaps the end of the fire preparation phase and the start of the fire support phase. Suppression of enemy defenses may take place simultaneously throughout the entire tactical and immediate operational depth of the enemy's defenses. (Tactical and immediate operational depth are determined by the enemy's division and corps rear boundaries, respectively).

The fire preparation phase might last up to 50 minutes. Because of the mobility of potential targets and the threat of enemy counterbattery fire, the Soviets are striving to increase the intensity and to reduce the length of the preparation phase—possibly to less than 15 minutes. They are adding more artillery to the force structure, and are giving special emphasis to the addition of multiple rocket launcher units.

Artillery support of the attack starts when the supported maneuver units begin their assault and continues with their advance through the enemy's defensive positions. The artillery fires on the enemy immediately in front of and on the flanks of attacking Soviet troops, shifting fires in sequential bands progressively deeper into the enemy's defensive positions (normally successive fire concentrations or rolling barrage). Artillery support tries to keep the fire superiority attained during the artillery preparation phase and suppresses enemy defenses during the attack.

Artillery support fires must coincide with the advance of the supported maneuver unit. The length of time artillery fires on the initial barrage line or line of targets is determined by the time required for the supported attacking troops to move from the line of attack to a safety line. Fires are shifted from line to line on the command of the maneuver unit commander.

In the *artillery accompaniment* phase, artillery units support maneuver units as they exploit their success in the rear of the enemy's defenses. The accompaniment phase begins at the end of the support phase and continues until the attacking forces have accomplished their mission—this normally would refer to the division mission of the day. During the accompaniment phase, artillery units displace with the units they support and fire on newly located targets or targets that have survived the preparation and support phases. Priority of fires go to the enemy's tactical nuclear weapons, artillery and mortars, and antitank weapons. Artillery operations in this phase coincide with the operations of the supported units and aviation support elements. During the accompaniment phase, artillery

units provide fires to the maneuver units as they attack enemy defenses from the march, fight meeting engagements, force water obstacles, commit the second echelon or reserve to battle, or repulse an airborne assault. If the enemy counterattacks, the artillery, in conjunction with tanks and motorized rifle troops, fires on the counterattack force as it advances and deploys for the attack. During pursuit, accompanying artillery fires on the withdrawing enemy and destroys or suppresses enemy units left behind to cover the withdrawal.

In the accompaniment phase, artillery units fire various types of missions, depending on the tactical situation. If the attackers encounter an enemy strongpoint in the depth of the enemy's defenses, the supporting artillery attacks the target with a fire concentration or massed fires. For repulsing a counterattack, the artillery employs defensive fire tactics such as standing barrier fire or rolling barrier fire. In supporting a unit that must overcome an enemy occupying hasty defensive positions, force a water obstacle, or commit its second echelon, the artillery might have to conduct a short preparation (4 to 10 minutes) followed by supporting fires (successive fire concentrations). The antitank reserve normally is used to repulse enemy counterattacks, to provide security for the flanks of supported units, or to reinforce hasty defensive positions assumed by the attackers in the course of the attack.

In this phase, the supporting artillery must conduct wide-ranging maneuvers in depth and across its front, using both fire and movement, and be prepared to reorganize and reorient its fires (maneuver by fire) to reinforce maneuver units moving on the main direction of attack. (The main direction of attack might change during the course of the attack).

The fire and maneuver of artillery units during all phases are planned in the initial fire plan. The artillery accompaniment part of the plan is then refined continuously during the course of the attack. The artillery accompaniment is conducted in close cooperation with aviation elements and other forces and systems (e.g., tactical rockets) executing the fire accompaniment phase.

The Soviets plan to achieve certain *density norms* for artillery, depending on the tactical situation. In the penetration of well-prepared enemy defenses, for example, high numbers of tubes per kilometer of frontage are desirable, even under nuclear-threatened conditions. However, modern artillery and methods of fire control will allow lower densities than those which were considered standard during World War II.

Some average guidelines for desired densities are—

- Attack of a well-prepared defense, in the direction of a main attack: 60 to 100 tubes per kilometer of frontage.
- Attack on a hasty defense in the direction of a main attack: 60 to 80 tubes per kilometer of frontage.
- Attack on a supporting axis: 40 tubes per kilometer of frontage.

These densities include all calibers of guns, howitzers, and mortars. Densities computed in number of tubes may increase by 50 to 75 percent when multiple rocket launchers are included.

Based on the fire plan, artillery is deployed to provide preparatory fires and the initial fire support of the attack. The figure below provides tactical deployment guidelines for Soviet artillery.

The prime mission of artillery in the *meeting engagement* is to gain and keep fire superiority over the enemy.

Tactical Deployment Norms

DISTANCES	MORTARS	GUNS & HOWITZERS	MULTIPLE ROCKET LAUNCHERS
Between Weapons	16-60 M	20-40 M	15-50 M
Between Batteries	—	500-1500 M (normally about 1000 M)	1000-2000 M
From the FEBA	500-1000 M	3-6 KM (DAG) 1-4 KM (RAG)	3-6 KM

In the meeting engagement, artillery is used—

- To neutralize enemy fire support means, especially nuclear-capable means.
- To impede maneuver and deployment of enemy forces.
- To cover the deployment and support the attack of friendly forces.

In anticipation of a meeting engagement, code designation for fire requests on particular areas and terrain features are planned in detail; a chart of selected reference points is distributed. Although basic fire planning is carried out by the CRTA, artillery often receives orders and amendments to orders by radio while on the move. Detailed fire planning is conducted by units initially engaging the enemy. As the battle develops, and as additional artillery is deployed, the fire plan is refined and enlarged to provide maximum fire at critical points. Accompanying artillery is positioned to facilitate prompt fires for each maneuver unit as it is committed. Reinforcing artillery displaces at a greater distance to be in the best location to support the battles with maneuver by fire.

In a *pursuit*, long-range artillery, moving forward by bounds, delivers interdiction fire on crossroads and communication routes to slow the enemy's retreat and to disrupt the approach of his reserves. The more mobile artillery units available to the tactical commanders (self-propelled weapons, multiple rocket launchers, and mortars) normally are attached to parallel pursuit units. Control of forward artillery is decentralized to a great degree to meet the requirements of a fluid situation. Nuclear strikes may be employed on the retreating enemy force. Tactical air support is increasingly important during the pursuit, when the artillery does not have sufficient time to emplace.

FIELD ARTILLERY IN THE DEFENSE

Fires in the defense consist of fire strikes, by all available delivery means, planned against the likely approaches to the defense positions. Close coordination is stressed between nuclear, chemical, and conventional artillery and aircraft delivery means. Intelligence efforts concentrate on determining enemy formations and locating their nuclear delivery means.

As in the offense, "maneuver by fire" in the defense means the shifting of concentrated fires. An essential part of maneuver by fire is the ability to shift fires as the enemy maneuvers. It is used to bring a high volume of fire against the enemy's most important attack groupings, against targets in his rear, and for covering friendly flanks with fire.

The artillery organization for combat in the defense is similar to that in the offense. Artillery groups are located so that they can execute their primary mission and still be capable of massing fires in support of forward defense positions, particularly against armor.

Fire planning supports the defensive mission of the force. The defensive plan provides for—

- Destruction or neutralization of enemy nuclear and nonnuclear weapons. Counterpreparation and counterbattery fires are planned for this purpose.
- Neutralization of enemy command and control facilities.
- Neutralization of enemy march columns and troop concentrations.
- Interference with the deployment of the attacking enemy.
- Support of friendly units, to include forces in the security zone.
- Neutralization of the enemy in front of the forward defenses.
- Neutralization of enemy units that have penetrated the defenses through extensive use of on-call fires and direct fire artillery.
- Delivery of fire in support of counterattacks and counteroffensives.
- Covering by fire the gaps and flanks in friendly sectors, engineer obstacles, and natural obstructions.
- Contamination of terrain and obstacles.
- Firing of smoke rounds.
- Illumination.

Artillery weapons are deployed in concealed and dispersed positions to employ flanking, interlocking, and suppressive fires at very close ranges and with great intensity. Each battery prepares primary, alternate, and night-firing positions. Selected artillery units will occupy temporary firing positions, located well forward, to provide fire support to units in the security zone.

Roving batteries and guns are employed to confuse the enemy as to the deployment and fire plans for friendly artillery. The regimental chief of artillery plans in detail the deployment of a roving unit. The plans include positions, missions, method of fire and number of rounds to be fired from each position, itinerary and duration of the mission. The roving unit may leave camouflaged decoys in a position to create the impression that it is still occupied.

FIRING NORMS

Firing norms are established for ammunition expenditure, the area coverage expected, the effect of the target, and the density of fire over time. When

establishing these norms, Soviet artillery planners consider several variables which are listed in the tables they publish for use in the field.

The norms change as any one or more of the variables change. These variables include—

- Type of target (e.g., equipment or personnel, deliberate or hasty defensive positions, hard- or soft-skinned vehicles, point or area disposition, etc.).

- Type and caliber of weapon engaging the target.
- Range to the target.
- Whether the target is under direct observation during the artillery attack.

A general table of ammunition expenditure norms to which most subsequent tables refer is given below. Time is not considered. These norms might apply to any of the methods of fire described. Note that the

targets are unobserved and situated at a range of 10 kilometers or less from the artillery. The table is based on the assumption that the rounds are fired by batteries that have made deliberate (as opposed to emergency) occupation of their firing positions. This means that the batteries are laid based on survey data and that they are firing with meteorological data that is no more than 3 hours old.


Ammunition Expenditure Norms

NORMS GOVERNING AMMUNITION EXPENDITURE FOR THE DESTRUCTION OR SUPPRESSION OF STATIONARY UNOBSERVED TARGETS AT RANGES OF 10 KM OR LESS (DELIBERATE OCCUPATION OF FIRING POSITION - SURVEY LAY, RECENT MET)

NUMBER	TARGET	REQUIRED EFFECT	RIFLED BARREL							MORTARS				ROCKET ARTILLERY		
			CALIBER IN MILLIMETERS							CALIBER IN MILLIMETERS				MEDIUM CALIBER	MED CAL LONG-RANGE	LARGE CALIBER
			76	85	100	122	130	162	203	82	120	160	240			
1	(Missile) launcher	Target destruction	800	720	640	300	280	200	70	-	-	140	60	510	360	200
2	Battery (platoon) of armored self propelled artillery (mortars)	Target suppression	1000	900	720	450	380	270	120	-	450	220	120	580	400	240
3	Battery (platoon) of unarmored self-propelled or dug-in towed artillery (mortars)	Target suppression	540	480	360	240	220	180	100	400	240	160	100	400	320	180
4	Battery (platoon) of towed artillery in the open	Target suppression	250	220	150	90	80	60	30	180	90	40	20	150	120	80
5	SAM battery	Target suppression	250	240	200	150	150	100	50	-	-	-	-	-	200	100
6	Signal and radar vans or radar control point in the open	Target suppression	420	360	280	180	180	120	60	350	180	80	40	300	240	120
7	Dug-in troops and weapons in prepared defense strongpoint positions	Suppression of 1 hectare of target area	480	450	320	200	200	150	60	-	200	100	50	320	240	100
8	Dug-in troops and weapons, tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, and APCs in hastily prepared defensive positions, and assembly areas	Suppression of 1 hectare of target area	400	350	250	150	150	110	45	300	140	85	45	240	180	80
9	Troops and weapons in assembly area in the open	Suppression of 1 hectare of target area	50	45	30	20	20	15	5	35	10	8	4	10	8	5
10	Command post in dug-out shelter or other overhead cover	Suppression of 1 hectare of target area	480	450	320	200	200	150	60	-	200	100	50	320	240	100
11	Command post in the open (or mounted in vehicle)	Suppression of 1 hectare of target area	120	100	80	50	50	40	15	-	25	20	10	30	20	15
12	ATGM, anti tank gun or other individual target in the open	Target suppression	250	240	180	140	140	100	50	240	140	80	35	-	-	-

Calculation of Fire Coverage

FIRE COVERAGE IS CALCULATED IN NUMBER OF ROUNDS PER HECTARE. A HECTARE IS 10,000 SQUARE METERS, THE EQUIVALENT OF 2.47 ACRES.



= 10,000 M² = 2.47 acres

DESTRUCTION

POINT TARGET - 90 percent probability that target is no longer combat effective.

AREA TARGET - High probability (at least 90 percent) that at least 50 percent of the elements comprising the target are no longer combat effective and/or that at least 50 percent of the target area has been destroyed (rendered ineffective for combat).

SUPPRESSION

AREA TARGET - High probability (at least 90 percent) that 25-30 percent of the elements comprising the target grouping are no longer combat effective and/or that 25-30 percent of the target area has been destroyed.

At ranges of 10 kilometers or less, coverage is determined using the table on page 9-23. To compute the ammunition expenditure on unobserved targets located at distances greater than 10 kilometers, the Soviets use the following formula:

$$N_d = \frac{D}{10} N_{10}$$

WHERE:

N_d = The number of rounds of ammunition expended per hectare of target area at a given distance beyond 10 kilometers.

D = The actual distance to be fired, rounded off to the nearest kilometer.

N₁₀ = The number of rounds to be fired per hectare of target area per norms established for the same weapon system at a distance of 10 kilometers or less.

Based on expenditure norms, the Soviets establish minimum target dimensions for firing batteries. The minimum target size (example at right) varies with range to target and weapon dispersion factors.

9-24

Minimum Target Size

SUPPRES- SION BY:	RANGE	RANGE
Battery of 122-mm Howitzers	Up to 6 KM	Over 6 KM
	100 M x 150 M (1.5 hectares)	100 M x 200 M (2 hectares)

A target smaller than the minimum is attacked with the same amount of ammunition required for the minimum size target.

Each weapon is assumed to be able to suppress an area, given in hectares, the size of which depends on the time allotted and the type of target. Examples A and B, Target Area Suppressions (shown at right) illustrate the area coverage of an unobserved platoon strong-point given different mission times. The firing unit is a 122-mm howitzer battalion.

In Example A, the range is 10 kilometers; in Example B, 15 kilometers. The Soviets will not always fire 100 percent of the suppression norm depending on the importance of the target or because of limitations on time and/or ammunition. A unit might also fire less than 100 percent because the target is being engaged by more than one artillery unit.

Target Area Suppressions

EXAMPLE A —

THE AMOUNT OF TARGET AREA IN HECTARES THAT CAN BE SUPPRESSED BY A 122-mm HOWITZER BATTALION FIRING AT A RANGE OF **10** KM OR LESS.

TARGET: Hastily prepared strongpoint position (see target number 8, Ammunition Expenditures Norms, page 9-23).

AMOUNT: 100% of norm = 150 rounds per hectare of target.

TIME ALLOWED FOR ARTILLERY STRIKE IN MINUTES	TARGET AREA (HECTARES)					
	50%		75%		100%	
	BATTALION	BATTERY	BATTALION	BATTERY	BATTALION	BATTERY
5	6.0	2.0	4.0	—	3.0	—
10	9.6	3.2	6.4	2.1	4.8	—
15	13.2	4.4	8.8	2.9	6.6	2.2
20	16.2	5.4	10.8	3.6	8.1	2.7

EXAMPLE B —

THE AMOUNT OF TARGET AREA IN HECTARES THAT CAN BE SUPPRESSED BY A 122-mm HOWITZER BATTALION FIRING AT A RANGE OF **15** KM.

TARGET: Hastily prepared strongpoint position, (see target number 8, Ammunition Expenditure Norms, page 9-23).

AMOUNT: 100% of norm = 225 rounds per hectare of target.

(Product of formula $N_d = \frac{D}{10} N_{10}$ applied to expenditure norm of 150, or $1.5 \times 150 = 225$.)

TIME ALLOWED FOR ARTILLERY STRIKE IN MINUTES	TARGET AREA (HECTARES)					
	50%		75%		100%	
	BATTALION	BATTERY	BATTALION	BATTERY	BATTALION	BATTERY
5	4.0	—	—	—	—	—
10	6.4	—	4.3	—	3.2	—
15	8.8	2.9	5.9	—	4.4	—
20	10.8	3.6	7.3	2.4	5.4	—

NOTE: A dash in place of a number indicates that the number of hectares covered was less than 2 for a battery and less than 3 for a battalion.

To achieve the optimum coverage in a battalion concentration, the following guidelines apply:

- Target Unobserved (Corrections not Possible).


Range setting: If the target is 100 meters deep or less, all tubes will fire on a single elevation setting. If the target is deeper than 100 meters, all tubes will be fired on three different elevation settings with the interval between settings equal to one third of the depth of the target. (See illustration below.)

Deflection settings: Each battery will fire on a single deflection setting that insures coverage of the entire

frontage of the battalion's target. As a result, each of the three batteries in the battalion superimposes its fire on that of the other two.

- Target Observed (Fire Adjusted). When the target is observed and fire can be adjusted on the target, the battalion target area normally will be subdivided into three roughly equal target groupings. Two batteries will be assigned target groups side by side across the target's frontage, and the third battery will attack targets in the depth of the target area. (See illustration at right.)

Distribution of Rounds on an Unobserved Area Target



Range settings: Each battery will fire on a single elevation setting if the depth of the target is 100 meters or less. If the depth of the target exceeds 100 meters, each battery will fire on three different range settings so that the interval between lines of concentration is equal to one-third of the depth of the target.

Deflection settings: If the target coverage per weapon is 25 meters or less, each battery will fire all tubes on a single deflection setting. If the target coverage (sheaf) per weapon is 25 meters to 50 meters, then the battery will fire on two different deflection settings. Mortar batteries will always fire on a single deflection setting. Target coverage per piece is obtained by dividing the target frontage by the number of weapons in the firing battery.


Until recently, the time required for mission accomplishment was not a major consideration in Soviet artillery planning except as a factor in coordination with supported maneuver units. Minimum time requirements may still not be officially incorporated

into Soviet artillery manuals as "norms," although such a change is now being called for by the Soviet Chief of Rocket Troops and Artillery.

The Soviets now are striving to reduce drastically the time required for fire missions. Among the reasons given, the most important are—

- **Target mobility.** Targets on today's battlefield are normally armored, highly mobile, and can relocate within minutes from the time they come under fire.
- **Increased effectiveness of fire.** The same ammunition allocation is much more effective against a target when the entire allocation is fired within a short period of time. This is especially true for the initial fire assault of a long fire preparation and for short, intense fire preparations.
- **Increased survivability.** The Soviets assess that enemy target acquisition capabilities have improved considerably, allowing enemy artillery to acquire and fire on Soviet artillery batteries within 4 minutes from the time the first Soviet round is fired.

Battery Target Grouping Assignments for an Observed Target



As a result of this perception of the threat, Soviet artillery planners try to reduce mission times to 4 minutes. This goal is especially important for the accompaniment phase. However, in a large-scale attack, the preparation and support phases often will be longer. When the enemy is defending and the Soviets have overwhelming fire superiority, they perceive their own vulnerability to enemy counterbattery fire to be greatly reduced.

When the rounds strike a target over a shorter period of time, the result is an increase in the density of fire on the target. In Soviet artillery computations, density of fire is measured by the number of rounds striking a hectare of the target area in one minute. Apparently, the Soviets have not yet formally established minimum density "norms", but their publications strongly suggest that 25 to 30 rounds per hectare per minute is the minimum acceptable density against most types of targets. Densities might even be higher for a moving target.

The Soviets consider highly dense artillery fire to be extremely effective in—

- Suppressing or destroying enemy defenses—especially ATGM positions.
- Suppressing or destroying moving armored targets—since the effect is so intense and sudden that the target is unable to escape or take cover.

The Soviets are developing technical, operational, and organizational solutions to the problems of reducing mission times and increasing fire density, such as those identified below.

The Soviets are introducing qualitative and quantitative changes in field artillery equipment and organizations, and revising their deployment doctrine. The density of artillery fire support assets in combined arms formations has been greatly increased. The introduction of improved munitions, self-propelled weapons, electronic fire direction computers, and improved target acquisition assets has enhanced the mobility and reaction time of artillery fire support.

Although the Soviets apparently continue to compute combat power ratios on the density of artillery weapons, the current emphasis is on density of fire rather than weapons. The artillery battalion has been designated as the basic tactical and fire unit. Missions that previously were fired by a single battery now are assigned to two or three battalions. Artillery units practice conducting fire missions without first firing registration and by adjusting fires with ground surveillance, counterbattery radars, and sound-ranging equipment. Batteries are assigned two or three alternate firing positions within a battalion firing position and are expected to reposition after one or two fire missions.

The Soviets consider that these measures will insure their artillery fire superiority by simultaneously contributing to the battlefield survivability of Soviet artillery and the destruction of the enemy's artillery. Achieving the desired mobility and firing norms will depend, in part, on the wider fielding of automated systems for intelligence analysis and firing data computation.

Solutions for Increasing Fire Effectiveness

TECHNICAL

- Increasing the rate of fire of newer generations of artillery weapons.
- Using improved rangefinders to reduce adjustment time on the target and to eliminate the need for registration for many types of missions.
- Using electronic computers to reduce mission computation time.

OPERATIONAL

- Firing accurately from emergency occupied positions.

- Firing for effect without registration.
- Using entire battalions to fire missions that previously were fired by individual batteries.

ORGANIZATIONAL

- Using more artillery to accomplish the same mission. This is the reason for designating the battalion as the basic firing unit.
- Providing organic artillery to all maneuver regiments. Tank regiments, formerly without organic artillery, now have up to a battalion of 122-mm howitzers.

CHAPTER 10

ANTITANK SUPPORT

ANTITANK WEAPONS SYSTEMS

The Soviets divide antitank weapons into two categories: general and special.

General weapon systems include missiles, aircraft, tanks, and artillery. These systems are designed to destroy a wide variety of battlefield targets, but may be employed successfully against tanks and other armored vehicles. According to the Soviets, any artillery-type weapon (over 20 mm) should have an antiarmor capability. All conventional artillery up to 152-mm caliber has good direct fire antitank capability and carries some armor-defeating ammunition. The 122-mm towed and SP howitzers and the 152-mm SP howitzer with their 360 degree traverse are particularly effective in this role. Field artillery often is used for direct fire. Antiaircraft guns could engage ground targets if required.

Special antitank weapon systems consist of antitank guided missiles (ATGMs), antitank guns, grenade launchers, and recoilless guns. These weapons are designed specifically to destroy tanks and their crews by direct fire. The Soviets consider ATGMs to be very effective antitank weapons, but limited by minimum ranges, low rate of fire, and visibility requirements. Soviet antitank forces therefore have been structured with a mix of ATGMs and direct fire weapons (guns and grenade launchers). The direct fire weapons provide quick-response fires at medium, short, and point-blank ranges, on broken ground, and under favorable visibility conditions.

The Soviets state that in a nonnuclear environment, direct fire from antitank guns, ATGMs, and tanks is the principal and most reliable means of destroying tanks. However, if nuclear weapons are employed, they will constitute the principal antitank fire support means. The capabilities of nuclear weapons, combined with the variety of delivery systems, allow for the destruction of whole tank units at practically all depths of the battlefield.

The Soviets believe that the high density of armored vehicles and improved techniques for their employment on the battlefield demand particularly careful and complete integration of general and special antitank weapon systems available at every level into the antitank fire support plan. The plan is developed in detail and coordinated at the highest level. Special emphasis is placed on careful terrain analysis to identify high-speed armor approaches and on the organization of surveillance and early warning systems. Flanks and likely armor approaches are covered by

mutually supporting antitank weapons sited in depth. During tactical moves, antitank elements are placed throughout march columns.

ORGANIZATION AND EQUIPMENT

Since neither *front* nor army has a fixed organizational structure, the antitank units at these levels will also vary. Normally, the *front* would have at least one antitank regiment assigned to its artillery division. *Front* and army antitank assets can be allocated to first echelon divisions, be assigned to the army combined arms reserve, or form the nucleus of an army antitank reserve.

The motorized rifle division antitank battalion normally consists of an ATGM battery and two gun batteries. A gun battery has two platoons and a fire control section. Whenever possible, the battalion is reinforced by engineer units who assist in construction of antitank obstacles. There are no antitank guns in Soviet tank regiments or at Soviet tank division level. The only ATGMs are in the tank division's motorized rifle regiment. All motorized rifle regiments have an ATGM battery.

An ATGM battery consists of three platoons. Each platoon has three BRDM-2s mounting six AT-3/SAGGER or five AT-5/SPANDREL ATGMs. In addition, platoon and battery commanders have BRDM-2 scout cars which mount 14.5-mm machine guns and carry target illumination equipment for night combat. The 14.5-mm machine guns on the command BRDMs are for engaging enemy infantry and soft-skinned vehicles.

Each BRDM-2 SAGGER launch vehicle carries six missiles ready for launching and eight in reserve. Each SPANDREL launch vehicle carries five ready-to-fire missiles and an estimated ten reserve missiles. Additional missiles are carried by three trucks.

The antitank platoon of a BTR-equipped motorized rifle battalion consists of three squads. One is equipped with two 73-mm recoilless guns SPG-9. The other two each have two manpack ATGM consoles (AT-3 or AT-4). Each squad is transported in a BTR.

TACTICAL EMPLOYMENT

Antitank units can be employed as a special antitank reserve, as an element of a combined arms reserve, or they may be integrated into a combined arms

formation itself (usually in the defense). The most frequent type of tactical employment is as a special antitank reserve.

Regimental, divisional, and sometimes army antitank reserves are formed both in attack and defense. They may consist of guns and guided missiles and generally will include an engineer mobile obstacle detachment (MOD) to lay hasty minefields. Tanks also may be included if the role of the antitank reserve is to deploy rapidly to meet tank threats. When additional assets (flamethrowers, tanks, combat engineers) are attached to the antitank reserve, these elements normally are subordinate to the antitank artillery commander.

Command relations of antitank units under conditions of attachment or support are comparable to those of field artillery units. (See section on Command and Control, Chapter 9).

If the antitank unit is designated as an antitank reserve, the unit commander is assigned missions directly by the combined arms commander. If the antitank artillery unit is part of a combined arms reserve, the unit commander is assigned missions by the commander of the combined arms reserve.

Antitank units may deploy in line, in two lines, echeloned right or left, or they may form a horseshoe or circle. These formations may be adopted by platoons within a battery or by the batteries of a battalion. Siting of the weapons within a platoon or battery is guided by the principles of defense in depth and mutually supporting fires.

The most common formation for the antitank battalion is two lines of batteries. Two batteries are placed in the first echelon and one in the second. They are sited to provide mutual support. Battery fire positions are located up to 1,000 meters apart. Alternate fire positions for the battery in the second line normally are chosen on the flanks.

The echelon right (or left) battle formation is chosen when it is necessary to cover tank approaches from both the front and one of the flanks. The subunits are again sited for mutual support.

Weapons sited at the top of a horseshoe formation open fire at extreme ranges, inviting enemy tank attacks so that the other guns can open flank fire. If enemy tanks penetrate the kill zone of a horseshoe, fire will be delivered simultaneously by all weapons.

Antitank guns usually are sited about 100 meters apart, but occasionally may be up to 300 meters; batteries and platoons are usually 300 to 500 meters apart, but may be up to 1,000 meters. Subunits normally are sited with overlapping fields of fire. Antitank battalion and battery commanders control fire from command

observation posts, normally collocated with one of the fire positions. The battery reconnaissance section deploys as a forward observation post to give warning of approaching enemy tanks. Antitank minefields may be laid by a mobile obstacle detachment 1.5 to 2 kilometers in front of antitank fire positions on the main tank approaches.

An ATGM battery can deploy with distances of 30 to 300 meters between vehicles and up to 1,500 meters between platoons; however, normal frontages are 500 meters per platoon and 1,500 meters per battery. Battery and platoon commanders control the fire of the launchers from observation points that usually are sited slightly to the rear and preferably on high ground. In good tank country, platoons are likely to be in line, but in broken country, one or more subunits will be in depth and platoons may be deployed independently. Within platoons, vehicles may be one-up, two-up, or echeloned to a flank. Whenever possible, ATGMs will be sited on high ground, clear of close or wooded country.

Normally each launcher is given an 80 degree arc of fire overlapping with each of its neighbors. Missiles are nearly always launched when the BRDM is stationary, preferably behind cover, or in defense, from a prepared emplacement. A normal drill is to fire not more than two missiles, then move at least 200 meters to a new firing position. Missiles also may be fired and controlled remotely from a position up to 80 meters away. Standard time for setting up in this mode is about 1.5 minutes.

THE OFFENSE

During an attack, the antitank reserve usually moves behind advancing first echelon tanks and infantry in the most exposed direction of attack, ready to repulse enemy armored counterattacks. The combined arms commander or the CRTA chooses successive firing lines to cover likely tank approaches. Firing positions are selected by the antitank unit commander.

The antitank reserve advances to successive firing lines in coordination with the progress of the attacking force and the orders of the combined arms commander to whom it is attached.

In preparation for an attack, antitank units are located on the most likely enemy armor approaches or may be positioned well forward to participate in the artillery preparation phase of the attack. They may be called upon to conduct fire with direct aiming against the enemy's armored vehicles. Antitank guns can conduct indirect observed fire (particularly when there is insufficient artillery).

During the artillery preparation phase, antitank units are responsible for—

- Containing enemy armor.
- Covering the deployment of the attacking units.
- Engaging armored and antitank targets on the forward edge of the enemy position as part of the preparatory fires.

During the support phase of the attack, antitank subunits cover the flanks and support the deployment of the second echelon and reserve.

During the accompaniment phase, fire positions are selected in the depth of the enemy positions from which to defeat armored counterattacks. Having received orders to deploy to one of these positions, the antitank unit commander will lead his weapons forward, put out observation posts, and move himself to a position from which he can direct fire. He will establish close cooperation with the maneuver force commander and the mobile obstacle detachment.

In anticipation of a meeting engagement, antitank subunits march with the advance guard or at the head of the main force. They must be prepared to deploy immediately and to provide fire support. At the beginning of a meeting engagement, antitank units will deploy in the threatened sector on an assigned firing line, covering the deployment of the combined arms force.

THE DEFENSE

The antitank fire support plan is developed in greater detail in the defense than in the offense. The Soviets believe that the basic system of fire in the defense is antitank fire. The antitank fire plan is designed to place an enemy armored force under continuous fire from the point of its first detection until it is destroyed in a first echelon kill zone.

ATGMs are given an engagement zone that extends out to 3 km from the forward edge. Tanks firing from defilade positions first engage attacking tanks at 2 to 2.5 km in front of the defensive positions. The engagement zone for antitank guns extends out to about 1.5 km. SPG or RPG weapons engage enemy armor at ranges less than 1000 meters.

In the defense, antitank units have these missions:

- Destroy enemy tanks and APCs forward of the first echelon.
- Destroy tanks and APCs that have penetrated the first defensive echelon.
- Cover gaps in the defense.
- Support the counterattack.

Fixed-wing aviation, surface-to-surface missiles, and massed artillery fires may be employed against

detected armor concentrations in assembly areas. Aircraft, especially ATGM-equipped attack helicopters, are the most effective weapon for engaging moving armor forces at greater ranges. Minelaying helicopters also may be used to lay hasty antitank minefields.

Indirect artillery and MRL fires are effective in isolating tanks from supporting forces and causing tank crews to secure the hatches. Although indirect artillery and MRL fires increase the vulnerability of attacking tanks to special antitank weapons (by stripping them of their supporting forces), the smoke and dust of the explosions can simultaneously degrade the effectiveness of direct fire support weapons by impairing gunner visibility.

At the start of a defensive action, the antitank reserve normally occupies camouflaged positions from which it can cover the most likely tank approaches. The Soviets state that each tank, ATGM, or antitank gun firing from a prepared camouflaged defensive position can defeat two to three attacking tanks. The commander selects from one to three firing lines to which his weapons may deploy on each possible approach. Subunit reconnaissance and engineer preparation of routes and fire positions follow, if time allows.

An antitank unit may be integrated into the defensive first echelon, occupying designated positions in either a battalion defensive area or company strongpoint. This type of deployment is usually by platoon, with the separation between platoons insuring mutually supporting fires. Battle formation depends on the mission and terrain and must insure the following:

- Concentration of fire on tanks by direct sighting along armor avenues of approach.
- Covering by fire of approaches to antitank barriers.
- Close coordination between the weapons of the antitank subunits and the antitank weapons of the company strongpoint or the battalion defense area.
- All-round defense of each platoon.

As the antitank reserve for a defending combined arms formation, an antitank subunit's tactical deployment is based on mission and terrain and must insure the following:

- Coordinated and concentrated fires on armor approaches.
- Echelonment of the firing positions in depth.
- Conduct of flanking fire on enemy tanks.
- Maneuver of the unit within the area of deployment and to firing lines.

If the defending units are forced to withdraw, ATGMs and antitank guns cover the withdrawal of forward elements. Antitank units break contact and withdraw to a new firing position when enemy armor has closed to 500 meters.

CHAPTER 11

AIR DEFENSE

CONCEPTS AND PRINCIPLES

The objective of the Soviet tactical air defense system is to reduce the effectiveness of enemy air attacks. This can be achieved by forcing enemy aircraft to expend their ordnance while still beyond the effective or optimum ranges of their weapons or by destroying the aircraft when they come within effective range of Soviet air defense weapons.

There are two important concepts in Soviet tactical air defense. First, air defense is considered to be an integral element of the combined arms concept. Secondly, air defense of ground forces is achieved by a variety of weapons and equipment that together form a system of air defense.

Soviet air defense of maneuver units includes three phases. The first phase includes all actions taken to destroy enemy aircraft while they are still on the ground at airfields or in marshaling areas. Soviet aviation resources and surface-to-surface missiles play the major role in this phase. The second phase includes all actions taken to destroy enemy aircraft while in flight but still at some distance from Soviet ground forces. Soviet aviation plays a sizable role in these actions, and medium-range air defense missile units also may have some role. The third phase entails the destruction of enemy airplanes and helicopters that have penetrated into the air space of Soviet maneuver elements. This role primarily belongs to Soviet tactical air defense forces. These three phases may overlap, and all three may be conducted simultaneously. This chapter discusses only the third phase.

The mission of the Soviet tactical air defense forces is to protect ground force units and other potential targets from attacks by fixed-wing ground attack aircraft and armed helicopters. To accomplish this mission, it is not necessary for Soviet air defense units to destroy every attacking enemy aircraft. If the Soviet tactical air defense system can prevent enemy air crews from pressing their attacks or can force them to expend their ordnance prematurely, for the most part it will have accomplished its mission. Soviet ground forces then are able to continue their missions.

The basic principles that have influenced Soviet air defense developments and apparently form Soviet tactical air defense doctrine are:

- *Firepower.* The Soviets use a variety of air defense weapons, both missiles and guns, and a force structure that provides a significant number

of these weapons, with a suitable mix of capabilities to ground force commanders.

- *Surprise.* Soviet writers emphasize the principle of surprise. They are aware of not only the physical destruction that can be achieved by an attack on an unsuspecting enemy, but also of the psychological effects of violent and unexpected fires on aviation crews. The psychological effects often are only temporary, but they can reduce the effectiveness of attacking air crews at critical moments.

- *Mobility and maneuver of air defense weapons.* The Soviets' mobile tactical air defense system allows air defense units to maneuver with tank and motorized rifle forces.

- *Continuous activity by air defense units.* Comprehensive air defense coverage can be guaranteed only if air defense units are constantly active and provided with adequate logistic support.

- *Aggressive action, initiative, and originality on the part of air defense unit commanders.* The Soviets recognize that air defense unit commanders must exploit the full capabilities of their equipment if they are to carry out their missions successfully. This demands aggressive action, initiative, and originality on their part. The future battlefield will be a fluid and volatile environment. Air defense unit commanders must be responsive to changes in the tactical situation. For example, if the supported unit's mission is modified, the air defense unit commander must reevaluate his own unit's deployment in light of the new requirements. The air defense unit commander also must be aware of changes in the tactics employed by enemy air forces.

- *Coordination of actions between supported maneuver units and supporting air defense units and between air defense units.* This principle emphasizes the Soviet perception of air defense as a single system composed of its various parts rather than a series of separate, distinct actions that bear no relation to each other or the conduct of the ground battle. Air defense is an integral element of the ground battle.

- *All-round security.* The Soviets recognize that air attack can come from any quarter and that it is not enough to provide security for only the units close to the forward edge and only in the direction of enemy forces.

ORGANIZATION AND EQUIPMENT

The Soviet inventory of tactical air defense weapons includes a variety of missiles, guns, and support equipment. There are air defense weapons at nearly every level. As with other weapon systems, the Soviets have incorporated recent technological developments into newly designed air defense weapons while improving other weapons already in production. They have developed a variety of air defense missiles while continuing to develop antiaircraft artillery (AAA).

A BMP-equipped motorized rifle battalion has an air defense platoon containing nine SA-7 surface-to-air missile (SAM) launchers. A BTR-equipped motorized rifle company has an air defense squad containing three SA-7 launchers. While tank companies are not known to have SA-7s, most Soviet tanks are equipped with turret-mounted antiaircraft machine guns. All Soviet tactical units receive training in the employment of massed, small arms weapon fire. This technique is practiced routinely to engage low-flying enemy aircraft, usually under the supervision of the company commander when he has been notified that enemy aircraft are approaching his position.

The SA-7s of the BTR-equipped motorized rifle company usually are employed as a squad, with the company commander retaining tight control. SA-7 gunners are not routinely attached to the platoons of the company. In a prepared defense, the battalion commander or regimental chief of air defense may control the employment of the company's SA-7s.

No air defense unit is organic to BTR-equipped motorized rifle battalions or tank battalions, although there may be an SA-7 squad assigned to protect the battalion command post or other points designated by the battalion commander. SA-7 SAM squads can be employed in any tactical unit, and also at higher levels. Armored vehicles of the battalion command group are equipped with vehicle-mounted antiaircraft machine guns.

The Soviet practice of positioning the command post in the key sector of the battalion's area in the defense provides an element of protection. The primary means of air defense for the maneuver battalion, however, is provided by its companies and the air defense elements attached from regimental or divisional assets. Usually such attachment is practiced by the Soviets and is the rule when the battalion is engaged in independent or semi-independent actions.

The systemic nature of Soviet tactical air defense measures can be seen in the maneuver regiment. There is a chief of air defense in the regiment. His responsibilities include planning and directing air defense activities within the regiment. He advises the commander on allocation and deployment of the

regiment's air defense assets, and he may sometimes control the employment of SA-7 SAMs of the subordinate motorized rifle battalions or companies.

Soviet tank and motorized rifle regiments have an organic air defense battery equipped with the ZSU-23-4 self-propelled antiaircraft gun (SPAAG) and the SA-9 SAM. The battery consists of a headquarters, a platoon of four ZSU-23-4s, a platoon of four SA-9 SAM launchers, and support and service elements. The regimental headquarters has a squad of three SA-7 SAM gunners.

The ZSU-23-4 has a relatively small engagement envelope and is considered a limited area or point defense weapon. Normally it is employed with individual SPAAGs located within several hundred meters of one another. When the four guns of a ZSU-23-4 platoon are employed in pairs, the pairs are usually kept within approximately 1,500 meters of one another. Typical missions for these weapons may involve two to four ZSU-23-4s protecting a battalion in the regiment's first echelon or on a road march.

The SA-9 has an engagement envelope significantly larger than that of the ZSU-23-4 and is an area defense weapon. It provides the regimental commander with an organic air defense missile capability that can encompass his entire unit. The SA-9 normally is deployed between the first and second echelons of a regiment, a location from which it can protect both first and second echelon subunits without being exposed to direct fire from enemy ground forces. Probable missions of SA-9 units include protecting the regimental command post, the regiment's organic artillery battalion, and other organic or attached elements in the regiment's sector.

A number of the new SA-13 SAM systems have been deployed in the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany since 1980. SA-13 units are replacing SA-9 units. Unlike the SA-9, the SA-13 is a tracked vehicle with greater cross-country mobility.

Introduction of the SA-6 or the SA-8 SAM into the divisional air defense regiment significantly improved air defense mobility and firepower. The transporter-erector-launchers (TEL) of both missiles are highly mobile. The SA-6 is mounted on a nonamphibious tracked vehicle, and the SA-8 is mounted on an amphibious wheeled vehicle.

Employment of the SA-6 or the SA-8 has a major impact on the division's combat capability. The division now has an organic air defense system that provides a significant degree of protection to the entire division. The range of the SA-6 provides for greater depth in the division's air defense system, especially against aircraft employing standoff weapons.

While the range of the SA-8 is significantly less than that of the SA-6, its higher road speed and amphibious capabilities make it especially well suited for pursuit or exploitation.

A Soviet army usually has one or two SAM brigades equipped with the SA-4 SAM. Generally, the missions of army-level air defense units are to augment divisional air defense capabilities in the forward area and to engage and destroy aircraft that get past the divisions' air defense systems.

The Soviets have developed extensive and effective radar target detection and fire control systems. Their radars can be assigned to two general categories: surveillance and fire control. Surveillance includes early warning, target acquisition, and height finding radars. Some fire control radars also have limited target acquisition capability.

It is important to view Soviet radars as systems rather than as separate units. Because the majority of target acquisition radars are concentrated above division level, most target information is accumulated and processed at army and *front* air defense operations centers and passed down to divisions. High level commanders select the weapon system that can best engage a given target. Target detection and monitoring by *front*, army, and division target acquisition radars provide the necessary data for engagement without unnecessarily exposing the air defense firing battery and TEL-mounted (particularly SA-8) radars to detection by enemy forces and subsequent neutralization by electronic countermeasures or destruction. (For more information on air defense organization and equipment, see FM 100-2-3.)

MISSIONS

Front headquarters plays a major role in the control of air defense assets of its subordinate units. The *front's* own air defense weapons are used for various missions, depending on the situation. Some may augment the air defense weapons of armies of the *front*. Others may provide general, *front*-wide air defense coverage or fill gaps between armies. In any event, *front* air defense assets are used primarily to insure continuous coverage in both detection and engagement capabilities. *Front* air defense weapons usually are located somewhere to the rear of army air defense weapons to engage aircraft that penetrate forward air defenses.

SA-4 units of Soviet armies provide medium- to high-altitude air defense and augment the air defense assets of divisions. Their engagement envelope extends from the army's rear to about 45 kilometers beyond the

forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) for first echelon armies. Laterally, this SA-4 coverage overlaps the envelope of adjacent armies.

The mission of the division's air defense regiment is to protect the maneuver regiments and other units or facilities within the division's area of activity. First echelon maneuver regiments, division headquarters, and the division's artillery and rocket units have the highest priorities for protection. The division commander is assisted by a chief of air defense, a field grade officer, who with his staff plans and directs the division's air defense operations.

Air defense regiments equipped with the SA-6 or the SA-8 SAM are capable of including all elements of the division in their engagement envelopes. Typical employment of the regiment's five missile firing batteries might involve two batteries providing support directly to the two first echelon maneuver regiments, while the remaining three batteries provide protection for the division headquarters, rocket and artillery units, and the remainder of the division. Units to the rear of first echelon maneuver regiments are protected by the engagement envelopes of the first echelon regiments and the missile batteries directly supporting them. The ranges of the SA-6 and the SA-8 allow them to be deployed several kilometers behind the line of contact, thus reducing their exposure to enemy ground-based weapons. From these positions, the missile batteries can still engage targets well forward of the FEBA.

SA-7 SAMs employed in the rear area provide local air defense against enemy aircraft that penetrate the division's primary air defense network. Control of the SA-7s is probably highly centralized to prevent engagement of friendly aircraft by mistake.

Front through division air defense assets are employed to create an area defense. Radars provide an unbroken detection envelope extending well into enemy territory and across the entire zone of operations. Enemy aircraft that manage to get past Soviet fighters probably are engaged first by *front* and army SA-4 missile units. While gaps may appear in the missile engagement envelope, significant effort is devoted to maintaining continuous coverage.

If enemy aircraft penetrate the air defense systems of *front*, army, and divisional air defense regiments, they will be engaged by the short-range SA-7 and SA-9 SAMs and the ZSU-23-4 anti-aircraft guns of the maneuver regiments. Tank, motorized rifle, and artillery units in the division's first and second echelons and the air defense subunits themselves are expected to be the primary targets of enemy air attacks. The ZSU-23-4 platoon of the maneuver regiment, directly supplemented by the regiment's SA-9 SAMs and further

supplemented by divisional air defense batteries, provides the key regimental air defense.

SUPPORT IN THE OFFENSE

Soviet ground force air defense weapons can fully support fast-moving tank and motorized rifle forces in dynamic offensive combat. Air defense units of *front* and army conduct basically an area defense, engaging enemy aircraft at some distance from the supported maneuver divisions and themselves. Divisional air defense regiments conduct primarily an area defense, though there is a significant element of point defense in support of the division's maneuver regiments. Operations by air defense batteries and the SA-7 SAM sections are largely of the point type due to the capabilities of their weapons and the units they defend.

Air defense actions are most complex in the maneuver regiment. As the supported unit performs its assigned missions, it continuously changes its location and combat formation. The air defense unit commander must respond to these changes and redeploy his own weapons to provide continuous and effective protection to the regiment's elements.

Allocation of air defense units is weighted in favor of maneuver units in areas where the threat is perceived to be the greatest. For example, a motorized rifle regiment in the division's first echelon usually receives additional air defense support from one or more batteries of the division's air defense regiment. These batteries need not operate in the maneuver regiment's formation. The range of their radars and missiles allows them to provide support to the first echelon from locations farther to the rear. Locating these missile batteries to the rear also decreases the likelihood of their being destroyed by enemy ground fire or aircraft.

A motorized rifle battalion attacking in a regiment's first echelon often is supported by ZSU-23-4s of the regiment's antiaircraft artillery platoon. In his combat order, the regimental commander assigns the ZSU platoon the mission of supporting particular battalions for a specified period. This period can begin before a battalion moves into an assembly area, in which case the air defense element provides protection to the battalion during the road march to the assembly area. Alternatively, the ZSU-23-4 platoon may join the maneuver battalion in the assembly area, though the Soviets prefer to have both subunits arrive at the assembly area at approximately the same time. Failure of the air defense subunit to join the maneuver battalion at the designated time leaves the battalion exposed to possible enemy air attack. In either case, the ZSU-23-4 platoon leader reports to the maneuver

battalion commander, and direct communications are established. The ZSU-23-4 platoon maintains communications with the regimental air defense battery. It also receives information from the divisional air defense target identification and warning network. This communications system provides for timely receipt of information on the tactical air situation.

The maneuver battalion commander and the ZSU-23-4 section or platoon leader work closely to integrate their weapons into an effective air defense plan. As the battalion occupies the assembly areas, air defense weapons deploy in accordance with this fire plan. Light discipline is strictly enforced, and radio listening silence is employed to reduce the likelihood of detection by enemy signal intelligence units. If the assembly area is to be occupied for an extended period, such as overnight, the ZSU-23-4s and the weapons and vehicles of the battalion are usually dug in.

The battalion commander provides guidance for the placement of the ZSU-23-4s and the SA-7 SAMs. Observation posts and firing positions are selected to provide comprehensive observation and interlocking fires on the most likely approach routes for low-flying aircraft and armed helicopters. When the entire platoon is employed, the two pairs of ZSU-23-4s are kept within mutually supporting range. As a rule, one gun crew is on alert in each of the ZSU-23-4 pairs except when warning of an air attack is received, at which time both crews go to alert status.

The SA-7 SAM squads of the three motorized rifle companies supplement the coverage provided by the ZSU-23-4 section or platoon. The three gunners of one company's SA-7 squad may be placed near the ZSU-23-4 section or platoon. The ZSU subunit leader may be given some degree of control over these SA-7 gunners in such a situation. The SA-7 squad of another motorized rifle company could cover a less likely avenue of approach. Placement of these SA-7 gunners is similar to that in an air defense ambush. The three SA-7s of the third motorized rifle company may be retained with the battalion in the assembly area to provide close-in protection. Observation posts are collocated frequently with SA-7 firing positions.

Besides the ZSU-23-4s and SA-7 SAMs, the battalion employs its vehicle-mounted machine guns, ATGMs, and massed small arms for close-in defense. When the battalion is reinforced by a tank company, the anti-aircraft machine guns on tanks provide additional air defense firepower in the assembly area.

To attack the battalion in its assembly area with conventional ordnance, an enemy aircraft must first penetrate the engagement envelopes formed by missile units of *front*, army, and divisions. The

attacking aircraft then come within range of the regimental and battalion defense systems. The ZSU-23-4s engage enemy aircraft immediately as they come within range. SA-7 gunners engage enemy aircraft that maneuver to avoid ZSU-23-4 fires or pass over the SA-7 firing positions. Finally, small arms and vehicle-mounted weapons engage enemy aircraft that pass over the maneuver battalions' positions.


In an attack, the exact location of tactical air defense weapons depends on the mission of the supported unit, the attack formation chosen by its commander, and considerations of terrain, fields of fire, and observation. If the maneuver unit is attacking on a broad frontage, sections of two ZSU-23-4s are usually deployed in a line formation to provide protection to the dispersed elements of the supported unit. When attacking on a narrow frontage, the two ZSU-23-4 sections of the platoon are deployed in column to provide greater control and increased concentration of platoon fire.

SA-7 gunners ride in armored personnel carriers or the BMP. Employment of a BTR company's SA-7 gunners in a group, close to the company commander, is preferred. It offers greater control and increased probability of a target's destruction. It also reduces the possibility of firing on a friendly aircraft.

When two maneuver battalions attack on line in the first echelon of a regiment, each normally is supported by a ZSU section. While the ZSU-23-4 sections remain within mutually supporting range, they are located far enough apart to reduce the chances of their simultaneous destruction by conventional weapons. The two guns of each section usually are located from 150 to 250 meters apart to insure adequate freedom of fire for engaging low flying targets (see below).

The air defense platoon command element usually follows the ZSU-23-4 sections at a distance of approximately 200 meters. Trucks carrying additional ammunition for the ZSUs follow at a distance of 1.5 to 2.5 kilometers to the rear of the firing sections.

Air Defense Support for a Motorized Rifle Battalion Assault



Basic employment techniques for air defense weapons in a meeting engagement do not differ significantly from those for the attack. Two ZSU-23-4s of the platoon normally are placed in a regiment's advance guard. SA-9 SAMs and any reinforcing elements from the division's air defense regiment most likely remain with the maneuver regiment's main force. Air observers are posted on all vehicles, and SA-7 gunners are prepared to engage designated targets in their sectors of observation and fire.

An additional concern is the need to protect air defense weapons, especially ZSU-23-4s with the advance guard, from enemy direct fire. The advance guard battalion also may be protected by SA-6 or SA-8 SAM batteries operating from the regiment's main body.

A motorized rifle battalion in a pursuit may be augmented by air defense elements from its regiment or possibly a battery from the division's air defense regiment. Air defense during pursuit is especially important, since the enemy will likely use air power to reduce the rate of advance and the strength of pursuing Soviet forces.

SUPPORT IN THE DEFENSE

The Soviets believe that the motorized rifle and tank battalions in a division's defending first echelon regiments will be priority targets for attacking enemy aircraft. Therefore, regimental air defense weapons are deployed well forward, with the ZSU-23-4 platoon usually supporting first echelon motorized rifle battalions. The SA-9 SAM platoon is probably located in the rear of the first echelon battalions or in the forward area of the second echelon, protecting the regiment's artillery battalion and command post. If the air threat is great, batteries of the divisional air defense regiment may be allocated to any of the maneuver regiments. Remaining divisional air defense batteries protect the division main command post and division artillery and rocket units.

A ZSU-23-4 platoon leader normally is given a mission order by his air defense battery commander to provide protection to a specific maneuver battalion or battalions for a given period of time. During this time, the ZSU-23-4 platoon leader reports directly to the maneuver battalion commander. The platoon leader also maintains communications with his battery headquarters and the division's target identification and warning net.

The maneuver battalion commander has overall responsibility for the organization and conduct of air defense by his own battalion and any attached

elements. The ZSU-23-4 platoon leader is responsible only for the performance of his own platoon.

When the platoon leader reports to a maneuver battalion commander, he is informed of the battalion's mission and disposition and the commander's tactical plan. He may receive further instructions from the battalion commander, and they may conduct a joint terrain reconnaissance.

The platoon leader identifies likely routes of approach for enemy aircraft, paying special attention to routes suitable for low-flying aircraft and helicopters. Positions for air defense weapons are also reconnoitered. If the battalion commander has directed that air defense ambushes and roving units are to be deployed, the ZSU-23-4 platoon leader designates primary and alternate positions on a map and establishes schedules for their movement. These positions and schedules are then coordinated with the battalion commander.

Battalion air defense preparations begin at the company level. Air observation posts are established in each company area close to the command observation posts, on terrain affording good visibility or along likely routes of enemy air approach. Schedules for rotating air observers are established, and sectors of observation and fire are designated for each post to maintain 360-degree observation of the air space surrounding the battalion's defensive area. SA-7 SAM firing positions are established in each motorized rifle company's area. These positions often are collocated with air observation posts near the perimeters of the companies' positions to extend the engagement envelopes as far as possible. While tank companies have no organic SA-7 SAMs, they do establish their air observation posts as part of the battalion's air defense warning system.

Company commanders determine sectors of fire for employment of massed fires of small arms and vehicle-mounted weapons, including tank-mounted anti-aircraft machine guns. ATGMs can be used to engage troop-carrying and armed helicopters. Signals for warning and engagement are coordinated, with primary reliance on visual signals and field telephone communications. Finally, personnel camouflage their vehicles, equipment, and positions as a passive air defense measure.


As in other combat actions, the ZSU-23-4s may be deployed in pairs (sections), with pairs of guns not more than to 1,500 meters apart. Positions for the ZSU-23-4s are usually well within a battalion's defensive area, which affords them a measure of protection from enemy observation and direct ground fire. This enables the ZSU-23-4s to provide protection to the entire battalion. Air observation posts are established in the

battalion rear area and at the battalion command observation post. The ZSU-23-4 platoon or section command post usually is located near the battalion command observation post.

The fires of the battalion's organic and attached air defense weapons are combined into an integrated air defense fire plan. The division target identification and warning network provides information about the enemy air situation. (Note the graphic illustration below.)

The battalion's air defense capabilities are only part of an overall air defense system. Preparations in the battalion are directed primarily against low-flying aircraft that have penetrated the overall air defense network and are attacking the battalion. Before aircraft can reach the outer limits of the battalion's air defense network, they must penetrate the SAM engagement envelopes of the SA-4 SAMs of *front* and army, the SA-6 or SA-8 SAMs of the division, and the SA-9 SAM platoon of the maneuver regiment's air defense battery.

Air Defense of a Motorized Rifle Battalion in a Defensive Posture



The Soviets believe that it is better to engage a hostile aircraft prematurely and waste some ammunition than to wait and allow the aircraft to expend its ordnance from an advantageous position. Aircraft are fired on continuously as long as they remain within range.

Aircraft posing the greatest threat are engaged on a priority basis. The preferred engagement technique is to continue firing at an already engaged target rather than to switch from target to target—unless a later-acquired target seriously threatens the air defense elements. Air observers and weapon crews outside the attacked sector maintain observation and readiness to fire to preclude enemy success through simultaneous air attacks from several directions.

Company commanders usually direct the firing of their SA-7 SAMs and the employment of massed small arms fires. A helicopter usually is engaged by the massed small arms fire of a single platoon; high-performance aircraft are engaged by all weapons of the company. Between attacks, air defense weapons are repositioned to reduce the likelihood of destruction in subsequent attacks and to deceive the enemy as to the strength and composition of air defense units.

Second echelon battalions of a motorized rifle regiment are located several kilometers behind the FEBA and usually do not have attached air defense elements. They benefit from the efforts of all air defense elements located to their front.

Second echelon maneuver regiments develop their air defense plan in coordination with the division's chief of air defense. It is also likely that one or more of the division's air defense batteries will be located in the defensive areas of these second echelon regiments.

In all cases, second echelon regiments take both active and passive air defense measures. Air observation posts are established, SA-7 SAM and massed unit fires are planned, and camouflage measures are taken.

One problem identified by Soviet writings on air defense of defending maneuver units is that their commanders often forget that air defense is an integral part of combined arms actions. Such an oversight can result in a poorly organized system of air defense, uncoordinated actions by organic and supporting air defense elements, and unnecessary losses of personnel and equipment to enemy air attacks.

Lesser problems involve maintaining continuous air observation and insuring that first echelon units have current and accurate information about the air situation. A problem less frequently mentioned is the high ammunition and missile expenditure rate that must result from the policy of early, multiple, and prolonged engagement of targets.

Air defense units play a significant role in defending Soviet ground forces against attacks by enemy airborne and airmobile troops. When an enemy airborne operation is detected, *frontal* aviation attempts to intercept and destroy enemy transport aircraft while they are at the marshaling airfields and en route to the drop zones. *Front*, army, and division SAM units engage the transport aircraft entering their respective air defense zones. Regimental air defense units near the drop zones also engage the transport aircraft. The ZSU-23-4 fires on paratroops and equipment descending to the ground. Vehicle-mounted machine guns and small arms fire also are used in this role.

Enemy airmobile units are engaged primarily by antiaircraft artillery and SA-7 and SA-9 SAMs. ZSU-23-4 guns are effective in combating airmobile forces flying at very low altitudes to avoid radar detection. The importance of visual surveillance in the early detection of these approaching helicopters is stressed repeatedly in Soviet writings. Vehicle-mounted machine guns and small arms fire also engage helicopters. Additionally, antiaircraft artillery attack enemy airborne and airmobile forces that have landed.

AIR DEFENSE RECONNAISSANCE

The Soviet concept of reconnaissance in air defense includes airspace surveillance and evaluation of the terrain for suitable weapon positions and likely routes of approach for low-flying aircraft—both ground-attack fighters and armed helicopters. Surveillance of the surrounding air space is continuous to maintain current data on the enemy air situation.

Terrain reconnaissance usually is conducted by the commander of the supported unit and the commander of the supporting air defense element. They conduct a preliminary map reconnaissance to tentatively identify positions for deployment of air defense weapons in defensive areas, along routes of march, or in areas to be seized by advancing Soviet forces. Significant emphasis is placed on identification of all potential attack routes for low-flying enemy aircraft of all types. Routes of approach suitable for armed helicopters and positions from which these helicopters might employ ATGMs are of special concern. The Soviets consider armed helicopters to be a serious threat to their tank and motorized rifle forces. Soviet commanders are trained to observe areas masked by trees or folds in the terrain that might be used by enemy aircraft using nap-of-the-earth (NOE) flight techniques to avoid radar detection.

The Soviets use electronic and electro-optical means and visual observation to conduct air

surveillance. Radar is used for technical surveillance, providing an all-weather detection capability.

Whenever possible, preliminary target data is passed from higher-level radar units to air defense commanders and their firing batteries. This reduces the vulnerability of battery radars and radar-equipped gun carriages and missile launchers to electronic countermeasures. Ideally, only aircraft that have been positively identified as hostile are engaged.

The Soviets are well aware of developments in electronic countermeasures and radar-homing ordnance. Radar personnel receive extensive training in countermeasures against enemy aircraft that use jamming devices and radar-homing weapons.

The development of technical reconnaissance means has not reduced the importance of visual reconnaissance. Soviet commanders are taught that an effective system of visual surveillance often may provide the first warning of an enemy air attack—especially one conducted by attack helicopters using NOE flight techniques. This is especially true at the subunit level.

Air observers are posted in all units operating close to enemy forces or in areas where enemy air attack is likely. Visual air surveillance is conducted on a 360-degree basis, and observers are assigned sectors of air space to monitor. According to the Soviets, an aircraft can be detected at ranges from 2 to 5 kilometers when the observer is assigned a 60- to 90-degree sector of observation and at ranges of 6 to 7 kilometers when assigned a 30-degree sector. Of course, terrain and visibility affect these distances. Using binoculars can increase detection ranges to about 12 kilometers. Aircraft flying at high altitudes may be detected at ranges of up to 50 kilometers when more sophisticated optical rangefinding equipment is used.

PROTECTION OF MARCH COLUMNS

The Soviets anticipate that their units may be subjected to heavy attacks by both ground-attack fighters and armed helicopters when conducting road marches. Accordingly, marching regiments are protected by their organic air defense weapons and by air defense weapons from their division.

Air attack is considered likely at chokepoints where rapid movement is impeded by terrain or other obstacles. These chokepoints include bridges, mountain passes, built-up areas, and similar locations.

Air observers are designated on all vehicles, and air defense elements, including SA-7 gunners, remain ready to engage targets at all times. Vehicle-mounted weapons are also employed. To reduce the likelihood of detection of the column by enemy electronic intelli-

gence (ELINT), radars on the vehicles may not be used unless the requirement for their use outweighs the risk of detection. Additional radars from the division's air defense regiment may be used if increased radar coverage is desired. Two radars are usually used, and they are set up at critical points along the march route. Usually only one radar moves at a time. If the commander decides not to use the additional radars during the march, one is placed in the advance guard and the other in the main force of the unit. Both remain ready for use at any time.

SA-7 gunners engage low-flying aircraft under the direction of their company commanders. Individual SA-7 gunners are assigned specific sectors of observation and fire to preclude several gunners engaging one target while additional targets approach from other directions. Tight control over the SA-7 gunners reduces the expenditure of missiles.

Regimental air defense weapons, particularly the ZSU-23-4 SPAAGs, play a major role in the defense of units making tactical marches. While one or two pairs of ZSU-23-4s may be employed to protect units on the march, the use of all four seems to be the rule. ZSU-23-4s are employed within 1,500 meters of each other to insure mutual support. Individual self-propelled anti-aircraft guns maintain at least 50 meters between themselves and other vehicles to insure an unobstructed field of fire for engaging low-flying aircraft. Targets can be engaged by the ZSU-23-4 moving at slow speeds or during the short halt which yields more accurate fire. Whenever a column stops, even for brief periods, the ZSU-23-4s pull off to the right side of the road with the rest of the column and remain ready for action.

When the threat of air attack is great, or when the commander directs, weapons of the division's air defense regiment are employed to protect columns. The SA-6 and the SA-8 SAMs—especially the SA-8, with its high degree of road mobility, amphibious capability, and integral radars—are well suited to providing air defense protection for columns. These weapons provide large engagement envelopes which could have a significant impact on enemy aircraft using limited-range, standoff weapons. It is highly likely that SAM batteries are used to protect columns, especially those moving up from the rear.

Air defense batteries relocate as necessary to provide continuous and effective protection to the supported unit. Soviet commanders maintain effective protection by leaving at least one battery in firing position to cover for the one(s) moving. Air defense elements attached to a maneuver unit usually move as a part of that unit.

AIR DEFENSE AMBUSHES AND ROVING UNITS

Soviet commanders employ special techniques to increase flexibility and effectiveness in their air defense. Among these are the use of air defense ambushes and roving air defense elements. Air defense elements used for both these techniques are similar in task organization and usually consist of a single anti-aircraft gun, section, or platoon. SA-7 SAM squads also may be used independently, or with other weapons.

Air defense ambushes and roving units are used to cover gaps in air defenses, to provide air defense coverage on less likely approach routes for enemy aircraft, and to deceive the enemy as to the disposition of other air defense elements. These tactics often are employed when the air defense assets are thought to be inadequate.

Air defense ambushes are most frequently positioned along less likely but possible approach routes for enemy aircraft. They usually consist of one or more ZSU-23-4s or SA-7 SAMs. The ZSU-23-4, with its inherent mobility and high rate of fire, is especially well suited for both ambushes and roving units. When necessary, radar elements of the divisional air defense regiment may support a unit operating from ambush.

Engagement is made only of those targets that approach on the designated route or in self-defense. Air defense units are immediately repositioned after engagement or discovery by the enemy.

Employment of roving air defense units is similar to that of ambushes. The primary difference is that while an ambushing unit lies in wait for approaching enemy aircraft, a roving unit moves to the most likely areas of enemy air attack and occupies a series of predesignated positions in the supported unit's area. The roving unit occupies these positions according to a prearranged schedule or on order of the air defense unit commander.

The Soviets believe that sudden and intense ground fire from an unexpected location or direction can be highly effective in destroying attacking aircraft. They believe that such fire can seriously degrade air crew performance and cause them to fire their weapons prematurely or force them to break off their attack. The Soviets also think that ambushes and roving air defense units can make the enemy believe that significant air defense elements are located in areas where there are actually only a few weapons. This can reduce the effectiveness of enemy reconnaissance and the likelihood of enemy air attack in the area concerned.

PROTECTION OF RIVER CROSSINGS

Soviet air defense plays a major role in river crossings by protecting the crossing site and forces from air

attack. They accomplish this mission by creating envelopes of protected air space above and around the crossing sites.

SA-7 gunners generally operate with the maneuver companies. As the battalion approaches the near riverbanks, SA-7 gunners move with the motorized infantry and are posted at key locations with assigned sectors of observation and fire. During the crossing, the SA-7 gunners cross with the companies, ready to engage enemy aircraft. On reaching the opposite bank, they are again assigned positions and designated sectors of observation and fire. The SA-7 gunners may also take part in air defense ambushes if terrain or threat considerations so dictate.

A platoon of four ZSU-23-4s often accompanies a reinforced motorized rifle battalion operating as an advance guard of a motorized rifle regiment.

During the motorized rifle battalion's march to a river, the ZSU-23-4 platoon usually moves at the rear of the forward security element. Normally, the ZSU-23-4 platoon is employed in two pairs. In some situations, only one pair may be located with the forward security element while the other pair is with the advance guard main body.

If the battalion is opposed while approaching the near bank, the ZSU-23-4s may engage ground targets. However, their vulnerability to antitank and other direct fire weapons makes such employment very risky. Air defense commanders seek alternative approach routes to the near bank if the threat of direct fire is significant. The ZSUs take up firing positions on the near shore, usually 300 to 500 meters from the water's edge, and not more than 1,500 meters apart. From these positions, they engage aircraft attacking the crossing site and, if necessary, support crossing elements with direct fire.

After motorized rifle subunits have crossed, ZSU-23-4s usually cross the river with the tank company on ferries or by bridge. While crossing, the ZSU-23-4s remain ready to engage attacking aircraft.

On reaching the far shore, they take up firing positions jointly agreed on by the maneuver unit commander and the ZSU-23-4 platoon commander. Air defense assets on the far shore at this point in the crossing consist of an SA-7 squad and the two ZSU-23-4s. These air defense weapons provide an engagement envelope above and around elements of the battalion on both sides of the river. As the rest of the battalion crosses and the regiment's main body reaches the near bank, ZSU-23-4s on the near shore usually are replaced by other air defense weapons—possibly by the regiment's SA-9 SAM platoon. Replacement of the ZSU-23-4s by other regimental or divisional air defense

weapons allows the ZSU-23-4 platoon to move forward and continue supporting elements on the far shore.

Major problems identified by Soviet articles discussing air defense of river crossings are how to insure comprehensive radar and visual observation and how to deal simultaneously with threats on multiple axes of approach. Other problems include difficulties in maintaining continuous 360-degree fire coverage and providing adequate ammunition resupply to firing elements on the far shore. The ammunition problem is especially critical for the ZSU-23-4s. Commanders are cautioned often to be sure that ammunition carriers are moved to the far shore to guarantee continuity of fire. The Soviets believe that these problems can be overcome and that well-trained, well-led air defense units can successfully support river crossings.

AIR DEFENSE OPERATIONS IN MOUNTAINOUS TERRAIN

Air defense units operating in mountainous terrain have unique problems. The rugged terrain makes it extremely difficult to maintain the unit integrity of both maneuver and air defense units. This makes maintaining comprehensive air surveillance and air defense fire support more difficult and results in a greater degree of decentralization than normal. These difficulties affect fire control and operations of air defense batteries, platoons, and even sections. The importance of the SA-7 is greatly increased in mountain operations.

Because of the restrictive nature of mountainous terrain and the typically limited road networks in such areas, maneuver units often have to move in several widely separated columns. Air defense weapons are placed forward in each column. Radar equipment and ZSU-23-4 SPAAGs, when present, usually move from high point to high point along routes of advance to obtain the best radar coverage, observation, and fields of fire. SA-7 SAM squads probably have greater freedom to engage than is normally the case. At times, authority to engage is even delegated to section leaders. Greater use is made of air defense ambushes using ZSU-23-4s, SA-7 SAMs, and the fires of motorized rifle units. Elements of the division's air defense regiment may directly support one or more of the division's columns. The employment of highly mobile SA-6 or SA-8 SAMs in divisional air defense regiments greatly increases the capability to support mountain combat.

AIR SPACE CONTROL

The Soviets have a multitude of air defense systems in their forces. Soviet commanders are concerned with

the division of air space among the various systems. To accomplish this, they use a combination of geographical, altitude, and time divisions of the air space to be defended.

A hypothetical geographic division of the air space might include establishing a boundary parallel to and well forward of the FEBA, beyond the maximum range of SA-4 SAMs. *Frontal* aviation engages enemy aircraft forward of this boundary, and ground-based air defense systems engage aircraft to the rear of this boundary. There also may be "safe corridors" through the engagement envelopes of ground-based systems for safe passage of Soviet aircraft beyond the line of contact. These corridors may be used in conjunction with time periods in which SAM units refrain from engaging aircraft unless directly attacked. Time periods also may be established during which all aircraft are fired on or during which no aircraft is fired on.

WEAKNESSES

The greatest potential weaknesses of the Soviet air defense system are that command and control could fail under the intense pressures of combat; Soviet commanders might fail to vigorously push their air defense assets forward at the same pace as their maneuver forces; and it may be difficult to supply air defense units with sufficient ammunition and repair parts during prolonged, fast-moving offensive operations.

If the air defense "umbrella" is not moved forward when necessary, Soviet tanks and motorized rifle units become exposed to enemy ground attack aircraft and armed helicopters, and they may suffer major losses. The only alternative to taking these losses would be to slow the pace of the advance, which would significantly reduce chances of success.

There is also the question of how Soviet air defense systems, including the personnel manning the weapons and equipment, will react when subjected to intensive and repeated attacks by large numbers of modern aircraft using sophisticated electronic warfare equipment and highly lethal advanced ordnance that will probably impose a high attrition rate on air defense units.

An underlying theme in Soviet writings is criticism of some maneuver unit commanders for failure to recognize fully that air defense is an integral element of combined arms combat. In tactical exercises, maneuver unit commanders often "forget" about the air threat and fail to employ their air defense capabilities effectively.

Other problems frequently mentioned are failure to organize effective and continuous air surveillance and

failure to supply air defense units with sufficient ammunition and other materiel. In both cases, the effectiveness of these units is greatly reduced.

Air defense command and control relationships are subject to conflicting pressures for centralization and decentralization. Factors favoring centralized control include the greater efficiency and effectiveness of centralized target detection systems and the increased ranges of modern SAMs. Factors favoring decentralized control include the need for flexibility to support fast-paced operations by maneuver units and the many unforeseen contingencies that can arise in local situations.

The regimental air defense staff sometimes plays a role in the employment of company air defense weapons, and there may be occasions when the division air defense staff dictates how maneuver regiments employ their air defense batteries. There also may be situations in which army or *front* directs the employment of divisional air defense assets. In general, the Soviets impose enough centralization to optimize efficiency while allowing sufficient decentralization for effectiveness.

Caution must be exercised when attempting to balance the "weaknesses" outlined above against the overall capabilities of the Soviet air defense system. Most of these weaknesses have been clearly identified by the Soviets themselves, and they are working to correct them. The most pervasive shortcomings appear to be with individual commanders rather than with system failures. It is highly unlikely that these problems would be so prevalent that they would seriously degrade the overall effectiveness of the Soviet air defense system in combat.

TRENDS

The most evident trends in Soviet tactical air defense developments in recent years have been the progressive increase in the size of the engagement envelope and the lethality of the weapons. New weapons systems are being introduced and modifications are being made to previously fielded systems. The SA-8 has been modified to carry six, rather than four, ready-to-fire missiles. The SA-13, currently being intro-

duced into service to replace the SA-9, is mounted on a tracked chassis and has good cross-country mobility. The more recently fielded weapons systems have redundant missile guidance capability, providing an enhanced ability to conduct successful engagements in a sophisticated countermeasures environment.

Continuing qualitative improvements are expected. An improved man-portable SAM can be expected. While the ZSU-23-4 is an exceptionally good weapon, its limited range, lack of an amphibious capability, light armor protection for crew members, and reduced effectiveness against more modern aircraft make it a likely candidate for replacement. Western developments in remotely-guided standoff weapons will probably influence future Soviet air defense weapon development.

Overall, the division's air defense capabilities have progressed from a point defense system to an area defense system. The combination of the SA-6 and SA-8 SAMs with the area defense weapons of *front* and army and the point defense weapons within the division gives Soviet ground forces a comprehensive, overlapping, and mobile area air defense system.

With the increasing lethality of air defense weapons and their deployment at lower levels in the force structure, effective control of the air space becomes more complex. The Soviets stress the need for the various air defense forces to adopt common terminology and to conduct operations with a single integrated plan under unified command and control. This emphasis on unity of effort may be reflected in the apparent reorganization of air defense elements formerly under *PVO Strany* and PVO of the Ground Forces into a single service, the Air Defense Forces (*Voyska PVO*).

Soviet ground-based tactical air defense systems present a formidable threat to any potential air enemy. Soviet air defense efforts appear to be nearly "state of the art" when viewed as a whole, and they are unsurpassed by any systems currently deployed by other nations. Soviet air defense weapons are deployed in variety and quantities unmatched by any other military force. Soviet air defense doctrine is comprehensive in threat evaluation and formulated response. It is cohesive in organization and equipment. It responds effectively to ground forces' support requirements.

CHAPTER 12

AIR SUPPORT

CONCEPT

Fixed-wing combat aircraft and attack helicopters provide air fire support to Soviet ground maneuver formations. Air support assets are an integral element of combined arms formations at *front*, army, and division levels. The majority of the aircraft and helicopters were introduced during the past decade and have significantly increased offensive air support capabilities.

Tactical fixed-wing aircraft support *fronts* and armies in theaters of military operations (TVDs). These assets accomplish the missions of air defense cover, air reconnaissance, and ground support. The aircraft also can conduct battlefield and rear area interdiction.

The support role of helicopters has greatly expanded concurrently with the rapid expansion of the number of helicopters. Attack helicopters are routinely employed in exercises to provide immediate air support to motorized rifle and tank regiments and battalions. Helicopters also perform a variety of logistic, intelligence, liaison, and communications functions. In addition, helicopter support for airmobile operations is a common feature of major Soviet field exercises.

The flexibility and maneuverability of tactical aviation assets give them a key role in modern combat. According to the Soviets, aviation has particular advantages over other combat forces in that it can—

- Conduct independent operations.
- Execute rapid, wide maneuvers.
- Combat enemy air, ground, and naval forces.
- Execute missions under diverse tactical and environmental conditions.
- Concentrate forces quickly for the execution of unexpected missions.
- Be redirected after launch to a different target.

Tactical aviation assets can provide continuous fire support to ground maneuver formations. Air fire support is responsive to rapid changes in the battlefield situation and can keep pace with mobile ground formations. Furthermore, aviation assets generally can strike targets that are out of range of artillery.

AIR SUPPORT DOCTRINE

The Air Operation

A massive air operation is the Soviet approach to the initial stage of a nonnuclear theater offensive. It

employs initial, massive nonnuclear air strikes throughout the theater of operations.

The increase in the number of Soviet ground attack aircraft in the last decade and the concurrent improvements in their range, armaments, and avionics have provided Soviet military strategists with a viable, non-nuclear offensive option for gaining the operational initiative and creating the conditions of victory in the period directly after the outbreak of hostilities. The concept of the air operation entails Soviet fixed-wing, ground attack aircraft from *frontal* aviation and intermediate-range aircraft from strategic aviation and naval aviation committed to a series of massive strikes against priority theater targets over a period of several days. With a small proportion of available air resources assigned to the neutralization of enemy air defenses and the creation of approach corridors, the majority of the aircraft attack enemy nuclear weapon systems, command and control centers, and airfields.

During the initial hours of the air operation, the commitment of fixed-wing aircraft to priority theater targets precludes their use for direct air support of ground force operations, and ground force commanders rely on combat helicopters to fill this role. Integrated fires of artillery, attack helicopters, and operational and tactical missiles assist in the creation of corridors through the enemy's forward air defenses. Missile strikes and attacks by air assault, special purpose, and partisan forces are planned against airfields, nuclear delivery and storage sites, and command and control facilities.

The air operation is simultaneously a concentrated effort to establish air superiority and a principal component of the overall Soviet effort to achieve total fire superiority to deprive the enemy of his nuclear attack capabilities. The air operation is distinguished from a general offensive in that the strikes are not in direct support of a coincidental advance by ground maneuver formations.

Due to its scale, an air operation is probably a TVD-planned and directed operation. However, an air operation on a smaller scale may be conducted in the course of a *front* operation to establish local air superiority.

As the number of priority targets is reduced in the course of the operation, ground attack aircraft are reassigned to the air support role according to a pre-arranged plan. Through this plan the ground force commanders regain the use of air support resources.

Air Support of Ground Forces

Besides the air operation at the onset of theater-level hostilities, Soviet doctrine calls for air support of ground forces in offensive operations. The Soviets recognize four stages of air support within an offensive operation: support of movement forward, air preparation, air support, and air accompaniment, which correspond to the phases of the fire support plan. The major difference between the phases is their time of deployment, although there are some differences in targeting, command, and aircraft used. (See page 12-8, Support in the Offense.)

ORGANIZATION AND EQUIPMENT

Soviet tactical aviation assets are organized on a functional/mission-related basis. The Soviets consider that homogenous formations of fighters, fighter-bombers, reconnaissance aircraft, etc., increase firepower and strike capability, promote firm control and maneuverability, and enhance the capability to conduct sustained operations. Tactical aviation assets consist generally of fighter, fighter-bomber, helicopter, and reconnaissance units, as well as miscellaneous support units.

The distribution of these assets among the different levels of command is currently in flux. The ongoing aviation reorganization shows an apparent desire to centralize control over most fixed-wing tactical aircraft and to decentralize control over the attack helicopters.

Frontal aviation organizations are located in 12 of the 16 military districts within the USSR and with each of the Groups of Soviet Forces in the GDR, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary. The strength and composition of the aviation assets of a *front* can vary considerably. *Frontal* aviation may include two or three air divisions and independent regiments of reconnaissance aircraft.

An air division typically contains either fighter or fighter-bomber aircraft, usually organized into three regiments of three squadrons each (see FM 100-2-3). Divisions are commanded by major generals or colonels; regiments by lieutenant colonels or colonels; squadrons and flights by majors and captains, respectively.

Concurrently with the rapid expansion of rotary-wing assets, the Soviets have organized a steadily increasing number of independent attack helicopter regiments (see FM 100-2-3). These independent attack helicopter regiments are apparently a principal component of what the Soviets refer to as army aviation, and are probably subordinate to army-level maneuver force commanders.

The aviation element in selected motorized rifle and tank divisions has been upgraded to squadron strength. The division aviation element formerly contained six to eight light, general-purpose helicopters. Selected divisions now have an organic aviation squadron that includes up to 12 HIP and HIND ATGM-equipped attack helicopters, in addition to the general-purpose helicopters.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

The command and control structure of *frontal* aviation is integrated with that of the ground forces to insure close and continuous coordination in a combined arms offensive. At *front* level, the deputy commander for aviation serves as chief of aviation on the *front* staff.

Aviation Control Element

At army and division level, an aviation control element normally is assigned to the staff of the commander. At army, this element generally consists of these personnel: an air controller, an intelligence officer, a liaison officer, and communications personnel. Aviation control elements at division level are similar to, but smaller than, those at army level.

Aviation control elements advise on the use of air assets, transmit air support requests to the aviation organizations, maintain communications and control with aircraft in the battle area, and advise the commander of air reconnaissance information. The aviation control element is separated into two sections. Each of these sections has a specially-equipped BTR-60. One section chief is collocated with the commander, and the other is collocated with the chief of staff.

Forward Air Controller

A forward air controller is assigned to ground force regiments when fixed-wing aircraft or combat helicopters are assigned for their support. The Soviet forward air controller is an air forces officer and generally a pilot. His tasks are to advise the regimental commander, to serve as the communications link between the regiment and the aviation control element at division, and to direct attacking aircraft to their targets. He is equipped with a vehicle and the equipment required to maintain communications with the division and the airfield. The forward air controller can call up air support at the request of the supported ground unit commander.

It is rare to find an air representative in a ground force battalion. However, a forward air controller may be assigned when air support is provided in a particularly important or difficult battalion action. Normally, however, a battalion commander has no direct communications with air support resources.

For mutual recognition and target designation, radioelectronic means such as radio beacons are used widely by the forward air controllers. Signal flares, colored smoke, beacon lights, and cloth panels are used when there is visual contact. When aircraft are operating against objectives that cannot be observed by ground troops or forward air controllers, target designation is carried out mainly using reconnaissance information obtained by the aircraft crews themselves. The crews use flares, aircraft maneuvers, and radioelectronic means for signaling, for communicating, and for making mutual identification.

Difficulties in Coordination

Judging from Soviet military writings, the method of coordination between the air and ground forces, especially at lower levels, is not always successful. The procedures worked out by air and ground force commanders before the launch of combat air missions often inhibit flexibility in mutual cooperation and prevent changes required by the situation that evolves after the missions are underway. Problems also arise because many ground force commanders do not have in-depth knowledge of the combat capabilities of aviation, and air forces commanders often are unfamiliar with the development of the ground battle except in general terms. Ground force unit commanders sometimes hesitate to call for air support unless the support has been planned beforehand. As one Soviet commentator stated recently, "The aviators fight according to their rules, and the combined arms troops according to theirs." The plans for mutual cooperation worked out before the actions are often incomplete and account for only the situation when aircraft approach the FEBA. Lower-level ground force commanders are not always informed of the fighter-bomber and combat helicopter resources allocated for immediate missions. The combined arms commanders do not always know the location and condition of aviation during the battle, the aviation's readiness to commit reserves, or the types of air strikes available. A failure by higher headquarters to supply damage assessment data to ground commanders causes unnecessary firing at previously destroyed targets.

To resolve the problems of mutual cooperation successfully, Soviet military experts suggest wider adop-

tion of automated control systems to speed and simplify collecting, transmitting, and processing information at all levels of command and control. More frequent joint tactical briefings, technical conferences, and meetings between lower-level ground force and air commanders also are suggested in Soviet military publications.

Night and Weather Conditions

At present, the Soviets are striving to increase the effectiveness of air support in poor weather and at night. Soviet air operations slow considerably under these conditions because of inadequate aircraft and ground-based equipment and shortcomings in flight personnel training. Also, some of the mutual identification and target designation systems used during complex weather conditions and for night flying are unsophisticated. The Soviets are evidently making efforts to correct these shortcomings. It is believed that about 20 percent of the third-generation, fixed-wing aircraft introduced in the 1970s and *frontal* aviation's combat helicopters are equipped with radioelectronic and infrared instruments. This equipment enables pilots to carry out sorties at night and in poor weather at low altitudes, and to search for, to detect, and to destroy targets. Even when modern, sophisticated equipment is used, the Soviets believe that—for air support of ground troops—it is important to train pilots to navigate by landmarks, to search for targets visually, and to determine the distances to targets without technical aids.

Effective *frontal* aviation operations in support of advancing troops depend a great deal on providing appropriate airfields. In some regions it is possible to use certain types of modern aircraft from unpaved airfields. Some captured enemy airfields also could be used. When appropriate airfields are available, third-generation aircraft with their increased operational range and load capability enable the Soviets to provide air support to ground forces advancing at high speed. However, the Soviets have been seeking a type of aircraft that could operate from small, unpaved airfields and insure reliable air support to their ground forces. To help fulfill this need, the combat helicopter has emerged as a weapon system that can provide adequate support with the required flexibility.

PLANNING AND PREPARATION

Planning and preparation of air support before an offensive begin with the *front* commander's orders to his aviation commander(s) and to his army

commanders. The order specifies the air units to be committed, the ground armies to be supported, and the time of attack.

With this information, the combined arms commander and his aviation staff reconcile the air assets allocated by the *front* commander with the air support requirements of the ground force divisions. A maneuver division commander consults his aviation staff and develops his requirements by determining the targets to be attacked in his sector and estimating his immediate missions. Available air support is divided among preplanned, on-call, and immediate air support missions. An on-call mission is one in which the target may be predesignated, but the timing of the strike remains at the discretion of the ground force commander. If combat helicopters are to be used, air support is divided specifically between the fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft, depending on the targets, flight distances, and disposition of enemy antiaircraft defenses. After these determinations are approved and integrated with the *front* fire support plan, the aviation commander issues specific orders to his air divisions and regiments concerning targets, numbers of sorties, air approach corridors, communications codes, and mission timing. The air representatives at army, division, and regiment then confirm, for the respective commanders, the air resources allocated to them. Normally, the *frontal* aviation commander holds a percentage of his forces in reserve to meet unforeseen demands of division commanders. Division commanders also can withhold a percentage of their allocated air assets as reserves.

When a regiment has been assigned specific air support, the regimental commander explains his objectives to the commander of the supporting air unit and the forward air controller assigned to his regiment. He also seeks their recommendations.

Both *front* and army commanders pay particular attention to coordination of artillery and missile fire with preplanned and on-call air strikes so that artillery and missile fire can neutralize or suppress enemy antiaircraft defenses before the arrival of attack aircraft.

Coordinating the delivery of nuclear strikes is an important function for the ground and air commanders and their staffs. The commander of combined arms forces decides the employment tactics for nuclear weapons immediately within the ground force zone of advance to the depth of the range of his tactical missiles. He has to determine the target and the type, method, and time of delivery of nuclear strikes for his own missiles and for the carrier aircraft operating in the zone of advance. Aviation missions for delivery of nuclear strikes beyond the range of ground force

missiles have to be assigned by the commander in charge of the entire operation (usually the *front* commander or above).

The Soviets normally maintain strict centralization in controlling air support resources. The supporting aviation will not always be under the operational control of the combined arms commander. Instead, air support resources may be apportioned into regiment-flights or aircraft sorties with the required quantity of munitions. These resources are allocated temporarily to the combined arms commander for the destruction of selected objectives. The combined arms commander may not know which air force unit or formation will accomplish the missions he requested.

Such centralized control allows a rapid reallocation of air support resources to accomplish the most important missions that suddenly arise during operations. Air force units that were not originally assigned for ground support may sometimes take part in delivering airstrikes against ground objectives. Decentralized employment of aviation (especially combat helicopters) will be used when operations are being waged on separate and disconnected axes. In that case, aviation assigned for air support will be transferred to the operational control of the combined arms commander, for employment according to his needs.

PREPLANNED AIR SUPPORT MISSIONS

As preplanned target assignments are received by air regiments and squadrons, they are studied closely to determine the best tactical approach. Large-scale maps and, in some cases, scale models of the terrain and targets are used to familiarize pilots with their assignments and to determine the optimum flight path and approach maneuvers.

Once airborne, the aircraft proceed to a designated checkpoint behind friendly lines where they confirm their target assignment with ground control. The emphasis placed on strict adherence to predetermined timing and flight paths indicates the probable use of "safe" corridors through friendly antiaircraft defenses. Aviation control elements and forward air controllers maintain communications with attack aircraft either directly or through radio relay aircraft.

As the aircraft approach the target area, forward air controllers establish communications and make sure targets are correctly identified by the pilots. When the target is in sight and has been confirmed by the forward air controller, the flight leader assigns individual targets and orders the attack. Aircraft follow the original flight plan through friendly antiaircraft defenses unless changed by ground control.

IMMEDIATE AIR SUPPORT MISSIONS

A request for immediate air support is submitted by the ground commander to the next higher headquarters and then forwarded through the chain of command. If a request for air support does not exceed the division commander's allocated assets, he can order the air strike through his aviation control element. Otherwise, army or *front* approval must be obtained, depending on the size of support requested.

As with preplanned support, the aviation control element at each command level participates directly in the evaluation of each air support request and in the coordination of the strike mission.

Aircraft designated for immediate missions can be airborne in holding areas or on the ground at airfields. Occasionally, an aircraft on armed reconnaissance patrol can be diverted to respond to an air support request within its area of operations. The Soviets recognize three levels of combat readiness for *frontal* aviation aircraft and crews. Aircraft in categories one and two respond to ground force requests for immediate air support. Before takeoff, pilots receive a short briefing that designates a checkpoint toward which to proceed and, possibly, the target location. On reaching the checkpoint, the pilots contact the air representative of the ground force units being supported to receive target designation or confirmation. Approach, attack, and recovery air control procedures remain the same as in preplanned air support missions.

AVIATION EMPLOYMENT

The Soviets emphasize that aviation can provide responsive and continuous fire support if its employment is guided by the following principles:

- The early attainment of air superiority.
- Coordination and integration with other arms.
- Employment in mass.
- Strict, centralized control.

Air-Ground Coordination

The Soviets consider that the coordinated use of the airspace over the battlefield and aerial delivery of ordnance close to friendly troops are among the most complex problems of modern combat. A consideration in their emphasis on early attainment of air superiority is simplification of the airspace management problem. To reduce air-ground coordination problems as much as possible, attack helicopters, fixed-wing ground attack aircraft, and artillery are not normally employed simultaneously in the same fire zone. Attacks by fixed-wing aircraft and artillery fire sometimes coincide in time, but they are assigned

separate target sectors. Attack helicopters normally are employed after the completion of the artillery preparation. However, it is possible to use both simultaneously. In such a situation, the helicopters are assigned entrance and exit corridors parallel to and between artillery fire concentrations, and under the trajectory of artillery rounds.

The Soviets constantly emphasize that familiarity among the different elements of the combined arms force of each other's tactics and equipment, and relationships of mutual trust and understanding, must be firmly established in peacetime if effective cooperation and coordination is to be maintained during combat. The peacetime distribution of air assets among the military districts and groups of forces and within the force structure reflects the Soviet desire to establish a peacetime organization that closely corresponds to the wartime structure of combined arms formations. The aviation command and control structure is closely aligned with that of ground maneuver formations to insure effective, continuous, combined arms coordination.

The Soviets prefer to use experienced pilots from the supporting aviation unit as forward air controllers. They prefer to have qualified helicopter pilots direct helicopter strikes and qualified fighter-bomber pilots direct fighter-bomber strikes. However, either forward air controller may direct strikes by both types of supporting aviation so long as adequate air-ground communications can be established.

The forward air controller provides pilots the target location (either in grid coordinates or in relation to a predetermined reference point), the time to execute the strike, and information on the ground situation. The forward air controller normally does not attempt to mark the target, but frequently uses pyrotechnics to mark friendly troop locations. He may give the pilots a signal when they should climb and identify their target. The pilot has primary responsibility for pinpointing the target. However, the forward air controller assesses and adjusts the strikes for successive target runs. Communications security between the forward air controller and aircrews is maintained by the transmission of brief coded messages and prearranged signals.

Minimum safety distances between friendly troops and air strikes during peacetime exercises vary between 200 and 700 meters. In actual combat, the Soviets likely accept less rigid safety distances.

Control and target identification posts are established as necessary to exercise command and control of helicopters and aircraft in a designated air sector. The posts support the introduction of aviation into an

area of combat operations and also may direct ground strikes. The posts also accomplish direct coordination between ground-attack and fighter aircraft and ground air defense units. These posts are equipped with radar, communications, and automated equipment and may be ground- or air-based.

Control Versus Mass

According to the Soviets, strict centralized control is one of the "ecisive conditions for the successful conduct of combat operations" by aviation. Centralized control and mass are viewed as corollary principles, providing for the fullest exploitation of the mobility and maneuverability of aviation.

Aviation assets may be dispersed to avoid destruction by the enemy's nuclear or massive conventional fire strikes. However, through centralized control they are rapidly reconcentrated to deliver massive strikes against the enemy's main attack or in support of their own main attack. Centralized control also is alleged to enhance the planning and execution of surprise strikes on the enemy, to allow the maintenance of a strong air reserve, and to simplify coordination among aviation assets performing different missions in the same air space (e.g., air defense, ground support, reconnaissance).

In a rapidly changing combat situation, centralized control expedites the reallocation of aviation assets to accomplish important missions that suddenly arise during combat operations, such as destruction of enemy nuclear weapons, aviation, and reserves. At times, aviation assets that were not originally assigned ground support roles may be tasked to strike ground objectives. In contrast, it would seem that decentralized control of aviation assets, especially attack helicopters, is desired when combat operations are conducted on separate, disconnected axes. In such cases, combined arms commanders control and employ allocated aviation assets according to the needs of their maneuver forces.

Reconnaissance and Targeting

The principal method for gathering target intelligence is air reconnaissance. The *front* commander's staff prepares an overall reconnaissance plan that details tasks for tactical aviation assets. Tactical aviation reconnaissance focuses on the tactical and operational depths of the enemy, although targets at strategic depths also may be assigned.

Air reconnaissance is conducted to determine the enemy's intentions and collect intelligence for

planning air and ground operations. There are four major categories of targets for air reconnaissance:

- Nuclear weapon systems and storage depots.
- Active and potential enemy airfields.
- Defensive positions and systems (air defense, command and control centers, electronic warfare centers).
- Enemy reserves, supply depots, and approach routes (particularly key intersections and bridges).

Aircraft crews on any mission are expected to immediately report observed enemy activity. Primary responsibility for air reconnaissance is borne by dedicated reconnaissance regiments. These regiments have specially equipped reconnaissance aircraft. Airborne electronic intelligence collectors also are available from aviation assets.

Perishable target intelligence data is transmitted by radio from the aircraft to ground command posts. Greater effort is being made to develop and improve methods for secure transmission of reports from the aircraft to data collection and processing centers. The processing of data from an air reconnaissance mission takes 2 to 8 hours, although procedures for interpreting reconnaissance data are being modernized to speed up this process.

In training exercises, the Soviets have shown some reservations about employing armed reconnaissance flights on battlefield and rear area interdiction missions ("free hunting" flights) until air superiority is established. Armed reconnaissance efforts would be directed toward disrupting the enemy's resupply operations and troop movements through the immediate exploitation of reconnaissance data (by a flight of a reconnaissance aircraft and two to four attack aircraft). Targets for interdiction missions are nuclear storage areas, enemy airfields, troop reserves, and command and control centers. Targets may be located up to 480 kilometers behind the front lines. Interdiction of enemy efforts to deploy and concentrate his forces against a rapid and highly mobile attacking force is considered particularly effective when the enemy lacks in-depth reserves and relies on moving forces laterally to blunt offensive operations.

The classification (characteristics and configuration) and location of targets are the bases for planning strikes). Targets are classified as single, multiple, line, or area. (See examples in the upper chart at right.)

Mission Execution

Air strikes in direct support of ground maneuver formations are primarily preplanned, with some on-call. The combined arms commander identifies the

targets, times, and desired damage for air strikes. The aviation commander determines the force, size, ordnance, and attack technique that will accomplish the strike mission.

Preplanned strikes are planned in great detail and integrated with other forms of fire support. Large scale maps and, in some cases, terrain models are used to familiarize pilots with targets, to plan approach and departure routes, and to develop attack techniques. Attack variations are developed and practiced to provide pilots with a ready response to changes in the situation.

The plan for preplanned strikes normally covers the first 1 to 2 hours of combat operations, but may cover a period of up to 24 hours in a static situation. The plan specifies the targets, strike force, time, location, attack

technique and ordnance, communication codes, and approach and departure routes.

A portion of available air assets is held in readiness to execute immediate missions against unexpected targets. On-call strikes are made against predesignated targets, with the timing of strikes left to the discretion of maneuver force commanders. Aircraft and helicopters designated for on-call missions can be airborne in holding areas or on the ground at forward airfields.

The Soviets recognize three levels of combat readiness for fighter-bomber aircraft and crews, which are described in the lower chart below. These categories are probably also applicable to other types of ground-attack aviation assets. Aircraft in categories one and two respond to on-call missions.

Classification of Air Strike Targets

CLASSIFICATION	EXAMPLE	ATTACK TECHNIQUE
SINGLE (OR POINT)	Rocket launcher, tank or armored vehicle, parked aircraft, or helicopter. Radar firing point, observation point, or bunker.	Single aircraft using low-level or dive delivery of ordnance. ARM employed against radars. Single helicopter using ATGM or rockets.
MULTIPLE	Group of 10-20 single targets occupying an area of 1-1.5 km.	Attack by a small group (2-8) of aircraft or helicopters with the appropriate ordnance.
LINE	Tactical march column (usually 1 km or longer), train, runway.	Attack by a single aircraft or a small group along the long axis of the target. Helicopters attack column from the flank.
AREA	Dispersal or assembly areas of a battalion or larger unit, supply depot, large command and control center, forward airfield.	Massive and concentrated air strikes, delivered from various altitudes and directions.

Levels of Combat Readiness

CATEGORY	CREW AND AIRCRAFT POSITION	DURATION OF READINESS	TIME BEFORE TAKEOFF
ONE	Aircraft are fully serviced and armed. Combat crews are briefed on their mission and are in the aircraft ready to start engines. Ground personnel are assisting the combat crews.	1-2 hours	3-5 minutes
TWO	Aircraft are fully serviced and armed. Combat crews are briefed and are in the vicinity of aircraft ready to take off within a specified short period of time after receiving a mission order.	2-4 hours	15 minutes
THREE	Aircraft are refueled and serviced. Cannons are loaded. External systems (bombs, rockets, missiles, fuel tanks, etc.) are not loaded. Combat crews are known, but briefing on air and ground situation is given before takeoff.	2-4 days	1-2 hours

The Soviets prefer to use helicopters for immediate, time-sensitive strikes close to friendly forces. The reduced logistic requirements of combat helicopters, compared to those of fixed-wing aircraft, very often allow deployment close to the main battle area which enhances their ability to respond to on-call missions. The Soviets indicate that helicopters have other advantages over high-performance aircraft, such as the ability to concentrate and maneuver undetected for a strike and the enhanced capability of helicopter pilots to evaluate more rapidly and exactly the battlefield conditions. The Soviets, concerned for the vulnerability of helicopters to high-performance fighters, prefer to employ them in ground support only to the range of their air defense umbrella.

Conversely, fixed-wing aircraft are employed more frequently in strikes on previously reconnoitered, fixed or semifixed targets, in the immediate rear, or at greater depths. The vulnerability of high-performance aircraft to ground-based air defenses when executing ground attacks necessitates a low-altitude, high-speed target approach and minimum time in the target area. Making such an approach, the pilot has only 3 to 6 seconds to identify his target and, after attacking his target, should clear the target area within 10 seconds.

The Soviets emphasize the importance of deception and surprise in paralyzing hostile anti-aircraft defenses. Aircraft approach the target area at the lowest permissible altitude given weather and terrain restrictions. Ideally, the approach altitude over enemy territory is 50 to 100 meters. Radio transmission is reduced to a minimum or prohibited entirely. Detected gaps in enemy radar coverage are exploited, and decoy flights in advance of attacking aircraft can be used to distract defending anti-aircraft systems. If more than one pass is necessary to destroy the target, attacking flights approach the target from different directions to minimize anti-aircraft effectiveness or approach from the direction of bright sunlight to minimize visual detection and recognition. Electronic countermeasures play a large role in neutralizing air defenses.

As long as modern anti-aircraft defense relies on radioelectronic equipment, neutralizing its operation through interference is considered by the Soviets to be a major way to reduce aircraft losses. Soviet aircraft possess radioelectronic jamming equipment, which they believe will help them overcome the enemy anti-aircraft defenses. The Soviets also expect their aircraft losses would be reduced due to the destruction of enemy anti-aircraft defense weapons by fire delivered by the ground troops. The ground force radiotechnical facilities can also create interference in enemy systems of control.

SUPPORT IN THE OFFENSE

Besides the air operation at the onset of theater-level hostilities, Soviet doctrine calls for air support of ground forces in offensive operations. The Soviets recognize four stages of air support within an offensive operation: support for movement forward, air preparation, air support, and air accompaniment, which correspond to the phases of the fire support plan. The major difference between the phases is their time of deployment, although there are some differences in targeting, command, and aircraft.

Support for movement forward is to protect units as they move up from assembly areas.

Air preparation takes place prior to the onset of a ground offensive, across a specified frontage. It can be simultaneous with the preparation fire of both the artillery and missile units and requires close, detailed coordination with these forces with regard to targeting and timing. Air strikes in the preparation phase generally extend no farther than the enemy's immediate operational depth (i.e., enemy corps rear area). Depending on the combat situation, the duration of an air preparation can be from 10 minutes to over an hour. The targets are those that conventional artillery and missiles cannot destroy because of their distance, mobility, or "hardening." The plan for the preparation phase specifies in detail the targets, strike aircraft, time, location, attack technique and ordnance, and approach and departure rates. In special situations, such as amphibious assaults, long-range aviation and/or naval aviation may participate in air preparation attacks.

Air support begins after ground forces start an offensive. Its targets are at tactical and immediate depths and include enemy nuclear weapons, command and control systems, and enemy reserves. The majority of air strikes are preplanned, but immediate air attack missions against centers of resistance are made at the request of ground force commanders within the limitations of their allocated resources. The air support phase closely follows the operational plan prepared before the onset of the offensive and is an extension of the strong artillery fires associated with Soviet offensive operations. As in the air preparation stage, the targets generally are those beyond the destruction capabilities of artillery and missiles.

Air accompaniment occurs as Soviet ground forces penetrate deeply into enemy defenses. The specific point at which air accompaniment begins is not clear, but it is during the advanced stage of offensive operations when the progress of the ground forces has outstripped the prepared fire support plan, and reassessment and reallocation of air resources are necessary. After allocating air resources before an offensive, the

front commander plays little further direct role in the conduct of air support unless large reallocations are required. However, in the air accompaniment phase, the role of the *front* commander is again emphasized, indicating the probability of significant reallocations of air resources supporting maneuver forces to adjust to the developments in the combat situation.

Air cover for airborne and airmobile operations is a type of air accompaniment mission which might take place concurrently with the preparation phase or support phase over the FEBA.

Both fixed-wing aircraft and combat helicopters are used in the three stages of air support for offensive ground operations. The increasing numbers of combat helicopters deployed enable them to play a greater role in the support of ground forces freeing fixed-wing aircraft for missions against deeper targets such as nuclear weapon depots and airfields.

In a meeting engagement, air support assets, especially attack helicopters, screen and support Soviet units as they maneuver into position. Also, air strikes are employed against enemy columns moving forward to reinforce engaged units. Soviet exercise scenarios frequently have attack helicopters employed in flanking attacks against reinforcing or counter-attacking enemy armor columns.

In a pursuit, air support assets (either high-performance aircraft or helicopters) attack withdrawing enemy units through armed reconnaissance and in ambushes along withdrawal routes. Combat helicopters also can be assigned to support forward detachments outside the range of artillery fire.

SUPPORT IN THE DEFENSE

In the defense, air fire support is integrated into the overall defensive fire plan. The air fire support plan extends to the immediate operational depth of the enemy and seeks to disrupt his attack plans.

Several variations of the air fire support plan are developed in detail. Variations of the plan take into account the anticipated actions of the enemy and his most probable avenues of approach. An aviation counterpreparation is planned for each variation. The objective of the counterpreparation is to launch a powerful, surprise, concentrated strike of short duration to preempt the enemy's plan. The targets of the counterpreparation are—

- Nuclear warheads and delivery systems.
- Artillery in firing positions.
- Aviation on airfields.
- Armored or mechanized forces preparing to attack.

- Major command and control points, headquarters, and communications centers.

- River-crossing sites and equipment, ammunition, and fuel dumps.

Variations of the plan also provide for air strikes against attacking forces that are out of range of artillery and tactical rockets, and concentrated fire by all fire support weapons or forces that have reached, or penetrated, forward defensive positions.

Helicopters with ATGMs are employed to counter-attack armored or mechanized forces. The helicopter force seeks routes that allow it to approach the flank of the enemy force undetected. If terrain variations do not provide adequate concealment for the force, smoke may be employed to conceal its approach.

During withdrawal, helicopters support rear guard units by attacking advancing enemy units from ambush and by laying minefields.

TRENDS

The Soviets are attempting to resolve problems about the provision of more reliable and continuous air fire support to ground forces. In this respect, their efforts seem to be concentrated in two areas: improved accuracy of munitions delivery and improved air and ground interaction.

The Soviets have already introduced a new generation of helicopter-mounted ATGMs with greater standoff range and accuracy. They also have in production or development precision-guided munitions (PGM), "smart bombs" which are similar to those deployed by US forces. A new air-to-surface missile, the AS-X, is expected to have a range of approximately 40 kilometers with electro-optical guidance and low altitude (150 meters) firing capability.

Soviet discussion on organizational forms of aviation has centered on improved interaction with maneuver formations, including organization of support for army-level operations, organization of bomber "strike groups," and development of improved night air reconnaissance and fire support of ground maneuver units.

Subordination of some aviation assets to the army commander has been accepted in practice, as the Soviets frequently refer to "army aviation." The issue now appears to be the optimum composition and strength of the army-level aviation force. Discussion focuses on a mixed air regiment of reconnaissance and liaison aircraft and up to a division-sized unit of ground attack aviation.

Considerable interest also has been expressed in forming aviation "strike groups." The strike groups

would be capable of conducting independent operations against key targets at operational and strategic depths of the enemy, both during and subsequent to the conduct of an air operation. It also would deliver strikes in support of ground maneuver formations at operational and tactical depths. A strike group would be two to three air divisions strong, would consist primarily of fighter-bomber and bomber (probably BACKFIRE and BADGER) aircraft, and would be subordinate directly to the Soviet High Command.

A third area of expressed interest is the improvement of nighttime aerial reconnaissance and ordnance delivery in support of ground maneuver formations. Despite heavy emphasis on night combat, the Soviets

recognize limitations in their capability to maintain continuity of air support at night. They see a need for improved target designation and mutual identification procedures between air and ground units at night, even to the extent of forming special helicopter units for night combat.

As new equipment is introduced and when organizational modification is accomplished, Soviet aviation will be able to provide increased support to combined arms forces. Improved accuracy of ordnance delivery, greater flexibility in employment, and increased responsiveness to combined arms commanders will enhance air-ground coordination.

CHAPTER 13

SMOKE

The Soviets employ smoke extensively on the battlefield. It probably will be used every time the situation permits. The Soviets distinguish between toxic and nontoxic smokes in their doctrinal literature. This distinction drives their planning on when they should mask. They intend to force the enemy to use his chemical protective systems which will generally lower his effectiveness.

A number of different agents may be used together. For instance, chloride mixtures produce a particularly effective liquid agent. Liquid chloride agents are composed primarily of titanium, silicon, or tin tetrachlorides. Smokes, such as the S-4 compound, (chlorosulfonic acid, sulfur trioxide, and sulfuric acid) may be seeded with particulates to block portions of the electromagnetic spectrum more fully. The vast quantities of white phosphorus on the battlefield suggest also that random mixtures of this agent will combine with other obscurants, both man-made and natural.

Soviet forces are well equipped for the use of smoke. Their munitions and equipment include—

* Smoke grenades.

- Smoke barrels, drums, and pots.
- Spray smoke generators.
- Mortar and artillery smoke rounds.
- Combat vehicle engine exhaust smoke systems.

Smoke delivery systems are plentiful, as are smoke-filled artillery projectiles, smoke bombs, spray tanks, and generator systems. Conventional wisdom, stemming from Soviet open writings, holds that some 7 to 10% of all artillery units of fire are smoke rounds, mostly white phosphorus (WP) and, more recently plasticized white phosphorus (PWP).

The Soviets maintain that when firing is done from a position covered with smoke at targets outside the smoke, effectiveness decreases approximately 10 times. When only the targets are concealed by smoke, effectiveness decreases four times.

In recognition of the need to counter target acquisition and guidance systems operating in the IR and microwave regions of the electromagnetic spectrum, the Soviets are developing smokes and aerosols capable of attenuating such radiation.

TYPES OF SMOKE SCREENS

The Soviets recognize three basic types of smoke screens: blinding, camouflaging, and decoy. Each type is classified as being frontal, oblique, or flank in nature, depending on the placement of the screen. Smoke

screens are either stationary or mobile depending on prevailing winds and the dispensing means used. Each basic type is intended to serve a different tactical purpose, but all may be employed simultaneously.

The intent of blinding smoke **s c r e e n s** is to blind enemy gunners, observation posts, and target acquisition systems and to restrict the enemy's ability to engage Soviet forces effectively. The blinding smoke screen normally is produced by the Soviet S-4 mixture and WP and/or PWP. The casualty effects and collateral damage produced by WP and PWP are significantly greater than those of other agents. These smokes probably are preferred for use against enemy positions. The WP and PWP can be delivered by rocket launchers, artillery, mortars and fixed-wing aircraft or helicopters. **S-4** probably is delivered by spray tanks mounted on aircraft.

Blinding smoke rounds are included in the artillery preparation for an attack and in fires in support of the attack. Likely targets are enemy defensive positions, rear assembly areas, counterattacking forces, fire support locations, and subsequent objectives.

The screening properties of a blinding smoke screen, coupled with the dust, HE combustion effects, and incendiary effects of phosphorus, create an environment in which fear and confusion are added to the measured effectiveness of the smoke.

The purpose of camouflage smoke is to provide freedom of movement for units, to conceal the location of units and the nature and direction of an attack, to provide protection against the thermal radiation of nuclear explosions, and to degrade night-vision sights. The camouflage smoke screen is used on or to the front of friendly troops. These screens normally are employed up to the point where forces deploy to the attack formation. The number, size, and location of camouflage smoke screens vary depending on terrain, weather, and the tactics conducted. Soviet writings describe a battalion-level exercise in which four separate camouflage screens were established to cover the battalion's deployment to company columns, movement toward the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA), and final deployment to attack formation, a distance of approximately 3 kilometers.

Camouflage smoke screens normally are established by using a combination of smoke barrels, smoke pots, combat vehicles with smoke-generating systems, decontamination vehicles, vehicles mounting smoke-generating devices, and/or aircraft. The smoke generators of armored or TMS-65 decontamination

vehicles establish a smoke screen very quickly. However, they can be easily detected, so normally they are used only when cover is available or well behind friendly lines. Smoke generating vehicles start at the center of the line to be smoked and travel in opposite directions along that line at approximately 15 kmph. Two vehicles are sufficient to lay a smoke screen long enough to cover a battalion advancing to the attack. For larger smoke screens, the line is divided into segments, with two vehicles assigned to each segment. The Soviets state that camouflage smoke screens should cover an area at least five times the width of the attacking unit's frontage.

The Soviets are concerned with the threat of enemy helicopter-mounted ATGM systems. Consequently, Soviet doctrine calls for advancing forces to move as close behind the smoke screen as possible. The higher the smoke screen, the higher a helicopter must go to observe troop movement behind the smoke screen and the more vulnerable the helicopter is to ground-based air defense weapons. The TMS-65, which can lay a smoke screen approximately 400 meters high, is an excellent dispenser for this purpose. There is considerable observation-free maneuver space behind a screen of this height. Conversely, smoke pots provide a 5- to 10-meter high screen which screens against ground observation, but leaves the force vulnerable to helicopters "hugging the deck" and "popping up" to shoot.

Soviet literature and training indicate that the Soviets do not consider "neutral" smokes to be harmful to personnel or equipment given the relatively limited exposure expected during the movement to attack. Consequently, Soviet troops rarely wear protective clothing when operating in camouflage smoke.

A *decoy screen* is established to deceive an enemy as to the actual location of friendly forces and a probable direction of attack. The site and location of decoy screens depends upon the type of combat action, time available, terrain, and weather conditions. An example of the use of decoy screens is a river crossing in which several possible crossing sites are screened simultaneously. If the enemy fires into the decoy screen, black smoke devices and fires will be ignited to simulate burning vehicles or equipment. Other "disinformation" which should be expected includes speakers emitting sounds of tanks operating.

METEOROLOGICAL INFLUENCES ON SMOKE

Local meteorological conditions impact greatly on the employment of smoke. The command and control

of troops maneuvering in smoke is extremely difficult even when the use of smoke is planned and commanders have had an opportunity to conduct reconnaissance and to prepare their troops. When meteorological conditions are not considered, smoke unexpectedly covering friendly forces can lead to disorientation, loss of command and control, and tactical disaster. Careful analysis of meteorological conditions in the planning process cannot be overemphasized. The meteorological conditions that most affect the employment of smoke are wind, lower-atmosphere stability, temperature, relative humidity, and precipitation.

Wind direction is usually specified according to its relation to the line of the FEBA and is classified as *head, tail, oblique, or flank*. A wind that blows at an angle of 60° to 90° to the FEBA is considered either a head or tail wind, depending on whether it is blowing from one's FEBA to that of the enemy (tail) or vice versa (head). An oblique wind blows across the FEBA at an angle of 30° to 60°. A flank wind blows parallel to, or not more than 30° from, the FEBA. A tail wind is highly favorable when forces are attempting to establish a blinding smoke screen.

Wind speed data help to predict the *drift* rate and life span of a smoke screen and the quantity of smoke agent required. The Soviets classify wind speed as being favorable, moderate, or unfavorable as shown below.

Wind Effects on Smoke Operations

WIND SPEED

CONDITION

0-1.5 meters/sec	Unfavorable
1.5-3.0 meters/sec	Moderate
3.0-5.0 meters/sec	Favorable
5.0-8.0 meters/sec	Moderate
Greater than 8.0 meters/sec ...	Unfavorable

Under favorable conditions, the smoke cloud is disrupted *very* little, its life span is optimum, and the quantity of smoke agent required is minimal. Under moderate conditions, a relatively large quantity of smoke agent is required; however, the life span of the cloud still permits tactical *use*. A high density of smoke may be achieved under moderate wind speeds. If the wind direction changes frequently, there is a danger of ineffective dispersal. With unfavorable wind speeds, the smoke cloud disperses too rapidly or not at all.

Three conditions of atmospheric stability are recognized: stable, neutral, and unstable. Stable conditions exist when the lower layers of the air are

cooler than the upper layers. This usually occurs at night and in the early morning when there is a cloudless sky. During this time, intermixing of air in the atmosphere is very limited, and the smoke tends to drift along the earth's surface. Neutral conditions exist when the air temperature is the same at the earth's surface as it is at the upper layers. This usually occurs when there is cloud formation and the wind speed exceeds 2 to 3 meters per second. This condition favors the employment of smoke. In unstable conditions, the lower layers are warmer than the upper layers, thus causing an intensive intermixing of the air

by vertical air movements. These conditions normally occur on cloudless days, and/or when wind speeds exceed 12 to 14 meters per second. Under these conditions a smoke cloud quickly disperses.

Heavy rain is unfavorable for smoke. Falling raindrops wash the smoke out of the air, and lead to the accelerated dispersion of a smoke cloud.

Favorable meteorological conditions for employing smoke occur when a wind is stable in direction with a speed of 3 to 5 meters per second and a stable or neutral atmospheric condition exists. Average conditions for using smoke include a wind speed of 1.5 to 3

**Munition Expenditure Norms for Producing
a 1-km Smoke Screen for 15 Minutes**

WEAPON	WIND DIRECTION					
	HEAD OR TAIL		OBLIQUE (45°)		FLANK	
	Number of tubes	Number of rounds	Number of tubes	Number of rounds	Number of tubes	Number of rounds
82-mm mortar	12		8-12	750	8	500
120-mm mortar	8		8	220	4	150
122-mm howitzer	8		8	220	4	150

NOTES:

1. The wind speed is assumed to be 3 to 5 meters per second.
2. If the wind speed is 6 to 7 meters per second, the ammunition consumption should be multiplied by 1.5.
3. An artillery battery of 6 pieces, regardless of the caliber of its weapon, can produce a smoke screen—
 - over a 500- to 700-meter front if the wind is a crosswind.
 - over a 150- to 200-meter front if the wind is a head or tail wind.
 If a front exceeds these dimensions, it must be divided among the batteries.
4. When there is a layer of snow over 20 cm in depth, the ammunition consumption should be multiplied by a factor of 1.5 to 2.

**Munition Expenditure Norms for Producing
a 120- to 200-Meter Smoke Screen for 15 Minutes**

WEAPON	REQUIRED ROUNDS WITH HEAD WINDS		REQUIRED ROUNDS WITH FLANKING WINDS			
	Up to 5 meters per second	More than 5 meters per second	Up to 2 meters per second	3-5 meters per second	6-7 meters per second	More than 7 meters per second
82-mm mortar	120	200	25	40	60	90
120-mm mortar or 122-mm howitzer	40	70	12	18	25	40

meters per second or 5 to 8 meters per second with neutral atmospheric conditions. Unfavorable conditions consist of wind speeds of less than 1.5 or greater than 8 meters per second, gusty winds, winds that are unstable in direction, strong unstable atmospheric conditions, and heavy rain.

An analysis of worldwide environmental conditions shows that certain areas are better suited for smoke use than others. For example, in Western Europe the winds are normally stable, the relative humidity is normally high, and the average number of cloud-free days is low (approximately 36 to 38 per year). As a result, Western Europe provides highly favorable conditions for the use of smoke. The Middle East, especially the desert regions, is not very favorable because of the low relative humidity.

Smokepots also may be used to establish a smoke screen. To estimate the number of pots required to maintain a smoke screen for a particular operation, the Soviets use the following formula:

$$N = \frac{AT}{LWD}$$

WHERE:

N = number of smokepots required
A = area of smoke screen (square meters)
T = time to maintain smoke screen (minutes)
L = length of impenetrable smoke screen from one pot (meters)
W = width of smoke cloud at end of screen from one pot (meters)
D = duration of smoke formation from one pot (minutes)

For safety, **N** is increased by 10 percent to 15 percent. Additionally, as the amount required is affected by available light and meteorological conditions, the required number may be reduced by 30 percent to 40 percent at night and increased by up to 50 percent if the wind is gusty or has a velocity greater than 5 meters per second.

*Soviet guidelines for the use of smoke are—

Before and during an attack, smoke should be placed on enemy firing positions and observation

points. Artillery, mortar, and aircraft are to be the primary means of dissemination.

- Artillery, aircraft, smokepots, and barrels are to be used to create screening smoke throughout the tactical depth of the enemy's defense and to screen the flanks of attacking units.

- Screening smoke of 2 to 3 hours' duration should be placed along a wide front to cover units conducting river-crossing operations. Screens are to be placed on both sides of the river; floating pots and barrels also may be placed in the river. Decoy screens are employed at one or more other likely crossing sites in an attempt to deceive the enemy.

- Important locations and possible targets such as troop concentrations, crossing sites, bridges, railroad junctions, and unloading areas are to be screened as the situation dictates.

- Avenues of approach to these locations also should be screened, with particular attention being given to eliminating reference points that could aid enemy aviation in targeting the screened location.

- Reliable communications and continuous coordination between units using smoke and forward air warning and air defense posts is essential.

- Maneuver forces should be covered by smoke screens set down on a broad front.

- Camouflage, blinding, and decoy smoke screens should be used to conceal the direction and time of attack and to minimize losses.

- Smoke may be used to mark targets for friendly aircraft and for signaling purposes.

- Smoke should be used to screen logistics routes and activities such as the repair and evacuation of tanks, evacuation of casualties, etc., that are within range of enemy fire and observation.

- Smoke should be used to cover the movements of guns into firing positions and from position to position.

- Smoke should be used to screen the activities of engineer units when clearing minefields and to mark passages through engineer barriers.

Soviet smoke doctrine and capabilities are impressive. However, very little training has been observed, except for limited driving drills. When vehicle drivers cannot see to drive, and young commanders cannot see to command, it must be expected that there will be confusion, and perhaps a hesitancy to use their doctrine as fully as they would like.

CHAPTER 14

ENGINEER SUPPORT

The Soviets recognize that execution of combined arms operations requires extensive use of engineer support. This support is influenced by the requirement to maintain high speed offensive operations, by the widely-dispersed nature of combined arms operations, and by the increased lethality of conventional and nuclear weapons.

ORGANIZATION

There are two types of Soviet engineers: sapper, or combat engineers found at regiment and division, and more skilled engineers organized and trained for specific missions. The latter type of engineer normally is organic to army and **front**.

Engineer troops are assigned down through regimental level in all Soviet maneuver divisions, and platoons are sometimes detailed to battalions for specific operations.

At army level, engineer units could include a ponton bridge regiment, an assault crossing battalion, and a general engineer regiment or brigade. At front level, there might be a general engineer regiment or brigade, along with specialized ponton bridge regiments and assault crossing battalions.

Motorized rifle or tank divisions have an engineer battalion with various vehicle-launched bridges, ponton bridges, and heavy amphibious ferries, along with trucks, and mine clearing, construction, and demolition equipment. The engineer battalions in tank divisions have a larger number of heavy amphibious ferries to support the divisions' armored vehicles. Airborne divisions have an engineer battalion of lesser strength, with no heavy vehicle-launched bridging equipment, ferries, or ponton bridge sections.

The engineer battalion at division level is capable of performing the following missions—

Provide engineer **staff** planning for organic and attached engineer troops.

- Construct, repair, and maintain roads, bridges, fords, and culverts.
- Support stream and river crossings with necessary equipment.
- Coordinate organic and attached engineer troops in water crossings.
- Assist in emplacement of obstacles and mines. Provide technical assistance in preparation of field fortifications.
- Conduct engineer reconnaissance and develop engineer intelligence.

- Provide personnel and equipment for water purification and supply of potable water.

- Assist in assault of fortified positions by furnishing **sappers**.

Most of the tasks described above are done by sappers. Engineers carry out more specialized work such as the construction and operation of floating bridges and ferries.

The engineer company in a motorized rifle regiment of a motorized rifle or tank division is organized into a mine warfare platoon, a technical (construction) platoon, and a bridge platoon. The company has several APCs, vehicle-launched bridges, and assorted mine-clearing equipment.

From his senior commanders, the battalion commander receives engineer support to enable his unit to cross natural and man-made obstacles, and to construct defensive positions and barriers.

The Soviets may assign motorized rifle or other troops to perform engineer tasks when necessary. Troops of all arms and services are trained to perform some engineer tasks such as building weapons emplacements and trenches, emplacing and clearing mines by hand, and camouflaging weapons and equipment.

Motorized rifle and tank regiments, however, rely heavily on their organic engineer company to—

- Provide limited mine **warfare** capability.
- Execute route reconnaissance and route opening.
- Support crossing of water and dry gaps with **truck**-launched and tank-launched bridging.
- Provide earth-moving capability for road work and entrenchments.
- Execute camouflage and demolitions.

The Soviet concept of engineer support includes the attachment of support units from higher levels to those front line units in contact with the enemy from assets of senior commanders. Engineer unit tactical employment does not always follow strict organizational lines. Tactical employment of combat engineer, engineer reconnaissance, and road and bridge subunits generally involves the formation of one or more of the following functional groupings:

- Mobile Obstacle Detachment (MOD).
- Movement Support Detachment (MSD).
- Engineer reconnaissance patrol.

Each engineer unit organic to a maneuver unit is commanded by a chief of engineer services (CES). The CES is responsible for the organization of engineer support, maintenance and use of engineer equipment,

and combat readiness of the engineer units. He concentrates engineer efforts to support a main offensive effort or critical defense sector. At each level, the CES coordinates with the chief of engineer services at the next higher level.

The CES at regimental level is usually a major. He participates fully in the staff and coordinates with the other chiefs of service and the chief of staff. He contributes to the reconnaissance plan, the combat order, river crossing, and NBC defense plans. In accordance with the commander's decisions, he plans engineer support, the disposition of engineer subunits, and the use of combat units assigned to engineer tasks.

ENGINEER SUPPORT IN THE OFFENSE

In the offense, the primary mission of the engineers is to assist in maintaining a high rate of advance. Emphasis is on clearing and maintaining routes for the advance of maneuver elements. This includes the clearance or removal of mines and other obstacles, crossing of water obstacles, assisting in flank protection and protection against counterattacks. Engineer reconnaissance, performed independently or with other reconnaissance, plays a significant role in achieving a high rate of advance. Basic engineer tasks also include the support of logistic operations in the rear area.

Engineer Reconnaissance

Engineers are included in *all* reconnaissance elements of tank and motorized rifle units. The mission of engineer reconnaissance is to report on the condition of the routes of advance for the main body. The unit performing the route reconnaissance must determine the following:

- Obstacles to be overcome.
- Engineer equipment required.
- Conditions of crossing sites.
- Location and quantity of materials which can be used to improve the march route.
- Nature of the terrain and the location of areas that do not afford natural concealment.

Engineer reconnaissance provides information about assembly areas, detours around obstacles, and warning of minefields and craters. Reconnaissance of water obstacles is done to find fording sites and suitable entry and exit points for amphibious combat vehicles. Detailed reconnaissance is required for bridge and ferry sites.

When the situation warrants, engineer reconnaissance patrols are formed for specific missions. An

engineer reconnaissance patrol may consist of one or two BRDM scout cars or APCs. It is usually commanded by an officer. Reconnaissance of tank fording sites require divers and a tracked amphibian with river reconnaissance devices. An engineer reconnaissance patrol is equipped with portable mine detectors and route marking flags and may have a vehicle-mounted mine detector for mounted mine reconnaissance of roads and trails.

Movement Support

Information gathered as a result of engineer reconnaissance is used to determine the selection of march routes requiring the least amount of engineering preparation and the employment of engineer assets for route clearing.

The movement support function includes all engineer activities which facilitate the movement of maneuver forces. A movement support detachment (MSD) is task organized from division or regimental engineer assets based on the mission and the availability of assets. It can be from platoon to company strength and is equipped with route and mine clearance vehicles and equipment. The MSD can fill craters, clear mines, prepare bypasses from major obstructions, and identify contaminated areas. It normally does not include bridging equipment with the exception of that needed for its own movement. Maneuver regiments have their own truck- and tank-launched bridges and normally do not require bridging support from the MSD.

During marches, the MSDs travel in advance of the main body clearing obstructions reported by division reconnaissance elements. The division engineer battalion can form two or three MSDs. These detachments are employed on main routes, and, where possible, under the protection of an advance guard or forward security element. On other routes, the leading regiments provide MSDs from their organic engineer resources. A common MSD at this level might consist of an engineer platoon with one or two dozers and up to three tanks fitted with dozer blades. MSDs are protected by up to a platoon of infantry or tanks and should be accompanied by chemical reconnaissance personnel.

Minefield Breaching

The normal Soviet method of breaching minefields during an assault or rapid advance is to employ mine plows fitted to the lead tanks. Although engineers reconnoiter the minefield, the initial breaching is not

Movement Support Detachment

VARIANT 1		
1 RECONNAISSANCE AND BARRICADE DESTRUCTION GROUP	2 ROAD-BRIDGE GROUP	3 ROUTE MARKING GROUP
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Tank w/Mine Plow • Combat Engineer Squad, APC-Mounted <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Explosives - Mine Detectors - Mine Probes • Bridge-laying Vehicle • Chemical Dosimetrists 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Truck-launched Scissors Bridge • Tracked Dozer • Carriers for Bridge and Road Personnel • Truck-mounted Crane • Motorized Rifle Platoon (-1 Squad) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Motorized Rifle Platoon. APC-Mounted, w/Marking Equipment

VARIANT 2			
1 RECONNAISSANCE AND BARRICADE DESTRUCTION GROUP	ROAD-BRIDGE GROUP		4 ROUTE MARKING GROUP AND RESERVE
	2 ROAD GROUP	3 BRIDGE GROUP	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Tank w/Mine Plow • Combat Engineer Squad, APC-Mounted <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Explosives - Mine Detectors - Mine Probes • Bridge-laying Tank • Chemical Dosimetrists 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Tractor Dozer • 1/2 Engr Squad w/Explosives 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Combat Engineer Squad • Truck-launched Scissors Bridge • Carriers for Bridge and Road Personnel • Truck-mounted Crane • Motorized Rifle Platoon (-1 Squad) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Motorized Rifle Squad • 1/2 Engr Squad w/Marking Equipment

primarily an engineer task **KMT-4** and KMT-6 plows normally are employed on the scale of one per platoon of three to four tanks. Engineers assist in the fitting of these and plow-roller combinations (**KMT-5s**) which

are commonly used for minefield reconnaissance. The Soviets estimate clearing speeds of about **10 kmph** for plow-fitted tanks and up to 22 kmph for roller-fitted tanks. Combat vehicles other than those on a tank

chassis have to wait until the full width of the lane is cleared. This is often done by tanks with plows or rollers towing a line charge across the minefield behind them and then setting off the charge.

The Soviets employ a mine-clearing device mounted on the BTR-50PK APC (two to each divisional engineer battalion). This piece of equipment fires an explosive hose (line charge) across the minefield which is then detonated. It clears a lane about 180 meters long by 6 to 8 meters wide. This equipment is particularly useful during an assault river crossing **when** there are minefields on the far bank and amphibious APCs may have to operate initially in the bridgehead without tank support.

Another mine-clearing device is the BDT explosive line charge. It consists of three separate linear charges, a nose section, and a detonator box. Each linear charge may be assembled to any desired length by connecting 2-meter sections together with threaded collars. The Light, sheet metal, 5cm-diameter, tubular sections are filled with cast TNT explosive at 9 kg per linear meter. The BDT is versatile, **in** that it may be used as a single, double, or triple charge. The forward end section is fitted with a roller to facilitate insertion of the charge into a minefield. The BDT is assembled in a rear area and towed by a tank to the edge of the minefield; then it is pushed into the minefield and fired. The triple line charge clears a 6-meter wide path along the entire length of the charge. A squad of men can assemble a 500-meter long triple charge in 1 to 1.5 hours.

Bangalore torpedoes also are used. Sections, 2-meters in length and carrying 6 kilograms of explosive, are connected by collars. The depth of clearance of a path 1 to 2 meters wide is limited only by the manageable weight that can be manually pushed into the minefield.

The number of lanes to be cleared depends on the terrain and the number of columns in the assault echelon. For a leading battalion in a main attack six to eight lanes may be required, one for each assaulting platoon. In supporting attacks as few as two may be sufficient. However, an average of four to six can be expected with at least two developed into permanent lanes 6 to 8 meters wide for the passage of artillery and logistic vehicles. Engineer sappers mark minefield lanes and provide traffic control through the minefield. The routes leading from a start line to each lane are marked with red triangular metal flags and black and white tapes. **illuminating markers** may be used at night. Routes through friendly minefields are marked by signs of various shapes placed not less than 20 meters apart on both sides of the route. If possible, they are positioned so as not to be visible from enemy positions

Mine Laying

Minefield laying is most rapidly accomplished using armored tracked minelayers (three to each divisional engineer battalion). Hand emplacement and towed minelayers are also utilized. Special teams called mobile obstacle detachments (MODS) are formed from regimental and division engineer assets. Their mission is the rapid laying of mines in the most likely enemy avenues for attacks or counterattacks. MODS are positioned on the flanks of a march formation to be prepared for rapid deployment and normally are in close proximity of the antitank reserve. An MOD consists of up to three armored tracked minelayers or truck-towed minelaying trailers and two to three vehicles carrying mines for resupply. Both the tracked minelayers and the minelaying trailers dispense mines at predetermined spacings of 4 or 5.5 meters. Mine-laying helicopters, which dispense mines from a chute while flying at a height of about 5 meters, may also be employed. Antitank minefield density is usually from 750 to 1000 mines per kilometer. Using the division's three armored tracked minelayers, a three-row antitank minefield up to 1,000 meters in length can be surface laid in half an hour on suitable ground. In the same time, a regimental MOD (three minelaying trailers) might lay some 500 meters of minefield.

Assault River Crossings

The Soviets stress that water obstacles should be crossed from the march to preclude major halts in the offense. Doctrine includes crossing these obstacles at multiple points along a broad front to overwhelm enemy defenses. Doctrine also calls for river crossings to be made at night; however, Soviet units rarely train in night river crossings. Smoke is used extensively to mask assault crossings conducted during daylight hours.

Engineer river crossing capability is found at the regimental engineer company organic to motorized rifle and tank regiments, the division engineer battalion, and special engineer battalions and regiments at front and army level. A more detailed discussion of Soviet river crossings can be found in *FM 100-2-2*.

ENGINEER SUPPORT IN THE DEFENSE

Engineer support for the preparation of defensive positions consists of the following actions:

- Engineer reconnaissance of the enemy and terrain.
- Preparation of fortifications for protection of weapons, personnel, and equipment.
- Construction of obstacles (coordinated with the tire plan and natural obstacles).

- Construction of routes for blocking and counterattacking forces.
- Support of camouflage and deception measures.
- Provision of water supply.

Engineer tasks during the defense are implementation of obstacle plans, particularly antitank obstacles, to block enemy penetrations. A mobile obstacle detachment (MOD) may join antitank reserves to counter enemy tank threats. Another task for the MOD is repair of existing routes and creation of new routes to support the maneuver of forces. A third task is reacting to the effects of nuclear strikes by the enemy (fire fighting, structure repair, removal of essential debris).

In first echelon units, engineer fortification of defensive areas is done preferably at night, or under conditions of reduced visibility. Mechanized digging capability is used for trenches, revetments, and shelters in those areas not subject to direct enemy observation or fire.

During the combined arms commander's personal reconnaissance, he makes final decisions about the disposition of units, strongpoints, fire support systems, the obstacle and barrier system, and the type of engineer preparation required. He considers the cover and concealment (camouflage) potential of the terrain, and devotes special attention to determining those areas where he can employ earth-moving machines and prefabricated fortification constructions.

Engineer troops assist in reconnaissance and preparation of the defense by determining the protective and camouflage features of the terrain and aiding in selection of positions for command posts and subunit strongpoints. Engineers also determine road and bridge conditions in the defensive area, availability of local materials for construction of positions, and the status of the water supply. Engineer observation posts usually are manned by two or three engineers with a periscope range finder and possibly photographic equipment. The posts are located approximately 2 to 3 kilometers apart along the front. They monitor the conditions of roads, barriers, bridges, and the water supply as well as assist in monitoring radiation and contamination levels in the defensive area.

To some extent fortification, shelters, and vehicle revetments are constructed by all troops. The engineers are charged with constructing the more complex fortifications. In addition, engineer troops normally construct barrier systems which are coordinated with the overall system of fire. The first priority in the barrier system is given to antitank obstacles. Additional maneuver routes for the rapid and con-

cealed employment of counterattack or blocking forces are prepared by engineers, to include mine clearance within the defensive area, if required.

As an example, in establishing a prepared defense, personnel of a motorized rifle battalion in the first echelon may construct the basic trenches and company and platoon strongpoints. Basic revetments for tanks, APCs, command observation posts, antitank guided missiles (ATGMs), and mortars may be constructed by engineers. Engineers employing digging machines may construct fortifications for the battalion's second echelon—covered shelters and bunkers, communications trenches, and alternate ATGM and mortar positions. Primary, temporary, and alternate artillery firing positions; ammunition bunkers; personnel shelters; and prime mover revetments are prepared by the gun crews. Obstacles are created on approaches into the defensive position, in front of artillery and air defense firing positions, in the undefended gaps between strongpoints, and on flanks. Antipersonnel minefields are emplaced forward of the FEBA to give added protection to antitank minefields or to protect gaps between defensive strongpoints. Existing roads are cleared, improved, and marked. Maneuver routes to the front and flanks and supply-evacuation routes are prepared, usually by the engineer elements of the senior combined arms commander. Dummy positions may be constructed. Effectiveness of all camouflage measures is checked periodically by aerial observation. Once established by engineers, water supply points usually are operated and monitored by motorized rifle troops.

The Soviets contend that a tank, protected by a revetment, is significantly more effective in defense than an attacking enemy tank and is superior in its direct fire capability and camouflage. Therefore, particular attention is given to masking and protecting aspects of the terrain and to preparing revetments with cleared fields of fire. Tank defensive positions in subunit strongpoints are prepared with primary and alternate positions (about 200 meters apart) for all-around defense. The primary revetments are constructed first, while alternate positions and ammunition storage areas follow in work priority.

CAMOUFLAGE AND WATER SUPPLY

The Soviets believe that camouflage measures are important in all combat actions. Under all conditions, camouflage is an individual as well as an organizational responsibility. Individual soldiers and crew members are expected to make use of natural vegetation to camouflage equipment and positions. Engineer tasks

are characterized by efforts to minimize the necessity for camouflage by proper site selection and reconnaissance of the natural camouflaging and concealing properties of the terrain. Camouflage nets may be used in place of natural foliage. Smoke also is employed to conceal movement and to deceive the enemy.

It is in the defense that camouflage is applied in the greatest detail. Here, the intent of camouflage is to compel enemy reconnaissance to report incorrect data on troop deployment through concealment and deception. Soviet guidelines state that camouflage should be convincing in its realism, that it be applied constantly and consistently through the whole area, and that it be diverse. In organizing for camouflage,

allowances must be made for proper use of the masking effect of terrain features, for the season and time of day, as well as the weather and other visibility factors. Troops are dispersed also and their dispersal areas frequently relocated, but not at the expense of either security or control. All troops are made aware of factors that adversely affect camouflage, such as light, sound, motion, incorrect coloration or contrast, shape, skylining and trackage.

In all combat operations, engineers are responsible for supplying water and for determining its suitability for human consumption. Where NBC weapons have been employed, medical service and chemical defense troops assist in evaluating the water.

CHAPTER 15

ELECTRONIC WARFARE

SOVIET EW CAPABILITIES

For years the Soviets have recognized the importance of electronic warfare (EW) and have made a major investment in electronic counter-countermeasures (ECCM), as well as lethal and nonlethal countermeasures. Soviet writings on **EW** are included under broader topics such as security, command and control, reconnaissance, air defense, and camouflage. This treatment of electronic warfare in the context of routine operations indicates that the Soviets consider **EW** to be integral to all combat actions.

Technical advancements in both electronic warfare support measures (ESM) and electronic countermeasures (ECM) have been noted in all Soviet forces. Ground forces continue to introduce new jammers, as well as a new series of improved signals intelligence (SIGINT) vehicles. The air forces have numerous aircraft devoted to EW as escort and standoff jammer platforms. Also since 1979, there has been increased emphasis on Soviet offensive, penetrating air forces equipped with ECM and accompanied by dedicated **EW** aircraft. Strategic fixed jammers are relocated throughout the Soviet Union. Soviet writings on EW indicate a close parallel to US practices and capabilities:

- Communication and electronic reconnaissance (COMINT/ELINT)*-Employed for intelligence collection, to include targeting for artillery and air.
- Electronic countermeasures (ECM)*-Employed to neutralize enemy communications and electronics through jamming and deception.
- Electronic counter-countermeasures (ECCM)*-ECCM capabilities are achieved through strict enforcement of signal security, equipment redundancy, alternate subsystems, system design, and operator skill.

Communications is the basic means to ensure troop control. Loss of communications is the loss of troop control, and the loss of troop control in battle invariably leads to defeat.

LTC L. Titov
Voyenny Vestnik No. 7, 1971

SOVIET RADIOELECTRONIC COMBAT (REC)


The Soviets have developed their electronic warfare capabilities into an integrated system called radio-

electronic combat (REC). REC doctrine adds a new dimension to the US view of electronic **warfare**. REC combines signals intelligence, direction finding, intensive jamming, deception, and destructive fires to attack enemy organizations and systems through their means of control. The purpose of REC is to limit, delay, or nullify the enemy's use of his command and control systems, while protecting Soviet systems by electronic counter-countermeasures. An estimated goal of the system is to destroy or to disrupt a majority of the enemy's command, control, and weapon system communications, either by jamming or by destructive fires.

The Soviets recognize the impossibility of completely depriving enemy forces of their sources of control for extended periods of time. Accordingly, Soviet REC planners have established mathematical models to estimate "critical times" in command and control procedures. This critical time is defined as the sum of the times required to complete a sequence of steps in control:

- Collection and reporting of data.
- Evaluation and decision.
- Issuance of orders and preparation.
- Completion of action.

Soviet Radioelectronic Combat (REC)



*US Terminology.

Against this background, the aim of radioelectronic combat is to disrupt the enemy's critical time phasing to the extent that perishable information (on which decisions and orders are based) becomes obsolete.

TARGET PRIORITIES

Communication control points are assigned a priority according to their expected relative impact on the battle. They are selected with the intention of eliminating them by either physical destruction or by jamming. Although REC target priorities are dependent on the command level and may be altered as the tactical situation develops, they generally are—

- Artillery, rocket, and air force units that possess nuclear projectiles or missiles and their associated control system.
- Command posts, observation posts, communications centers, and radar stations.
- Field artillery, tactical air force, and air defense units limited to conventional firepower.
- Reserve forces and logistics centers.
- Point targets that may jeopardize advancing Soviet forces, e.g., dug-in tanks, antitank guided missile emplacements, bunkers, and direct fire guns.

INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS

Essential to the success of Soviet REC objectives is the collection of accurate and timely intelligence. Soviet forces require knowledge of the enemy's electronic order of battle with details of operational procedures, equipment types, emission characteristics, and locations. Some technical intelligence information concerning US electronic equipment is obtained from open source material, such as technical manuals and field manuals. These manuals may include ways in which communications and electronics equipment is employed, transmitter power output, kinds of antennas normally used with different equipment, and frequency bandwidth. Other vital information is obtained by the reconnaissance, target acquisition, and intelligence assets available at the various command levels. Locating targets of specific interest to the REC effort is accomplished best through the use of electronic intercept and direction finding (DF) measures.

ELECTRONIC INTERCEPT AND DIRECTION FINDING

Radio intercept and radio direction finding are the primary means of gathering enemy intelligence

through electronic means. Radio intercept is the ability to monitor and understand message content, while radio direction finding is designed to locate transmitting stations. As demonstrated by Egyptian use of Soviet equipment during the October 1973 Middle East War, the Soviets have an extensive intercept capability for radio transmissions and radar emissions. Intercept units are moved forward immediately behind leading regiments and have the capability to intercept enemy transmissions within the following distances from the FEBA:

- Artillery ground radar - about 25 km
- VHF - about 40 km
- HF ground waves - about 80 km
- HF skywave - unlimited

These ranges are greatly extended when airborne intercept is employed.

Soviet ground based and airborne intercept equipment generally lacks the technical sophistication of the latest Western equipment, but is simple, rugged, and easy to maintain.

The Soviet DF capability is equivalent to that for intercept. Various types of mobile directional antenna systems can be used in a radio direction finding (RDF) role. Forward area mobile elements include a VHF tactical radio direction finder with an Adcock antenna, as well as the POLE DISH radar direction finder. Tactical FM radios operating on low power can be picked up by Soviet RDF units at distances in excess of 10 kilometers and high power signals detected at distances up to 40 kilometers. RDF operational accuracies are usually within ± 3.5 degrees.

* Direction finding is used—

To provide approximate locations of electronic emitters.

- To provide locations which, when applied with SIGINT, terrain analysis, or other means, can be refined to a target area of sufficient accuracy for artillery fires.

- To develop a "picture" of the battlefield which reveals the disposition and possible intentions of enemy units.

- To provide adequate locations for firing on most radars and jammers.

Because of the length of transmission, the peculiarity of their signal, and power output, jammers can be easily located and identified as targets for attack by suppressive fires. Ground radars, due to signal characteristics, may be located with greater precision than radio emitters, often within 50 to 200 meters. Information from DF resources is evaluated quickly, but usually requires further confirmation by other sources. DF targets within conventional artillery range, which are extremely perishable and considered to be a

serious threat, are given priority and engaged immediately.

The chart below illustrates Soviet ground-based electronic intercept and DF capabilities. About 25 seconds after the communications begin, the enemy targeting sequence can continue even if friendly communications cease. Accordingly, the danger point is reached when radio transmissions exceed 20 to 25 seconds.


Besides the targets located by direction finding, it is expected that others will be developed due to the

enemy's lax signal security and poor electronic counter-countermeasures.

ELECTRONIC COUNTERMEASURES (ECM)

REC doctrine establishes a requirement to jam at critical times enemy command and control and weapon system communications when they cannot be destroyed by firepower. Available equipment includes the R-330A and R-834 radio jammers. Additionally,

Intercept and Direction Finding



newer and more technically-advanced jammers are being deployed by Soviet ground forces. Radar jammers include the BRICK series of noise jammers.

Soviet technical writings concerning ECM have dealt with these missions:

- Jamming in support of air defense operations, suppressing radar bombing equipment, radio navigation equipment, and radio control links for air-to-surface missiles (ASMs) and surface-to-surface missiles (SSMs).
- Jamming in support of ground operations, suppressing nuclear delivery systems, radars, radio control links for ASMs and SSMs, command posts, and communications centers.

The principal means of jamming discussed in Soviet writings are—

- Radar jamming by using barrage and spot noise, pulse, chaff, and decoys.
- Electronic jamming of command guidance systems—using pulse and simulation techniques.
- Radio noise jamming of AM and FM signals.

Jamming targets will include the tactical air control system, which uses HF radios for immediate air requests, VHF-FM radios to link forward air controllers, and UHF radio links for strike control.

USE OF FIREPOWER

Integral to Soviet REC doctrine is the use of physical destruction means. Soviet forces can physically attack in three ways: indirect fire, ground attack, and air attack.

- *Indirect fire.* This includes artillery, mortars, rockets, and surface-to-surface missiles.
- *Ground attack.* The Soviets may attempt to destroy C³ elements by using special purpose forces, agent-saboteurs, airborne and heliborne forces, or other elements operating behind the front lines.
- *Air attack.* The Soviets may decide to attack with high performance aircraft or attack helicopters. Aircraft may use conventional ordnance (bombs, cluster bomb units (CBUs), rockets, cannon, or machine gun fire) or precision-guided munitions (smart bombs and ASMs).

Ground forces also may be used to plant a transmitter within the enemy perimeter for beacon bombing.

GROUND BASED EW CAPABILITIES

Electronic warfare units are found at various command levels from *front* down to division level. A typical *front* could include at least a radio and radar

intercept regiment, a radio intercept regiment, an air defense jamming regiment, and a radio jamming regiment. EW units available to the army commander normally would be of battalion size. Within the division, the EW capability is centered in the divisional reconnaissance battalion. The battalion can conduct limited intercept and direction finding, as well as traditional ground reconnaissance.

Based on Soviet historical experiences and their current capabilities, it appears that the destructive aspects of REC are emphasized near the FEBA, probably within the division. More elaborate applications of REC, such as large deception plans, would be prepared at army level, or higher, with subordinate divisions implementing them.

Front, army, and divisional artillery units also have an organic target acquisition capability. Generally, these units contain—

- Surveillance and weapon locating radars.
- Radar intercept and direction finding sets.
- Sound ranging equipment with a range of about 14 km from the FEBA.
- Flash spotting observation posts.

Some knowledge of Soviet ground-based EW capabilities has been derived from the Arab use of Soviet EW equipment during the October 1973 Middle East war. It is unlikely that the systems observed represented the full array of EW systems available to Soviet forces, nor were they the most modern. The EW means used by the Arabs against Israeli ground forces included—

- SIGINT monitoring of the clear text radio communications.
- Direction finding of radio transmissions for targeting.
- Barrage jamming to disrupt command channels.
- Intrusion to give false directions and orders.

AIRBORNE EW CAPABILITIES

Aviation supporting *front* operations includes support squadrons with aircraft equipped to conduct electronic warfare missions. These units can conduct electronic reconnaissance missions and ECM against radar, electronic guidance, and communications systems. The most common air ECM operations are spot or barrage jamming and dispensing chaff directed against enemy air defense early warning and fire control radars. *Frontal* aviation bombing operations will be protected or camouflaged by aircraft using ECM in either a stand-off or escort role. Jamming equipment, with an effective range up to 200 kilometers and covering frequencies used by NATO air

defense radars, is installed in these ECM aircraft. They also may eject chaff to achieve jamming, deception, and camouflage. Individual aircraft may carry self-screening jammers and chaff dispensers.

Various Soviet aircraft have variants that are dedicated to EW activities. Included are modified versions of the AN-12 CUB used for ECM and electronic intelligence (ELINT) collection, the COOT-A ECM or ELINT variant of the IL-18 transport which supposedly carries a side-looking airborne radar (SLAR), and fighter variants such as the MiG-21 FISHBED H with a center-line pod, and the MiG-25 FOXBAT, which carries five cameras and is believed to have a SLAR capability. There are also ECM versions of the Yak-28 BREWER (E-model) fixed-wing aircraft and the Mi-4 HOUND helicopter (C-model). The Mi-4 contains multiple antennas projecting from the front and rear of the cabin, and, on each side, communication jammers.

Airborne electronic reconnaissance platforms provide a much improved capability to intercept radio and radar signals more frequently and at greater distances than ground-based systems. These airborne electronic reconnaissance platforms are aimed at the detection and location of enemy battlefield surveillance radars, command posts, communication centers, and tactical nuclear delivery systems. They also are used in standoff or escort jamming roles.

Long-range EW aircraft include the BEAR D, BISON C, BADGER D, and BADGER F variants.

SEABORNE EW CAPABILITIES

From all indications, the Soviets are engaged in updating and expanding their naval EW capabilities. The auxiliary intelligence gatherers (AGI) perform the more overt functions and are the best known of all Soviet intelligence gathering activities. These vessels, many of which are basically trawlers, follow major NATO exercises. The AGI have increased in number from 4 in 1963 to 58 in 1981, and are used for collection of communication and electronic intelligence. Additionally, the Soviet fleet includes over 160 survey and research vessels, some of which could have electronic reconnaissance missions.

Naval aircraft are employed in long-range reconnaissance and ocean surveillance, with some aircraft equipped to provide midcourse target data for antiship missiles launched "over the horizon" from surface ships, submarines, and other aircraft. Reconnaissance aircraft now in use include about 50 of the larger Tu-95/BEAR D turbo-prop planes, about 100 twin-jet Tu-16/BADGER aircraft, and Tu-22/BLINDER jet aircraft that have a supersonic speed.

ELECTRONIC COUNTER-COUNTERMEASURES (ECCM)

The Soviet objective for ECCM is the satisfactory operation of their electronic equipment in the face of enemy disruption. Thus physical protection of the equipment is included, as well as other practices beyond the scope of western ECCM. Modern ECCM features have been designed into the newer air defense equipments used in the Yom Kippur War. However, the greatest emphasis has been on organizational and individual techniques that can be applied in the field.

Organizational ECCM Techniques

Physical destruction of the enemy jammer is an important ECCM technique. More traditional techniques involve changing operating schedules and call-signs, alternate use of different radars, skip-echelon communications, redundant communications links, and the use of high ground between radio-relay terminals and enemy territory. Operator ECCM training and discipline also are organizational functions carried out at all echelons. For example, air defense radar operators receive regular training in both chaff and active jamming environments.

Individual ECCM Techniques

Operators are drilled thoroughly in the use of their equipment and in built-in ECCM features. In many cases, operator initiative is expected to overcome the lack of complete ECCM circuitry. Operators can change power, modulation, and antenna direction as appropriate. Operators may initiate frequency changes, but obviously must remain under organizational control. Soviet military writings continually stress communications security (COMSEC) and operator awareness of equipment capabilities and limitations.

Antiradar Camouflage

The Soviets conceal military equipment against detection by ground, airborne, and shipborne radars by a technique called "antiradar camouflage." Depending on the radar visibility of the objects to be camouflaged, antiradar camouflaging is achieved by creating false targets or by blending into the terrain background those objects that might serve for orientation. Equipment may be concealed behind local features or by making use of the camouflaging properties of the ground relief. The Soviets use natural cover, timber, brush wood, metallic nets, and corner reflectors for radar camouflage. Mock-ups of military equipment also can be used as antiradar reflectors.

The Arab air defense system during the 1973 Middle East War provided an insight into the equipment and ECCM techniques of the Soviet forces. Their use displayed—

- *Signal security.* The radars of the SAM and AAA, which were moved forward to cover the initial assault, were kept silent until after the initiation of the assault.

- *Frequency spread.* Each of the diverse air defense systems operated within separate radar frequency bands, so that no one jamming system could operate simultaneously against all.

- *Frequency diversity.* Tracking and guidance radars were able to change frequencies to overcome jamming.

- *Multiple and interchangeable missile guidance systems.* Some systems worked on pulsed radar, others on continuous wave. Some of the radar tracking systems also possessed optical tracking for continued

operations in a high ECM environment. Other systems used infrared homing.

- *Mobility.* All tactical air defense systems were extremely mobile and capable of quick change of position after firing or being spotted by reconnaissance.

SATELLITES

About 70 percent of Soviet space systems serve a purely military role. Soviet military satellites perform a wide variety of reconnaissance and collection missions. Recent reconnaissance satellites have improved intelligence collection processing capabilities. ELINT satellites can lock onto intercepted signals to provide information concerning target location. Large area radar surveillance satellites have also been identified.

CHAPTER 16

NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL,
AND CHEMICAL WARFARE

The Soviets anticipate the use of nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) weapons, particularly nuclear and chemical. The Soviets have developed and fielded a wide range of NBC detection and warning devices, individual and collective protective equipment, and decontamination equipment that facilitates the continuation of combat operations despite the presence of contaminants. *The Soviet ground forces' capability to protect themselves against NBC weapons and to operate in contaminated environments is unmatched by any other military force in the world.* Another factor illustrating the Soviets' overall preparedness for combat operations in an NBC environment is the extensive psychological conditioning that is combined with NBC training. The Soviet soldier is conditioned to regard the employment of NBC weapons as a real possibility in modern warfare. He is further conditioned to regard an NBC environment not as a disastrous situation, but one in which well-trained and skillful troops can survive and which they can use to their advantage.

The Soviets readily admit that casualties would be considerable in any future war involving the use of NBC weapons. However, they insist that the timely use of protective equipment, correct employment of reconnaissance assets, and expeditious decontamination procedures can significantly reduce a combat unit's vulnerability.

During the last decade, the Soviets have steadily improved their capability for waging theater nuclear and chemical warfare, while significantly improving their conventional fire support capabilities. This force modernization has introduced a degree of flexibility previously unavailable to Soviet combined arms commanders and created multiple options for the employment of nuclear and chemical weapons. Consequently, the Soviets have examined the possibility of waging a theater conflict at different levels, with or without nuclear weapons. They have developed what would seem to be a more balanced view toward the complementary employment of nuclear and nonnuclear fire support.

Confident that they can fight decisively with or without nuclear weapons, the Soviets now consider that a major conflict may be nonnuclear for at least an initial period and may remain nonnuclear for the duration of the conflict in certain "peripheral" theaters. Despite the potential for a sustained period of conventional or nonnuclear combat, a theater conflict will be conducted under a "nuclear-scared" posture.

The Soviets classify both nuclear and chemical weapons as "weapons of mass destruction" relative to troop protective measures, but consider chemical munitions to be "conventional" weapons when discussing employment doctrine.

NUCLEAR WEAPONS

The Soviets classify nuclear weapons according to yield or explosive power and type of burst. Nuclear weapons are considered very high in explosive power if their yield is over 500 kilotons, high if between 100 and 500, medium if between 15 and 100, and low if up to 15 kilotons. Types of burst that may be employed are air, ground (surface), underground, and underwater.

Soviet training materials present detailed descriptions of the destruction factors associated with nuclear explosions—the shock wave, thermal and light radiation, initial (penetrating) radiation, and residual radioactive contamination of the ground. The Soviets attribute the bulk of a nuclear weapon's destructiveness to its shock wave, although the actual distribution of energy depends largely on the type of burst employed. Following an atmospheric explosion, for example, 50 percent of the resultant energy is said to be released through the shock wave. Thermal and light radiation accounts for 35 percent of the energy for such a blast; initial radiation, 5 percent; and fallout, 10 percent for those weapons employed in the ground burst mode.

In measuring both initial radiation and fallout, the Soviets use *roentgen* (r) as the standard unit of measurement of radiation absorbed dose. The Soviets prefer to measure radiation dosage in roentgens rather than rads and do not specify time periods for total exposure doses when discussing the various degrees of radiation sickness. One roentgen (r) equals 0.88 rads.

They state that a single dose of up to 50 r in the course of 4 days or a continuous dose of up to 100 r over 10 days is not considered dangerous. Doses greater than 100 r are said to cause radiation sickness. First-degree radiation sickness occurs when a total dose of 100 to 200 r is absorbed. The latency period lasts from 2 to 3 weeks, and symptoms include lethargy, nausea, and intermittent fever. First-degree radiation sickness is curable. Second-degree radiation sickness is caused by a total exposure dose of 200 to 300 r. The latency period lasts about 1 week, after which radiation induced symptoms appear. The symptoms are similar to those experienced with

first-degree radiation sickness but are more severe. Recovery takes about 2 months with good medical care. Third-degree radiation sickness is caused by a total exposure dose of 300 to 500 r. The latency period is only a few hours, and the symptoms are still more severe. With active medical treatment, recovery takes several months. A dose greater than 500 r is usually fatal. Radioactive contamination of an area, or fallout, is measured in roentgens per hour. According to the Soviets, an area is contaminated if 0.5 roentgens per hour or more is measured.

Besides the shock wave, thermal and light radiation, initial radiation, and fallout produced by nuclear weapons, the Soviets mention secondary effects such as fires and electromagnetic interference. Electromagnetic interference, or electromagnetic pulse (EMP), originates with the release of nuclear radiation. It is a pulse of short duration that covers most of the usable frequency band to a range greater than the other effects of the detonation. EMP can burn out unprotected electronic equipment such as data processing and intelligence equipment, weapons systems, and radars.

NUCLEAR OPERATIONS

Planning

Although the opening stages of an offensive are likely to be conventional, planning focuses on the necessity to counter enemy employment of nuclear weapons, to maintain the initiative and momentum of the offensive, and to maintain fire superiority over the enemy (pre-empt his strike). The fire plans for divisions and higher levels include contingency plans for nuclear strikes. At all stages nuclear delivery means will be surveyed in and target-ready to make a strike. The decision to initiate tactical nuclear warfare would be made at the highest level of government. The fire plan for the initial massive nuclear strike, as it would include strikes by the Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF), is probably developed at theater level and approved by the Supreme High Command. Employment authority for subsequent nuclear strikes probably is delegated to *front* and may be as low as army command level. The division chief of rocket troops and artillery (CRTA) submits recommendations for the subsequent employment of the division's nuclear and chemical weapons to the army commander for approval and integration into army and *front* fire support plans.

In deliberately planned operations, nuclear fires are planned in detail. In more mobile situations, as in meeting engagements, exploitation, and pursuit, some

nuclear weapon systems are kept in high readiness to fire on targets of opportunity.

Soviet target analysts favor airbursts and use larger yields than their US counterparts. Strikes near the FEBA are to be followed up by maneuver forces as closely as safety and circumstances permit. Deep strikes may be exploited with the use of airborne troops.

Nuclear allocations vary with the strength of the enemy defense and the scheme of maneuver. A main attack probably receives the highest percentage of weapons; however, weapons also might be reserved for other large, important targets.

Targeting

Soviet nuclear delivery systems that threaten the European theater include intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBM) and medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBM) stationed in the Soviet Union. They also include aircraft from both strategic and *frontal* aviation, rockets and surface-to-surface missiles with ranges from 70 to 900 kilometers, and 203-mm howitzers and 240-mm mortars.

The following targets are considered suitable for employment of tactical nuclear strikes:

- Enemy nuclear-delivery means—air, artillery, missiles, and rockets. (These receive the highest priority.)
- Headquarters of division and higher levels.
- Prepared defensive positions.
- Reserves and troop concentrations.
- Supply installations, especially nuclear ammunition storage points.
- Communication centers.

Soviet targeting analysts work on the assumption of high reliability of nuclear delivery means. They usually rely on one device per target. If a target is considered to require more than one nuclear device, coverage will be overlapping.

The suitability of targets is determined by their priority category, missions, the current tactical situation, and the nuclear weapons available for use.

Offensive Employment

Once the decision to release nuclear weapons is made, their use is governed by two principles: mass and surprise. The initial nuclear strike will be accomplished suddenly, throughout the depth of the enemy's combat deployment, and in coordination with non-nuclear fires. Initial nuclear strike objectives are—

- To destroy the enemy's main combat formations and his command and control system.

- To destroy the enemy's nuclear weapons.
- To isolate the battlefield.
- To breach the enemy's main line of defense and define the main axes of attack.

Nuclear fires are employed to support the main attack while other fire support means support secondary or supporting attacks. The enemy's forward defenses are targeted and destroyed rather than avoided and bypassed. Nuclear strikes in effect are the main attack. These strikes then are exploited by a high-speed air and ground offensive.

Subsequent nuclear strikes are integrated with the maneuver and fire support plans and employed to re-initiate an offensive that has been slowed or stopped by organized enemy resistance. Nuclear strikes also may be used to eliminate the threat of a counterattack and to clear resistance from the opposite bank in a river crossing. In pursuit, nuclear strikes are planned on "choke points" when retreating enemy forces present lucrative targets.

Defensive Employment

If an enemy offensive can be severely degraded by the impact of nuclear weapons, the defender may gain the opportunity to switch quickly to an offensive role. This drastic change in force correlation is sought when nuclear weapons are employed on the defense. Primary uses are—

- Destruction of enemy nuclear delivery means.
- Destruction of main attacking groups.
- Counterpreparations.
- Elimination of penetrations.
- Support of counterattacks.
- Denial of areas to the enemy by use of surface bursts.

Radiologically contaminated barriers produced by surface or subsurface bursts may be used to prohibit or slow the advancing enemy and to canalize large elements into pockets to become a nuclear target.

BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

Since the summer of 1979, information has been obtained from a variety of sources that presents evidence of an inadvertent release of anthrax bacteria from a highly secured military installation in Sverdlovsk. The available information and US technical analysis point strongly to biological research and development activities that exceed those normally expected for biological warfare protection purposes.

If biological weapons are employed, they would probably be targeted against rear area objectives such

as food supplies, water sources, troop concentrations, convoys, and urban and rural population centers rather than against front line forces. The Soviets realize that if biological agents are employed against such targets, they could seriously disrupt and degrade mobilization plans as well as the subsequent conduct of a war. Some biological agents are extremely persistent, retaining their capabilities to infect for days, weeks, or longer. The prolonged incubation period makes it difficult to track down the initial location and circumstances of contamination.

Biological weapons consist of pathogenic microbes and the toxins caused by micro-organisms, both of which are intended to incapacitate or kill people or animals and destroy plants, food supplies, or material. Almost a thousand different types of pathogenic micro-organisms are known to exist; however, not all of them are adaptable for use in warfare as biological weapons. Micro-organisms are classified as bacteria, viruses, rickettsia, or fungi. Bacteria, which are resistant to both low temperatures and freezing, cause diseases such as bubonic plague, cholera, and anthrax. Viruses are responsible for smallpox, variants of encephalitis, and yellow fever. Rickettsia, bacteria-like micro-organisms which are found living as parasites in arthropods, can cause certain human diseases such as rocky mountain spotted fever. Fungi are similar to bacteria in that both exist in plants; however, fungi have a more highly developed structure. Toxins are a class of highly active poisons produced as a naturally occurring by-product of some living organisms, or through a chemical production method. A few well-known diseases that are produced by toxins include botulism, tetanus, and diphtheria. Toxins can retain their potency for many weeks and, in some cases, for months. Available delivery means mentioned by the Soviets include rockets, artillery shells, mines, air-dropped packets, aircraft sprayers, saboteurs, and infected insects and rodents.

There is a degree of danger inherent in the use of some pathogenic microbes because of the difficulty or near impossibility involved in controlling an epidemic caused by them. Some pathogenic microbes and toxins derived from microbes are not contagious, while other microbes cannot be transmitted without a suitable vector.

CHEMICAL WEAPONS

The armed forces of the Soviet Union are better equipped, structured, and trained than any other military force in the world to conduct offensive and defensive chemical warfare. Although the Soviets are aware

of their overwhelming advantage, they continue to steadily improve their chemical warfare capabilities. Much of their training revolves around the use of lethal agents. Reports from Afghanistan and Southeast Asia show the Soviet's willingness to use chemical agents when it is to their advantage.

The basic Soviet principle of chemical warfare is to achieve surprise. They would use massive quantities of chemical agents against unprotected troops or equipment. Chemical agents also may be used to restrict the use of terrain.

Initially, the use of chemical weapons may be subject to the same level of decision as nuclear weapons, but they are likely to be used more freely once the initial authority for employment has been given. In a nuclear war, chemical weapons are used to complement nuclear weapons. However, they may be used in a non-nuclear environment against an enemy whose chemical defenses are weak or where their use would be particularly advantageous.

Airfields, nuclear storage sites, and nuclear delivery systems are targets for chemical attacks since such targets can be neutralized without the necessity of pinpoint strikes. Also, contamination of key points along rear area lines of communication can seriously disrupt rear area resupply and reinforcement, while simultaneously keeping those points intact for subsequent use by attacking Soviet forces.

In the offense, other likely chemical targets are—

- Troops occupying defensive positions across the front of a Soviet attack. The troops may be neutralized by nonpersistent agents delivered by multiple rocket launchers.
- Nuclear delivery systems, troop concentration areas, headquarters, and artillery positions. All types of chemical agents delivered by field guns, multiple rocket launchers, missiles, and aircraft are the most likely.
- Bypassed pockets of resistance which pose a threat to the flanks or rear of attacking forces. Defending troops can be attacked directly or their movement restricted by contamination.

In defense, persistent chemical agents are employed to deny the enemy use of certain terrain and to canalize attacking forces. Chemical agents are employed against an attacking force to impede effective command and control and to destroy the momentum of the attack by causing the attacking troops to adopt protective measures.

The Soviets have a variety of systems capable of chemical delivery. They include aircraft, multiple rocket launchers, artillery, mines, rockets, and missiles.

The Soviets classify chemical agents according to the effect they have on the organism. They identify six major types: nerve, blood, blister, choking, psychochemical, and irritant. Nerve agents are fast-acting chemical agents. Practically odorless and colorless, they attack the body's nervous system causing convulsions and eventually death. A fatal dose consists of only 2 to 10 milligrams. Nerve agents are further classified as either G or V agents. G agents were developed in Germany before and during World War II and include the agents Tabun, Sarin, and Soman. The V agents are quicker acting and more persistent than the G agents. Blood agents cause death by blocking the oxygen transferral mechanisms in the body. A common blood agent is hydrogen cyanide.

Blister agents, such as mustard (H) or lewisite (L) and combinations of the two compounds, can disable or kill after contact with the skin, or after being inhaled into the lungs or ingested. Contact with the skin can cause painful blisters or blindness after eye contact. These agents are especially lethal if inhaled. Incapacitants disrupt a victim's mental and physical capabilities. Consciousness may not be lost, however, and the effects usually wear off without leaving permanent physical injuries. Irritants, also known as riot-control agents, cause a strong burning sensation in the eyes, mouth, skin, and respiratory tract. The effects of these agents, the best known being tear gas, are also temporary. Victims recover completely without having any serious aftereffects.

Chemical agents are categorized as persistent or nonpersistent. Persistent agents, such as V-agents, some G-agents, and the blister agent mustard, can retain their disabling or lethal characteristics depending on environmental conditions for days, weeks, and in some cases, years. Nonpersistent agents generally last a shorter period of time, depending on weather conditions. Soviet military writings indicate that nonpersistent agents would be used across the front of a Soviet attack before a combat engagement. Persistent agents would be used deep within the enemy's rear and along troop flanks to protect advancing units.

The Soviets possess antidotes for protection from agents of potential adversaries as well as their own. They have developed and fielded an antidote for soman, which is an agent they possess but is not in the US inventory.

Chemical agents believed to be in the Soviet inventory include the agents described in the chart at right. Stockpiles of chemical agents greatly exceed those available to the West and are sufficient to sustain large scale use.

Chemical Agents Reportedly Stockpiled by the Soviet Union

TYPE OF AGENT	SYMBOL/NAME	SYMPTOMS IN MAN	EFFECTS ON MAN	RATE OF ACTION
NERVE	G Series GB/Sarin GD/Soman (VR 55)	Difficult breathing, sweating, drooling, nausea, vomiting convulsions, and dim vision.	At low concentrations, incapacitates; kills if inhaled or absorbed through the skin.	Very rapid by inhalation; slower through skin.
	V Agent		Incapacitates; kills if contaminated skin is not decontaminated rapidly.	Delayed through skin; more rapid through eyes.
BLOOD	AC/Hydrogen cyanide	Rapid breathing, convulsions, coma, and death.	Incapacitates; kills if high concentration is inhaled.	Rapid.
BLISTER	HD/Mustard HN/Nitrogen Mustard L/Lewisite HL/Mustard and Lewisite CX/Phosgene Oxime	Mustard; nitrogen mustard-no early symptoms. Lewisite and mustard-searing of eyes and stinging of skin. Phosgene oxime-powerful irritation of eyes, nose and skin.	Blisters skin and respiratory tract; can cause temporary blindness. Some agents sting and form wheals on skin.	Blister delayed hours to days; eye effects more rapid. Mustard lewisite and phosgene oxime very rapid.
INCAPACITANT	None known, but a sleep inducer has been reported in Afghanistan.	Slowing of mental and physical activity; disorientation and sleep.	Temporarily incapacitates.	Unknown.
IRRITANT	DA/Diphenylchloroarsine DM/Adamsite CN/Chloroacetophenone CS/O-Chlorobenzalmonitrile PS/Chloropicrin	Causes tears, irritates skin and respiratory tract.	Incapacitates, non-lethal.	Very rapid.

SOVIET PROTECTION AND WARNING EQUIPMENT

Most Soviet NBC equipment is dependable and apparently in good supply. Some of it, as in the case of the electrically fired warning flag dispenser, is rather ingenious. However, other pieces of protective NBC equipment have drawbacks. One deficiency is the low level of human engineering that is applied to their general design. An additional shortcoming is the potential effect of weather on chemical and radiation reconnaissance instruments, which are calibrated for

optimal use within rather narrow ranges of temperature (-40 degrees to +40 degrees C) and humidity (50 to 80 percent). In winter, the instruments are warmed up chemically or electrically before use. The present inventory of NBC equipment includes, but is not limited to, detection and warning devices, individual and collective protective equipment, and decontamination equipment. For information concerning individual items of equipment, see FM 100-2-3.

CHEMICAL DEFENSE TROOPS

There are approximately 80,000 to 100,000 fulltime NBC defense personnel in the Soviet ground forces. Although they are designated "chemical defense troops," their responsibilities also include protection against the effects of nuclear and biological weapons. Like engineer and signal forces, chemical defense troops are considered a vital element of combat support. Although all troop branches of the ground forces can be assigned to perform certain NBC protection-related activities, chemical defense troops are tasked with primary responsibility for insuring that combat units function as capably as possible in an NBC environment.

Chemical defense troops have two primary missions: NBC reconnaissance and NBC decontamination. Their basic missions include—

- Reconnoitering known or likely areas of NBC contamination.
- Warning troops of the presence of NBC contamination.
- Monitoring changes in the degree of contamination of troops positions.
- Monitoring the NBC contamination of personnel, weapons, and equipment.
- Performing decontamination of personnel, weapons, clothing, equipment, vehicles, troop positions, and sections of roads.

The basic chemical defense unit is the chemical defense company which is organic to tank and motorized rifle regiments. The company has an authorized strength of 35 to 50 personnel. At division level, there is a chemical defense battalion with an authorized personnel strength of approximately 200 men. A chemical defense battalion is also organic to each combined arms and tank army. These battalions are larger than the ones organic to divisions and at full strength consist of several hundred personnel. The largest chemical defense troop unit is the chemical defense brigade subordinate to military districts and probably subordinate to Soviet groups of forces stationed in non-Soviet Warsaw Pact nations.

The reconnaissance and decontamination elements of chemical defense units are rarely employed as whole units. Commanders from military districts through regiments usually divide their chemical defense assets and assign them to their various maneuver units in a direct support role. No chemical defense units are subordinate to maneuver battalions or companies. However, each tank and motorized rifle company has an NBC noncommissioned officer heading a small team of extra duty NBC specialists. Company- and battalion-level NBC specialists are capable of checking unit NBC equipment and conducting NBC training.

They also help decontaminate personnel and equipment and perform limited NBC reconnaissance when regimental NBC support is unavailable.

NBC TRAINING

Training of Soviet ground forces in NBC defense is comprehensive and realistic. It covers recognition and detection of NBC agents, operation of NBC measuring and monitoring instruments, procedures for warning troops of NBC attack, self-protection, self-administration of antidotes, and decontamination. Realism is emphasized to the extent that live, albeit diluted, agents are occasionally used during training exercises.

NBC protective training actually starts long before a conscript enters military service. Soviet citizens are required to attend civil defense instruction as early as the second grade. This instruction takes place during the years of formal education and continues at factories and collective farms. Also, youth organizations such as the Pioneers, *Komsomol*, and DOSAAF teach NBC defense subjects. So when the typical Soviet male is drafted, he already knows how to use a protective mask. He is familiar with the effects of NBC weapons and knows correct procedures for protecting himself.

Ground forces' training programs integrate NBC defense with other training. NBC training is conducted along with firing exercises, tactical problems, field exercises, and specialist—such as engineer—training. While qualifying at a rifle range, troops frequently are required to wear their protective suits and masks. During tactical drills, such as penetration of an enemy defensive position, NBC attacks are simulated. Personnel receive orders to don protective gear, to button up inside combat vehicles, and take other appropriate actions. Following completion of their mission, exercise personnel decontaminate weapons, equipment, and themselves. During engineer training, ground forces combat troops learn to perform engineer duties required in a NBC environment. Such duties include upgrading personnel shelters to provide for NBC defense and clearing rubble and obstructions following a nuclear blast.

Premilitary Training

The 1967 Soviet Law on Universal Military Service instituted a program of premilitary training for Soviet youth, both boys and girls. This training takes place in general education schools, technical-vocational schools, factories, and collective farms. Premilitary training consists of 140 hours of instruction. Civil

defense, and particularly NBC defense, subjects account for 35 of the 140 hours of instruction. Although premilitary training in schools normally begins with the ninth grade, Soviet youth receive limited NBC training, primarily consisting of protective mask drills, in the second and fifth grades as well.

Premilitary training in NBC defense consists of both theoretical and practical instruction, with the practical accounting for more than half of the training received. Theoretical training includes classes on the types of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons found in foreign armies; their physical properties and means of employment; and the effects of weather and terrain on their employment. During practical instruction conducted in classrooms and on training fields, youths learn how to defend themselves against NBC weapons, construct shelters and slit trenches, administer first aid for NBC-related wounds, use NBC protective masks, conduct reconnaissance and rescue work in contaminated areas, and decontaminate personnel and equipment.

Besides premilitary instruction at school and on the job, Soviet youth must attend a summer camp for about 5 days. These camps emphasize field training in the same military subjects taught previously in schools, factories, and collective farms. Instruction in NBC defense equipment and procedures is an important part of the program. The camps normally are set up at training areas of nearby military units. Trainees compete with one another in a program that is closely integrated with a physical fitness program. Those who excel are awarded badges.

Besides the NBC portion of the required 140 hours of premilitary instruction, Soviet youths receive NBC defense training through voluntary participation in the activities of DOSAAF, *Komsomol*, and Pioneers. The annual military games (known as *Zarnitsa* and *Orlenok*) conducted by the Pioneers and *Komsomol*, respectively, also provide NBC defense training for Soviet youths before induction. (More information on DOSAAF, *Komsomol*, and Pioneers can be found in *FM 100-2-2*.)

Unit Training

Following basic training and on assignment to a unit, a Soviet soldier's training builds from simple to complex and from theory to practice. This is particularly true of NBC defense training, which begins with theoretical classroom instruction on NBC weapons and how to defend against them. It continues with training drills conducted both in classrooms and at specially equipped field training sites where troops

rehearse individual training topics. This three-tiered training program culminates with field exercises aimed at testing ground force capability to perform in an NBC environment.

The chemical service chiefs of regiments and divisions plan and supervise NBC defense training. At battalion, a chemical instructor, probably a warrant officer or NCO, performs this function.

Theory. Theoretical instruction normally is given by platoon commanders and begins in classrooms with lectures on the physical properties and effects of chemical and biological agents and nuclear explosions. Trainees also learn how weather and terrain influence the use of NBC weapons and the persistent contamination of various objects by NBC agents. Instructors familiarize troops with the types of NBC weapons found in military organizations of the West and their methods of employment. Training aids include posters depicting the various stages of a nuclear blast, mockups of munitions used to disseminate chemical and biological agents, and film strips depicting the effects of NBC weapons.

During classroom sessions, information on the destructive characteristics of NBC weapons is balanced with instruction on protective aspects of the terrain, man-made shelters, and defensive NBC equipment. While Soviet soldiers are taught to respect the destructive power of NBC weapons, they are also indoctrinated against viewing combat in an NBC environment as hopeless. For example, while studying the characteristics of the shockwave and fallout of a nuclear burst, trainees also learn that the nature and number of troop casualties depend on their position and degree of protection at the moment of blast, distance from the burst, and yield of the weapon.

Training Drills. Following classroom instruction, soldiers participate in drills to practice putting on protective masks and protective suits, administering antidotes, and decontaminating themselves and their equipment. Specific drills are performed until proficiency is attained. Later, during the tactical exercise phase of the training program, all the various NBC defense measures are practiced. When participating in the drills, troops normally train by squads and the entire training effort is led by platoon commanders. The soldiers are tested on their performance within specified time limits. They also are evaluated on the length of time that they are able to wear a mask and protective suit while performing routine military tasks such as marching, loading equipment, firing weapons, and working with various types of instruments.

Field Exercises. After attaining the necessary level of competence, personnel are ready for the third stage of NBC defense training: the performance of NBC defense measures during field exercises. During exercises such as an attack against a fortified position, motorized rifle troops are made to cross simulated zones of contamination in full protective gear, to perform decontamination of weapons and equipment, and to practice the administration of chemical agent antidotes. Occasionally exercises are conducted with training type agents.

During a march, simulated NBC attacks frequently occur and subunits are forced to react accordingly. They disperse along the road at specified intervals, cross "contaminated" zones while observing correct NBC defense measures, conduct brief halts to perform limited decontamination, and then continue their advance. Troops don masks and protective suits while on the march and during the conduct of firing training.

During tactical exercises conducted under simulated NBC conditions, maximum use is made of available training aids and actual equipment to heighten realism. Mockups of destroyed combat vehicles obstruct march routes. Detonated minefields produce craters to hinder cross-country movement. Smoke-producing demolitions simulate nuclear clouds of nuclear attacks. Soldiers are notified of NBC attacks and contaminated areas as they would be during actual combat by preestablished signals over radios and by flares. During decontamination procedures, troops train with actual equipment. Combat troops also train jointly with chemical defense units during exercises that involve the decontamination of heavy equipment.

Training of Chemical Defense Troops

Soldiers assigned to chemical defense units of the ground forces also undergo a three-tiered training program in NBC defense. However, NBC defense training given to chemical defense troops is more detailed and wider in scope than that presented to regular ground force troops.

Following classroom instruction, chemical defense troops are divided into groups according to specialty and taken to training areas where they practice their particular skills. When training with a large and complex piece of equipment, such as a DDA decontamination station, experienced service personnel first demonstrate how to set it up and put it into operation. Then the trainees themselves do the work sequentially at a slow pace. After chemical defense trainees acquire competence in individual

tasks, they perform the drill at a normal pace without interruption within a prescribed time limit. Next, they learn to work with their instruments in complicated conditions, such as while wearing NBC protective gear. Once proficiency is attained in this manner on a particular piece of equipment, cross-training within crews and between squads is practiced.

The third step in the training cycle is the performance of NBC specialist tasks within the framework of a tactical situation. While in the field, chemical defense exercises include—

- Reconnoitering "contaminated" areas of terrain.
- Measuring the intensity of "contamination" and posting warning signs.
- Transmitting NBC reconnaissance data by radio.
- Performing decontamination of vehicles, personnel, and equipment.

Like other ground forces elements, chemical defense personnel participate in competitions at the end of the training year.

In combat, chemical defense troop units would be divided. They would provide support directly to combat units. To train for such a role, chemical defense troops participate in the field training exercises of motorized rifle and tank units. Accordingly, NBC reconnaissance specialists constitute part of a forward detachment or advance guard of motorized rifle and tank units conducting march and offensive training. Decontamination units often set up their stations and practice decontamination of troops.

Training of Chemical Defense Officers

Some officers assigned to the chemical defense troops are graduates of officer training programs in civilian educational institutions, although most are trained at commissioning schools similar in many respects to US military academies. The Soviets presently maintain three service schools for chemical defense officers: the Saratov Higher Military Engineer School of Chemical Defense, the Tambov, and the Kostroma Higher Military Command Schools of Chemical Defense. All three provide students with a general military education as well as specialist training in NBC defense. The Saratov school involves a 5-year curriculum and trains cadets in engineering for technical positions in the chemical defense troops. Graduates are commissioned as lieutenant-engineers and are qualified as chemical engineers. The Tambov and Kostroma institutions are 4-year schools that train officers for command positions in the chemical defense troops. Graduates receive the rank of lieutenant.

After an officer has served a number of years in a chemical defense unit, he is eligible for further schooling in his specialty at the Timoshenko Military Academy for Chemical Defense located in Moscow. Applicants must have graduated from a higher military school, such as the Tambov, Saratov, and Kostroma schools; have at least 2 years of practical troop experience; and pass an entrance examination. Applicants who are not accepted for resident study may apply for a correspondence program. Most officers who attend the academy are senior captains and majors. Successful completion of the course is a prerequisite to further advancement.

PROTECTIVE MEASURES

Basic tactical measures for protection against NBC weapons include dispersion, rapid movement, deception, and camouflage. Other measures call for continuous contact with the enemy ("hugging") or withdrawal from expected nuclear target areas.

NBC Protective Equipment

Basic personal protective measures begin with NBC protective equipment. Such protective equipment issued to the ground forces, when used correctly and in combination, provides protection against harmful agents that attack through both the respiratory system and the skin. They also reduce the degree of injury caused by thermal and light radiation emitted during a nuclear explosion. More important, Soviet NBC protective equipment enables combat troops to operate on contaminated terrain, which allows the continuous conduct of combat operations. Troops don their protective masks and cover themselves with their protective capes the instant of an NBC attack. They don their protective suits, gloves, and boots to the degree required after the agents settle.

Troops normally are notified of an NBC attack or contaminated areas by chemical observers who make use of preselected signals: flares and radio transmission of codewords. The warning then is passed on by voice and vehicle horns. Troops having firsthand knowledge of an NBC attack or contaminated area take appropriate action immediately, without awaiting the signal or an order to do so. Vehicles with troops riding in open beds or on top of them stop briefly to allow the troops to don their protective masks and capes.

Depending on the location of troops, the circumstances surrounding an NBC attack, and the type of agent employed, various protective measures are adopted, either separately or in combination.

A significant characteristic of most NBC protective suits, including Soviet models, is the physical burden associated with prolonged wear, especially in warm temperatures. The suits are bulky and uncomfortable. When worn fully buttoned-up for an extended period of time in hot weather, soldiers become fatigued quickly and combat efficiency is lowered. In some cases, heat prostration may result. Accordingly, the Soviets have devised norms stipulating desired maximum lengths of time for various temperature ranges for wearing NBC protective suits.

Wearing Periods for NBC Protective Suits

TEMPERATURE (CENTIGRADE)	MAXIMUM TIME SPENT IN PROTECTIVE SUIT
30° and above	15 to 20 minutes
25° to 29°	Up to 30 minutes
20° to 24°	40 to 50 minutes
15° to 19°	1.5 to 2 hours
Below 15°	More than 3 hours

The Soviets use these norms as guidelines only, realizing that certain situations may require troops to wear protective suits beyond desired maximum times. In most chemical environments, troops leave the bottom of the protective suit unbuttoned to reduce the heat load.

Besides intensification of training, the Soviets advocate the use of collective protection systems, such as shelters and combat vehicles equipped with filter and ventilation systems. When riding in non-NBC protected combat vehicles, personnel need only don protective masks during an NBC attack or when crossing contaminated terrain. They do not need to wear protective suits, masks, gloves, or boots when riding inside NBC protected vehicles. One drawback of collective protection systems is that personnel exiting a shelter or vehicle cannot return until they completely decontaminate or remove their protective clothing to avoid contaminating the inside of the shelter or vehicle.

NBC Reconnaissance

This is performed by chemical defense personnel assigned to reconnaissance elements of chemical defense units. NBC reconnaissance involves two general types of activity—NBC observation posts and NBC reconnaissance patrolling.

Although normally staffed with chemical defense specialists, NBC observation posts can be manned by combat troops who have received special training. The functions of NBC observation posts are to detect NBC contamination, to determine radiation levels and types of toxic substances, to monitor the drift of radioactive clouds, to notify higher headquarters of NBC information, as well as meteorological data, and to give the general alarm to threatened troops. An NBC observation post normally consists of three or four observers located near the command post of a combat unit. During movement, the NBC observation post moves in its own vehicle in close proximity to the combat unit commander.

On detecting NBC contamination, the observers measure the intensity of radioactivity or determine the type of chemical or biological agent and report this information to the supported commander. The commander plots the information on his map and reports to the next higher headquarters. NBC reconnaissance posts report directly to the supported commander rather than to the commander of their chemical defense unit. To accelerate the transmission of information, a standardized radio message is used.

In the event of an enemy nuclear attack, observers switch on their detection instruments immediately after the shock wave passes. The observers estimate the type and location of the burst and the direction of movement of the contaminated cloud. They then give the general warning and notify the unit commander.

When operating in chemical reconnaissance patrols, chemical defense personnel travel in reconnaissance vehicles specially equipped with NBC detection and warning devices. The Soviets also have experimented with the use of helicopters to perform NBC reconnaissance. Helicopters equipped with chemical and radiological area survey instruments are particularly useful for performing reconnaissance of areas with extremely high contamination levels. Helicopters also aid in screening large areas of terrain when time is limited.

The reconnaissance assets of chemical defense units, such as the chemical reconnaissance platoon of a chemical defense company, can reconnoiter a large contaminated area or be divided into squads and attached to combat units to perform reconnaissance of multiple routes. Before starting a mission, a chemical reconnaissance patrol receives the following information from the chemical reconnaissance platoon leader:

- Enemy situation, route(s) or area to be reconnoitered.
- Times for beginning and completing the reconnaissance; to what point, line, or level of radiation to conduct the reconnaissance.

- Procedures for submitting reports and messages.
- Interval for switching on detection instruments.
- Signals to be used for warning troops of contamination or enemy NBC attack.
- Location of the assembly area to be occupied by the patrol following completion of the reconnaissance mission.

Before a patrol begins its mission, personnel check their individual NBC protection equipment and detection instruments. They also examine the NBC and communication equipment located on their reconnaissance vehicle. As they begin their reconnaissance, patrol members don their individual protective gear.

If only one route is to be covered, it is divided into 1 to 2 kilometer segments and reconnoitered by the patrols in leapfrog fashion. When performing NBC reconnaissance of multiple routes, one patrol is assigned to each route. If NBC reconnaissance is being conducted in support of a march, the patrol operates well in front of the main body. The patrol may operate as part of a forward security element or combat reconnaissance patrol, or it may move along a separate route. The patrol leader normally makes reports to the maneuver unit commander for every 2 or 3 kilometers of route his patrol reconnoiters.

As a patrol performs its mission, a designated crewman constantly observes the readings of the onboard NBC survey meters. If radioactive or chemical contamination is discovered, the patrol immediately determines the radiation level or type of toxic substance present. The patrol leader plots contaminated areas on his map, reports to his commander, and orders his patrol to mark the contaminated areas with warning flags that are dispensed mechanically from a device mounted on the rear of the reconnaissance vehicle. The patrol designates bypass routes around contaminated areas or finds routes through the area with the lowest levels of contamination.

In the event of nuclear contamination, bypass routes normally are sought when radioactivity encountered by a patrol measures above 30 roentgens per hour. Otherwise, routes normally are found through the contaminated area that have the lowest levels of contamination. When establishing bypass routes, a patrol returns to the assigned routes as soon as practicable.

On completion of its mission, an NBC reconnaissance patrol moves to its assigned assembly area, where final reports are made and patrol members are debriefed. Patrol members also decontaminate themselves, their individual NBC protective gear, and their vehicle and its equipment.

Decontamination Procedures

Soviet doctrine prescribes that in the event of contamination, a combat unit should conduct a partial decontamination with organic equipment and solutions no later than one hour after having been subjected to NBC contamination. This entails a brief halt while troops decontaminate themselves and their clothing, their individual weapons, crew-served weapons, and combat vehicles. If a unit is forced to conduct partial decontamination in the contaminated area, personnel remain in NBC protective gear while doing so. Following the completion of partial decontamination, the unit immediately resumes its mission. After a unit accomplishes its mission, but no later than 5 hours from the time of contamination, it should undergo complete decontamination of personnel, clothing, NBC protective gear, armament, and equipment.

Complete decontamination of a maneuver unit is performed by chemical defense troops. As with

chemical reconnaissance elements, decontamination units of chemical defense companies and battalions can operate either as a whole or in smaller elements. Decontamination units deploy to areas where contaminated combat units are located. They set up near movement routes or establish centrally located decontamination points to serve several troop units.


Before deploying his equipment, the commander of a decontamination unit dispatches a reconnaissance group to select a favorable site, mark off areas with pegs for setting up the various pieces of equipment, and establish and mark routes of entry and exit for the site. Sites are selected that provide natural concealment, good approach routes, terrain protection, and sources of uncontaminated water. After decontamination stations are set up, the decontamination unit commander orders security measures against enemy observation or attack. This normally includes making use of natural concealment, employing camouflage,

and digging trenches. If natural concealment is insufficient, a smokescreen may be generated. Luminous markers are emplaced to guide troops of contaminated units to the decontamination stations.

Crews remain in their vehicles while the vehicles are decontaminated. To decontaminate their vehicles, operators drive in columns past two TMS-65s, one located on each side of the road, operated by chemical defense troops. If TMS-65s are not available, ARS-12s or 14s may be used, although they are not as fast as the TMS-65s. After decontamination, each vehicle is checked for any remaining contamination.

Troops then proceed to the personnel decontamination stations, which are set up in tents. The major piece of equipment used to supply warm water for showers and to decontaminate clothing is the DDA-53 or DDA-66 steam chamber vehicle. (More information on decontamination equipment can be found in FM 100-2-3.)

Movement of Personnel for Decontamination



Foldout for 16-11

16-11

COMBAT IN AN NBC ENVIRONMENT

A maneuver unit commander receives much of his initial information regarding the NBC situation in combat orders issued by a higher unit. He supplements this information with intelligence acquired by his own reconnaissance assets. As he makes his estimate of the situation, he considers:

- Effects of the present NBC situation on organization of forces for combat; influence of possible enemy use of NBC weapons.
- Condition of NBC protective equipment, concealment and cover in the area of activity
- Meteorological conditions that might influence the movement of contamination.

Based on his estimate, the commander issues instructions to his subordinates. These instructions include missions for attached and organic NBC reconnaissance elements, special measures to be taken while crossing contaminated terrain, the subunits responsible for conducting rescue work in the event of enemy NBC attack, and signals to be used for warning of the enemy NBC attack.

Two different sets of NBC warning signals normally are designated—one for nuclear attack or contaminated area encountered and one for chemical or biological agent situations. If an NBC warning signal is given on a march or during an attack, exposed troops must halt to don protective masks and protective suits and then continue their mission. NBC protective gear is removed only on the commander's order.

Once subjected to an NBC situation, the commander is required to make periodic reports regarding his unit's exposure to contamination. Reports include the amount of contamination received by platoons as a whole and by officers individually. If exceptionally high levels of contamination are experienced, reports are made immediately.

If a unit is subjected to an enemy NBC strike, the commander organizes reconnaissance of the area of destruction or contamination, restores communications, and orders predesignated subunits to begin rescue operations. In addition, he reports losses to his superior and appoints replacement commanders.

Actions During the March

Before conducting a march, the commander issues his march order, which designates those subunits assigned to conduct NBC reconnaissance, signals used to warn of NBC attack or contaminated areas, and recovery procedures following an NBC attack. The following is an example of a motorized rifle battalion commander's instructions regarding NBC aspects of a march:

Commander's Orders in an NBC Situation

During the march, a chemical reconnaissance squad will advance with the combat reconnaissance patrol. The chemical reconnaissance squad is responsible for marking contaminated areas and measuring intensity levels of contamination. Communications with the squad will be through the commander of the combat reconnaissance patrol. A chemical observation post will be established at the battalion command post, and chemical observers will be assigned to the companies.

The NBC warning signals are a red flare shot into the air and the word *Groza* transmitted over the radio.

On my order, antiradiation tablets* are to be taken by personnel.

Contaminated areas will be crossed at maximum speed and with troops in NBC protective gear. Distance between vehicles during transit will be 100 meters.

* Soviet antiradiation tablets are contained in individual medical kits. The Soviets have fielded a number of different types of tablets, some of which are mildly effective or are of very little benefit. At most, the tablets can only treat initial symptoms of radiation sickness, such as headaches, dizziness, and nausea.

The Offense

If a force occupies an assembly area before initiation of an attack, personnel and equipment are dispersed to ensure maximum protection against enemy use of NBC weapons. A distance of 50 meters is prescribed for vehicle intervals. Companies are separated by at least 1.5 kilometers. Commanders notify subordinates of NBC warning signals and the measures to be taken under NBC attack. Contingency plans are developed governing the restoration of control, reconstitution of combat units, and evacuation of personnel and equipment.

If an enemy force employs NBC weapons during any phase of the attack, Soviet forces are to take precautionary measures immediately. They don their protective gear, and continue their advance. They then perform a partial decontamination as soon as possible.

If a defending enemy force conducts a withdrawal, attacking units commence pursuit operations. Close contact during pursuit restricts a withdrawing enemy's use of NBC weapons since, in using them, he would endanger his own troops.

By 2000 hours today, all units must verify the supply and condition of their NBC equipment, to include individual protective clothing, reconnaissance instruments, decontamination equipment, and vehicle collective systems.

Following transit of contaminated areas, partial decontamination will be performed on order of the company commanders at the first halt.

If the enemy attacks our columns with NBC weapons, wounded personnel will be evacuated to the battalion medical point.

Destroyed vehicles and equipment should be moved to the side of the road. My deputy commander is in overall charge of all recovery operations following an NBC strike.

Prior to initiation of the march, a review is to be conducted with battalion personnel regarding actions on contaminated terrain and the conduct of partial decontamination.

Following an attack, subunits assemble as soon as possible for complete decontamination performed by chemical defense troops.

The Defense

Before occupying defensive positions, chemical reconnaissance squads survey the area and mark any contaminated sectors. Chemical observers are assigned to company and battalion command posts and to artillery firing positions. To attain reliable NBC protection, chemical observation posts of two or three observers are established throughout a defensive position at a ratio of one post for each 2 to 2.5 kilometers of defensive area. During bad weather, more chemical observation posts normally are set up. Observers periodically switch on their NBC detection instruments and make reports as prescribed in the commander's combat order.

If a defending force is subjected to a NBC attack, chemical reconnaissance squads determine the type

and intensity of contamination and mark contaminated sectors. Partial decontamination and first aid are performed, and defensive structure is reestablished.

Before a withdrawal, chemical reconnaissance patrols reconnoiter withdrawal routes, mark contaminated sectors, and establish bypass routes. Withdrawing main body forces travel over multiple routes and in dispersed formation for protection against enemy NBC attacks.

Recovery Operations

Commanders at all levels plan recovery operations to be undertaken in the event of NBC attacks. Recovery operations entail restoring control, reconnoitering the area of destruction, conducting rescue work to include repair of vehicles and evacuation of wounded, extinguishing fires, performing decontamination of

personnel and equipment, and forming new combat units from surviving ones and reinforcements.

Depending on the situation and availability of forces, recovery detachments are either formed from organic subunits or made available by higher headquarters. If formed from organic units, they normally come from the second echelon or reserve of a combat force. Regardless of origin, recovery detachments are established and receive a general mission before the conduct of an operation. The detachments usually include chemical reconnaissance, motorized rifle, engineer, medical, and vehicle repair personnel.

Following an NBC attack, the unit commander orders the implementation of recovery measures and gives the priority of their implementation. Chemical reconnaissance patrols are normally the first to reach the area of destruction. They determine the nature and intensity of contamination and mark contaminated

Actions Performed During Recovery Operations

IN THE EVENT OF ENEMY NUCLEAR ATTACK

AREA RECONNAISSANCE:	Determination of approach routes to locations of affected units; measurement of radiation levels. Determining degrees of destruction, presence of fires, and losses in manpower and equipment. Selection of evacuation routes and points for gathering sick and wounded and damaged equipment.
RESCUE WORK:	Determination of amount and sequence of rescue work. Finding wounded and sick and getting them out of damaged equipment and combat vehicles.
PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT EVACUATION:	Rendering first aid to wounded and sick. Removing them to collection points and evacuating them to the medical post. Evacuation of damaged equipment from the area.
DECONTAMINATION:	Decontamination of personnel, weapons, and equipment.

IN THE EVENT OF ENEMY CHEMICAL ATTACK

CHEMICAL RECONNAISSANCE:	Determination of type of toxic agent used by enemy and designation of boundaries of contaminated area. Selection of evacuation routes and areas for deployment of medical post and decontamination station.
RESCUE WORK:	Finding the injured, getting them out of combat vehicles and engineering equipment. Putting protective masks on wounded, administering first aid and chemical agent antidotes.
PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT EVACUATION:	Removal of wounded to medical post. Administration of antidotes as necessary. Preparing wounded personnel and unmanned equipment for evacuation.
DECONTAMINATION:	Decontamination of personnel and degasification of equipment and weapons.

sectors. The recovery detachment commander appoints new unit commanders to replace casualties. He selects locations for setting up a medical aid station, NBC contamination station, damaged-vehicle collection point, and an area for reconstituting units. He also designates routes for reinforcement and evacuation to and from the area. He then reports to his next higher commander on the situation and the measures taken. Meanwhile, engineers assigned to the damage control detachment clear rubble, extinguish fires, rescue personnel, and build temporary roads. Personnel and vehicles that are fit to return to duty are decontaminated first. The final step consists of forming new units and equipping them with weapons and combat vehicles. While the recovery detachment performs its mission, elements from a combat unit's second echelon or reserve that were not affected by the enemy NBC attack provide security by screening against any further enemy activity.

CONCLUSIONS

The Soviet Army is the best prepared force in the world to conduct both offensive and defensive NBC operations. Numbering 80,000 to 100,000 personnel,

chemical defense troops are capable of accomplishing a number of tasks in support of combat troops. They have a wide variety of dependable equipment which, for the most part, is in good supply. Individual items of equipment are adequate to protect from contamination for hours, days, or longer, depending on the nature and concentration of the contaminant. Antidotes provide protection from the effects of Soviet agents as well as those of Western countries. Agent detector kits and automatic alarms are available in adequate quantities and are capable of detecting all standard agents. Timely detection and warning of an attack, however, remain a problem.

Besides providing their troops with dependable protective equipment, the Soviets place heavy emphasis on individual NBC protective training which attempts to psychologically temper personnel to the demands of NBC warfare. Soviet troops are subjected to realistic and stressful situations while learning the technical skills needed to operate in NBC environments. Up-to-date instructional materials are widely available. Training is generally comprehensive and realistic. Individual protection, reconnaissance, and decontamination are all stressed.

GLOSSARY

ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AAA	antiaircraft artillery	EMP	electromagnetic pulse
AAG	army artillery group	ESM	electronic warfare support measures (US term)
AAICV	airborne amphibious infantry combat vehicle	FAC	forward air controller
ACRV	artillery command and reconnaissance vehicle	FEBA	forward edge of the battle area (US acronym used in this manual as the equivalent of the Soviet term "forward edge")
ACV	armored command vehicle	FOP	forward observation post
AGI	auxiliary intelligence gatherers	Frag-HE	fragmentation high-explosive round
AICV	amphibious infantry combat vehicle	FROG	free rocket over ground
AMRP	artillery mobile reconnaissance post	FS	fin-stabilized round
An-(no.)	Soviet designation for aircraft from Antonov design bureau	FSE	forward security element (of the Advance Guard)
APC-T	armor piercing capped tracer round	GAZ-(no.)	medium truck produced by Gorkiy Motor Vehicle Plant
API-T	armor piercing incendiary tracer round	GRU	general staff's main intelligence directorate
AP-T	armor piercing tracer round	HE	high-explosive round
APVO	Aviation of National Air Defense	HEAT	high-explosive antitank round
AS-(no.)	US designation for Soviet air-to-surface missile	HEI	high-explosive incendiary round
ASC	armored scout car	HEP	high-explosive plastic round
ASM	air-to-surface missile	HVAP	hyper-velocity armor piercing round
ASW	antisubmarine warfare	HVAPFSDS ..	hyper-velocity armor piercing fin-stabilized discarding Sabot round
AT-(no.)	US designation for Soviet antitank guided missile	IFV	infantry fighting vehicle
ATGM	antitank guided missile	Il-(no.)	Soviet designation for aircraft from Ilyushin design bureau
BAF	battalion assault force (naval infantry)	INA	information not available at the UNCLASSIFIED level
BVR	beyond-visual-range	IR	infrared
CBU	cluster bomb unit	IRBM	intermediate-range ballistic missile
CES	chief of engineer services	I-T	incendiary tracer round
CINC	commander-in-chief	KamAZ-(no.) .	medium truck produced by Kama River Motor Vehicle Plant
COMINT	communications intelligence (US term)	KGB	Committee for State Security
COP	command observation post	KrAZ-(no.)	heavy truck produced by Kremenchug Motor Vehicle Plant
CRP	combat reconnaissance patrol	LMG	light machinegun
CRTA	chief of rocket troops and artillery	LOC	line of communications
DAG	division artillery group	LOP	lateral observation post
DF	direction finding	LRA	long range aviation
DOI	date of introduction	LuAZ-(no.)	light truck produced by Lutsk Motor Vehicle Plant
DOSAAB	Voluntary Society of Assistance to the Army, Aviation, and Navy (premilitary training organization)	LZ	landing zone
OZ	drop zone		
ECM	electronic countermeasures		
ELINT	electronic intelligence (US term)		

MAZ-(no.)heavy truck produced by
 Minsk Motor Vehicle Plant
 MCLOSmanual-command-to-line-of-
 sight guidance
 Mi-(no.)Soviet designation for helicopter
 from Mil design bureau
 MiG-(no.)Soviet designation for aircraft
 from Mikoyan-Gurevich design
 bureau
 MOD..Ministry of Defense; Minister
 of Defense
 MOD..Mobile Obstacle Detachment
 (Engineer Element)
 MOPmobile observation post
 MPAMain Political Directorate
 MRBMmedium-range ballistic missile
 MRDmotorized rifle division
 MRLmultiple rocket launcher
 MRRmotorized rifle regiment
 MSDmovement support detachment
 (engineer element)
 MVDMinistry of Internal Affairs
 OMGoperational maneuver group
 POL..petroleum, oils, lubricants
 PPOprimary party organization
 PGMprecision-guided munitions
 PVO..air defense
 PWPplasticized white phosphorus
 RAGregimental artillery group
 RAP..rocket-assisted projectile
 RDF..radio direction finding
 REC.radioelectronic combat
 REGrepair and evacuation group
 rkhRussian abbreviation (literally:
 radio-chemical) used as suffix in
 Soviet designations for NBC
 reconnaissance vehicles
 RVGKReserve of the Supreme
 High Command
 SA-(no.)US designation for Soviet
 surface-to-air missile

SACLOSsemiautomatic-command-to-line-
 of-sight guidance
 SAMsurface-to-air missile
 shp..Shaft horsepower
 SLARside-looking airborne radar
 SPself-propelled
 SPAAGself-propelled antiaircraft gun
 SRBM..short-range ballistic missile
 SRF..strategic rocket forces
 SSspin-stabilized round
 SS-(no.)US designation for Soviet
 surface-to-surface missile
 SSMsurface-to-surface missile
 STOL..short takeoff and landing aircraft
 Su-(no.)Soviet designation for aircraft
 from Sukhoi design bureau
 TASMtactical air-to-surface missile
 TDtank division
 TELtransporter-erector-launcher
 TELARtransporter-erector-launcher-
 and-Radar
 TOP..technical observation point
 TRtank regiment
 Tu-(no.)Soviet designation for aircraft
 from Tupolev design bureau
 TVD..theater of military operations
 UAZ-(no.).....light truck produced by
 Ulyanovsk Motor Vehicle Plant
 Ural-(no.)medium truck produced by
 Ural Motor Vehicle Plant (not an
 acronym)
 UWunconventional warfare
 VOSOCentral Military Transportation
 Directorate
 VTAmilitary transport aviation
 VTOL..vertical takeoff and landing
 VVSSoviet Air Force
 WP..white phosphorus
 Yak-(no.)Soviet designation for aircraft
 from Yakovlev design bureau
 ZIL-(no.)medium truck from Likhachev
 Motor Vehicle Plant

NATO NICKNAMES**Air-To-Surface
Missiles**

KANGAROO, AS-3
 KELT, AS-5
 KERRY, AS-7
 KINGFISH, AS-6
 KIPPER, AS-2
 KITCHEN, AS-4

Aircraft

BACKFIRE, Tu-26
 BADGER, Tu-16
 BEAR, Tu-95
 BLACKJACK, Tu-7
 BLINDER, Tu-22
 BREWER, Yak-28
 CAMBER, Il-86
 CANDID, Il-76
 CLINE, An-32
 COALER, An-72
 COCK, An-22
 COOT, Il-18
 CUB, An-12
 CURL, An-26
 FARMER, MiG-19
 FENCER, Su-24
 FIREBAR B, Yak-28P
 FISHBED, MiG-21
 FITTER A, Su-7B
 FITTER C, Su-17
 FLANKER, Su-27
 FLOGGER B, MiG-23
 FLOGGER D, MiG-27
 FOXBAT, MiG-25
 FOXHOUND, MiG-31
 FRESCO, MiG-17
 FULCRUM, MiG-29

**Antitank Guided
Missiles**

SAGGER, AT-3
 SPANDREL, AT-5
 SPIGOT, AT-4
 SPIRAL, AT-6
 SWATTER, AT-2

Helicopters

HALO A, MI-26
 HARE, MI-1
 HARKE, MI-10, MI-10K
 HIND, MI-24
 HIP, MI-8
 HOMER, MI-12
 HOOK, MI-6
 HOPLITE, MI-2
 HOUND, MI-4

Radars

BIG FRED, MT-SON
 END TRAY, RMS-1
 FIRE CAN, SON-9, SON-9A
 FLAP WHEEL
 FLAT FACE, P-15
 GUN DISH
 LONG TROUGH
 PORK TROUGH
 PORK TROUGH 2, SNAR-6
 SMALL FRED, BMP-SON
 SMALL YAWN

**Surface-To-Air
Missiles**

GAINFUL, SA-6
 GAMMON, SA-5
 GANEF, SA-4
 GASKIN, SA-9
 GECKO, SA-8
 GOA, SA-3
 GRAIL, SA-7
 GUIDELINE, SA-2

**Surface-To-Surface
Missiles**

SCALEBOARD, SS-12
 SCUD A, SS-1b
 SCUD B, SS-1c

FM 100-2-1

16 JULY 1984

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

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General, United States Army
Chief of Staff

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